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States fundamentally depend on the cooperation of their citizens with the 
authorities. Citizens’ cooperation in matters of taxation is a particularly significant 
case in point. A sufficient level of tax compliance is required to allow states to fund 
essential public goods such as schools or hospitals. Various theories suggest that 
citizens’ cooperation with the authorities can be attained by at least two basic 
means: the recourse to enforcement and the fostering of trust (Kirchler, 2007; Alm & 
Torgler, 2011). 
Classical economic theory assumes that enforcement is an adequate means 
of effecting cooperation with the authorities. Based on the theory of the homo 
economicus, individuals are perceived as egoistic and rational utility maximizers who 
cooperate only if doing so promises a higher utility than non-cooperation (Becker, 
1968). Hence, a citizen would pay their taxes as required only if there is a high 
probability of being detected if they fail to do so and detected tax evasion carries a 
substantial penalty. Hence, the financial benefit of tax compliance is higher than that 
of tax evasion (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973). 
More recent research suggests that trust is crucial for cooperation, not only 
among individuals but also between individuals and the authorities (Goodsell, 2008; 
Levi & Stoker, 2000; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Trust is defined as the willingness to 
take risks and be vulnerable to the actions of another party (Mayer, Davis & 
Schnorman, 1995). Numerous empirical studies show that trust in the authorities—
including the tax authorities—increases the willingness of citizens to cooperate with 
them and pay their taxes as required (Feld & Frey, 2002; Torgler, Demir, Macintyre & 
Schaffner, 2008; Tyler & Degoey, 1996; van Dijk & Verboon, 2010). Consequently, 
numerous researchers and an increasing number of states and tax authorities 
emphasize the need, alongside the strengthening of enforcement measures, to 
foster trust in order to promote citizens’ cooperation in matters including taxation. 
The slippery slope framework combines insights from psychological and 
classical economic theory and integrates the most important determinants governing 
tax compliance in one coherent model (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl, 
2008). It suggests that the power of the authorities (i.e., the taxpayers’ perception 
that the authorities will detect and punish tax evasion) and trust in the authorities 
(i.e., the taxpayers’ perception that the authorities are benevolent and work for the 
common good) both play an important role in fostering tax compliance. However, 
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these two determinants are related to different motivational processes and different 
tax climates between authorities and taxpayers. 
The extended slippery slope framework (eSSF; Gangl, Hofmann & Kirchler, 
2015) focusses specifically on the interaction between power and trust. Drawing on 
an analysis of the interaction between differing kinds of power (i.e., coercive and 
legitimate power) and varying kinds of trust (i.e., reason-based and implicit trust), the 
eSSF explains (1) how tax cooperation develops; (2) how specific tax climates can 
be promoted and modified, and (3) how tax motivations (i.e., enforced compliance, 
voluntary cooperation, committed cooperation) can be fostered and adjusted. The 
eSSF suggests that all these various factors relating to power, trust, tax climates and 
tax motivations play a role in explaining and facilitating tax compliance and offers a 
clear account of measures the authorities can take to foster the trust and cooperation 
of the citizenry. 
The academic articles presented in the context of this Habilitation draw on the 
eSSF both directly and indirectly. In large part, they offer empirical analyses 
scrutinizing the validity of the eSSF’s assumptions. Yet those not directly engaged in 
this scrutiny too are stimulated, be it on the theoretical or empirical plane, by the 
eSSF, for instance, by drawing on its theoretical concepts and measurement scales 
to examine types of economic cooperation other than tax compliance.  
In what follows, I will first present a short outline of the eSSF. After that the 
distinct contribution of this cumulative Habilitation to research on trust and 
cooperation between public authorities and citizens is presented. 
1.1 The Extended Slippery Slope Framework (eSSF) 
The extended slippery slope framework conceptualizes the dynamic 
relationships between four key determinants of tax compliance: power, trust, tax 
climates, tax motivations. The eSSF defines power as the perceived ability of a party 
to influence another party’s behaviour based on coercive or legitimate power (French 
& Raven, 1959; Raven, Schwarzwald & Koslowsky, 1998; Tyler, 2003). The 
perceived ability of the authorities to enforce compliance with the help of rigorous 
audits and substantial fines is classified as coercive power. The authorities’ ability to 
persuade citizens to comply with the rules and regulations voluntarily on the basis of 
fair and legitimate procedures, expertise, information and a positive image qualifies 
as legitimate power. 
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The eSSF distinguishes between reason-based and implicit trust. This 
definition is based on the socio-cognitive trust model rooted in the differentiation 
between slow and fast cognitive processes (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Evans, 
2003). The concept of reason-based trust covers instances in which taxpayers 
choose to trust the authorities based on the evaluation of various criteria such as the 
pursuit of an important goal, perceived motivation, competence or benevolence, and 
the perception that external conditions (e.g., political backing) allow the authorities to 
work efficiently. The concept of implicit trust denotes an automatic trust reaction to 
associative learned stimuli such as signs that remind people of positive experiences 
in the past, a perceived shared identity or friendly faces. 
Drawing on research on regulation (Adler, 2001; Haslam & Fiske, 1999), the 
eSSF distinguishes between three basic tax climates characterizing the interaction 
and cooperation between tax authorities and taxpayers: the antagonistic, the service 
and the confidence climate. When the interaction between tax authorities and 
taxpayers is hostile and they work against each other like “cops and robbers”, the 
climate is antagonistic (Kirchler et al., 2008). The category of the service climate 
encompasses cases in which the tax authorities act as a service provider interacting 
professionally with taxpayers as clients on the basis of clear-cut bureaucratic 
procedures (new public management approaches are a case in point). In a 
confidence climate, mutual trust prevails. Tax authorities and taxpayers share the 
same values and cooperate as equal partners.  
The eSSF further distinguishes between three different kinds of tax motivation 
reflecting gradations between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000): 
enforced compliance, voluntary cooperation and committed cooperation. In the case 
of enforced compliance, taxpayers rationally consider the potential sanctions and 
pay their taxes as required only because they fear rigorous audits and substantial 
fines. In cases of voluntary cooperation, taxpayers pay their taxes as required 
because tax evasion would be more difficult and because they reciprocate to the tax 
authorities’ services. In cases of committed cooperation, taxpayers are personally 
convinced that paying their taxes as required is a moral obligation and the right thing 
to do. 
The eSSF thus provides a flexible instrument facilitating the analysis of how 
these various factors—power, trust, tax climates and tax motivations—interact in any 
given context and are likely to develop over time. Moreover, it generates detailed 
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conclusions as to how tax authorities can foster trust and tax compliance in specific 
contexts. One of its crucial insights is that the manner in which tax authorities deploy 
their power helps shape levels of trust and, consequently, the tax climate and tax 
motivations in any given setting. Figure 1 illustrates this mechanism. 
 
Figure 1: The development of tax climates and tax motivations according to the 
eSSF (adopted from Gangl, van Dijk, W., van Dijk, E. & Hofmann, 2020) 
 
While the tax authorities can indeed generate tax compliance by deploying 
coercive power, they do so at the cost of creating an antagonistic climate and 
enforced motivation. Rigorous controls and substantial sanctions raise tax 
compliance while concurrently decreasing implicit trust, provoking reactance and 
creating a hostile climate (Feld & Frey, 2007; Kramer, 1999). Compliance in an 
antagonistic climate relies on a vicious cycle of high levels of coercion leading to low 
implicit trust which, in turn, necessitates more coercion and so on.  
A combination of high levels of both coercive and legitimate power may break 
this vicious cycle by promoting reason-based trust, thus creating a service climate in 
which taxpayers are voluntarily cooperative. Reliance on legitimate power, based on 
voice and fair, transparent and democratically accountable procedures, allows 
taxpayers to place their trust in the contention that the tax authorities’ use of coercive 
power is underpinned by competence and good faith. Numerous empirical studies 
have demonstrated that the combination of coercive and legitimate procedures can 
foster trust and cooperation with the authorities (Mooijman, Van Dijk, Van Dijk & 
Ellemers, 2017; Tyler, 2011; Wenzel, 2003). Thus, the combination of coercive and 
legitimate power leads to a service climate in which taxpayers pay taxes in response 
to professional services. 
Over time, positive experiences with legitimate power in a service climate can 
foster the emergence of implicit trust and help create a confidence climate. If the tax 
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authorities enjoy a sustained good reputation, reasoned trust can turn to implicit 
trust. Legitimate power commands taxpayers’ implicit trust and results in their paying 
their taxes as a matter of course. Conversely, the tax authorities trust the taxpayers 
and see their role in helping taxpayers comply. 
Confidence climates are put at risk by the authorities’ use of coercive power. 
In a high-trust relationship of this kind, the deployment of massive coercive power is 
perceived as a betrayal of trust (Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2013) and likely to 
transform a confidence climate into an antagonistic climate. The eSSF postulates 
that only the combination of low levels of coercive power with high levels of 
legitimate power can maintain a confidence climate by assuring taxpayers of the 
authorities’ good faith. 
The eSSF thus offers a holistic theoretical tool facilitating predictions as to 
how the tax authorities can build, maintain and maximize taxpayer trust and 
compliance. It thereby makes many theoretical contributions and renders a range of 
practical recommendations.  
2. Trust and Cooperation Between Public Authorities and the Citizens 
This cumulative Habilitation makes an interdisciplinary contribution to the 
fields of applied social and economic psychology, economics and administrative 
studies and, more specifically, to research on trust and cooperation between public 
authorities and citizens. It comprises twelve peer-reviewed articles published in 
leading international journals. The journals in question either rank in the top quartile 
(Q1) of social psychology journals (e.g., the Journal of Social Issues and Policy 
Review and the Journal of Political Psychology) or count among the most important 
outlets for research in the field of economic psychology (e.g., the Journal of 
Economic Psychology and Economic Letters). I closely collaborated with renowned 
international colleagues from a range of disciplines (including psychology, 
economics, law, and management studies), in writing all twelve articles, acting as 
first author for eight of them. The articles fall into three categories.  
The first category comprises seven articles that test the theoretical 
assumptions of the extended Slippery Slope Framework (eSSF; Gangl et al., 2015) 
which was theoretically developed by me and my colleagues while working on my 
PhD thesis. In these articles a variety of empirical methods is applied such as 
incentivized laboratory tax experiments (Gangl, van Dijk, W., van Dijk, E. & 
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Hofmann, 2020; Hartl, Hofmann, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthalter & Kirchler, 2015; 
Hofmann, Hartl, Gangl., Hartner-Tiefenthalter & Kirchler, 2017), neuro-physiological 
experiments (Gangl, Pfabigan, Lamm, & Kirchler, 2017), online experiments (Gangl, 
van Dijk et al., 2020; Hofmann et al., 2017), online surveys (Gangl, Hofmann, de 
Groot, Antonides, Goslinga, Hartl, & Kirchler, 2015; Gangl, Hofmann, Hartl, & 
Berkics, 2020) or qualitative interviews with taxpayers and tax officers (Gangl, Hartl, 
Hofmann & Kirchler, 2019). Alongside their contribution to the validation of the eSSF, 
these articles also deepen our understanding of the effects of coercive and legitimate 
power on trust in public authorities and tax cooperation, of the relationship between 
tax motivations and tax compliance, of the extent to which self-employed taxpayers 
and tax officials rely on eSSF concepts, and of the means required to either sustain 
or regain a confidence climate. 
The second category comprises three articles addressing other specific 
aspects of tax compliance. The article on the effect of close supervision on 
taxpayers’ tax compliance (Gangl, Torgler, Kirchler & Hofmann, 2014) draws on a 
field experiment. The article on the effect of patriotism on tax compliance (Gangl, 
Torgler & Kirchler, 2016) draws on several online experiments. The third of these 
articles is an extensive review focusing on the tax compliance of the wealthy and 
policy instruments likely to increase their tax compliance (Gangl & Torgler, 2020). 
The third category comprises two articles on aspects of trust and cooperation 
in the economic sphere more generally. The first article examines associations 
between trust in public institutions (e.g., the police or government) and trust between 
individuals (Spadaro, Gangl, Van Prooijen, Van Lange & Mosso, 2020). The second 
article presents a measurement instrument designed to assess a cooperative and 
ethical business culture (Tanner, Gangl & Witt, 2019). 
 
2.1 Articles Comprising the Habilitation 
Empirical Validation of the Extended Slippery Slope Framework 
[1] Gangl, K., Pfabigan, D., Lamm, C., Kirchler, E., & Hofmann, E. (2017). 
Coercive and legitimate authority impact tax honesty. Evidence from 
behavioral and ERP experiments. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 12(7), 1108-1117, https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsx029  
[2] Hartl, B., Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M., & Kirchler, E. 
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(2015). Does the description of a tax authority affect tax evasion? – The 
impact of displayed coercive and legitimate power. PLoS ONE, 10(4), 
article e0123355, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0123355  
[3] Hofmann, E., Hartl, B., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M., & Kirchler, E. 
(2017). Authorities’ coercive and legitimate power: The impact on 
cognitions underlying cooperation. Frontiers in Psychology, 8(5), 1-15, 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00005  
[4] Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., Hartl, B., & Berkics, M. (2020). The impact of 
powerful authorities and trustful taxpayers: Evidence for the extended 
slippery slope framework from Austria, Finland and Hungary. Policy 
Studies, 41(1), 98-111, https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2019.1577375  
[5] Gangl, K., van Dijk, W., van Dijk, E. & Hofmann, E. (2020). Building versus 
maintaining a perceived confidence-based tax climate: Experimental 
evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 81, article 102310, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2020.102310 
[6] Gangl, K., Hartl, B., Hofmann, E., Kirchler, E. (2019). The relationship 
between Austrian tax auditors and self-employed taxpayers: Evidence from 
a qualitative study. Frontiers in Psychology, 10(1034), 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01034 
[7] Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., de Groot, M., Antonides, G., Goslinga, S., Hartl, 
B., & Kirchler, E. (2015). Taxpayers’ motivations relate to tax compliance: 
Evidence from two representative samples of Austrian and Dutch self-
employed taxpayers. Journal of Tax Administration, 1, 15-25, 
http://jota.website/article/view/45 
Other Specific Aspects of Tax Compliance 
[8] Gangl, K., Torgler, B., Kirchler, E., & Hofmann, E. (2014). Effects of 
supervision on tax compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Austria. 
Economic Letters, 123, 378-382, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.027  
[9] Gangl, K., Torgler, B., & Kirchler, E. (2016). Patriotism’s impact on 
cooperation with the state: An experimental study on tax compliance. 
Political Psychology, 37, 867-881, https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12294 
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[10] Gangl. K., & Torgler, B. (2020). Tax compliance by the wealthy: A review 
of the literature and agenda for research. Social Issues and Policy Review, 
14(1), 108-151, https://doi.org/10.1111/sipr.12065  
Aspects of Trust and Cooperation in the Economic Sphere more Generally 
[11] Spadaro, G., Gangl, K., Van Prooijen, J.W., Van Lange, P.A.M., Mosso, 
C.O. (2020). Enhancing feelings of security: How trustworthy state 
institutions promote interpersonal trust. PlosOne,15(9), article 0237934, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237934  
[12] Tanner, C., Gangl., K., & Witt, N. (2019). The German ethical culture 
scale (GECS): Development and first construct testing. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 10(1667), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01667 
2.1 Summary of the Articles by Category 
2.1.1 Empirical Validation of the Extended Slippery Slope Framework 
The first five articles test various assumptions of the eSSF concerning the 
deployment of coercive and legitimate power by tax authorities empirically and 
contribute to a better understanding of the two main means with which tax authorities 
seek to ensure tax compliance: the proverbial carrot and stick. The sixth article 
examines the extent to which taxpayers’ and tax officials’ actual assumptions about 
tax compliance correspond to the eSSF’s concepts. The seventh article analyses the 
relationship between tax motivations and tax compliance. 
Article 1. By examining the basic cognitive characteristics of coercive and 
legitimate power based on a neurophysiological ERP experiment, this article 
contributes to a better understanding of what motivates taxpayers to cooperate with 
the tax authorities. It presents the results of two incentivized laboratory tax 
experiments in which coercive power and legitimate power were manipulated in a 
between- and within-subject design based on scenarios in order to test the effect on 
tax payments, enforced compliance, voluntary cooperation, rational decision-making, 
decision-making times and ERP potentials. In this instance, voluntary cooperation 
was assessed with scales from the TAX-I (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010). This concept of 
voluntary cooperation is assessed in a manner similar to committed cooperation in 
the eSSF. In the scenarios, participants were asked to imagine they were self-
employed and paying taxes on the income generated in this capacity in a fictitious 
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country. The likelihood that the audits of the tax authorities of this fictitious country 
would detect tax evasion was given as fifteen per cent. In cases of detected tax 
evasion, participants would be required to pay the tax they had withheld and the 
same amount again as a fine. Participants knew that their behaviour in a randomly 
chosen tax round at the end of the experiment would determine their final 
remuneration for participation. They were randomly assigned to two possible 
scenarios. The tax authorities were described as relying predominantly either on 
rigorous audits and substantial fines (coercive power) or on legitimacy-based 
procedures and the provision of services (legitimate power). The actual behaviour of 
the fictitious tax authorities (e.g., the frequency of tax audits) did not vary, however. 
After paying taxes over 40 rounds while constantly being reminded of the tax 
authorities’ reliance on coercive or legitimate power, respectively, participants 
completed a questionnaire using scales measuring enforced and voluntary 
compliance, rational decision-making and reactance in complying with the tax 
authorities. Subsequently, before embarking on another 40 rounds, in order to create 
balanced conditions, participants were told that, due to a change in government, the 
tax regime would switch from prioritizing legitimate power to relying principally on 
coercive power or vice versa. In addition, decision times were assessed in 
experiment 1 and ERPs (i.e., P2, MFN) in experiment 2. 
The results of experiment 1 indicated that recourse to coercive power led to a 
lower level of tax payments, a higher degree of enforced compliance, less voluntary 
cooperation, more rational decision-making and more reactance than reliance on 
legitimate power. Also, tax decisions tended to be taken more quickly in the face of 
coercive rather than legitimate power. In experiment 2, the deployment of coercive 
power led again to a higher degree of enforced compliance, less voluntary 
cooperation and more reactance than recourse to legitimate power. There was no 
differential in terms of the actual level of tax payments or the relative extent of 
rational decision-making. Importantly, experiment 2 also showed that P2 amplitudes 
were more, and MFN amplitudes less, pronounced in the face of coercive rather than 
legitimate power. Based on previous ERP experiments on decision-making, the P2 
variation suggests that reliance on legitimate power is more likely than recourse to 
coercive power to heighten arousal. The MFN variation suggests that the use of 
legitimate power precipitates an increased response conflict, likely resulting from the 
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moral pressure associated with the need to negotiate possible contradictions 
between communal and individual benefits. 
In conclusion, the data from the questionnaires completed at the end of both 
experiments bear out the assumptions of the eSSF: while recourse to coercive 
power generates enforced compliance and reactance, reliance on legitimate power 
fosters voluntary cooperation. Whether the authorities rely on coercive or legitimate 
power does not ultimately affect the actual level of tax payments, both ensure 
compliance. Importantly, the decision-time and ERP results suggest that while 
recourse to coercive power generates a simple stimulus-response reaction, reliance 
on legitimate power precipitates a complex moral conflict on the issue of whether to 
cooperate. Consequently, conventional assumptions regarding the effect of coercive 
power that initially fed into the eSSF needed to be revised. These findings suggest 
that coercive power may not in fact owe its effect to rational calculations in terms of 
the potential benefits or disadvantages but, rather, to an automatic response to the 
stimulus coercion. 
Article 2. This article presents the results of four experiments undertaken to 
assess the respective impact of coercive and legitimate power on tax compliance 
and compare the effect of either in isolation as well as a combination of both. 
Building on the methodological approach outlined in the summary of the first article, 
we undertook four complex laboratory tax experiments based on scenarios in which 
the participants were again self-employed taxpayers confronted with tax authorities 
that prioritized either coercive or legitimate power or a combination of both. 
Experiment 1 examined the impact of the actual audit probability and the perceived 
deployment of coercive and legitimate power on tax payments. We undertook this 
experiment in order to test the assumption that, contrary to the claims of traditional 
neo-classical theories regarding tax evasion, not (only) the actual (audit probability) 
but the perceived form of power exercised by the tax authorities (coercive or 
legitimate) too influences the level of tax payments. While classical economic 
theories have acknowledged the significance of actual audits and fines they have 
dismissed the relevance of the way in which audits and fines are perceived. The 
results of experiment 1 bore out our assumption that, while actual differences in audit 
probability have very little effect on the level of tax payments, the perceived levels of 
coercive or legitimate power do impact them. Experiment 2 manipulated low versus 
high levels of coercive power in a between- and a within-subject design. The results 
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demonstrated that high levels of coercive power precipitate a higher level of tax 
payments than low levels of coercive power, and that the sequence of experiencing 
low versus high levels of coercive power has no effect on the outcome. Experiment 3 
manipulated low versus high levels of legitimate power in a between- and a within-
subject design. The results showed that an increase in the level of legitimate power 
precipitates an increase in the level of tax payments. In this case too, the sequence 
of experiencing low versus high levels of legitimate power made no difference. 
Experiment 4 tested low versus high levels of coercive power in combination with low 
versus high levels of legitimate power in a between- and a within-subject design. The 
results confirmed the findings of the previous two experiments, underscoring that 
increases in the levels of coercive and legitimate power lead to increases in tax 
compliance independently of each other. This theoretical insight is also of 
considerable practical importance in that it clarifies that the tax authorities can take 
recourse to both coercive and legitimate power to effect cooperation.  
Article 3. The third article investigates the cognitive effects that are elicited by 
coercive and legitimate power, respectively, and examines the extent to which these 
effects, in turn, influence tax payment levels. We set out to test the extent to which 
recourse to coercive and legitimate power, respectively, elicit implicit or reason-
based trust and engender perceptions of the tax climate as antagonistic or service-
oriented and of compliance as enforced or voluntary. The article reports four 
experiments, whereby experiment 1-3 were the same experiments as presented in 
article 2. However, other dependent variables than in article 2 were analyzed. 
Experiment 1 bore out the assumption of the eSSF that an increase in the level of 
coercive power precipitates a decrease in the level of implicit trust and contributes to 
a more antagonistic climate and a greater sense of enforced compliance. It also 
demonstrated that the impact of high levels of coercive power on taxpaying 
intentions is immediate (i.e., not mediated). Experiment 2 bore out the assumption of 
the eSSF that high levels of legitimate power have a positive impact on reason-
based trust and the perception that the tax climate is service-oriented and taxpayers’ 
cooperation voluntary. In this case, reason-based trust mediates the effect of 
legitimate power on taxpaying intentions. Experiment 3 compared the impact of low 
versus high levels of coercive and legitimate power in combination and largely 
confirmed the results of the first two experiments. However, in this case, the coercive 
power deployed had no negative effect on implicit trust. Experiment 4 utilized an 
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experimental questionnaire and used a 2 (low versus high levels of coercive power) 
by 2 (low versus high levels of legitimate power) design to examine whether the 
eSSF’s assumptions also hold in another context, in this case, that of insurance 
fraud. It transpired that while higher levels of coercive power increased the 
perception of an antagonistic climate and enforced compliance, they again had no 
negative impact on implicit trust. Higher levels of legitimate power had a positive 
impact on reason-based trust and the perception that the climate was service-
oriented and cooperation voluntary.  
In conclusion, the experiments presented in this article largely confirm the 
assumptions of the eSSF about the impact of the recourse to coercive and legitimate 
power on trust, tax climates, tax motivation and tax compliance. Moreover, we were 
able to demonstrate that the eSSF’s assumptions are also applicable to fields of 
economic decision-making other than tax compliance (such as insurance fraud). 
However, the assumed negative relationship between coercive power and implicit 
trust was only partly confirmed. These findings are all of considerable importance to 
a better understanding of various psychological mechanisms that affect tax 
compliance. 
Article 4. The fourth article presents the results of a study drawing on survey 
data pertaining to taxpayers in Austria, Hungary, and Finland. While the participants 
in the previous laboratory experiments were students, our principal aim with this 
study was to test the assumptions of the eSSF on a heterogeneous sample of actual 
taxpayers. The study demonstrated that perceived recourse to coercive power was 
related to lower levels of implicit trust and thereby indirectly also to less pronounced 
tax compliance intentions. Perceived reliance on legitimate power was directly and 
indirectly (via reason-based trust) related to more pronounced tax compliance 
intentions. The positive correlation between implicit trust and tax compliance 
intentions was mediated, as the assumptions of the eSSF suggested, via a 
perceived confidence climate and committed cooperation. In conclusion, we were 
able to demonstrate that the eSSF can account not only for the tax behaviour of 
students in a laboratory setting but also for “real” taxpayers’ tax compliance 
intentions. However, contrary to the eSSF’s assumptions, this study registered no 
positive correlation between the use of coercive power and tax compliance. 
Article 5. The research presented in this article focussed specifically on the 
eSSF’s assumption that a combination of coercive and legitimate power can facilitate 
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the move from an antagonistic to a confidence climate, on the one hand, but erodes 
an existing confidence climate, on the other. This is an important assumption, given 
that the existing literature suggests that the combination of coercive and legitimate 
power is always suited to foster trust. Article 5 was based on an online experiment 
with taxpayers and an incentivized laboratory experiment with students. Participants 
were first asked to imagine they were self-employed taxpayers in either an 
antagonistic or confidence-based climate. Having paid their taxes for several years, 
they were informed that the government had changed and they would henceforth be 
facing a combination of low versus high levels of coercive power and low versus high 
levels of legitimate power. The results of both experiments supported the 
assumptions of the eSSF by demonstrating that the combination of coercive and 
legitimate power increases trust and a confidence climate, provided it was preceded 
by an antagonistic climate. By contrast, when preceded by a confidence climate, the 
same combination of coercive and legitimate power reduces trust and a confidence 
tax climate. Results showed as expected that the confidence climate was only 
maintained by the combination of low coercive power with high legitimate power. 
While only one of these experiments demonstrated both a negative correlation 
between coercive power and the level of implicit trust and a positive correlation 
between coercive power and the level of tax cooperation, the recourse to legitimate 
power precipitated higher levels of reason-based trust and tax compliance in both 
experiments. These are important theoretically and practically relevant findings 
underscoring that the means the authorities need to deploy to attain trust differ from 
those required to sustain trust. The combination of high levels of both coercive and 
legitimate power serves to increase trust when preceded by an antagonistic tax 
climate but has the opposite effect in an already existing high-trust situation (i.e., a 
confidence climate). 
Article 6. This article presents the results of in-depth interviews with 33 self-
employed taxpayers and 30 experienced tax officials. It transpired that the 
explanations interviewees offered to explain their decision to pay taxes or motivate 
tax compliance, both in terms of their considerations and the situational factors 
influencing their decisions, closely matched the assumptions of the eSSF. In 
addition, new conceptual sub-categories emerged. These included the setting of 
deadlines as a means of exerting coercive power and personal support as a factor 
that increases implicit trust in the tax authorities. We also identified varying types of 
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tax compliance. These included stalling behaviour and the intentional creation of 
complexity in tax documents. Alongside the practical importance of its structured 
holistic survey of actual practices and perceptions at the coal face and their 
relevance to, and impact on, actual and perceived tax compliance, the significance of 
this article rests on the new research hypotheses it generated. 
Article 7. The research presented in this article subjected three tax 
motivations outlined by the eSSF—enforced compliance (i.e., willingness to pay 
one’s taxes for fear of audits and fines), voluntary cooperation (i.e., willingness to 
pay one’s taxes in reciprocation of the tax authorities’ services) and committed 
cooperation (i.e., willingness to pay one’s taxes out of a genuine sense of duty)—and 
their relationship to tax compliance. It draws on data from two representative 
samples of entrepreneurs in Austria and the Netherlands. Contrary to our 
expectations, we discovered a negative correlation between enforced compliance 
and tax compliance. Moreover, it transpired that voluntary cooperation did not 
translate into tax compliance. On the other hand, the research bore out our 
assumption of a positive correlation between committed cooperation and tax 
compliance. This suggests that high levels of tax compliance depend on committed 
cooperation, i.e., on taxpayers being willing to pay their taxes out of a genuine sense 
of personal duty. This has fundamental theoretical implications. Should these 
outcomes be confirmed by follow-up studies, the eSSF would need to be 
reconfigured to prioritize committed over enforced compliance or voluntary 
cooperation as a prerequisite for high levels of tax compliance. 
 
2.2.2 Other Specific Aspects of Tax Cooperation 
Although the next three articles address other specific aspects of tax 
compliance not directly related to the eSSF, they too have benefited from the 
research on the eSSF, either on a methodological plane or through the use of scales 
developed to test eSSF concepts. These articles make important contributions to the 
field of tax psychology by using innovative new methods such as field experiments 
(Article 8), by investigating assumptions about the relevance of patriotism to tax 
compliance (Article 9), and by reviewing research on one of the most pressing 
problems in the field, the high rate of tax avoidance among the wealthy (Article 10). 
Article 8. This article presents the results of a field experiment in which 
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recently established firms were exposed either to the tax authorities’ standard 
treatment (i.e., no personal contact between tax authorities and taxpayers) or their 
close supervision. In the second case, the firms were regularly contacted and 
monitored by tax officials who informed and reminded them of their tax liabilities in a 
friendly and supportive manner. It transpired that the closely supervised firms were 
more likely to pay the taxes they owed but less likely to do so on time. In the article, 
we discuss possible reasons for the fact that the close supervision backfired in terms 
of getting the firms to pay their taxes on time. It may be that supervised firms 
concluded that they did not need to pay much attention to the due dates since tax 
officials would call and remind them anyway, while those who were not supervised 
may have been more worried about the presumed negative consequences of 
missing the deadlines. As one of the first field experiments undertaken in the field of 
tax compliance, and by demonstrating that the close supervision and monitoring of 
taxpayers can backfire, at least in part, this article made an important theoretical 
contribution to the field. 
Article 9. This article presented research undertaken to determine whether 
patriotism is causally connected to tax compliance. Numerous surveys have reported 
a positive correlation between patriotism and tax compliance, but very few 
experiments have been conducted to test for a causal connection. There is, 
however, a snare. Social-identity theory suggests that the promotion of patriotism 
(i.e., of identification with, and positive emotions towards, one’s own group) might 
also foster nationalism (i.e., the view that one’s own country should dominate and 
discriminate against other countries and their citizens). In this case, the increase in 
nationalism would cancel out the beneficial effect of patriotism on tax compliance. 
Ordinarily, tax authorities would want to refrain from eliciting patriotism if doing so 
would also generate or increase (radical) nationalism. Relying on survey data, we 
initially demonstrated an indirect correlation, mediated by reason-based trust and/or 
voluntary cooperation, between national and local patriotism as well as nationalism, 
on the one hand, and tax compliance, on the other. In this instance, we again 
assessed voluntary cooperation using the scales from the TAX-I (Kirchler & Wahl, 
2010). We then undertook three online tax experiments drawing on participants living 
in Austria whom we recruited through the economic discussion forums of certain 
newspapers. 
In experiment 1, participants presented with the flag of the country (i.e., 
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Austria) whose nationals they were subsequently displayed higher levels of national 
patriotism, reason-based trust, voluntary cooperation and tax compliance than their 
counterparts who had been shown a fictitious flag. However, the Austrian flag 
marginally also lead to more nationalism. In experiment 2, in order to prime their 
national patriotism, participants were asked to write down what they liked versus 
disliked about their lives in Austria. The national patriotic versus national non-
patriotic priming increased reason-based trust and in turn voluntary cooperation and 
tax compliance; no relevant influence on nationalism was found. In experiment 3, 
participants were shown images of either Austrian or Australian landscapes which 
elicited high versus low local patriotism. Also, the local versus foreign landscapes 
directly and indirectly (via voluntary cooperation) increased tax compliance; no 
relevant effect on nationalism was found. Results thus show that national or local 
patriotism can be elicited without simultaneously fostering nationalism. In addition, 
article 9 promoted our understanding of the causal mechanisms that result in the 
positive correlation between patriotism and tax compliance. 
Article 10. This article presents a review of existing literature on the tax 
compliance of the wealthy undertaken in order to demonstrate the need for further 
psychological research in this specific area and to develop initial ideas for a tailored 
approach suited to increase the tax compliance of the wealthy. Given that it fosters 
social inequality and reduces the ability of states to respond to challenges such as 
the climate crisis, tax evasion and avoidance among the wealthy is one of the most 
important problems of our time. The review begins with an outline of the history of 
taxing the wealthy, from the emergence of agricultural societies to the current 
globalized financial market that helps facilitate tax avoidance by wealthy individuals 
and large corporations. This is followed by the presentation of empirical research 
demonstrating that wealthy taxpayers tend to be less tax compliant than average 
taxpayers. We then discuss the political and economic conditions (macro level), the 
social contextual factors (meso level) and the individual variations (micro level) that 
likely explain the lower tax compliance among the wealthy in psychological terms. 
A number of policy proposals tailored specifically to the issue in hand emerge 
from this review. At the micro, meso and macro levels alike, both coercive and 
legitimacy-based nuanced measures are required. On the macro level, states need 
to create stricter, more coercive legal environments, specialized revenue bodies and 
tailored marketing campaigns. On the meso level, tax practitioners need to be 
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regulated more rigorously and a range of reputational and participatory mechanisms 
need to be introduced. On the micro-level, tax auditors need to be well trained, able 
to respond flexibly to individuals’ personal motivation and willing to treat taxpayers 
with seriousness and respect. The research also suggests that the wealthy are 
particularly likely to react negatively to coercive power, given that they have the 
financial and psychological resources at their disposal to fight the tax authorities and 
evade sanctions. Conversely, legitimate power exercised by specialized revenue 
bodies that maintain personal contact and allow for more taxpayer participation 
would likely enhance tax compliance among the wealthy. By laying the conceptual 
groundwork and making specific suggestions for further research required to 
underpin the authorities’ efforts to combat one of the major challenges of our time, 
the extreme tax avoidance among the wealthy, this article makes a crucial 
contribution to the field. 
 
2.2.3 Aspects of Trust and Cooperation in the Economic Sphere more Generally 
The final two articles deal with aspects of trust and cooperation in the 
economic sphere more generally. One of them makes a theoretical contribution to 
the better understanding of how the authorities impact trust between individuals, the 
other makes an important practical contribution by developing a psychological 
measure for the assessment of how ethical the climate in an organization is, which 
should, in turn, encourage enhanced compliance with ethical rules. 
Article 11. This article presents research undertaken in order to explore 
whether and how the authorities can influence interpersonal trust (i.e., mutual trust 
among citizens). It has long been accepted that mutual trust between citizens 
enhances their trust in public institutions. Whether institutions can also help foster 
mutual trust between citizens, by contrast, has been a matter of considerable 
controversy. Drawing on data from three complementary sub-studies, we concluded 
that citizens’ trust in public institutions can indeed foster interpersonal trust, provided 
the institutions are able to enhance the citizens’ sense of security. Individuals are 
more likely to take the risk of trusting another unknown individual if they are 
confident that a trustworthy institution would step in and protect them if necessary. 
The first study focussed on survey data from Italy assessing participants’ attitudes 
towards five public institutions including the police and the government. Results 
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showed that trust in Italian institutions is related to general trust in Italian citizens via 
feelings of security (e.g., the feeling that one can count on public institutions if 
anything happens). The second study analysed data from the European Social 
Survey covering 16 countries and indicated that institutional trust is related to 
interpersonal trust via the feeling of being safe when walking alone after dark. Study 
3 was an incentivized experiment in which participants were led to believe they were 
playing a trust game with a partner from a country whose police forces were either 
trustworthy or not. Participants who assumed they were playing with a partner from a 
country with trustworthy police forces felt more secure, were more likely to trust their 
partner, and willing to send them more money than participants who assumed they 
were playing with someone from a country with untrustworthy police forces. The 
finding that there is a causal mechanism form trusting institutions to interpersonal 
trust and not (just) vice versa that interpersonal trust impacts instructional trust is an 
extremely important theoretical and practical relevant contribution. 
Article 12. This article presents a psychological scale for the assessment of 
how ethical the culture in any given organization is: the German Ethical Culture 
Scale (GECS). It is widely accepted that the compliance with ethical rules 
presupposes an ethical organizational culture. The GECS was a desideratum 
because there was previously no German-language scale that integrated important 
determinants of ethical conduct (e.g., ethical goal setting) in a theoretically 
satisfactory manner. The article frames the issue in terms of a theoretical 
differentiation between compliance factors (i.e., those that deter ethical misconduct) 
and integrity factors (i.e., those that facilitate ethical conduct). Compliance factors 
include (1) controlling, (2) sanctioning, (3) clarity of rules (4) avoidance of rule 
defectiveness and (5) rule viability. Integrity factors include (perceived) high levels of 
(6) accountability and (7) leaders’ role modelling, on the one hand, and (perceived) 
low levels of (8) pressure to compromise, (9) obedience and (10) ill-conceived goals, 
on the other. The GECS was developed on the basis of three studies.  
In study 1, a preliminary pool of items was generated based on a literature 
search and presented to a sample of Swiss employees. Results based on an 
exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) allowed us to reduce the 
number of items and develop an initial factor structure. In study 2, some of the 
factors were adapted slightly and new factors (based on input from practitioners) 
introduced before conducting another CFA based on a sample from Germany; 
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importantly, criterion validity was established by examining how the factors relate to 
“observed ethical misconduct”. The results of these studies allowed us to generate 
the final set of items that constitute the GECS, confirming that variance in the 
application of the ten aforementioned factors correlated to, and explained, variance 
in observed misconduct above and beyond that explained by formal factors such as 
the non/existence of a code of conduct or ethics help-line. Study 3 drew on a Swiss 
and German sample and was designed to establish construct validity. The study also 
demonstrated, inter alia, that the composite integrity factor increased autonomous 
work motivation whereas the composite compliance factor decreased it. 
By providing the first validated German-language instrument of its kind, this 
article makes an important practical contribution, helping organizations to identify 
and prioritize factors that help avoid misconduct and facilitate ethical conduct. This 
latter, crucial distinction between compliance and integrity factors is of theoretical 
significance to the assessment of ethical organizational culture. 
 
3. Conclusion 
This cumulative Habilitation makes a substantial theoretical as well as 
practical contribution to our knowledge of how trust and cooperation can be fostered 
between the authorities and the citizenry. In particular, it focusses on ways in which 
the authorities can encourage the citizens to trust them, and each other, in order to 
enhance citizens’ cooperation, principally in the field of tax compliance but also in 
other areas. While the articles are generally based on, or draw on, the theoretical 
model of the eSSF, they also utilize a range of other methods to validate theoretical 
assumptions and pay concurrent attention to both conceptual and practical concerns. 
For the most part, the empirical investigations confirm the assumptions of the 
eSSF. There were, however, a few exceptions in terms of the functionality of 
coercive power and enforced compliance. The notion of a negative correlation 
between recourse to coercive power and implicit trust, and a positive correlation 
between reliance on coercive power and tax compliance, was not borne out by all of 
the studies (see, Gangl, Hartl et al., 2020; Gangl, van Dijk et al., 2020; Hofmann et 
al., 2017). One of the studies also revealed a negative correlation between enforced 
cooperation and tax compliance (Gangl, Hofmann et al., 2015). This suggests that 
not all kinds of power, climate or motivation are equally capable of fostering tax 
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cooperation. In this respect, legitimate power seems to be superior to coercive 
power. Not only does its use increase reason-based trust, the perception of dealing 
with a service- and/or confidence-based climate and committed tax cooperation. Its 
impact on tax compliance is also more stable than that of coercive power (Gangl et 
al., 2017; Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2017). Importantly, high-trust 
constellations (such as a perceived confidence climate) can be maintained only by 
combining a substantial measure of legitimate power with a low level of coercive 
power (Gangl, van Dijk et al., 2020). Thus, although coercive power is seen as 
necessary by taxpayers and tax officers (Gangl et al., 2019) the present Habilitation 
experiments indicate that its effects on trust depends on contextual factors. It matters 
whether it is combined with reliance on legitimate power or not, and its efficacy 
varies by existing tax climate. Further research is required to expand our knowledge 
regarding the efficient recourse to coercive power. One of the great benefits of the 
research undertaken on the basis of the eSSF is its ability to render clear-cut 
practical recommendations for the tax authorities, urging them to foster cooperation 
based on legitimate power, services, fair procedures, personal support and, more 
generally, a mindset geared to the goal of helping taxpayers comply rather than the 
detection of non-compliance. 
The articles investigating other specific aspects of tax compliance have also 
generated pioneering theoretical insights and helped set the relevant research 
agenda. By elucidating the causal mechanism that allows patriotism to influence tax 
compliance (Gangl et al., 2016) this research is likely to generate further studies on 
how patriotism might be elicited (without fostering radical nationalism) in order to 
enhance cooperation with the authorities. The review article concerning the 
(deficient) tax compliance among the wealthy in particular will fuel future research. It 
has provided a comprehensive overview of psychological distinctions between 
wealthy and average taxpayers and outlined psychological measures potentially 
suited to increase wealthy taxpayers’ compliance (Gangl & Torgler, 2020). Further 
qualitative interview studies, survey studies, online experiments and field 
experiments are required to enhance our understanding of how wealthy taxpayers 
might be motivated to be more compliant. Research on the impact of tax policies on 
distinct groups of taxpayers is in any case a notable desideratum. It should focus not 
only on differing levels of income and wealth but also on factors such as taxpayers’ 
political orientation or (where applicable) migrant background. 
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The final two articles focussing on aspects of trust and cooperation in the 
economic sphere more generally have added substantive new insights to the 
literature on institutional and social trust by showing that the authorities can foster 
trust and cooperation between citizens by giving them a sense of security (Spadaro 
et al., 2020). A range of laboratory or field experiments should test this hypothesis 
further. The German Ethical Culture Scale (GECS) is the first German-language 
instrument of its kind and will play a prominent role in allowing enterprises and 
institutions in the DACH countries to assess how ethical their institutional culture is 
and develop strategies best suited to promote ethical standards. 
In conclusion, the twelve peer-reviewed articles that form this cumulative 
Habilitation have consistently made significant theoretical and practical contributions 
to scholarship on trust and cooperation between the authorities and individuals, 
notably in the field of tax cooperation. They are theoretically and methodologically 
sophisticated and playing a significant role in shaping ongoing research in the field 
as well as the development of clear-cut recommendations as to how the authorities 
can increase trust and improve cooperation. 
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ETV 05.10.2017 Fostering tax morale in the digital age: The evidence-
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Introduction
Social systems are characterized by individuals who cooperate
in the provision of non-excludable public goods, or defect and
free-ride (Dawes, 1980). Tax honesty and tax evasion represent
highly relevant examples of such cooperation. They do not only
impact the possibilities of modern societies to provide schools
or roads, but can also fuel social turbulences based on perceived
injustice, if some taxpayers are perceived to systematically
avoid paying their fair share of taxes. To uphold cooperation
in these fragile systems, modern societies employ centralized
institutions who wield harsh coercive or soft legitimate author-
ity to ensure individual cooperation (Raven et al., 1998; Turner,
2005; Güth et al., 2007; Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011).
Empirical evidence shows that the two qualities of authority
lead to different motivations to cooperate (Kastlunger et al.,
2012; Hofmann et al., 2014; Hofmann et al., 2017), but rarely dif-
fer in their positive effect on cooperation (Alm et al., 1992;
Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Isakov and Rand, 2012; Hofmann et al.,
2014; Hartl et al., 2015).
Coercive and legitimate authority promote cooperation origi-
nating from different motivational states (Koslowsky et al., 2001;
Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al., 2015). Coercive authority based
on control and punishment is assumed to fuel mistrust (Mulder
et al., 2006), to be perceived as ferocious and unfair (Mossholder
et al., 2009), and to induce calculative cost-benefit analyses
(Kirchler, 2007), which frame the decision to cooperate as a busi-
ness decision rather than as an ethical decision (Tenbrunsel
and Messick, 1999). Thus, the decision to cooperate might be-
come a deliberate rational decision about one’s own egoistic
utility and societal goals become less salient. Consequently, co-
ercive authority is seen to cause resistance, reactance (Brehm,
1966) and negative emotional arousal (Coricelli et al., 2010), and
it enforces motivation to comply out of feared penalization
(Frey, 1997; Kirchler et al., 2008). In contrast, legitimate authority
is based on acceptance, appreciation, perceived expertise and
information provision (Raven et al., 1998; Gangl et al., 2015). It is
assumed to increase trust and fairness (Tyler and Fagan, 2008;
Hechter, 2009) and might be perceived as the communication of
a widely accepted rule by community members (Bendor and
Mookherjee, 1990), or as an instrument to establish fairness and
a social norm of cooperation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).
Legitimate authority might induce moral pressure and psycho-
logical stress (e.g. a conflict, Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Dulleck
et al., 2016) in response to the felt urge to reciprocate to legitim-
ate authority (Fehr et al., 1997). Legitimate authority might pro-
voke a deliberate conflict between self-interest and community
interests which, in turn, fosters a voluntary motivation to co-
operate (Tyler, 1997; Kirchler et al., 2008; Hofmann et al., 2014).
Thus, decisions about cooperation under coercive or legitimate
authority do reflect rational economic choices (Camerer, 2003)
and social motives of reciprocity or inequity aversion (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2002). Although coercive and legitimate authority
are perceived so differently, their positive effects on cooperative
behavior do not seem to vary dramatically (Hartl et al., 2015).
Taxpaying can be considered as a highly relevant real life ex-
ample for cooperation in a social context. Tax behavior is fre-
quently investigated in laboratories. Referring to experimental
games, income, tax rates, audit probabilities and fine rates are
manipulated and tax payments over several tax filing trials are
registered as dependent variable (Mittone, 2006; Alm et al., 2010;
Hartl et al., 2015). Although a bulk of empirical studies on tax be-
havior has been published, studies on cognitive processes
underlying tax behavior are rare and neurophysiological in-
sights are missing.
We performed an event-related potentials (ERPs) study,
investigating how tax payment decisions are affected by differ-
ent types of centralized authorities. ERPs have been repeatedly
used to gain insights into social decision-making, with their
high temporal resolution enabling detailed insights into the
mental chronometry of decision-making. In particular, ampli-
tude variation of the Medial Frontal Negativity component
(MFN; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) has been investigated in
this regard. It is a negative scalp potential within 200–300 ms
after (feedback) stimulus onset at fronto-central electrodes,
with the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) and ventral stri-
atum as potential neuronal generators (Debener et al., 2005;
Becker et al., 2014). Generally, MFN amplitudes are more nega-
tive after unfavorable compared to favorable (Miltner et al.,
1997), unexpected compared to expected (Alexander and Brown,
2011; Pfabigan et al., 2011), and salient compared to insignificant
outcomes (Talmi et al., 2013). Moreover, MFN enhancement was
interpreted as a signal of enhanced cognitive control (Botvinick
et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004), which describes, among others,
the monitoring and regulation of response strategies, feedback
processing yielding strategy regulation and response conflict
(i.e. concurrent activation of incompatible response options;
Folstein and Van Petten, 2008). Taken together, MFN amplitude
variation reflects early and coarse stimulus evaluation proc-
esses (Yeung et al., 2004; Hajcak et al., 2006). Regarding social
decision-making, the MFN is usually observed in economic
games focusing on asset distribution, such as the Ultimatum
Game (UG; Güth et al., 1982). There, MFN amplitude enhance-
ment indicates unfair compared to fair outcomes (Boksem and
De Cremer, 2010; Alexander and Brown, 2011; Alexopoulos et al.,
2012, 2013), concurrently also reflecting cognitive control.
Another ERP component frequently investigated during so-
cial decision-making is the P300. This positive-going component
peaks within 300–500 ms after (feedback) stimulus onset at pos-
terior electrodes (Polich, 2007). More pronounced P300 ampli-
tudes have been reported in response to a greater change in
evaluative stimulus categorization (Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito
et al., 1998) and greater attention allocation (Polich, 2007). Larger
P300 amplitudes were found after positive compared to negative
outcomes (Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Pfabigan et al., 2015).
In UG studies, P300 amplitudes were also sensitive to outcome
fairness–usually larger after fair compared to unfair offers (Wu
et al., 2012; Qu et al., 2013).
We conducted two experiments introducing taxpaying in
two centralized institutional contexts. In the first experiment,
we collected behavioral data and reaction times while partici-
pants performed repeated fast tax decisions under coercive and
legitimate authority. In the second experiment, the tax para-
digm was slightly adapted to an individual assessment and
such that the speed of participants’ proceeding the tax decision
was reduced, to allow a more valid assessment of ERP data.
As in previous studies, we expected that in contrast to legit-
imate authority, coercive authority will lead to self-reported
enforced motivation to comply, low voluntary motivation to co-
operate (Kastlunger et al., 2012; Hofmann et al., 2014) and
enhanced rational decision-making and reactance than legitim-
ate authority (Brehm, 1966, Kirchler, 2007). Overall tax payments
should not differ between the authority conditions (Hartl et al.,
2015). For reaction times (experiment 1) and ERP data (experi-
ment 2) we tested two opposing hypotheses. On the one hand,
coercive authority might induce a more complex decision pro-
cess than legitimate authority. It provokes a comparatively
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effortful calculative cost-benefit analysis and deliberation about
possible ways to reduce the tax burden. Legitimate authority
might be perceived as a positive signal and thus produces a fast
response to spontaneously cooperate (Tenbrunsel and Messick,
1999; Kirchler, 2007). On the other hand, legitimate authority
might induce more complex cognitive processes than coercive
authority, as personal utility optimization motives might be in
conflict with the moral pressure to pursue societal goals.
Reciprocity towards the legitimate authority might elicit a cog-
nitive response conflict whereas coercive authority produces a
fast response to cooperate (Fehr et al., 1997). Reaction times
serve as indicator of cognitive effort and indicate whether cost-
benefit analysis induced by coercive authority or the heightened
response conflict induced by legitimate authority lead to more
complex, deliberate and, thus, slower decisions (Rubinstein,
2007). For the ERP data, we expected MFN enhancement to indi-
cate heightened cognitive control demands due to response
conflict either in the coercive or the legitimate context
(Botvinick et al., 2001). Enhanced P300 amplitudes should reflect
enhanced categorization demands and attentional processing
(Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito et al., 1998; Polich, 2007) in case either
coercive or legitimate authority induce a more complex decision
process. In addition, we explored the P2 component prior to the
MFN, which is indicative of arousal levels (Carretié et al., 2001)
and attention capture (Potts, 2004).
Experiment 1
Method
The following section describes the central methodological as-
pects of our study; additional methodological details are pro-
vided in Supplementary Material.
Sample
The sample consisted of 80 volunteers (38 men, 1 did not indi-
cate sex; Mage ¼ 24.89, SDage ¼ 6.48). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two taxpaying conditions (coercive authority
of tax administration followed by legitimate authority [n¼ 39],
or legitimate authority followed by coercive authority, [n¼ 41].
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki (7th revision, 2013) and local ethical guidelines for ex-
perimentation with human participants (including approval by
an institutional review board) at the Faculty of Psychology,
University of Vienna.
Procedure
Participants were asked to imagine being self-employed, earn-
ing money in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and paying
taxes (40% of their income) over several trials in a fictitious
country. They were informed that the tax administration would
conduct tax audits with a chance of 15%. In case of detected tax
evasion they would have to pay back the evaded amount plus a
fine of the same amount. Participants were informed that a ran-
domly chosen trial determinates their final remuneration for
participation. After the introduction to the rules of the tax
game, in counterbalanced order, 40 coercive and 40 legitimate
authority trials followed, presented on a PC. After introducing
the first authority, each trial started with the endowment of one
out of five incomes (each presented eight times per authority in
exactly the same sequence for all participants; the randomized
sequence was determined prior to the experiment) and the
presentation of 40% tax rate. Then participants decided how
much tax they wanted to pay. After 40 trials in the first country,
participants filled out the first self-report questionnaire.
Subsequently, they were told to move to another country with a
changed authority where they filed taxes during another 40 tri-
als, ending by filling out the second self-report questionnaire.
Participants were reminded of the respective authority manipu-
lation every 10th trial. Finally, one prior to the experiment ran-
domly selected trial determined the payment of all participants
based on their behavior in this trial. On average, individuals
earned e10.78.
Material
To manipulate authority, two scenarios were developed which
described tax administrations that basically work with harsh
controls and punishments (coercive authority) or with profes-
sional experts who support taxpayers filing their taxes (legitim-
ate authority). To allow a direct comparison of the effect of both
scenarios, a within-subjects design was used in which all par-
ticipants were presented with both scenarios, in counterbal-
anced order. A manipulation check revealed that the
centralized institutions were perceived as manipulated (see
Supplementary Material [1.1.3, 3] for material and details on the
manipulation check).
Tax behavior was assessed by averaging taxpaying decisions
over 40 tax filing trials. For each tax filing trial one out of five in-
comes (60.000 ECU, 70.000 ECU, 75.000 ECU, 85.000 ECU, or
90.000 ECU) was assigned to the participants. Participants read
the information about coercive or legitimate authority, their in-
come, and the tax rate until they choose to terminate the slide
by pressing key 1. Afterwards, participants were presented with
a slide with five possible tax amounts to pay corresponding to
0% (fully dishonest), 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% (fully honest) of
the tax due. This slide was presented until participants choose
one of the options via button press (keys 1–5, pre-assigned to
the respective percent value). The different income levels
ensured that participants varied the responses over the 40
trials.
Mean reaction times were assessed from the onset of the tax
amount screen until button press. For each trial, outliers (2.17%
of all data points) were discarded in case reaction times were
longer than the mean reaction time plus three times the stand-
ard deviation.
Self-reports were assessed with two identical question-
naires. Perception of coercive authority and legitimate authority
was assessed with the Interpersonal Authority Inventory
(Raven et al., 1998; Hofmann et al., 2014) adapted to our tax con-
text. Reactance was measured by the adapted Hong
Psychological Reactance Scale (Shen and Dillard, 2005).
Deliberate rational decision-making was measured by the
adapted Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini and Epstein,
1999). Enforced compliance was measured by the TAX-I
(Kirchler and Wahl, 2010), voluntary cooperation by items
adapted from the motivational posture scale capitulation
(Braithwaite, 2003). Response scales were 7-point Likert scales
(1–disagree, 7–agree). Items and their reliability scores are re-
ported in Supplementary Material (4).
Statistical analyses
To analyze the differential impact of the two centralized institu-
tions, 2 x 2 univariate analysis of variance with authority ma-
nipulation (coercive vs legitimate) as within-subject factors, and
order of manipulation (coercive followed by legitimate authority








oettingen user on 21 Septem
ber 2018
or vice versa) as between-subjects factor was performed, with
self-report, behavioral and reaction time data as dependent
variables. Effect sizes of significant results are specified with
partial eta squared (gp
2) and Cohen’s d; the alpha-level was set at
P< 0.05. In the following, we present only the significant results
of main effects. Detailed results and robustness checks are pre-
sented in Supplementary Material (1.1.4, 1.1.5).
Results
Self-report data. Self-reported enforced compliance was signifi-
cantly affected by the type of authority (F(1,77) ¼ 54.55, P < 0.001,
gp
2 ¼ 0.42). As Figure 1 shows, enforced compliance was higher in
the coercive (M¼ 5.39, SE¼ 0.18) than in the legitimate authority
condition (M¼ 3.88, SE¼ 0.20). This is especially true if coercive
authority follows legitimate (for details on an interaction effect
see Supplementary Material). On the other hand, voluntary co-
operation was only affected by authority (F(1,77) ¼ 59.51, P <
0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.44), it was higher under legitimate (M¼ 4.65,
SE¼ 0.15) than coercive authority (M¼ 2.90, SE¼ 0.15). Also, ra-
tional decision-making was affected by authority (F(1,78)¼11.55, P
< 0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.13) and was higher under coercive (M¼ 5.00,
SE¼ 0.17) than legitimate authority (M¼ 4.35, SE¼ 0.18).
Reactance was also higher under coercive (M¼ 5.25, SE¼ 0.15)
than legitimate authority (M¼ 3.80, SE¼ 0.18; F(1,78) ¼ 81.77, P <
0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.51; for details see Supplementary Material).
Behavioral data. Tax compliance was significantly higher under
legitimate (F(1,78) ¼ 5.96, P ¼ 0.017, gp2 ¼ 0.07; M¼ 4.07; SE¼ 0.12)
than coercive authority (M¼ 3.77, SE¼ 0.14). Reaction times
were significantly affected by the contrast between coercive
and legitimate authority (F(1,78) ¼ 177.63, P < 0.001, gp2 ¼ 0.70).
Compared to time 1 (first 40 trials) (t(78) ¼ 1.05, P ¼ 0.295), at
time 2 (second 40 trials) (t(78) ¼ –1.97, P ¼ 0.052, d¼ 0.45) coer-
cive authority (M¼ 1784.67 ms, SE¼ 138.61) by trend yielded
faster responses than legitimate authority (M¼ 2230.02 ms,
SE¼ 138.98).
Discussion experiment 1
Corroborating previous studies, experiment 1 shows that a per-
ceived coercive compared to a legitimate authority led to less
Fig. 1. Differences in self-reports in experiment 1 and 2.
Note: The bars represent means with the standard error. T1 and T2 indicate whether the authority was presented first (T1, i.e. first 40 trials) or second (T2, i.e. second 40
trials). 1¼disagree, 7¼agree.
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voluntary cooperation (Hofmann et al., 2014). For enforced
compliance and reactance, we observed sensitivity to the
change from coercive to legitimate authority. More specifically,
legitimate authority’s negative effect on enforced compliance
and reactance was particularly strong when a legitimate au-
thority was perceived as the direct change following coercive
authority. Overall and in line with previous studies (e.g.
Hofmann et al., 2014), the effect sizes indicated that the differ-
ence between coercive and legitimate authority was the most
important factor affecting enforced compliance and reactance.
Results also showed that legitimate authority led to slightly
higher tax payments than coercive authority. Coercive authority
induced more self-reported rational decision-making than legit-
imate authority. However, reaction time results indicate that
the decision under coercive authority was quicker to reach com-
pared to legitimate authority. At time 2 (second 40 trials), coer-
cive authority led to faster reactions than legitimate authority.
Experiment 1 is one of the rare attempts showing that the dif-
ferent psychological meanings of coercive and legitimate au-
thority can also be detected by indirect measures of cognitive
processes such as reaction times. To clarify the exact nature of
these processes and how coercive and legitimate authority af-
fect them, data providing access to the temporal sequence and
different cognitive processes underlying decision-making and
behavior are needed. Therefore, our second experiment as-





The sample consisted of 81 volunteers of which three were
excluded because of limited task comprehension or excessive
alpha-band EEG activity (final sample: n¼ 78, 40 men, Mage ¼
24.51, SDage ¼ 5.05). All participants were right-handed (Oldfield,
1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and reported
no past or present neurological or psychiatric disorder. All par-
ticipants gave written informed consent prior to the experi-
ment. Recruitment and ethical guidelines were comparable to
experiment 1. They were again randomly assigned to one of two
taxpaying conditions (coercive authority of tax administration
followed by legitimate authority [n¼ 38], or legitimate authority
followed by coercive authority [n¼ 40]).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a sound-attenuated,
shielded chamber. As in experiment 1, they were asked to im-
agine being self-employed, earning income, and paying taxes
over several years. To ensure that participants understood the
instructions, they were led through a taxpaying example and
performed 10 training trials. Then, identical to experiment 1
(order counterbalanced), 40 coercive and 40 legitimate authority
trials followed. However, different to experiment 1, participants
were reminded every 5th trial to make the manipulation more
salient. Each trial started with the presentation of a white fix-
ation cross on black background (1000ms). Afterwards, the flag
of the respective country, the fictitious income, and the 40% tax
rate in total numbers were presented centrally on black back-
ground (3000 ms). Prior to the actual tax decision, another
screen was blended in asking ‘How much tax would you pay in
[current country]?’ (2000 ms). This slide was added to the ex-
perimental design to avoid fast responses to the tax decision as
in Experiment 1. Afterwards, participants were presented with
five options for taxpaying, either representing 0%, 25%, 50%,
75% or 100% of the 40% tax rate (absolute numbers). Participants
had to choose between the keys 1–5 on a standard keyboard to
indicate their tax decision via button press. No time limit was
given for their decision. A variable inter-stimulus-interval
(1400–1600 ms) was presented afterwards depicting the fixation
cross. After 40 trials in the first context, participants filled out
the first self-report questionnaire and were subsequently in-
formed that they would move to a different country with a dif-
ferent tax administration. After introducing the second context,
another 40 trials were presented applying the same experimen-
tal design as before, ending with filling out the second
self-report questionnaire. At the end, participants were remun-
erated based on a e10 show-up fee and their tax decision in one
randomly chosen tax trial (on average e22.12).
Material
The same material as in experiment 1 was used
(Supplementary Material 1.2.3).
EEG was recorded from 57 equidistantly arranged electrodes
in a cap. Signal preprocessing and artefact correction was con-
ducted using EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Please refer
to Supplementary Material for further details on data collection
and preprocessing (1.2.2).
To assess ERP amplitudes, data were epoched time-locked to
the onset of the income separately for coercive and legitimate
trials. MFN amplitudes were extracted at FCz as peak-to-peak-
to-peak values (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004); i.e. difference between
the MFN component and the mean of the preceding P2 and the
subsequent P300 component) in the time window 150–400 ms
post income. P300 amplitudes were extracted at Pz as peak-to-
peak values (Pfabigan et al., 2011); i.e. difference between the
P300 and the preceding N2 component in the time window 200–
600 ms post income.
Statistical analyses
Several 2 x 2 univariate analyses of variance with manipulation
of authority (coercive vs legitimate authority) as within-subjects
factors, and order of manipulation (coercive followed by legitim-
ate authority and vice versa) as between-subjects factor were
performed with self-report data, behavioral data, and P2, MFN
and P300 amplitudes as dependent variables. Again, we present
only significant results. Detailed results and robustness checks
are presented in Supplementary Material (1.2.4–6).
Results
Self-report data. As shown in Figure 1, self-reported enforced
compliance was again significantly higher under coercive
(M¼ 5.65, SE¼ 0.17) than legitimate authority (M¼ 4.13, SE¼ 0.20;
F(1,76) ¼ 50.78, P < 0.001, gp2 ¼ 0.40). Again, voluntary cooper-
ation was significantly higher under legitimate (M¼ 4.92,
SE¼ 0.14) than coercive authority (M¼ 3.03, SE¼ 0.15; F(1,76) ¼
103.11, P < 0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.58). Rational decision-making did not
differ between coercive and legitimate authority. Again, react-
ance was significantly higher under coercive (M¼ 5.18, SE¼ 0.17)
than legitimate authority (M¼ 3.79, SE¼ 0.18; F(1,75) ¼ 50.17, P <
0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.40).
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Behavioral data. Tax payments were not affected by our experi-
mental manipulation (all P-values> 0.195). See Supplementary
Material 1.2.5 for descriptive statistics.
ERP data. P2 amplitudes were significantly more pronounced
under legitimate (M¼ 5.20, SE¼ 0.52) than coercive authority
(M¼ 4.13, SE¼ 0.58; F(1,76) ¼ 5.30, P ¼ 0.024, gp2 ¼ 0.07). As
Figure 2a indicates, MFN amplitudes were significantly more
pronounced under legitimate (M ¼ –9.35, SE¼ 0.54) than coercive
authority (M ¼ –8.27, SE¼ 0.56; F(1,76) ¼ 9.43, P ¼ 0.003, gp2 ¼
0.11). P300 amplitudes were significantly more pronounced
under coercive (M¼ 9.67, SE¼ 0.62) than legitimate authority
(M¼ 8.64, SE¼ 0.52; F(1,76) ¼ 6.81, P ¼ 0.010, gp2 ¼ 0.08). See
Supplementary Material 1.2.6 for descriptive statistics.
Discussion experiment 2
Experiment 2 confirmed most of the results of experiment 1,
apart from the absent differences in tax payments and self-
reported rational decision making. However, these absent dif-
ferences replicate existing findings (Hartl et al., 2015) and might
originate from the different settings in both experiments.
Concerning ERP data, results show that coercive authority dif-
ferentially affected attentional processing (P2, P300) and
reduced cognitive control demands (MFN) compared to legitim-
ate authority.
General discussion
We investigated whether or not coercive and legitimate central-
ized institutions elicit comparable cognitive and neuronal
processes to reach the final tax payment decision. In experi-
ment 1, coercive authority led to less tax payments, faster deci-
sions and more self-reported rational decision-making, and to
less voluntary cooperation than legitimate authority. In experi-
ment 2, no difference in tax payments and self-reported rational
decision-making was found. This can be due to differences in
experimental procedures, fostering less spontaneous decisions
in experiment 2. On the neuronal level, tax authority influenced
all ERPs. P2 and MFN amplitudes were more pronounced in le-
gitimate compared to coercive conditions, while P300 ampli-
tudes were more pronounced in coercive than legitimate ones.
In tax experiments which applied a similar paradigm, both
coercive and legitimate authority are shown to increase tax pay-
ments (Wahl et al., 2010; Hofmann et al., 2014; Hartl et al., 2015).
This, however, is based on different motivations. Coercive au-
thority was shown to lead to less trust in institutions, more
enforced compliance and less voluntary cooperation than legit-
imate authority (Hofmann et al., 2014). The different psycho-
logical processes underlying both types of authority might
explain why some previous studies (Hofmann et al., 2014) as
well as experiment 1 show that legitimate authority generates
higher tax payments than coercive authority. Enforced compli-
ance elicited by coercive authority reduces tax payments; vol-
untary cooperation based on legitimate authority increases tax
payments (Kastlunger et al., 2012; Gangl et al., 2015). Thus, par-
ticularly when individuals decide spontaneously these different
motivational processes related to voluntary cooperation and
enforced compliance might generate higher tax payments for
legitimate than for coercive authority.
In ultimatum game studies, enhanced MFN amplitudes are
usually observed after unfair compared to fair offers, and most
Fig. 2. (A) Time-courses of the P2 and MFN component at FCz (upper panel; also showing P300 peak used for peak quantification [Yeung and Sanfey, 2004]) and the P300
component at Pz (lower panel; also showing N2 peak used for peak quantification [Pfabigan et al., 2011]). Time point zero indicates onset of the flag, tax income, and
the 40% tax rate. Negative is drawn upwards per convention. (B) Scalp topographies of the mean difference between coercive and legitimate trials in the P2 time inter-
val (170–210 ms; left side), MFN time interval (260–300 ms; in the middle) and the P300 time interval (300–400 ms, right side). (C) Bar graph depicting mean and SE of P2,
MFN and P300 peak values per condition and time point. Please note that absolute values of the three ERPs (in mV) were plotted for a uniform display. Note: b2p¼base-
to-peak; p2p¼peak-to-peak; p2p2p¼peak-to-peak-to-peak approaches for ERP quantification.
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likely reflect fairness-related norm enforcement in these situ-
ations (Feng et al., 2015). Along these lines, Fehr and Camerer
(2007) reported that unfair offers in economic games induce mo-
tivational response conflict between economic self-interest and
norm enforcement. MFN amplitude variation in the current
study might therefore reflect enhanced response conflict
induced by legitimate compared to coercive tax authority since
evading tax might be perceived as more conflicting in the legit-
imate than the coercive context because of moral pressure to
pursue community goals on costs of egoistic motives.
Legitimate authority is likely perceived as positive and as
community-serving, which in turn calls for reciprocity (Fehr
et al., 1997; Tyler and Fagan, 2008), mirrored by enhanced volun-
tary cooperation (Hofmann et al., 2014). Thus, MFN and volun-
tary cooperation data indicate that legitimate authority might
make it more difficult to defect than coercive authority.
Moreover, we observed significantly larger P2 amplitudes during
legitimate than coercive trials. This further corroborates the
MFN results. Thus, even before indicating response conflict by
MFN variation, legitimate tax authority stimuli induced height-
ened arousal levels (Carretié et al., 2001) or higher attention cap-
ture (Potts, 2004) than coercive tax stimuli.
In contrast to the early evaluation indicated by P2 and MFN
components, enhanced P300 amplitudes were observed in coer-
cive compared to legitimate trials. This finding suggests at first
glance that coercive authority might yield greater evaluative
changes and attention (Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito et al., 1998;
Polich, 2007), which disagrees with a simple calculative cost-
benefit heuristic. However, Fabre et al. (2015) proposed that
larger P300 amplitudes during asset distribution might reflect
more automatic processing in line with simple heuristics in
working memory (Khader et al., 2011), while decreased ampli-
tudes might reflect a disruption of heuristic-driven processing.
For example, P300 amplitudes are larger for fair compared to
conflicting unfair and mid-fair proposals (Hewig et al., 2011; Wu
et al., 2012; Qu et al., 2013). Also, in dual-task settings, P300 amp-
litudes are larger in the main task if the second task is an easy
compared to a difficult cognitive task (Kramer et al., 1985).
Therefore, we belief that legitimate compared to coercive au-
thority is related to a rather difficult decision conflict which dis-
rupts also stimulus categorization (mirrored in P300 decrease).
Faster decisions in experiment 1 in the coercive condition
also indicate that a simple calculative cost-benefit analysis
might represent an easy-to-apply cognitive heuristic, which is
processed faster than the response conflict induced by reci-
procity during legitimate authority. Thus, our findings indicate
that tax decisions under coercive authority were processed
more easily than under legitimate authority.
Self-reported rational decision-making was enhanced under
coercive compared to legitimate authority in experiment 1.
However, no such difference was observed in experiment 2.
Although reaction time and ERP data indicate that the legitim-
ate condition is the more complex one, this self-report finding
suggests that the decision complexity under legitimate author-
ity was not consciously perceived by the participants. The dif-
ferent experimental settings might be partly responsible for
this. The rather spontaneous tax decision in experiment 1
might have led to more conscious cognitive workload in the co-
ercive than in the legitimate condition. In contrast, the experi-
mentally prolonged tax decision in experiment 2 might have
reduced the conscious workload for coercive compared to legit-
imate authority. Alternatively, the rational decision-making
scale might not be able to differentiate between simple calcula-
tive cost-benefit analysis and deliberate decisions about the
social consequences of one’s decision. The present results sug-
gest that both, coercive and legitimate authority, lead to deliber-
ate considerations, but with varying cognitive demands.
Concerning our opposing hypotheses, we found that coer-
cive authority induces simpler calculative cost-benefit analysis
instead of more complex social evaluation processes, which in
turn make it less conflicting to defect under coercive compared
to legitimate authority (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999).
Surprisingly, the hypothesis that the cost-benefit analysis
induced by coercive authority is more complex than the tax de-
cision under legitimate authority is not supported by our data.
Relating our findings to previous literature (Coricelli et al., 2010;
Dulleck et al., 2016) suggests that coercive authority might in-
duce less deliberate and less emotional demands compared to
legitimate authority, which might provoke a straining conflict
on reciprocity and fairness accompanied by psychological
stress. Thus, coercive and not legitimate authority might pro-
voke more instinctive economic choices (Rubinstein, 2007) and
allows a fast calculative response whereas legitimate authority
introduces a complex conflict between self- and social interests.
Our finding that legitimate authority leads to more fairness-
related response conflict might also serve as explanation for
why legitimate authority sometimes leads to higher tax pay-
ments than coercive authority (e.g. when spontaneous deci-
sions are made such as in experiment 1 and Hofmann et al.,
2014). Legitimate more than coercive authority might trigger
and explain individuals’ tax morale (Frey and Torgler, 2007).
Taxpaying is an excellent example for social decision-
making and implies financial decisions which affect both self-
interest and other-orientation (Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Several
authors suggested that a dual-process system is at work during
decision-making reflecting the interplay of self-interest vs
other-orientation (see Sanfey and Chang, 2008). System 1 is
assumed to represent an automatic, fast, effortless, uncon-
scious and slow-learning system implementing automatic and
heuristic-based judgements. Contrarily, system 2 is assumed to
represent a controlled, slow, effortful and fast-learning system
implementing more deliberate reasoning and potentially reap-
praising input from system 1, and balancing competing inter-
ests. Thus, the question arises whether tax decisions under
coercive and legitimate authorities are purely based on
heuristic-based judgments (system 1) or involve more deliberate
reasoning (system 2). The calculative cost-benefit analysis as a
heuristic might be used to easily assess self-interests, while so-
cial norm enforcement might be reflective of other-orientation.
Enhanced MFN amplitudes during legitimate compared to coer-
cive trials might reflect system 1 activity, since MFN variation
usually reflects automatic, coarse stimulus evaluation (Hajcak
et al., 2006)–indicating enhanced response conflict between self-
and other-interests. Subsequent P300 variation indicates that
participants might have countered system 1 and tried to costly
implement more deliberative reasoning during legitimate trials
resulting in diminished P300 amplitudes compared to coercive
trials (Fabre et al., 2015).
Limitations of the current study concern the consequences of
the necessary compromise between research methods in tax
psychology and neuroscience. The experimental setting (within-
subject design), number of assessed trials (40) and the assess-
ment of tax decisions (5-point Likert-type scale) deviates from
the standard tax paradigms but was necessary to meet the re-
quirements of EEG measurement. However, replication of the ef-
fects of coercive and legitimate authority on enforced compliance
and voluntary cooperation (Hofmann et al., 2014) show that the
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present experiments can be compared with previous ones, pro-
viding evidence for the internal validity of the present results.
Future studies on cognitive and neuronal processes involved
in tax decisions should examine more realistic settings by ana-
lyzing the impact of a combination of high vs low coercive with
high vs low legitimate authority on cooperation (Hartl et al.,
2015). Moreover, trust is argued to be as important for cooper-
ation as coercive and legitimate authority (Kirchler et al., 2008).
Cooperation in social systems is organized by centralized in-
stitutions such as tax administrations which aim to motivate
tax honesty. The present experiments are the first attempt of
generating insights into psychological, cognitive and neuronal
processes involved in taxpaying under coercive or legitimate
authority. Our results also have policy implications: legitimate
compared to coercive authority makes tax compliance to a com-
plex social instead of a simple economic problem, thus should
be a preferred strategy of tax administrations to foster general
tax morale. A better understanding of tax compliance might
help to ensure sufficient funds for public goods and might in-
crease public confidence if all taxpayers are perceived to con-
tribute their fair share instead of exploiting the system.
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Güth, W., Levati, M.V., Sutter, M., van der Heijden, E. (2007).
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in vol-
untary contribution experiments. Journal of Public Economics, 91,
1023–42.
Hajcak, G., Moser, J.S., Holroyd, C.B., Simons, R.F. (2006). The
feedback-related negativity reflects the binary evaluation of
good versus bad outcomes. Biological Psychology, 71(2), 148–54.
Hartl, B., Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M.,
Kirchler, E. (2015). Does the sole description of a tax authority
affect tax evasion?–the impact of descripted coercive and legit-
imate power. PLoS One, 10, e0123355.
Hechter, M. (2009). Legitimacy in the modern world. American
Behavioral Scientist, 53, 279–88.
Hewig, J., Kretschmer, N., Trippe, R.H., et al. (2011). Why humans
deviate from rational choice. Psychophysiology, 48(4), 507–14.
Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Kirchler, E., Stark, J. (2014). Enhanced tax
compliance through coercive and legitimate power of tax
authorities by concurrently diminishing of facilitating trust in
authorities. Law & Policy, 36, 290–313.
Hofmann, E., Hartl, B., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M.,
Kirchler, E. (2017). Authoritiescoercive and legitimate power:
the impact on cognitions underlying cooperation. Frontiers in
Psychology, 8, 1–15.
Isakov, A., Rand, D.G. (2012). The evolution of coercive institu-
tional punishment. Dynamic Games and Applications, 2, 97–109.
Ito, T.A., Larsen, J.T., Smith, N.K., Cacioppo, J.T. (1998). Negative
information weighs more heavily on the brain: the negativity
bias in evaluative categorizations. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 75(4), 887–900.
Kastlunger, B., Lozza, E., Kirchler, E., Schabmann, A. (2012).
Powerful authorities and trusting citizens: the slippery slope
framework and tax compliance in Italy. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 34, 36–45.
Khader, P.H., Pachur, T., Meier, S., Bien, S., Jost, K., Rösler, F.
(2011). Memory-based decision-making with heuristics
involves increased activation of decision re levant memory
representations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 3540–54.
Kirchler, E. (2007). The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, UK.
Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., Wahl, I. (2008). Enforced versus voluntary
tax compliance. The “slippery slope framework”. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 29, 210–25.
Kirchler, E., Wahl, I. (2010). Tax compliance inventory TAX-I: de-
signing an inventory for surveys of tax compliance. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 31, 331–46.
Koslowsky, M., Schwarzwald, J., Ashuri, S. (2001). On the rela-
tionship between subordinates’ compliance to power sources
and organizational attitudes. Applied Psychology, 50, 455–76.
Kramer, A.F., Wickens, C.D., Donchin, E. (1985). Processing of
stimulus properties: evidence for dual-task integrity. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 11,
393–408.
Miltner, W.H.R., Braun, C.H., Coles, M.G.H. (1997). Event-related
brain potentials following incorrect feedback in a time-
estimation task: evidence for a ‘generic’ neural system for
error detection. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9(6), 788–98.
Mittone, L. (2006). Dynamic behavior in tax evasion: an experi-
mental approach. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 35, 813–35.
Mossholder, K.W., Bennett, N., Kemery, E.R., Wesolowski, M.A.
(2009). Relationships between bases of power and work reac-
tions: the mediational role of procedural justice. Journal of
Management, 24, 533–52.
Mulder, L.B., van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., Wilke, H.A.M. (2006).
Undermining trust and cooperation: the paradox of sanction-
ing systems in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 42, 147–62.
Oldfield, R.C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handed-
ness: the Edinburgh inventory. Neuropsychologia, 9(1), 97–113.
Pacini, R., Epstein, S. (1999). The relational and experiential in-
formation processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and
the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 76(6), 972–87.
Pfabigan, D.M., Alexopoulos, J., Bauer, H., Sailer, U. (2011).
Manipulation of feedback expectancy and valence induces
negative and positive reward prediction error signals manifest
in event-related brain potentials. Psychophysiology, 48(5),
656–64.
Pfabigan, D.M., Sailer, U., Lamm, C. (2015). Size does matter!
Perceptual stimulus properties affect event-related potentials
during feedback processing. Psychophysiology, 52(9), 1238–47.
Polich, J. (2007). Updating P300: an integrative theory of P3a and
P3b. Clinical Neurophysiology, 118(10), 2128–48.
Potts, G.F. (2004). An ERP index of task relevance evaluation of
visual stimuli. Brain and Cognition, 56, 5–13.
Qu, C., Wang, Y., Huang, Y. (2013). Social exclusion modulates
fairness consideration in the ultimatum game: an ERP study.
Frontiers Human Neuroscience, 7, 505.
Raven, B.H., Schwarzwald, J., Koslowsky, M. (1998). Conceptualizing
and measuring a power/interaction model of interpersonal influ-
ence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28, 307–32.
Rubinstein, A. (2007). Instinctive and cognitive reasoning: a
study of response times. The Economic Journal, 117, 1243–59.
Sanfey, A.G., Chang, L.J. (2008). Multiple systems in decision
making. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1128, 53–62.
Shen, L., Dillard, J.P. (2005). Psychometric properties of the Hong
psychological reactance scale. Journal of Personality Assessment,
85, 74–81.








oettingen user on 21 Septem
ber 2018
Talmi, D., Atkinson, R., El-Deredy, W. (2013). The feedback-
related negativity signals salience prediction errors, not re-
ward prediction errors. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(19), 8264–9.
Tenbrunsel, A.E., Messick, D.M. (1999). Sanctioning systems, de-
cision frames, and Cooperation. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 44(4), 684–707.
Tyler, T.R. (1997). The psychology of legitimacy: a relational per-
spective on voluntary deference to authorities. Personality and
Social Psychology Review, 1(4), 323–45.
Tyler, T.R., Fagan, J. (2008). Legitimacy and cooperation: why do
people help the police fight crime in their communities? Ohio
State Journal of Criminal Law, 6, 231–75.
Turner, J.C. (2005). Explaining the nature of power: a three-process
theory. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 1–22.
Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., Kirchler, E. (2010). Trust in authorities
and power to enforce tax compliance: an empirical ana-
lysis of the slippery slope framework. Law & Policy, 32(4),
283–406.
Wu, Y., Hu, J., van Dijk, E., Leliveld, M.C., Zhou, X. (2012). Brain
activity in fairness consideration during asset distribution:
does the initial ownership play a role? PLoS ONE, 7(6),
e39627.
Yeung, N., Botvinick, M.M., Cohen, J.D. (2004). The neural basis of
error detection: conflict monitoring and the error-related
negativity. Psychological Review, 111(4), 931–59.
Yeung, N., Sanfey, A.G. (2004). Independent coding of reward
magnitude and valence in the human brain. Journal of
Neuroscience, 24(28), 6258–64.








oettingen user on 21 Septem
ber 2018
[2] Hartl, B., Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M., & Kirchler, E. (2015). 
Does the description of a tax authority affect tax evasion? – The impact of displayed 
coercive and legitimate power. PLoS ONE, 10(4): article e0123355, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0123355 
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Does the Sole Description of a Tax Authority
Affect Tax Evasion? - The Impact of
Described Coercive and Legitimate Power
Barbara Hartl1*, Eva Hofmann1, Katharina Gangl1, Martina Hartner-Tiefenthaler2,
Erich Kirchler1
1 University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria, 2 Vienna University of Technology, Vienna, Austria
* barbara.hartl@univie.ac.at
Abstract
Following the classic economic model of tax evasion, taxpayers base their tax decisions on
economic determinants, like fine rate and audit probability. Empirical findings on the rela-
tionship between economic key determinants and tax evasion are inconsistent and suggest
that taxpayers may rather rely on their beliefs about tax authority’s power. Descriptions of
the tax authority’s power may affect taxpayers’ beliefs and as such tax evasion. Experiment
1 investigates the impact of fines and beliefs regarding tax authority’s power on tax evasion.
Experiments 2-4 are conducted to examine the effect of varying descriptions about a tax
authority’s power on participants’ beliefs and respective tax evasion. It is investigated
whether tax evasion is influenced by the description of an authority wielding coercive power
(Experiment 2), legitimate power (Experiment 3), and coercive and legitimate power com-
bined (Experiment 4). Further, it is examined whether a contrast of the description of power
(low to high power; high to low power) impacts tax evasion (Experiments 2-4). Results show
that the amount of fine does not impact tax payments, whereas participants’ beliefs regard-
ing tax authority’s power significantly shape compliance decisions. Descriptions of high co-
ercive power as well as high legitimate power affect beliefs about tax authority’s power and
positively impact tax honesty. This effect still holds if both qualities of power are applied si-
multaneously. The contrast of descriptions has little impact on tax evasion. The current
study indicates that descriptions of the tax authority, e.g., in information brochures and
media reports, have more influence on beliefs and tax payments than information on fine
rates. Methodically, these considerations become particularly important when descriptions
or vignettes are used besides objective information.
Introduction
Official announcements of tax authorities as well as media reports provide taxpayers with de-
scriptions of their tax authority. The question arises how taxpayers respond to such informa-
tion and whether different descriptions of a tax authority affect taxpayers`beliefs regarding tax
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authority’s power (coercive power or legitimate power), and most interestingly tax evasion [1].
Taxpayers’ subjective beliefs regarding tax authority’s coercive or legitimate power, may even
outweigh economic key determinants [2]. While coercive power bases on frequent audits and
severe fines in case of tax evasion, legitimate power rests upon the legitimacy of the position of
the authority, its expertise, its dissemination of information, and its ability to be a role model
for identification [3].
Field experiments show that audit information letters from the tax authority to taxpayers
impact self-reported income [4–6]. Some of these letters can be seen as unintentional manipu-
lation of two forms of power: coercive power and legitimate power. First, taxpayers were in-
formed that both their state and federal tax returns would be closely examined [6]. This
description of coercive power such as severity of fines may change taxpayer’s beliefs regarding
tax authority`s coercive power and increase tax honesty by leading to an overestimation of the
actual audit probability. Second, letters in the field experiment contain department phone
numbers to call for information and assistance with tax filing. This assurance of support corre-
sponds with the concept of legitimate power [7]. Strategies of good governance, establishing a
customer orientation and focusing on supportive and transparent processes, lead to higher tax
compliance [8–10]. These measures of legitimate power promise to be more effective than tra-
ditional coercive methods [9,11] because the perception of transparency and fairness induces a
feeling of reciprocity at the taxpayers, which in turn enhance tax compliance [12].
The aim of the current study is to analyze whether taxpayers base their decisions to pay
taxes honestly on beliefs about tax authority’s power rather than on economic key determi-
nants, and whether the description of a tax authority (as wielding coercive and legitimate
power) affects taxpayers’ beliefs and as a result tax evasion, although objective information
concerning audit probability and fines is available. Contrary to previous research, the isolated
effects of the description of coercive and legitimate power are examined. Further, it is of inter-
est whether these isolated effects of coercive and legitimate power still hold when a tax authori-
ty is described as wielding both forms of power simultaneously.
Theoretical background
The classical economic model of tax evasion [13–15] is the dominant theoretical model in re-
search on tax compliance. In this model, taxpayers are treated as expected utility maximizers,
confronted with a decision under risk. Basically, individuals decide whether to evade taxes run-
ning the risk of getting audited and fined ending up with less money than if they had declared
all income honestly, or to pay honestly, which results in a sure loss. The implementation of
audits and fines increases the costs of non-compliance [15]. Thus, audits and fines are re-
searched as authorities’means for enhancing taxpayers`compliance [6, 16–22]. The probability
of an audit is positively related to tax compliance [6,17,21,23–25], as are high fines for tax eva-
sion [17,22].
In the simplest form of the economic model of tax evasion [16], taxpayers receive an
amount of income I, and have to decide how much income to report to the tax authority (see
also [6]). If income I is reported honestly, the income is taxed according to the tax rate t and
taxpayers end up with an income of IH = I—t x I. If taxpayers fully evade taxes, they save
money, but run the risk of getting caught, as audits take place with a fixed probability p. When
taxpayers are audited, than all unreported income can be discovered and the audit results in a
payment of a fine at rate f. The income IC therefore equals IC = I − f x (t x I). When taxpayers
have not reported any income to the tax authority and no audit takes place, then they end up
with an income of IN = I. Taxpayers are therefore assumed to choose between a sure loss
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(paying honestly, E(IH) = I—t x I) or the probability of a gain or a major loss according to the
expected utility function of E(I) = p(IC) + (1-p) (IN).
Literature reviews report inconsistent empirical findings concerning the relationship be-
tween audits, fines, and tax evasion [18,26,27]. Although laboratory experiments have consis-
tently supported the positive impact of audits on tax behavior, levels of tax honesty in field
experiments are far higher than a simple risk-return model would predict [28]. In almost all
countries in the world the audit probability is low, which should result in low levels of tax com-
pliance. Contrary to this economic assumption, tax honesty is still high in most countries [29].
These findings may be due to the fact that individuals find it hard to deal with uncertainty.
Several studies show that taxpayers poorly predict audit probabilities and fine rates [18,30,31].
Rather than on objective key economic figures, taxpayers seem to base their tax behavior on
their subjective beliefs regarding tax authority’s ability to detect evasion, that is the tax author-
ity’s power [2,32]. Prior research has shown different ways by which taxpayers become aware
of enforcement strategies of the tax authority [33]. According to these insights, taxpayers pay
attention to official information disseminated by the tax authority as well as unofficial informa-
tion. It is therefore of relevance to investigate how the description of the tax authority modifies
taxpayers’ beliefs of tax authority’s power and tax evasion.
A tax authority can be believed to be powerful, holding coercive power or legitimate power.
Descriptions of coercive power comprise the severity of fines for tax evasion [10,34]. In such a
case taxpayers overestimate the probability of audits and fine rates, even when fully informed,
so that there is far less tax evasion than predicted by the economic model [16]. Beliefs on tax
authorities’ coercive power instead of accurate information on audits and fines rates should act
as an indicator for the estimation of audit probability and fines and therefore affect tax compli-
ance [35]. Describing a tax authority as wielding high coercive power should positively impact
tax honesty.
The perception of legitimate power origins from taxpayers’ conviction that the tax authori-
ty holds expertise [10]. Savvy information for taxpayers to pay their taxes correctly prompts a
perception of legitimate power. Another source of legitimate power roots in the feeling of
identification with the tax authority and the authority’s goals. Legitimate power also stems
from the perception that the tax authority is in a (legal) position that gives authority over tax-
payers. Beliefs on tax authorities’ legitimate power should increase tax honesty as they lead to
perceptions of fairness and transparency, and in turn call for reciprocal behavior (“You
scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours”, [36]). Taxpayers are more likely to report their in-
come honestly when they think that the tax authority is doing a good job [1]. When the tax au-
thority works in a way that is beneficial for the taxpayers (e.g., provides services), they
cooperate in paying taxes even when defection would rationally be the best option in the
short-term [12,26]. The impact of perceived legitimate power on tax compliance has only
been investigated indirectly, for instance, by investigating the impact of service considerations
on tax payments [7] or by investigating the effect of legitimate power on intended tax compli-
ance [10]. Empirical evidence shows that legitimate power enhances tax payments. However,
it is relevant to examine if descriptions of legitimate tax authorities initiate beliefs on legiti-
mate power and affect tax evasion even in cases where objective information about economic
key figures are present.
It is necessary to examine the isolated effects of descriptions of coercive and legitimate
power, as they are supposed to impact tax evasion in different ways. Up to now, field experi-
ments using announcements and tax letters do not explicitly address coercive or legitimate
power or only trigger the perception of both forms of power [6]. Likewise, descriptions or vi-
gnettes on power of the tax authority used in experiments with behavioral data do not explicitly
differentiate between coercive and legitimate power [2,37].
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Different qualities of power do not exist independently of each other [38]. Tax authorities
usually do not choose one set of policies over another, but rather set measures of both, coercive
and legitimate power [10]. A few studies address interaction effects of different types of social
power in an organizational context [39,40]. It was shown that employees comply with manage-
rial directions in particular when their supervisors exert coercive as well as legitimate power
[41]. In the context of taxes, the perception of a high audit probability and severe fines (coer-
cive power) may be of little deterrent value when taxpayers think that an audit will fail to un-
cover tax evasion [18]. Although the combination of coercive power and legitimate power
might lead to a reduction of beliefs of coercive measures, additional legitimate power is dis-
cussed to signal efficiently applied audits to discover non-compliance, as experts are at work.
Research has shown, that if sanction mechanisms are believed to be fair (that is legitimate), co-
operation increases [42]. Hofmann et al. [10] assume that in the tax context coercive and legiti-
mate power exercised in combination generate the highest degree of intended tax honesty
because the tax authority is perceived as a legitimate and expert power holding authority. In
this vein, the joint description of coercive and legitimate power may have a higher impact on
tax payments than if only one quality of power is perceived.
Although descriptions of coercive and legitimate power may outweigh objective informa-
tion, the effect could differ according to taxpayers’ prior experience with the tax authority. Ex-
ternal factors, like a change of government after an election or a revolution, can prompt a
change of the belief of the intensity of power. How do taxpayers react to such a change of
power? As tax authorities worldwide start changing their policy to enhance compliance by
using supportive procedures rather than means of enforcement, it is relevant to further re-
search how taxpayers adjust their beliefs and react to such a contrast of power. As descriptions
on prior events are used to qualify current judgments, a change could foster contrast effects
[43,44]. A change of the description of the tax authority will lead to a comparison process, in
which new evidence on the tax authority will be evaluated in contrast to the previous descrip-
tion. For instance, after experiencing a contrast from high to low coercive power of the tax au-
thority, taxpayers may react with less compliance than they would without the specific prior
descriptions of power, even if economic key figures remain constant. On the other hand, a con-
trast from high to low legitimate power indicates that the tax authority has reduced its services,
which leads to decreased reciprocal behavior. Taxpayers experiencing these contrasting de-
scriptions might be less compliant than taxpayers who do not undergo this change but con-
stantly face descriptions of low legitimate power. The contrast of described power (low to high
power; high to low power) may therefore impact tax evasion.
The Current Studies
Based on the inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between the severity of fines and
tax evasion, we first conduct an experiment, in which we examine the impact of information
on one economic key determinant, i.e., fine rates (0.5 vs. 1 vs. 2 times the evaded amount) on
tax evasion, the impact of beliefs regarding tax authority’s power on tax evasion and whether
beliefs are based on the information about the fine rate (Experiment 1). Further, we extend pre-
vious research by modifying participants’ beliefs regarding tax authority’s power with varying
description about the tax authority, and investigate whether the descriptions of the authority
affect tax evasion. Three experiments are conducted with varying descriptions of the tax au-
thority (Experiment 2–4). The procedures were similar and economic key figures, such as audit
probability and fine rate, were kept constant throughout the three experiments. In particular,
we investigate whether the description of a tax authority exerting low versus high coercive
power (Experiment 2) or low versus high legitimate power (Experiment 3) impacts tax evasion
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while economic key figures are held constant. Building on these findings, we examine whether
the combination of high coercive and legitimate power induce higher tax payments than if the
intensity of only one quality of power is described as high (Experiment 4). A possible contrast
effect of presentations of the tax authority is examined in the experiments 2, 3, and 4.
Ethic Statement
All four experiments reported here were conducted in respect to the Declaration of Helsinki
(revised 1983) and local guidelines of the Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna. Accord-
ing to the Austrian Universities Act 2002 (UG2002), only medical universities are required to
appoint ethics committees for medical research. Therefore, no ethical approval was required
for the present study. The majority of participants were recruited via an online data bank of the
Department of Applied Psychology, for which they had to provide their written consent to par-
ticipate in studies. All participants were invited to the laboratory of the Faculty and gave their
verbal consent to participate in the study. Information about the duration, the tasks, the pay-
ment, and the confidentiality was provided to participants prior to attending the experiments.
All participants voluntarily took part in the experiment and could withdraw at any time during
the experiment with no further consequences. Data were collected anonymously and no harm-
ing procedures were used. The experiments are part of a project proposal approved by three in-
ternational scientific peer-reviewers from the field for the Austrian Science Fund (FWF).
Experiment 1: Fine Rate
Materials and Methods
Participants. Overall, 108 students (32% males,M[age] = 23.96, SD = 5.92) majoring in
different fields from management to biology (not acquainted with the tested theories and hy-
potheses) took part in the study. Thirty-eight percent of participants had no experience with
the tax authority; the others reported at least some contact.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted with the software z-Tree [45]. Participants
were invited to the laboratory and randomly assigned to one of three conditions, manipulating
the fine rate in case of detected tax evasion (0.5 vs. 1 vs. 2 times the evaded amount).
Introduction. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were introduced to the
rules of the experiment and informed about audit probability (kept constant in all conditions)
and fine rate (0.5 vs. 1 vs. 2 times the evaded amount). A numeric example helped to under-
stand the information.
In the following you are taking part in an experiment on tax behavior which takes 20 peri-
ods. In each period a certain income is allocated to you, of which you have to pay taxes. The
tax rate is 40% of your income. In each period your final income is the result of the allocated
income minus the taxes paid. At the end of the experiment one period will be selected ran-
domly. The income that you have gained in this period will be paid to you by the experi-
menter. Additionally, for each period there exists a tax audit probability of 15%. In case you
are audited and you have evaded taxes, you have to pay back the evaded amount plus a fine
of [0.5] [1] [2] time/s the evaded amount.
After the introduction, participants were asked to imagine being a self-employed
taxpayer in a fictitious state who has to pay taxes. They also received the information that
only at the end of the experiment they get to know if and when an audit had taken place.
After every fifth period, participants were briefly asked to remember that they are self-
employed and that they will have to pay taxes in Chomland for the next remaining years
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(periods). We repeated the following analysis, controlling for a possible effect of the remind-
er. The analysis showed that the reminder has no effect on the tax payments, revealing the
same results.
Experimental task. In each of the 20 periods, participants received varying incomes in ex-
perimental currencies (ECU) on which they had to pay taxes. Every participant received the
same amount of money in every round, ranging from 50,000 ECU to 95,000 ECU (sequence
was set before the experiment). They were asked to indicate how much tax they will pay from
the allocated income. For further analyses, the relative tax compliance (ranging from 0 to 1)
was used.
Questionnaire. After the 20th period, participants filled in a questionnaire to assess
their beliefs about tax authorities’ coercive (4 items) and legitimate power (22 items). Reli-
ability of scales, tested with Cronbach α, was .85 for coercive power and .90 for legitimate
power. The scale legitimate power compounds four subscales (legitimacy, expertise, informa-
tion, identification). For the sake of simplicity and due to the measurement model the sub-
scales were combined to one scale. All items can be found online in supplementary material
(see S1 Table).
Remuneration. At the end of the experiment, participants were remunerated for partici-
pation. One period out of 20 was randomly selected and participants were remunerated accord-
ing to their decisions in this period. The participants’ earnings depended on their tax
payments, random tax audits and the respective fines in case of detected tax evasion (partici-
pants received on average 2.53 EUR or 3.16 USD, respectively).
Results
Fine rate on tax evasion. To test whether different fine rates have an impact on tax eva-
sion, the three conditions (0.5 vs. 1 vs. 2 times the evaded amount) are included as dummy var-
iables in a repeated measures regression, analyzing all 20 periods of taxpaying (F(17, 106) =
2.18, p = .008, R2 = .18). Fine rate 1 serves as reference group. The analysis reveals no significant
differences between 1 time and 0.5 times the evaded amount, β = -.04, t(106) = -0.55, p = .58
and 1 time and 2 times the evaded amount, β = .02, t(106) = 0.32, p = .75. Regardless of the ma-
nipulation, tax evasion is equally low when the fine was 0.5 times (M0.5x = .82, SD = .29), 1 time
(M1x = .84, SD = .23) or 2 times the evaded amount (M2x = .85, SD = .23). The amount of fine
(0.5 vs. 1 vs. 2 times fine) has no impact on tax evasion.
Beliefs on tax evasion. To test whether beliefs about tax authority’s coercive and legiti-
mate power impacts tax evasion, a repeated measure regression is conducted, F(18, 105) = 4.14,
p< .001, R2 = .31. The analysis reveals a significant main effect of coercive power, β = .83,
t(105) = 2.19, p = .03 and significant main effect of legitimate power, β = .65, t(105) = 2.37,
p = .02, but no significant interaction effect of coercive and legitimate power (p = .10). As ex-
pected, the perception of the tax authority as wielding high coercive or high legitimate power
leads to higher tax payments.
Fine rate on beliefs. AMANOVA reveals no significant effect of different fine rates on
participants`beliefs regarding tax authority’s coercive power (F(2, 104) = 0.77, p = .47) or legiti-
mate power (F(2, 104) = 0.47, p = .63). Regardless of severity of fines, the beliefs of coercive
power (M0.5x = 4.50, SD = 1.46;M1x = 4.49, SD = 1.33;M2x = 4.86, SD = 1.57) and legitimate
power (M0.5x = 4.40, SD = 0.84;M1x = 4.60, SD = 0.93;M2x = 4.58, SD = 1.03) are equally high
in all three conditions. This indicates that tax evasion is related to participants`beliefs regarding
tax authority’s power, but the manipulation of fine rates does not affect the beliefs of coercive
and legitimate power.
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General Method for Experiment 2, 3, and 4
In experiment 2, 3, and 4, we examine whether descriptions of the tax authority affect partici-
pant’s beliefs regarding tax authority’s power and further affect tax evasion, while all economic
key figures, including fine rate are held constant.
Procedure
The following procedure was identical for experiment 2, 3, and 4. The experiments were con-
ducted with the software z-Tree [45] and took place in the laboratory.
Economic determinants. Equal to experiment 1, participants were introduced to the rules
and informed about audit probability and fine rate at the beginning of the experiments. A nu-
meric example helped to internalize the information.
In the following you are taking part in an experiment on tax behavior which takes 40 peri-
ods. In each period a certain income is allocated to you, of which you have to pay taxes. The
tax rate is 40% of your income. In each period your final income is the result of the allocated
income minus the taxes paid. At the end of the experiment one period will be selected ran-
domly. The income that you have gained in this period will be paid to you by the experi-
menter. Additionally, for each period there exists a tax audit probability of 15%. In case you
are audited and you have evaded taxes, you have to pay back the evaded amount plus a fine
of 1 time the evaded amount.
Introduction to the fictitious scenario. Participants were asked to imagine being a self-
employed taxpayer in a fictitious state who has to pay taxes. They also received the information
that only at the end of the experiment they get to know if and when an audit had taken place.
Imagine that you are a citizen in the fictitious state Chomland. You are self-employed and
you will have to pay taxes in Chomland for the next 40 years (40 periods). In Chomland,
you only get to know if and when a tax audit took place after employment has ended (40
periods).
Manipulation I: Description of tax authority. The description of the tax authority in the
fictitious state differed between the three experiments. After the introduction to the fictitious
state, participants read a description of the tax authority, which was holding different qualities
of power. The description contained data about the way in which the authority makes sure that
taxpayers comply. Coercive power and legitimate power were manipulated either separately
(Experiment 2 and 3) or in combination (Experiment 4). After every fifth period, participants
were reminded of the features of the respective tax authority by means of sentences repeated
from the description of the tax authority (i.e. short sequences repeated from the description
they had received in the beginning; additional analysis for all three experiments showed that
the reminder had no effect on the tax payments). To check whether the description of the tax
authority affects participants’ beliefs about tax authorities power, participants filled in a ques-
tionnaire assessing their perception of wielded coercive and legitimate power by the tax author-
ity twice, after the 20th period (first sequence) and the 40th period (second sequence) of the
experimental task (Table 1). Reliability of scales was tested with Cronbach α, ranging from .89
to .97 over the experiments.
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Manipulation II: Contrast of power. In all three experiments, control conditions and ex-
perimental conditions were realized. After the 20th period (first sequence), participants were in-
formed that due to a change of the government, the intensity of power of the tax authority had
changed. Participants in the experimental conditions received a different description of this
new tax authority contrasting the first description. In the control condition, the hypothetical
tax authority was the same in the first and second sequence. Table 1 provides an overview of all
experimental and control conditions for the three experiments.
Experimental task. Equal to experiment 1, in each period, participants received varying
incomes in experimental currencies (ECU) on which they had to pay taxes. They were asked to
indicate how much taxes they will pay. For further analyses, the relative tax compliance (rang-
ing from 0 to 1) was used.
Remuneration. One period out of 40 was randomly selected and participants were remu-
nerated according to their decisions in this period. The participants’ earnings depended on
their tax payments, random tax audits and the respective fines in case of detected tax evasion
(participants received on average 6.20 EUR or 8.18 USD, respectively).
Experiment 2: Coercive Power
Materials and Methods
Participants. Overall, 120 students (64% males,M[age] = 24.48, SD = 5.85) majoring in
several different fields from management to biology (not acquainted with the tested theories
and hypotheses) took part in the study. Forty-seven percent of participants had no kind of ex-
perience with the tax authority; the others reported at least some contact with them.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (two experi-
mental conditions: low coercive power (lcp)! high coercive power (hcp), hcp! lcp; two con-
trol conditions: lcp! lcp, hcp! hcp), in which the tax authority were described as holding
low and/or high coercive power.
Low/high coercive power manipulation. The tax authority of Chomland calculated that
the tax revenue was about 200 billion ECU for the past year. Of this income, about 0.09/2 bil-
lion ECU was spent on tax audits and punishments of taxpayers. In general, the tax authority is
Table 1. Manipulation of coercive and legitimate power before (Periods 1–20) and after the change in the tax authority (Periods 21–40).
Experimental conditions Control conditions
Periods in experiment Periods in experiment
1–20 21–40 1–20 21–40
Experiment 2 low coercive high coercive high coercive high coercive
high coercive low coercive low coercive low coercive
Experiment 3 low legitimate high legitimate high legitimate high legitimate
high legitimate low legitimate low legitimate low legitimate
Experiment 4 high coercive/ low legitimate high coercive/ high legitimate high coercive/ high legitimate high coercive/ high legitimate
low coercive/ high legitimate high coercive/ high legitimate
high coercive/ high legitimate high coercive/ low legitimate high coercive/ low legitimate high coercive/ low legitimate
low coercive/ low legitimate high coercive/ low legitimate
high coercive/ high legitimate low coercive/ high legitimate low coercive/ high legitimate low coercive/ high legitimate
low coercive/ low legitimate low coercive/ high legitimate
high coercive/ low legitimate low coercive/ low legitimate low coercive/ low legitimate low coercive/ low legitimate
low coercive/ high legitimate low coercive/ low legitimate
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123355.t001
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well known for its mild/severe punishments. Since it has so far rarely/always conducted strict
audits, the taxpayers feel little/very forced to cooperate.
The tax authority consists of employees who work with lax/strict audits.
For the tax authority, the severity of punishment for tax evasion is of low/high importance.
It works on the basis of lax/strict control measures. Its working principles are based little/par-
ticularly on the penalties for tax evasion.
After every fifth period, participants received a reminder of the features of the respective tax
authority by means of sentences repeated from the description of the tax authority. For in-
stance, participants in the condition, in which the tax authority held high coercive power re-
ceived the following reminder:
Please remember! You are a citizen in Chomland, in which the tax authority is well known
for its severe punishment. Tax auditors work on the basis of lax/strict control measures.
Additionally, during their ‘experimental’ life as a taxpayer, power of the tax authority
changed in the experimental conditions from low/high coercive power to high/low coercive
power (Table 1).
Results
Coercive power on beliefs. A repeated measures regression (F(27, 119) = 31.70, p< .001,
R2 = .66) reveals a significant main effect of intensity of power, β = .78, t(119) = 15.41, p< .001
and a significant interaction effect of intensity of power and sequence, β = .10, t(119) = 3.24,
p = .002. As expected, the description of the tax authority as wielding low or high coercive
power affects the participant’s beliefs regarding the tax authority’s power. Whereas the belief of
low coercive power is equally low in the first sequence (M = 2.60, SD = 1.34) and the second se-
quence (M = 2.52, SD = 1.67), high legitimate power is perceived to be lower in the first se-
quence (M = 5.51, SD = 1.37) than in the second sequence (M = 6.06, SD = 0.87). Thus,
descriptions of low and high coercive power initiate respective beliefs.
Coercive power on tax evasion. To test whether coercive power has an impact on tax pay-
ments, again a repeated measure regression was conducted, analyzing all 40 periods of taxpay-
ing. The model with all variables significantly predicts tax payments, F(26, 119) = 5.10,
p< .001, R2 = .15. As expected, there is a significant main effect of intensity of power, β = .14,
t(119) = 2.64, p = .009, with higher tax payments in conditions with high coercive power than
with low coercive power. In addition, there is a significant main effect of sequence, β = .07,
t(119) = 3.22, p = .002, with higher tax payments in the second sequence than in the first se-
quence (Fig 1). The other main effects and interaction effects do not reach significance,
p> .20. Therefore, descriptions of coercive power impact tax payments. Table 2 provides the
results for the repeated measure regression for all three experiments.
Contrast effect of coercive power. To test for a contrast effect of descriptions, all condi-
tions are compared with an ANOVA due to the tax payments in the second sequence, i.e., the
last 20 periods. The analysis shows that overall, the four treatment conditions significantly dif-
fered (lcp! hcp, hcp! lcp, lcp! lcp, hcp! hcp), F(3, 116) = 3.52, p = .02, ηp2 = .08. But
post hoc tests show that the comparison of the relevant experimental and control conditions in
the second sequence (lcp! hcp versus hcp! hcp, hcp! lcp versus lcp! lcp) reveals no sig-
nificant result: Participants who experienced a contrast from low to high coercive power de-
clare the same amount of income as participants in the control conditions, who experienced
only high coercive power (p = .18). Equally, a change from high to low coercive power does not
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lead to lower tax payments than when the tax authority wielded only low coercive power
(p = .30). Therefore, a change in coercive power does not lead to a contrast effect in beliefs.
Experiment 3: Legitimate Power
Materials and Procedures
Participants. Students (N = 130, 60% males,M[age] = 24.40, SD = 4.89) majoring in dif-
ferent fields took part in the study. Most participants had at least some contact with the tax au-
thority, but 43% of participants reported to have no experience with them.
Fig 1. Experiment 2. The impact of low and high coercive power on relative tax payments before and after
the change in tax authority. Note. lcp . . . low coercive power, hcp . . . high coercive power.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123355.g001
Table 2. Repeatedmeasure regression predicting relative tax payments in Experiment 2, 3, and 4.
Experiment
Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Predictor ΔR2 β ΔR2 β ΔR2 β
Model .15*** .22*** .12***
Coercive Power (CP) .14** .20***
Legitimate Power (LP) .33*** .12***
Sequence .07** .02 .04***
Condition .10 .05 -.04
CP X LP .01
CP X Sequence .04 .04
CP X Condition .02 .02
LP X Sequence .03 .01
LP X Condition -.05 .02
Sequence X Condition -.01 -.03 .02
CP X LP X Sequence -.01
CP X LP X Condition -.09**
CP X Sequence X Condition .00 .03
LP X Sequence X Condition -.02 -.01
Note. Repeated measure regression was clustered at the individual level, controlling for gender, age, income, nationality, employment, conditions of work
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Procedure. For Experiment 3, basically the same procedure as in Experiment 2 was ap-
plied. However, the description of the tax authorities depicted legitimate power instead of coer-
cive power as in Experiment 2. Again, participants were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions (two experimental conditions: low legitimate power (llp)! high legitimate power
(hlp), hlp! llp; two control conditions: llp! llp; hlp! hlp), in which the fictitious tax au-
thority held either low or high legitimate power.
Low/high legitimate power manipulation. The tax authority of Chomland calculated
that the tax revenue was about 200 billion ECU for the past year. Of this income, about 0.09/2
billion ECU was spent on the training of employees of the tax authority and on the advising
of taxpayers.
In general, the tax authority is little/very appreciated for its work. As it has provided bad/
good service so far, the taxpayers feel little/much obliged to cooperate.
The tax authority consists of early school leavers/experts who work with non-professional/
professional advice. For the tax authority, the accuracy of the tax returns is of low/high impor-
tance. It works on the basis of unlawful/lawful measures. Its working principles are based little/
particularly on the traceability of decisions.
Similar to Experiment 2, the power of the tax authority changed in the experimental condi-
tions during the life as taxpayers from low/high legitimate power to high/low legitimate power
(Table 1).
Results
Legitimate power on beliefs. A repeated measures regression (F(27, 129) = 22.17,
p< .001, R2 = .59) reveals a significant main effect of intensity of power, β = .69, t(129) =
13.23, p< .001 and a significant interaction effect of intensity of power and sequence, β = .14,
t(129) = 3.85, p< .001. As expected, the description of the tax authority as wielding low or
high legitimate power affects the participants’ beliefs regarding the tax authority’s power.
Whereas low legitimate power is perceived as significantly lower in the first sequence
(M = 3.48, SD = 1.64) than in the second sequence (M = 3.84, SD = 1.72), high legitimate
power is perceived as equally high in the first sequence (M = 4.51, SD = 1.57) and in the second
sequence (M = 4.76, SD = 1.39). Thus, descriptions of low and high legitimate power initiate
respective beliefs.
Legitimate power on tax evasion. Again, to test whether legitimate power has an impact
on tax payments, a repeated measures regression is conducted, analyzing all 40 periods of tax-
paying (Table 2). The model with all variables significantly predicts tax payments, F(27, 129) =
9.45, p< .001, R2 = .22. As expected, there is a significant main effect of intensity of power,
β = .33 t(129) = 6.86, p< .001, with higher tax payments in conditions with high legitimate
power than low legitimate power (Fig 2). The other main effects and interaction effects do not
reach significance, p> .22. Therefore, descriptions of legitimate power increase tax payments.
Contrast effect of legitimate power. Again, the impact of the contrast of power intensity
on tax payments is tested with an ANOVA to examine the difference between the tax payments
in all four treatment conditions (llp! hlp, hlp! llp, llp! llp, hlp! hlp) in the second se-
quence. The analysis shows that overall, the treatment conditions significantly differ, F(3, 126)
= 11.32, p< .001, ηp
2 = .21. Again, the post hoc analysis comparing the relevant experimental
and control conditions (llp! hlp versus hlp! hlp, hlp! llp versus llp! llp) reveals no sig-
nificant result: Participants in the experimental condition, who experienced a change from low
to high legitimate power, do not pay significantly more taxes than participants in the control
condition who experienced only high legitimate power (p = .59). Contrary to expectation, re-
sults revealed a tendency that a change from high to low legitimate power leads to higher tax
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payments (M = .62, SD = .29) than if the tax authority wields only low legitimate power
(M = .48, SD = .35; p = .06).
Experiment 4: Coercive and Legitimate Power Manipulated
Combined
Experiment 2 and 3 confirmed that descriptions of coercive power or legitimate power have an
impact on tax payments: in Experiment 4, both forms of power were combined with the same
design and material as in Experiments 2 and 3.
Materials and Procedures
Participants. Overall, 368 students (34% males,M[age] = 24.26, SD = 5.56) majoring in
different fields participated in the experiment. Again, 41% of participants had no experience
with the tax authority, the others mainly very little experience.
Procedure. For Experiment 4, basically the same procedure as in the other experiments
was applied. The description of the tax authority differed only in the combined display of coer-
cive and legitimate power of the tax authority. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
twelve treatment conditions (eight experimental conditions; four control conditions), in which
the fictitious tax authority are described as holding low or high coercive power and low or high
legitimate power.
Low/high coercive power and low/high legitimate powermanipulation. The tax authori-
ty of Chomland calculated that the tax revenue was about 200 billion ECU for the past year.
Of this income, about 0.09/2 billion ECU was spent on tax audits and punishments from
taxpayers and about 0.09/2 billion for the training of employees of the tax authority and on the
advising of taxpayers.
In general, the tax authority is known for its low/high penalties for tax evasion, and is little/
very appreciated for its work. It works on the basis of unlawful/lawfulmeasures as well as lax/
strict control measures. Since so far, it has rarely/always conducted strict audits, the taxpayers
feel little/very forced to cooperate.
The tax authority consists of employees who work with lax/strict controls.
In addition, the tax authority consists of early school leavers/experts who work with non-
professional/professional advice. Its working principles are based little/particularly on the trace-
ability of its decisions and little/particularly on the penalties for tax evasion.
As the authority has provided bad/good service so far, the taxpayers feel little/much obliged
to cooperate.
Fig 2. Experiment 3. The impact of low and high legitimate power on relative tax payments before and after
the change in tax authority. Note. llp . . . low legitimate power, hlp . . . high legitimate power.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123355.g002
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Overall, for the tax authority the severity of punishments for tax evasion is of little/high im-
portance and the accuracy of the tax returns is of little/high importance
In the experimental conditions, the tax authority was described as changing after 20 periods
from, e.g., high coercive power and low legitimate power to high coercive power and high legit-
imate power (Table 1).
Results
Coercive and legitimate power on beliefs. A repeated measure regression (F(34, 367) =
40.74, p< .001, R2 = .63) reveals a significant main effect of intensity of coercive power,
β = .77, t(367) = 25.44, p< .001 and a significant main effect of sequence, β = .07, t(367) = 3.77,
p< .001. As expected, the description of the tax authority as wielding low or high coercive
power affects the participant’s beliefs regarding the tax authority’s power. The perception of co-
ercive power was lower in the first sequence (M = 4.06, SD = 1.90) than in the second sequence
(M = 4.35, SD = 2.06).
The analysis for legitimate power (F(34, 367) = 19.80, p< .001, R2 = .50) reveals a significant
main effect of intensity of legitimate power, β = .62, t(367) = 16.87, p< .001 and a significant
interaction effect of intensity of legitimate power and condition, β = .13, t(367) = 3.41, p = .001.
In the experimental conditions, low legitimate power is perceived as significantly lower
(M = 3.11, SD = 0.94) than in the control conditions (M = 3.38, SD = 1.05), whereas high legiti-
mate power is perceived as higher (M = 5.05, SD = 1.04) in the experimental conditions than in
the control conditions (M = 4.79, SD = 0.87). Thus, descriptions of coercive and legitimate
power induce respective beliefs.
Coercive and legitimate power on tax evasion. To test the impact of the description on
tax payments a repeated measures regression is conducted, analyzing all 40 periods of taxpay-
ing (Table 2). The model with all variables significantly predicts tax payments, F(34, 367) =
4.86, p< .001, R2 = .12. As expected, there is a significant main effect of coercive power, β = .20
t(367) = 5.57, p< .001, as well as legitimate power, β = .12 t(367) = 3.04, p = .003. The descrip-
tion of high coercive power leads to significant higher tax compliance (M = .81, SD = .32) than
the description of low coercive power (M = .66, SD = .37). Likewise, a tax authority wielding
high legitimate power leads to significant higher tax compliance (M = .77, SD = .34) than a tax
authority wielding low legitimate power (M = .70, SD = .34). Additionally, a significant three-
way interaction effect of intensity of coercive power, legitimate power and condition, β = -.09,
t(367) = -2.88, p = .004 is found. In the control conditions, the combination of high coercive
and high legitimate power leads to significantly higher tax payments (M = .89, SD = .23) than
when only one quality of power was high (Mhcp = .73, SDhcp = .35;Mhlp = .68, SDhlp = .37). In
contrast, in the experimental conditions, the combination of low coercive and low legitimate
power leads to significantly lower tax payments (M = .58, SD = .38) than when one quality of
power is applied (Mhcp = .80, SDhcp = .31;Mhlp = .72, SDhlp = .36). The other main and interac-
tion effects do not reach significance, p> .22. Therefore, simultaneous descriptions of coercive
and legitimate power lead to an increase of tax payments. Fig 3a–3d provide an overview of the
relative tax payments in all 40 rounds, grouping together the experimental conditions with the
corresponding control conditions.
Contrast effects of coercive and legitimate power. The impact of a contrast of power is
tested with an ANOVA comparing tax payment in the second sequence. The analysis shows
that overall, the treatment conditions significantly differ, F(11, 356) = 4.98, p< .001, ηp
2 = .13.
A post hoc test shows that participants who experienced a change from ‘low coercive/high le-
gitimate power’ to ‘low coercive/low legitimate power’ declare less income (M = .52, SD = .37)
than the control group ‘low coercive/low legitimate power’ (M = .69, SD = .27; p = .02). All
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other relevant comparisons show no significant results, p> .24. Thus, from all eight possible
contrasting descriptions only one has an impact, i.e., the contrast from high to low legitimate
power when it is combined with low coercive power.
General Discussion
Based on the neo-classical economic model of tax evasion [13–15], the severity of fines is one
key determinant for taxpayers’ decisions to evade taxes. When integrating the economic deter-
minants of Experiment 1 (40% tax rate; 15% audit probability; 0.5 vs. 1 vs. 2 times fine) into the
economic model of tax evasion [16], the rational decision should always be to fully evade taxes,
as the expected utility of paying honestly is always lower. Nevertheless, tax evasion is low in all
conditions, regardless of the amount of fines. It seems that participants base their tax decision
on beliefs regarding tax authority’s power rather than on objective information about the fine
rate. This finding is in line with earlier research showing that taxpayers find it hard to deal with
economic key figures [18,30,31]. Additional experiments were conducted to examine whether
descriptions of the tax authority affect participants’ beliefs regarding tax authority’s power and
further affect tax evasion, while all economic key figures, including the fine rate are held con-
stant. Three laboratory experiments confirmed that the description of a tax authority and
therefore additional information about coercive and legitimate power has an effect on beliefs
on tax authority’s power and most interestingly on tax payments. The positive impact of coer-
cive power is in line with earlier research that stresses the effectiveness of informing taxpayers
about coercive means [4–6]. Further, this result extends previous research by showing that
even when taxpayers have objective knowledge of audit probability and severity of fines, addi-
tional coercive information has an impact on tax evasion. Current findings therefore underline
the assumption that subjective beliefs on the probability may be more important for under-
standing tax evasion than objective criteria [2,18,30]. The impact of the description of legiti-
mate power on tax compliance supports the assumption that the perception of service
orientation leads to reciprocal behavior [1,12]. Thus, taxpayers are more likely to report their
income honest, when they think that the tax authority works in a way that is beneficial for
them. Current findings show that this effect still holds despite available information about eco-
nomic key figures.
Fig 3. Experiment 4. The impact of coercive power and legitimate power on relative tax payments. (a)
Relative tax payments in the experimental conditions and control conditions with high coercive power and
high legitimate power in the second sequence. (b) Relative tax payments in the experimental conditions and
control conditions with high coercive power and low legitimate power in the second sequence. (c) Relative tax
payments in the experimental conditions and control conditions with low coercive power and high legitimate
power in the second sequence. (d) Relative tax payments in the experimental conditions and control
conditions with low coercive power and low legitimate power in the second sequence. Note. lcp . . . low
coercive power, hcp . . . high coercive power, llp . . . low legitimate power, hlp . . . high legitimate power
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123355.g003
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An additional objective of the current paper was to investigate possible interaction effects of
tax authority’s power. A very important and new finding is that the effect of coercive and legiti-
mate power on tax payments still holds when both qualities of power are applied. However, un-
like assumed by previous studies on intended tax compliance [10], legitimate power did not
alter the effect of coercive power. Both qualities of power have a similar strong and indepen-
dent impact on tax compliance (Fig 4).
The current study analyzes possible contrast effects of the description of a tax authority.
Contrary to expectations, the contrast of descriptions has little impact on tax evasion. A con-
trast effect was not found when coercive power and legitimate power are described solely. The
description of both qualities of power only leads to a contrast effect in one of eight conditions.
When the tax authority is described as holding low coercive power, a decrease in legitimate
power leads to higher tax evasion than in the control condition. Future research needs to clarify
if and why a decline in perceived legitimacy is more severe for tax compliance than a decline in
perceived coercion. For that, additional laboratory experiments and field experiments are need-
ed to clarify this important practical impact.
Like all laboratory experiments, the current study has some limitations; the ecological validi-
ty of the results can be questioned. The fact that the amount of tax payments were unrelated to
the well-being of the ‘society’ of the fictitious country does not fully represent the situation tax-
payers experience in the field. Nevertheless, considering this fact, the results might become
even more meaningful. In the current study, evading taxes was not harming anyone and would
therefore certainly be the profit-maximizing strategy. However, in no experimental condition
did average tax contributions ever drop below 40%; actually, they even reached 94% in one
treatment condition. Concerning the interpretation of the results, it has to be taken into ac-
count that additional information on tax authority’s coercive power may have increased
uncertainty, which is assumed to lead to reporting of more income [46,47]. Information on le-
gitimate power on the other hand includes the perception of the tax authority as doing a good
job and therefore may affect tax morale and social norms [48]. Especially the source of infor-
mation [33] may be relevant for the perception of social norms. Information on tax authority’s
power through informal communication with other taxpayers may affect the perception of so-
cial norms of cooperation, which are relevant determinants of tax compliance [49]. Further re-
search needs to clarify if the impact of additional information on tax evasion is mediated
through the perception of social norms or tax morale. The current studies cannot explain
whether additional information on power outweighs economic determinants or rather shapes
Fig 4. Forest Plot of regression coefficients for coercive power and legitimate power.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123355.g004
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the interpretation of economic key figures. It is needed to be investigated further, whether tax-
payer still believe in objective determinants, although they receive additional information.
It might be argued that the descriptions of the tax authorities in experiments 2–4 induce a
demand effect that participants feel forced to act according to the descriptions (c.f., [50,51,52]).
Although in principle this is correct, it is also the actual objective of the experiments to investi-
gate this effect (c.f., [53]). Further, the experimental setting reproduces taxpayers’ reality, who
are confronted rather with descriptions and stories of tax authorities than with economic key
figures. Thus, the experimental manipulation is increasing external validity (c.f., [54]).
In reality, taxpayers are confronted with a lot of information displaying the tax authority of
their country through several information sources. The manipulation in the current studies
compromises information on tax authority’s coercive and legitimate power, but cannot fully
represent the complexity of the presentation of the authority in reality. Field experiments as
well as further laboratory experiments should focus on how taxpayers deal with the wealth of
information they receive through various sources and how tax authority’s power should be dis-
played in order to be recognized by taxpayers.
Taxpayers’ beliefs about tax authority’s power may not only be modified by information
about the authority, but are likely to change according to the experience with the tax authority.
Beliefs may especially change after taxpayers experienced an audit. In the current study, partici-
pants only got to know at the end, which period was selected for tax audits and if they are au-
dited and fined or not. To further eliminate the impact of real life beliefs on the perception of
the fictitious tax authority, students were used as experimental participants, like in similar tax
experiments [31], as they are naïve regarding tax payments. The real life beliefs might have in-
terfered with the manipulated perception of the fictitious tax authority. It can be assumed that
actual information about the tax authority, for instance, through information letters or news-
paper articles, might be even more effective in collecting taxes than a simple description in an
experimental setting, and assure robustness and generalization of the findings. As taxpayers
usually lack information about the exact audit probabilities [55], official information of the tax
authority as well as unofficial information from other taxpayers may be an even more impor-
tant information source for tax decisions [33]. This certainly needs to be investigated further.
Concluding, the insight gained from the current study has a considerable scientific as well
as practical impact. It clearly demonstrated that despite the provision of objective economic
figures, such as audit probability and fines, the subjective perception of power of the tax au-
thority impacts tax payments. From a scientific perspective, this finding is particularly impor-
tant for field experiments or laboratory experiments, where descriptions or vignettes are used
to inform participants about the tax authority. According to the current results, researchers
should pay attention on how they supply information since more information is needed to
fully understand the interaction of different qualities of power. From a practical perspective,
the study sheds some light on the effect of the perception of the tax authority’s power on tax
compliance. Perception of power is modified by the information provided by the tax authority.
Thus, sending letters or changing the presentation by means of public information sources are
a field for future research [1]. As audits are costly for the tax authority and the government and
large fines are recommended to be utilized only when absolutely necessary [56], such strategies
could be considered as alternatives to lower the cost for levying taxes [4,5,26].
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The execution of coercive and legitimate power by an authority assures cooperation
and prohibits free-riding. While coercive power can be comprised of severe punishment
and strict monitoring, legitimate power covers expert, and informative procedures. The
perception of these powers wielded by authorities stimulates specific cognitions: trust,
relational climates, and motives. With four experiments, the single and combined impact
of coercive and legitimate power on these processes and on intended cooperation of
n1 = 120, n2 = 130, n3 = 368, and n4 = 102 student participants is investigated
within two exemplary contexts (tax contributions, insurance claims). Findings reveal
that coercive power increases an antagonistic climate and enforced compliance,
whereas legitimate power increases reason-based trust, a service climate, and voluntary
cooperation. Unexpectedly, legitimate power is additionally having a negative effect on
an antagonistic climate and a positive effect on enforced compliance; these findings lead
to a modification of theoretical assumptions. However, solely reason-based trust, but not
climate perceptions and motives, mediates the relationship between power and intended
cooperation. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
Keywords: coercive power, legitimate power, trust, authority, cooperation
INTRODUCTION
In a community, contributions to public goods are often obligatory (e.g., paying taxes in order
to finance health services), but some individuals exploit the vulnerable system, refraining from
participation, and consequently free ride (Marwell and Ames, 1979). Paying taxes and filing
insurance claims are classic real world examples of the free-rider problem. Thus, communities
employ regulating formal authorities (e.g., tax administration, insurance companies) with legal
measures to persuade free-riders to follow their obligations and to contribute for the benefit of
the community. Thereby, we define authorities as processes or individuals which organize the
cooperation in a community by an assigned social position that allows to create and maintain
environments and thereby influence the behavior of individuals (cf. Andringa et al., 2013). In
the current article, we focus on formal authorities. Such authorities have different mechanisms to
foster cooperation: the coercive power and the legitimate power (Andreoni et al., 1998; Braithwaite,
2009; Gangl et al., 2013). Employing coercive power, an authority manages behavior with strict
monitoring and heavy punishment whereas by using the legitimate power approach, an authority
operates through legitimacy of its position, expertise, a policy to disseminate relevant information,
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and its ability to make others identify with it (Andreoni et al.,
1998; Braithwaite, 2009; Gangl et al., 2013, 2015). The slippery
slope framework (Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al., 2015)
postulates that the perception of both kinds of power stimulate
cooperative behavior, but that the underlying cognitions differ.
We shed light on the cognitions that are elicited via coercive
and legitimate power of authorities and in turn impact the
intention to cooperate. Earlier research shows that coercive
power and legitimate power both enhance cooperation in
public good dilemmas, where individual interests collide with
collective ones (Masclet et al., 2003; Tyler, 2006; Van Lange
et al., 2013; Hartl et al., 2015). However, the actual underlying
cognitions responsible for the increase in cooperation are not
well-understood.
According to the slippery slope framework the perception of
authorities’ power is assumed to impact individuals’ cognitions,
such as trust in authorities (implicit and reason-based trust),
the relational climate (antagonistic and service climate), and
motives for contribution (enforced compliance, voluntary
cooperation; Gangl et al., 2015). Implicit trust is diminished when
authorities apply coercive power; in contrast, reason-based trust
is strengthened by legitimate power. Coercive power induces
an antagonistic climate between authorities and individuals.
Legitimate power stimulates a service climate. Finally, coercive
power leads to enforced compliance, and legitimate power results
in voluntarily cooperation.
In this paper, we investigate the cognitions that operate
when coercive and legitimate power are wielded to prohibit
free-riding (e.g., tax evasion and insurance fraud). The study
investigates how coercive power and legitimate power solely or
in combination over perceptions of power influence trust in
authorities, the climate between authorities and individuals, and
the motives of cooperation. Additionally, it analyzes whether
the cognitions such as trust, perceived relational climates or
motives, mediate the relationship between power and intention
to cooperate.
In the remainder of this article, the impact of coercive power
and legitimate power on cooperation, trust, relational climates,
and motives are defined. Three laboratory experiments in the
tax context and one online experiment in the insurance context
are described, each assessing the impact of power. Finally, we
discuss the results and identify their theoretical and practical
implications for legislation and law enforcement.
THE IMPACT OF POWER ON
COOPERATION
Power is conceptualized as the capacity of an organization or
person to influence another parties’ behavior (e.g., Freiberg, 2010;
Gangl et al., 2015). Following theory on power (cf. harsh vs.
soft power in Raven et al., 1998; coercion vs. persuasion and
authority in Turner, 2005; instrumental vs. normative in Tyler
et al., 2010) we distinguish between two primary concepts of
power, coercive power based on deterrence and legitimate power
based on persuasion (Gangl et al., 2015). Coercive power is
defined as “harsh” power, as the capacity to detect and sanction
unlawful behavior (Raven et al., 1998; Turner, 2005). Legitimate
power is defined as “soft” power and refers to the power of
position, expertise, dissemination of relevant information, and
identification (Raven et al., 1998, cf. Tyler, 2006). Thus, legitimate
power is defined by formal and informal rules established by a
rightfully elected government (power of position), and by their
knowledge about skillful procedures (power of expertise). In
addition, information power and power of identification are seen
as means of legitimate power, whereby information, for example,
is given on how to behave in accordance with the law, and
identification with the authority means that individuals identify
with the ideas of the authority such as a specific political party.
Coercive power and legitimate power are two independent
forms, which can be wielded exclusively or in combination
(cf. French and Raven, 1959; Raven, 1992, 1993; Raven et al.,
1998). For instance, wielding coercive power by threatening
severe sanctions for unwanted behavior alone is not enough
to explain compliant and cooperative behavior (Fehr and Falk,
2002); underlying cognitions such as expectations (Copeland
and Cuccia, 2002), reciprocity (Feld and Frey, 2007), and
fairness (e.g., Hartner-Tiefenthaler et al., 2012) additionally
encourage cooperation. In line with these aspects, we argue that
legitimate power, such as distributing information about what
the “morally” desired behavior is and the expertly handling
of members’ contributions to the communal good, becomes
important. Empirical evidence shows that coercive power, as
well as legitimate power, has a positive impact on cooperative
behavior (e.g., Tyler et al., 2010; Hofmann et al., 2014; Hartl et al.,
2015). An interaction effect of coercive and legitimate power on
cooperation has not been found (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2014; Hartl
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, theoretically we would expect that the
combination of coercive power and legitimate power is affecting
the cognitions underlying cooperative behavior via perception of
power (Gangl et al., 2015). Thus, although cooperation might be
the same, the underlying cognitions are supposed to be different.
POWER AND TRUST
The application of power is strongly related to trust, whereby
trust means “to be vulnerable to the actions of another party
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to
monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, p.
712). However, the exact nature of the dynamics and relationship
between power and trust is not clear. Power was shown to
decrease but also to increase trust in authorities (Bachmann,
2001; Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005; Mulder et al., 2006;
Weibel, 2007; Chenhall et al., 2010; Fu et al., 2013). One reason
for the divergent results might be that the decision to trust can
be either based on reasons or taken implicitly (Castelfranchi and
Falcone, 2010), resulting in two forms of trust: implicit trust
(system 1 trust) and reason-based trust (system 2 trust). Implicit
trust is defined as an automatic and unintentional reaction to
stimuli that are associated with positive past experiences or
a shared identity. For instance, a taxpayer trusts implicitly in
a tax authority, if s/he feels trust immediately without any
considerations; this automatic reaction can stem from past
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positive experiences that ended in a learning process that the
tax authority can be trusted. Reason-based trust is defined
as a deliberate decision to trust another party based on the
evaluation of the other parties’ good intentions and internal and
external fostering and hindering circumstances to comply with
the good intentions (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). Such as
a taxpayer weighs whether a tax authority is to be trusted by
considering whether the tax authority is pursuing a goal that
is valuable to the taxpayer, whether the tax authority is acting
motivated, benevolently, and competently, and whether there
are external factors fostering or hindering the tax authority’s
actions.
The slippery slope framework argues that coercive power
damages implicit trust (Gangl et al., 2015); as coercion signals
authorities’ distrust, it may weaken affective and social bonds
with authorities, thereby interrupting habitual and implicit
cooperation (Kramer, 1999; Das and Teng, 2001). Legitimate
power, on the other hand, strengthens trust (Fu et al., 2013); when
authorities are perceived as knowledgeable and legitimate in
their position, reason-based trust increases. Perceived assistance
by experts who work on a transparent legal basis provides
many reasons to trust in the competence, motivation, and
benevolence of authorities (Bijlsma-Frankema and Van de Bunt,
2002; Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). For reason-based trust,
a strong relationship with legitimate power is assumed because
authorities with high levels of legitimate power are perceived as
being competent to provide assistance and support (Gangl et al.,
2015).
The direct impact of power on trust might in turn also
impact cooperation. Thus, trust might be a mediator for the
relationship between power and cooperation. However, up to
now, most empirical research treats trust as a moderator of
the impact of power on cooperation. A meta-analysis shows
that power in a trusted environment leads to more cooperation
than does power that is exerted in a low-trust environment
(Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). Furthermore, experiments show
that sanctions exerted by trusted authorities, compared to
non-trusted authorities, evoke stronger moral judgments about
free-riders (Mulder et al., 2009). There is empirical evidence
that power also directly impacts trust (Kramer, 1999; Bijlsma-
Frankema and Costa, 2005; Fu et al., 2013). Thus, we assume
that trust is not only a moderator but also a mediator between
power and cooperation. Coercive and legitimate power impact
trust and might consequently influence cooperation with the
authorities.
POWER AND RELATIONAL CLIMATES
The slippery slope framework postulates that exerting power
establishes specific relational climates, whereby climate is defined
as the perceived quality of interaction between authorities and
individuals (Victor and Cullen, 1988; Martin and Cullen, 2006).
This is a “psychological climate that characterizes climate as an
individual-level and personal perception” (Ehrhart et al., 2013, p.
70). Two climates can be distinguished in relation to power, the
antagonistic climate and the service climate (Kirchler et al., 2008;
Gangl et al., 2015). Coercive power and negative experiences
with authority trigger an aversive antagonistic climate in which
distrust prevails. In such a climate, the authority convicts
members of misconduct and suspects others as criminals. In
turn, individuals hide from the authority, which justifies stricter
controls and sanctions that intensify the vicious circle of distrust
(Kirchler et al., 2008).
In contrast, legitimate power and positive impressions of
the authorities’ intents and work lead to a friendly relational
climate in which the authority acts client-oriented. In such a
service climate, the authority presents all necessary information
for the community members to behave in accordance with the
rules. It applies services to support members’ cooperation (e.g.,
preprinted tax forms) to make cooperation easier and non-
cooperation more difficult (Gangl et al., 2015).
Empirical research on the impact of power on climates is rare
(Alm and Torgler, 2006; Hofmann et al., 2014). Derived from a
study on the relationship commitment of business partners (Fu
et al., 2013), connections between power and the service climate
can be assumed. Legitimate power relates positively to a service
climate (i.e., relationship commitment), whereas coercive power
relates negatively to it. Based on these results, we predict that
in general, coercive power stimulates an antagonistic climate,
whereas legitimate power stimulates a service climate. However,
the effects on climate when coercive power and legitimate power
are exerted simultaneously are not clear as empirical studies are
lacking.
POWER AND MOTIVES FOR
COOPERATION
Forms of power also encourage different motives for cooperation
(Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al., 2015). The punishment aspect
of coercive power prompts enforced compliance as threat of
severe punishment. Thus, enforced compliance is defined as
motive to cooperate because of the deterrent effect of monitoring
and punishment (Kirchler et al., 2008). Enforced motivation
only leads to cooperation when individuals fear monitoring
and punishment and therefore think there is no alternative to
comply with the rules (van Meegeren, 2001; Kirchler et al.,
2008). Coercive power is effective as long as there are sufficient
resources to detect breaches of rules and to undertake subsequent
punishment (Becker, 1968; Mulder et al., 2009). In cases in which
violations are not discovered or not avenged, coercive power is
perceived as weak and, therefore, enforced motives, as well as
cooperation decline.
Legitimate power, on the other hand, increases voluntary
cooperation. Voluntary cooperation is defined as a motivation to
cooperate with the authorities because one wants to reciprocate
the positive experience gained through applied legitimate power
(Kelman, 2006). Legitimate power activates a felt urge to
reciprocate the legitimate treatment (Feld and Frey, 2007).
Thus, individuals voluntarily accept their obligation to cooperate.
Authorities support customers and clients (e.g., tax authorities
offer pre-printed forms that can be submitted without the need
for the taxpayer to fill in the form) so that cooperation is
perceived as easy and a natural reciprocal act. Although, coercive
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power and legitimate power are assumed to increase cooperation,
the rationale behind cooperation differs fundamentally1.
When coercive and legitimate power are applied together,
the resulting motives to comply are unclear. Although, results
indicate cooperative behavior based on coercive and legitimate
power, the underlying cognitions are still unexplored (Hofmann
et al., 2014; Hartl et al., 2015). First, empirical evidence indicates
that people cooperate voluntarily when legitimate power is high,
but only under the condition that rule-breakers can be punished
(Kroll et al., 2007). Thus, the combination of coercive and
legitimate power seems to increase voluntary cooperation and
enforced compliance. In general we assume that the combination
of coercive power and legitimate has the same impact as if
coercive power and legitimate power were applied solely.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
We examine the cognitions underlying the intentions to
cooperate in different social dilemma situations. In order to
investigate differences in cognitions induced by extremely low
or high levels of coercive and/or extremely low or high levels
of legitimate power an experimental design is opted for. The
experiments allow for controlling other possible influences and
showing the pure influence of coercive and legitimate power.
The current studies were embedded in a broader research
program testing the impact of the two forms of power—solely
and combined. Hartl et al. (2015) examined the impact of
beliefs of coercive and legitimate power on tax behavior and
found a significant effect of both on experimental cooperative
behavior. However, so far, the underlying and probablymediating
cognitions of why people intent to cooperate with authority have
not been analyzed. Hence, this study investigates the underlying
cognitions of this behavior. As such, we analyze intended tax
compliance but not behavior (partial correlation controlling for
conditions between tax honesty intention and tax payments is
r = 0.58, p < 0.001 in Study 1, r = 0.60, p < 0.001 in Study 2,
and r = 0.64, p < 0.001 in Study 3). We examine the following
three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Coercive power leads to low levels of implicit trust,
an antagonistic climate, and enforced compliance.
Hypothesis 1b:Coercive power leads to low levels of implicit trust,
an antagonistic climate, and enforced compliance, when at the
same time legitimate power is wielded.
Hypothesis 2a: Legitimate power leads to reason-based trust, a
service climate, and voluntary cooperation.
Hypothesis 2b: Legitimate power leads to reason-based trust, a
service climate, and voluntary cooperation, when at the same time
coercive power is wielded.
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between coercive power and/or
legitimate power and intended cooperation is mediated by
1Although, enforced compliance and voluntary cooperation seem similar to the
concept of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000), this is not
the case. While enforced compliance is comparable to extrinsic motivation based
on external regulation, voluntary cooperation can neither be classified as other
forms of extrinsic (based on introjection, identification, integration) or intrinsic
information, because it is actually a reciprocal act.
implicit trust, reason-based trust, the antagonistic climate, the
service climate, enforced compliance and voluntary cooperation.
To test these hypotheses, following standard procedures (cf.
Kirchler et al., 2009) we conducted laboratory experiments and
an online experiment. In the laboratory experiments, participants
imagined being a taxpayer in a fictitious country (Chomland)
in which tax authorities wield coercive power (Study 1) or
legitimate power (Study 2) exclusively or in combination (Study
3). In the online experiment, coercive and legitimate power were
manipulated in combination, but rather than investigating tax
compliance, the decision concerned an insurance claim (Study 4).
To measure the level of cooperation, participants had to
decide how much of their income they declare honestly to
pay taxes and how much they claim at the insurance for
compensation, respectively. For reasons of comparison, the
designs of the four studies and the procedures are similar,
facilitating conclusions on the effects of the different forms of
power across various contexts. A between-subjects design of the
laboratory experiments assured that participants were confronted
with low or high forms of power.




In all, 120 students (64%men,Mage = 24.48, SD= 5.85) majoring
in several different disciplines participated on a voluntary basis
and were paid according to their behavior in the experiment. As
student populations are specifically naïve regarding experiences
with tax authorities and our hypotheses, they specifically suit
hypotheses testing in this context (Mittone, 2006).
Experimental Design and Procedure
The study was conducted by randomly assigning participants to
one of two conditions. All participants were asked to imagine
being self-employed taxpayers in the fictitious country Chomland
with a hypothetical tax authority (for similar tax experiments see,
e.g., Kirchler et al., 2009; Andrighetto et al., 2016). Specifically
participants learnt “In each period a certain income is allocated
to you, of which you have to pay taxes. The tax rate is 40% of
your income. In each period your final income is the result of
the allocated income minus the taxes paid. At the end of the
experiment one period will be selected randomly. The income
that you have gained in this period will be paid to you by the
experimenter. Additionally, for each period there exists a tax
audit probability of 15%. In case you are audited and you have
evaded taxes, you have to pay back the evaded amount plus a fine
of 1 time the evaded amount.” The final income was paid out by
the experimenter.
In the two conditions, the tax authority held either low or high
levels of coercive power. A tax authority with low/high levels of
coercive power was, for example, described as “... well-known for
its lenient/hard sanctions.” After participants were introduced
to the experimental set-up, a taxpayer’s life was simulated using
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were asked
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to answer two items about their intention to pay taxes honestly
in this situation (tax honesty intention, two items; e.g., “How
likely is it that you, as a citizen of Chomland, state your income
and expenses totally correctly?”). After that, participants paid
their taxes, whereby at the end of the experiment participants
were remunerated based on their behavior [participants received
on average 5.99 EUR (SD = 1.22) or 7.66 USD (SD = 1.56),
respectively].
Material
In all treatment conditions, participants had to fill out a
questionnaire. The questionnaire assessed implicit trust (three
items; e.g., “I trust the tax authority in Chomland without
thinking about it.”), reason-based trust (seven items; e.g., “I trust
the tax authority in Chomland because it gives me competent
advice.”), the antagonistic climate (three items; e.g., “Between the
tax authority in Chomland and taxpayers there exists a climate of
ruthlessness.”), the service climate (three items; e.g., “Between the
tax authority in Chomland and taxpayers there exists a climate
that is characterized by its service-oriented nature.”), enforced
compliance (three items; e.g., “When I pay taxes according to the
law in Chomland, I do so because the tax authority often carries
out audits.”), and voluntary cooperation (three items; e.g., “When
I pay taxes according to the law in Chomland, I do so because
the tax authority supports taxpayers who make unintentional
mistakes.”). As a manipulation check, we asked participants’
perceptions of the tax authority’s coercive power (four items;
e.g., “I believe that the tax authority persecutes taxpayers with
audits and fines.”) and legitimate power (22 items; e.g., “I
believe that the tax authority knows how to give good advice to
taxpayers.”) by adapting published scales from the organizational
context (Hinkin and Schriesheim, 1989; Raven et al., 1998) to
the tax context (all items are listed in Supplementary Material).
The scale of legitimate power compounded four sub-scales
(legitimacy, expertise, information, identification), but for the
sake of simplicity and due to the tested measurement models,
the sub-scales were combined into one scale. Responses were
indicated on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“I totally
disagree”) to 7 (“I totally agree”). Cronbach’s α for the eight scales
were excellent and can be found in Table 1.
Socio-demographics (gender, age, income, nationality,
employment, form of employment, working hours, and
experience with tax authorities) were also assessed.
Results
Preliminary Data Analyses
To check whether the manipulation of coercive power was
successful, an ANOVA2 was performed with the perceptions of
coercive power as the dependent variable. The results showed that
the manipulation was successful as low (cplow) and high (cphigh)
levels of perceptions regarding coercive power were in line with
the manipulation (cplow:M = 2.60, SD = 1.34; cphigh:M = 5.51,
SD= 1.37; Table 1). The manipulation of coercive power had no
significant effect on the perceptions of legitimate power (Table 1).
2All ANOVAs (studies 1–4) were also undertaken as ANCOVAs with socio-
demographic control variables, resulting in the same results as the reported
ANOVA results.
TABLE 1 | Study 1: Results of the ANOVAs with coercive power as
independent variable.
Dependent variables α F (df1, df2) p ηp
2
Perceptions of coercive power 0.93 139.26 (1, 118) <0.001 0.54
Perceptions of legitimate power 0.90 0.37 (1, 118) 0.55 <0.01
Implicit trust 0.89 3.27 (1, 118) 0.07 0.03
Reason-based trust 0.84 0.00 (1, 118) 1.00 <0.01
Antagonistic climate 0.78 9.80 (1, 118) <0.01 0.08
Service climate 0.76 1.00 (1, 118) 0.32 0.01
Enforced compliance 0.94 57.97 (1, 118) <0.001 0.33
Voluntary cooperation 0.74 0.03 (1, 118) 0.87 <0.01
Intended tax honesty 0.90 6.61 (1, 118) <0.05 0.05
α, Cronbach α.
Participants experiencing low or high levels of coercive power
reported equal perceptions of legitimate power (cplow:M = 4.13,
SD= 1.04; cphigh:M = 4.24, SD= 0.90; see Table 1).
Coercive Power
The impact of coercive power on trust, climates, and motives
To test Hypothesis 1a, ANOVAs were conducted, including
coercive power (low vs. high) as factor variables and implicit
and reason-based trust, antagonistic and service climate, and
enforced compliance and voluntary cooperation as dependent
variables (see Table 1 for ANOVA results; for a graphical
representation see Figure 1 in the Discussion Section). As
expected, coercive power showed a tendency to decrease implicit
trust (cplow: M = 2.43, SD = 1.70; cphigh: M = 1.93, SD
= 1.31; Table 1). Furthermore, no matter whether participants
experienced low or high levels of coercive power, they reported
an equal intensity of reason-based trust (cplow: M = 3.50, SD =
1.28; cphigh:M = 3.50, SD= 1.25; Table 1).
Regarding the perception of the relational climate, the analysis
showed that, as expected, high levels of coercive power led to a
higher perception of an antagonistic climate (cphigh: M = 3.86,
SD = 1.68) compared to when coercive power was low (cplow:M
= 2.96, SD = 1.47; Table 1). Service climate was not affected by
different levels of coercive power (cplow: M = 3.34, SD = 1.61;
cphigh:M = 3.05, SD= 1.55; Table 1).
Regarding the motives for cooperation, as expected,
participants felt more enforced to comply when coercive
power was high (cphigh: M = 5.27, SD = 1.80) rather than low
(cplow: M = 2.73, SD = 1.86; Table 1). Participants experiencing
low or high levels of coercive power reported equal levels of
voluntary cooperation (cplow: M = 3.56, SD = 1.51; cphigh: M =
3.61, SD= 1.42; see Table 1).
The mediating role of implicit trust, the antagonistic climate,
and enforced compliance
Investigating Hypothesis 3 regarding whether implicit trust, the
perception of the antagonistic climate and enforced compliance
mediate the relationship between coercive power and the
intention to pay taxes honestly, we first tested, using an ANOVA,
whether or not the manipulation of coercive power impacted the
intention to pay taxes honestly. The manipulation of high levels
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TABLE 2 | Study 1: Mediation analysis from coercive power to tax honesty intention (THI) (standard errors in parentheses).
Path coefficients Indirect effects
To THI To IT To AC To EC Estimate Sobel Z Symmetric 95% CI
From coercive power (CP) 0.77 (0.38) −0.50 (0.28) 0.90 (0.29) 2.54 (0.33)
From implicit trust (IT) 0.28 (0.10)
From antagonistic climate (AC) −0.03 (0.11)
From enforced compliance (EC) 0.08 (0.90)
CP→IT→THI −0.14 (0.10) −1.505 −0.31; −0.01
CP→AC→THI −0.03 (0.10) −0.271 −0.20; 0.13
CP→EC→THI 0.21 (0.24) 0.088 −0.17; 0.61
of coercive power lead to higher tax honesty intention (M = 4.92,
SD = 1.70) compared to low levels of coercive power (M = 4.10,
SD= 1.78; Table 1).
In a second step, we applied the program Mediate (Hayes
et al., 2011) to test whether the relationship between coercive
power and tax honesty intention is mediated by the proposed
variables (i.e., implicit trust, antagonistic climate, and enforced
compliance) at the same time. With this method, we received
outcomes on simple (mediators and criterion regressing
on predictor) and multivariate linear regressions (criterion
regressing on mediators and on predictor; Hayes et al., 2011;
Hayes, 2013).
The mediator analysis revealed one indirect effect from
coercive power to tax honesty intention, the relation was only
found to be mediated by implicit trust (95% CI [−0.31; −0.01];
Table 2). However, Sobel test statistics (Sobel test = −1.51, p =
0.13) do not indicate a significant mediation.
Discussion
As predicted, coercive power generally has a negative impact
on implicit trust and initiates the perception of an antagonistic
climate and enforced compliance, overall confirming hypothesis
1a. Coercive power applied alone does not impact reason-
based trust, the perception of a service climate or voluntary
cooperation. In addition, the relationship between coercive
power and intended tax honesty seems not to be mediated.
Implicit trust, a perceived antagonistic climate and the enforced
motive to cooperate are not mediators. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not
confirmed.




Overall, 130 students (60% men, Mage = 24.40, SD = 4.86)
majoring in different fields participated on a voluntary basis and
were paid based on their behavior in the experiment. Again,
this population was selected because of their naivety regarding
experiences with tax authorities (Mittone, 2006).
TABLE 3 | Study 2: Results of the ANOVAs with legitimate power as
independent variable.
Dependent variables α F (df1, df2) p ηp
2
Perceptions of coercive power 0.89 13.38 (1, 128) <0.001 0.10
Perceptions of legitimate power 0.95 79.66 (1, 128) <0.001 0.38
Implicit trust 0.88 1.84 (1, 128) 0.18 0.01
Reason-based trust 0.89 59.04 (1, 128) <0.001 0.32
Antagonistic climate 0.83 41.15 (1, 128) <0.001 0.24
Service climate 0.88 47.11 (1, 128) <0.001 0.27
Enforced compliance 0.91 19.75 (1, 128) <0.001 0.13
Voluntary cooperation 0.85 13.81 (1, 128) <0.001 0.10
Intended tax honesty 0.78 20.38 (1, 128) <0.001 0.14
α, Cronbach α.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The experimental design and procedure was similar to Study
1. Two conditions were used, in which the tax authority was
described as holding either low or high levels of legitimate
power. The tax authority with low levels of legitimate power was
characterized as being, for example, “poorly appreciated for its
work”; the ones holding high levels of legitimate power were
presented as, for example, being “highly appreciated for its work.”
The scenario contains all aspects of legitimate power (legitimacy,
expertise, dissemination of information, and identification).
Cronbach’s α for the eight scales were excellent and can be found
in Table 3. The participants were remunerated according to their
behavior and received, on average, 6.40 EUR (SD = 1.38) or 8.18
USD (SD= 1.76), respectively.
Results
Preliminary Data Analyses
The manipulation was successful as low and high levels
of legitimate power induced perceptions according to the
manipulation (lplow: M = 3.16, SD = 1.05; lphigh: M = 4.89,
SD = 1.16; Table 2). Surprisingly, the analysis showed that the
manipulation of legitimate power had a significant impact on
the perceptions of coercive power (Table 3). The perceptions of
coercive power were higher when legitimate power was high
(lphigh: M = 4.51, SD = 1.57) rather than low (lplow: M = 3.48,
SD= 1.64).
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TABLE 4 | Study 2: Mediation analysis from legitimate power to tax honesty intention (THI) (standard errors in parentheses).
Path coefficients Indirect effects
To THI To RBT To SC To VC Estimate Sobel Z Symmetric 95% CI
From legitimate power (LP) 0.79 (0.32) 1.74 (0.23) 1.89 (0.28) 1.06 (0.29)
From reason-based trust (RBT) 0.28 (0.15)
From service climate (SC) −0.10 (0.11)
From voluntary cooperation (VC) 0.09 (0.11)
LP→RBT→THI 0.48 (0.27) 1.812 0.05; 0.94
LP→SC→THI −0.18 (0.20) 0.900 −0.51; 0.15
LP→VC→THI 0.09 (0.12) 0.798 −0.09; 0.30
Legitimate Power
The impact of legitimate power on trust, climates, and
motives.
Testing Hypothesis 2a, ANOVAs were conducted including
legitimate power (low vs. high) as factor and implicit and
reason-based trust, antagonistic and service climate and enforced
compliance and voluntary cooperation as dependent variables
(see Table 3 for ANOVA results; for a graphical representation
see Figure 1 in the Discussion Section). Regardless of whether
or not participants experienced low or high levels of legitimate
power, they reported an equal intensity of implicit trust (lplow:
M = 1.97, SD = 1.55; lphigh: M = 2.34, SD = 1.54; see Table 3).
As expected, participants experiencing high levels of legitimate
power reported high levels of reason-based trust (lplow:M= 2.55,
SD= 1.09; lphigh:M = 4.29, SD= 1.48; see Table 3).
Regarding the perception of the relational climate,
unexpectedly the analysis revealed that low levels of legitimate
power led to a higher perception of an antagonistic climate (lplow:
M = 4.47, SD = 1.47) compared to when legitimate power was
high (lphigh: M = 2.80, SD = 1.48). In line with the hypothesis,
the perception of a service climate increased with legitimate
power (lplow: M = 2.57, SD = 1.50; lphigh: M = 4.46, SD = 1.64;
see Table 3).
Regarding the motives for cooperation, participants in the
condition of high levels of legitimate power felt more enforced to
comply (lphigh:M= 4.70, SD= 1.68) compared to participants in
the condition of low levels of legitimate power (lplow: M = 3.36,
SD = 1.75). In line with predictions, participants experiencing
high levels of legitimate power reported higher levels of voluntary
cooperation (lphigh: M = 3.90, SD = 1.61) than did participants
experiencing low levels of legitimate power (lplow: M = 2.84, SD
= 1.65; see Table 3).
The mediating role of reason-based trust, the service climate,
and voluntary cooperation.
Testing Hypothesis 3, we first investigated for the impact of
legitimate power on tax honesty intention. The ANOVA revealed
that high levels of legitimate power lead to higher tax honesty
intention (M = 4.92, SD = 1.43) compared to low levels of
legitimate power (M = 3.74, SD= 1.55; Table 3).
In a second step, we used Mediate (Hayes et al., 2011) for
the mediator analysis. The findings showed that an indirect
effect from legitimate power to tax honesty intention was solely
explained by reason-based trust (95% CI [0.05; 0.94]; Table 4).
Also Sobel test statistics (Sobel test= 1.81, p= 0.07; RM = 0.62
3)
do by trend indicate this significant mediation.
Discussion
Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, high levels of legitimate power
have a positive effect on reason-based trust, on the perception of a
service climate and on voluntary cooperation. Not hypothesized,
high levels of legitimate power also increase perceptions of
coercive power, and higher enforced compliance. Furthermore,
legitimate power profoundly reduces the perception of an
antagonistic climate. Although, coercive power was assumed to
be the only quality of power to have an impact on enforced
compliance and the perception of an antagonistic climate,
the findings point out that legitimate power is additionally
interfering. Regarding Hypothesis 3, only reason-based trust
is by trend mediating the relationship between legitimate
power and tax honesty intention. In the third experiment, the
relationship between coercive power and legitimate power is
examined.
STUDY 3: COERCIVE POWER AND




Analogous to Study 1 and 2, 368 students (34% men, Mage =
24.26, SD = 5.56) majoring in different disciplines participated
in the experiment and were paid based on their behavior in the
experiment.
Experimental Design and Procedure
Experimental design and procedure were similar to Studies 1 and
2, but four conditions were designed in which the hypothetical
tax authority held either low or high levels of coercive power
and low or high levels of legitimate power. The combination of
low/high levels of coercive power and low/high levels of legitimate
power was operationalized through scenarios (e.g., “In general,
3We us RM, the ration of the indirect effect to the direct effect, as an effect size for
the mediation (Preacher and Kelley, 2011).
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the tax authority is known for its low/high penalties for tax
evasion, and is little/very appreciated for its work.”). Cronbach’s
α’s are excellent and are presented in Table 3. Participants
were remunerated according to their behavior and received,
on average, 6.21 EUR (SD = 1.32) or 7.94 USD (SD = 1.69),
respectively.
Results
In the following, only hypothesized and/or significant results are
reported; however, for completeness, Table 5 displays all findings
independently of whether or not they were significant.
Preliminary Data Analyses
Checking the coercive power manipulation with the participants’
perceptions of coercive power, the ANOVA showed that low
and high levels of coercive power conditions induced respective
perceptions (cplow:M = 2.67, SD= 1.21; cphigh:M = 5.50, SD=
1.33; Table 5).
Likewise, a manipulation check for legitimate power
confirmed the manipulation (Table 5). Participants experiencing
high levels of legitimate power reported perceptions of higher
legitimate power (lphigh: M = 4.82, SD = 0.94) than did
participants who experienced low levels of legitimate power
(lplow: M = 3.20, SD = 0.99). Similar to Study 2, the analysis
showed that the manipulation of legitimate power had a
significant impact on the perceptions of coercive power
(Table 5). Participants perceived coercive power to be stronger
when legitimate power was high (lphigh: M = 4.82, SD = 0.94)
rather than low (lplow:M = 3.20, SD= 0.99).
Coercive Power and Legitimate Power
The impact of coercive and legitimate power on trust,
climates, and motives
Testing Hypotheses 1b and 2b, 2 (low vs. high levels of coercive
power) by 2 (low vs. high levels of legitimate power) ANOVAs
with the depending variables implicit and reason-based trust,
antagonistic and service climate and enforced compliance and
voluntary cooperation were applied. Contrary to expectations,
participants in conditions with low/high levels of coercive power
and low/high levels of legitimate power reported equal intensity
of implicit trust (main effects: cplow: M = 2.17, SD = 1.39;
cphigh: M = 2.00, SD = 1.33; lplow: M = 2.02, SD = 1.39; lphigh
M = 2.16, SD = 1.33; see Table 5; for a graphical representation
see Figure 1 in the Discussion Section). Regarding reason-based
trust, the analysis revealed, as expected, that participants reported
higher levels of reason-based trust when legitimate power was
high (lphigh: M = 4.39, SD = 1.17; lplow: M = 2.69, SD = 1.04;
see Table 5).
Regarding the perception of the relational climate, the analysis
showed that the perception of an antagonistic climate increased
with coercive power (cplow: M = 3.35, SD = 1.51; cphigh:
M = 4.08, SD = 1.81) and decreased with legitimate power
(lplow: M = 3.38, SD = 1.58; lphigh: M = 3.03, SD = 1.56; see
Table 5). Furthermore, as expected, the analysis showed that the
perception of a service climate increased with legitimate power
(lplow: M = 2.47, SD = 1.33; lphigh: M = 4.11, SD = 1.43, see
Table 5).
TABLE 5 | Study 3: Results of the ANOVAs with coercive power and
legitimate power as independent variables.
Dependent variables α F (df1, df2) p ηp
2
Perceptions of coercive power 0.91
CP 459.61 (1, 364) <0.001 0.56
LP 5.71 (1, 364) 0.02 0.02
CPxLP 0.18 (1, 364) 0.68 <0.01
Perceptions of legitimate power 0.94
CP 0.26 (1, 364) 0.61 <0.01
LP 260.33 (1, 364) <0.001 0.42
CPxLP 0.07 (1, 364) 0.79 <0.01
Implicit trust 0.86
CP 1.42 (1, 364) 0.24 <0.01
LP 0.94 (1, 364) 0.33 <0.01
CPxLP 0.09 (1, 364) 0.76 <0.01
Reason-based trust 0.86
CP 1.29 (1, 364) 0.26 <0.01
LP 217.19 (1, 364) <0.001 0.37
CPxLP 1.78 (1, 364) 0.18 <0.01
Antagonistic climate 0.84
CP 21.40 (1, 364) <0.001 0.06
LP 70.871 (1, 364) <0.001 0.16
CPxLP 0.33 (1, 364) 0.56 <0.01
Service climate 0.85
CP 0.09 (1, 364) 0.76 <0.01
LP 128.81 (1, 364) <0.001 0.26
CPxLP 1.08 (1, 364) 0.30 <0.01
Enforced compliance 0.92
CP 90.24 (1, 364) <0.001 0.20
LP 5.49 (1, 364) 0.02 0.02
CPxLP 0.07 (1, 364) 0.79 <0.01
Voluntary cooperation 0.83
CP 0.11 (1, 364) 0.75 <0.01
LP 45.37 (1, 364) <0.001 0.11
CPxLP 0.02 (1, 364) 0.89 <0.01
Intended tax honesty 0.86
CP 34.50 (1, 364) <0.001 0.09
LP 19.75 (1, 364) <0.001 0.05
CPxLP 0.04 (1, 364) 0.85 <0.01
α, Cronbach α; CP, main effect coercive power; LP, main effect legitimate power; CPxLP,
interaction effect of coercive and legitimate power.
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Regarding the motives for cooperation, the analysis
highlighted that, as expected, in conditions with low levels
of coercive power, participants reported feeling less enforced
than in conditions with high levels of coercive power (cplow: M
= 3.35, SD = 1.67; cphigh: M = 5.06, SD = 1.80; see Table 5).
Furthermore, as expected, participants reported more voluntary
cooperation when legitimate power was high (lphigh: M = 4.04,
SD = 1.55; lplow: M = 2.99, SD = 1.43, see Table 5). No other
main effects and no interaction effects were significant (see
Table 5).
The mediating role of trust, climate, and motive.
Testing Hypothesis 3, the ANOVA found that coercive and
legitimate power had a significant impact on intended tax
honesty and that no significant interaction existed. High levels of
coercive power led to higher tax honesty intention (M = 4.98,
SD = 1.41) than did low levels of coercive power (M = 4.02,
SD = 1.78). Similarly, manipulations of high levels of legitimate
power stimulated higher tax honesty intention (M = 4.86, SD
= 1.50) than did lower legitimate power (M = 4.13, SD = 1.76;
Table 5).
In a second step, we again used Mediate (Hayes et al., 2011)
for the mediator analysis, this time working with two predictors,
i.e., coercive power and legitimate power. The results showed that
there is only one indirect effect, that is, from legitimate power
to tax honesty intention via reason-based trust (95% CI [0.10;
0.65]; Table 6). Also Sobel test statistics (Sobel test = 2.11, p =
0.03; RM = 0.37) do indicate this significant mediation. All the
other indirect effects from coercive and legitimate power are not
significant.
Discussion
The analyses partly confirm Hypotheses 1b and 2b. The
manipulation of coercive power and legitimate power at the same
time in the context of taxpaying confirmed that in cases of high
levels of coercive power, the antagonistic climate and enforced
compliance are more distinct. In addition, higher legitimate
power induced reason-based trust, a distinct service climate and
voluntary cooperation. Contrary to Hypothesis 1b, high levels of
coercive power did not reduce implicit trust. Also, high levels of
legitimate power fundamentally reduced an antagonistic climate.
Regarding the mediating effect testing Hypothesis 3, only reason-
based trust mediated the relationship between legitimate power
and tax honesty intention. In Study 4 the impact of coercive
power and legitimate power is investigated in another situation.
STUDY 4: COERCIVE POWER AND




Overall, 102 students (83% men, Mage = 22.66, SD = 3.12)
majoring in industrial engineering participated in the study. For
participation, all students received bonus points for one of their
courses. Again, this population primarily was selected because
TABLE 6 | Study 3: Mediation analysis from power to tax honesty intention (THI; standard errors in parentheses).
Path coefficients Indirect effects
To THI To IT To RBT To AC To SC To EC To VC Estimate Sobel Z Symmetric
95% CI
From covercive power (CP) 1.02 (0.18) −0.17 (0.14) 0.13 (0.12) 0.74 (1.16) −0.04 (0.14) 1.71 (0.18) −0.05 (0.16)
From legitimate power (LP) 0.32 (0.22) 0.14 (0.14) 1.71 (0.12) −1.34 (0.16) 1.64 (0.14) 0.42 (0.18) 1.05 (0.16)
From implicit trust (IT) 0.04 (0.06)
From reason-based trust (RBT) 0.22 (0.10)
From antagonistic climate (AC) −0.04 (0.06)
From service climate (SC) −0.05 (0.07)
From enforced compliance (EC) −0.03 (0.05)
From voluntary cooperation (VC) 0.08 (0.07)
CP→IT→THI −0.01 (0.02) −0.584 −0.04; 0.01
LP→IT→THI 0.01 (0.01) 0.554 −0.01; 0.03
CP→RBT→THI 0.03 (0.03) 0.972 −0.01; 0.08
LP→RBT→THI 0.37 (0.17) 2.174 0.10; 0.65
CP→AC→THI −0.03 (0.05) −0.461 −0.10; 0.04
LP→AC→THI 0.05 (0.08) 0.664 −0.08; 0.18
CP→SC→THI 0.00 (0.01) 0.265 −0.02; 0.02
LP→SC→THI −0.09 (0.11) −0.831 −0.28; 0.10
CP→EC→THI −0.05 (0.08) −0.599 −0.19; 0.09
LP→EC→THI 0.09 (0.08) −0.581 −0.05; 0.02
CP→VC→THI −0.00 (0.02) −0.301 −0.04; 0.02
LP→VC→THI 0.09 (0.08) 1.126 −0.04; 0.21
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of their naivety regarding the hypotheses and because of their
inexperience with insurance organizations.
Experimental Design and Procedure
In contrast to Studies 1–3, in Study 4 scenarios in an online
experiment were used in which an insurance organization was
presented as wielding high or low levels of coercive power
and high or low levels of legitimate power. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions. The combination
of low/high levels of coercive power and of low/high levels of
legitimate power was operationalized through items such as,
“In general, the insurance company is known for its low/high
penalties for insurance fraud. It is little/very appreciated for its
work.” After the scenarios, the respondents had to report damage
to the insurance organization. They had to “... imagine that [their]
television set broke from the wall so that it was now in pieces.
The television set had a value of 600 MU [MU, monetary units],
which [they] had to report to the insurance company according
to the terms. With the help of a friend, who can fake an invoice
up to a maximum of 1000 MU, [they] could report a higher
claim to the insurance company.” The amounts of respondents’
claims (ranging from 600 to 1.000 MU) were collected to assess
their relative cooperation with the insurance organization and
will further be displayed in percentages [(reported amount −
600)/400]. The questionnaire that was used in Studies 1–3 was
adapted to the insurance context and was applied to measure
insurance fraud intention [one item; “Which damage sum would
you claim at the insurance company (min. 600 MU, max. 1000
MU):”], implicit trust (three items; e.g., “I trust the insurance
company Chom-Insurance without thinking about it.”), reason-
based trust (seven items; e.g., “I trust the insurance company
Chom-Insurance, because it gives me competent advice.”), the
antagonistic climate (three items; e.g., “Between the insurance
company Chom-Insurance and the insurants, there exists a
climate of ruthlessness.”), the service climate (three items; e.g.,
“Between the insurance company Chom-Insurance and the
insurants, there exists a climate, which is characterized by its
service-oriented nature.”), enforced compliance (three items; e.g.,
“When I hand in my damage claims according to the rules of
Chom-Insurance, I do so because the insurance company often
carries out controls.”), and voluntary cooperation (three items;
e.g., “When I hand in my damage claims according to the rules
with Chom-Insurance, I do so because the insurance company
supports me if I have unintentionally filled in my damage
claim incorrectly.”). Analog to the tax context, the participants’
perceptions regarding wielded coercive power (four items; e.g., “I
believe that the insurance company Chom-Insurance persecutes
insurance fraudsters with audits and fines.”) and legitimate power
(22 items; e.g., “I believe that the insurance company Chom-
Insurance knows how to give good advice to insurants.”) of the
insurance organization were adapted for insurance and assessed
as manipulation check. Responses were indicated on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“I totally disagree”) to 7 (“I
totally agree”). Cronbach’s α’s are excellent and presented in
Table 7. Socio-demographics (gender, age, income, nationality,
employment, and experience with insurance organizations) were
also assessed.
TABLE 7 | Study 4: Results of the ANOVAs with coercive power and
legitimate power as independent variables.
Dependent variables α F (df1, df2) p ηp
2
Perceptions of coercive power 0.87
CP 69.94 (1, 98) <0.001 0.42
LP 0.90 (1, 98) 0.35 <0.01
CPxLP 5.99 (1, 98) 0.02 0.06
Perceptions of legitimate power 0.94
CP 0.46 (1, 98) 0.50 <0.01
LP 16.80 (1, 98) <0.001 0.15
CPxLP 0.16 (1, 98) 0.69 <0.01
Implicit trust 0.95
CP 1.14 (1, 98) 0.29 0.01
LP 1.43 (1, 98) 0.23 0.01
CPxLP 0.00 (1, 98) 0.29 0.01
Reason-based Trust 0.88
CP 0.01 (1, 98) 0.94 <0.01
LP 23.67 (1, 98) <0.001 0.20
CPxLP 0.00 (1, 98) 0.95 <0.01
Antagonistic climate 0.89
CP 7.62 (1, 98) <0.01 0.07
LP 4.47 (1, 98) 0.04 0.04
CPxLP 1.73 (1, 98) 0.19 0.02
Service climate 0.88
CP 1.08 (1, 98) 0.30 0.01
LP 26.69 (1, 98) <0.001 0.21
CPxLP 0.30 (1, 98) 0.59 <0.01
Enforced compliance 0.89
CP 4.56 (1, 98) 0.04 0.04
LP 3.30 (1, 98) 0.07 0.03
CPxLP 0.23 (1, 98) 0.63 <0.01
Voluntary cooperation 0.81
CP 2.73 (1, 98) 0.13 0.02
LP 10.72 (1, 98) 0.001 0.10
CPxLP 0.06 (1, 98) 0.81 <0.01
Intended insurance fraud
CP 2.03 (1, 98) 0.16 0.02
LP 0.00 (1, 98) 0.99 <0.01
CPxLP 1.46 (1, 98) 0.23 0.02
α, Cronbach α; CP, main effect coercive power; LP, main effect legitimate power; CPxLP,
interaction effect of coercive and legitimate power.
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Results
In the following, only hypothesized and/or significant results
are reported; for completeness, Table 7 displays all findings
independently, whether significant or not.
Preliminary Data Analyses
The manipulation check showed that perceptions on coercive
power and legitimate power were induced in line with the
manipulation (Table 7). Participants held perceptions of lower
coercive power in the low levels of coercive power condition
(cplow: M = 3.17, SD = 1.32) than in the high levels of
coercive power condition (cphigh:M = 5.28, SD = 1.31). A weak
interaction of coercive and legitimate power on the perceptions of
coercive power existed, but as this interaction explains only 6% of
the variance and the main effect of coercive power explains 42%,
this interaction is negligible. Participants experiencing high levels
of legitimate power held perceptions of higher legitimate power
(lphigh: M = 4.74, SD = 1.14) than the participants experiencing
low legitimate power (lplow:M = 3.79, SD= 1.15; Table 7).
Coercive Power and Legitimate Power
The impact of coercive and legitimate power on trust,
climates, and motives
Testing Hypotheses 1b and 2b, 2 (low vs. high levels of
coercive power) by 2 (low vs. high levels of legitimate power)
ANOVAs with the dependent variables implicit and reason-
based trust, antagonistic and service climate and enforced
compliance and voluntary cooperation were conducted. Similar
to the experiments in the tax context, participants in conditions
with low/high levels of coercive power and low/high levels of
legitimate power reported equal intensity of implicit trust (main
effects: cplow: M = 2.02, SD = 1.62; cphigh: M = 2.35, SD
= 1.55; lplow: M = 2.00, SD = 1.43; lphigh M = 2.40, SD =
1.70, see Table 7; for a graphical representation see Figure 1
in the Discussion Section). As expected, participants reported
high levels of reason-based trust when legitimate power was high
(lphigh: M = 4.46, SD = 1.14; lplow: M = 3.22, SD = 1.37, see
Table 7).
The analysis showed that, as expected, the perception of an
antagonistic climate increased with coercive power (cplow: M =
2.84, SD= 1.71; cphigh:M = 3.84, SD= 1.85) and decreased with
legitimate power (lplow: M = 3.84, SD = 1.81; lphigh: M = 2.99,
SD= 1.81, see Table 7). Furthermore, as expected, the perception
of a service climate increased only with legitimate power (lplow:M
= 3.05, SD= 1.62; lphigh:M = 4.58, SD= 1.33, see Table 7).
Regarding motives for cooperation, the analysis showed
that, as expected, participants in conditions with low levels
of coercive power reported feeling less enforced (cplow: M =
3.69, SD = 1.81) compared to conditions with high levels of
coercive power (cphigh: M = 4.37, SD = 1.66; see Table 7). As
expected, participants reported more voluntary cooperationwhen
legitimate power was high (lphigh: M = 4.35, SD = 1.49; lplow:
M = 3.37, SD = 1.44, see Table 7). No other main effects or
interaction effects were significant (see Table 7).
The mediating role of trust, climate, and motive
Testing Hypothesis 3, an ANOVA revealed no significant main
effect of coercive power, no impact of legitimate power and no
significant interaction (Table 7).
In a second step, we applied again the program Mediate
(Hayes et al., 2011) for the mediator analysis. The results revealed
that there are three indirect effects from power to insurance
fraud. First, legitimate power impacts insurance fraud intention
via reason-based trust (95% CI [−20.80; −0.44], Table 8).
Second, coercive power impacts insurance fraud intention via
enforced compliance (95% CI [0.77; 10.64]) and third, legitimate
power also impacts insurance fraud intention via enforced
compliance (95% CI [0.28; 9.38]). However, Sobel test statistics
revealed only a trend for a mediation from coercive power to
enforced compliance to insurance fraud (CP→EC→IFI: Sobel
test = −1.72, p =.08; RM = −0.26). All other mediation were
not significant (LP→RBT→IFI: Sobel test = −1.60, p = 0.11;
LP→EC→IFI: Sobel test = 1.52, p = 0.13). The other indirect
effects from coercive and legitimate power are not significant.
Discussion
The predictions of Hypotheses 1b and 2b are partly confirmed.
The combination of coercive and legitimate power backs up
the prediction that coercive power impacts the antagonistic
climate and enforced compliance (Hypothesis 1b). Furthermore,
legitimate power had a positive impact on reason-based trust,
the perception of a service climate and voluntary cooperation
(Hypothesis 2b). In line with Study 3 but contrary to predictions,
legitimate power reduced the antagonistic climate. In contrast to
Studies 1–3, results of the mediator analysis showed that coercive
power increases enforced compliance, which in turn decreases
the intention to commit insurance fraud.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, all four studies confirm the hypothesized impact of
coercive and legitimate on cognitions when deciding to cooperate
with authorities (Figure 1). As expected, when coercive power
was applied exclusively, it decreased implicit trust, increased the
perception of an antagonistic climate, and enforced compliance.
For the combined prevalence of coercive and legitimate power,
coercive power does not impact implicit trust, but leads to a
perceived antagonistic climate and to an enforced motive to
comply. The missing impact of coercive power on implicit trust,
when combined with legitimate power, might stem from the fact
that legitimate power stimulates rational considerations because
of reason-based trust, and rational considerations are aspect
of system 2, so that implicit trust (system 1) cannot arise (cf.
Sittenthaler et al., 2015). Coercive power has a direct impact on
tax cooperation intention and an indirect effect mediated via
enforced compliance on insurance fraud intention.
As expected, legitimate power (wielded exclusively or in
combination with coercive power) increases reason-based trust,
the perception of a service climate and the motive to cooperate
voluntarily. The relationship of legitimate power and intended
cooperative behavior is mediated by reason-based trust.
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FIGURE 1 | The impact of coercive and legitimate power on the trust, climate, and motive scales in Study 1–4.
Two unexpected results were found. First, in Study 2, and
by tendency in Studies 3 and 4, legitimate power, contrary
to expectations, increased the enforced motive to cooperate.
One explanation is that due to feelings of reciprocity, even the
wielding of legitimate power might make participants experience
some “social” coercion that is responsible for motives of enforced
compliance. This is in line with Ouchi’s (1979) informal clan
control, which sees reciprocity and a legitimate organization as
the foundation. Additionally, social agreement, such as common
values and beliefs, would constitute a further pre-requisite for
clan control. Another possible reason is that legitimate power
leads to the impression that authorities have a high proficiency
for detecting and punishing defecting individuals, which results
in feelings of enforced compliance. This result shows that a
relations between legitimate power and enforced compliance
needs to be included in the Slippery Slope Framework (Gangl
et al., 2015) so that future research will consider this issue.
Second, contrary to expectations but in line with earlier
findings (Hofmann et al., 2014), legitimate power, even
when combined with coercive power, reduced the perceived
antagonistic climate (Studies 2–4). When combined, the exertion
of audits and fines (i.e., coercive power) can be believed to
be legitimate and, thus, be accepted as the right thing to do.
This assumption was supported by Study 2, which showed that
coercive power is more pronounced when legitimate power is
rather high (in this study, only legitimate power was manipulated
and no information on coercive power was given). Then, trust
in authorities and relational climates were more effected by
legitimate power than by coercive power alone. This is suggested
by the relatively strong impact of legitimate power on reason-
based trust in Study 2–4. Overall, the present results certainly
indicate a connection between coercive power and legitimate
power. With the current experiments, this connection, e.g., how
the application of legitimate power impacts the perception of
coercive power, cannot sufficiently be tested, but the Slippery
Slope Framework (Gangl et al., 2015) needs to be modified
including a connection between coercive power and legitimate
power and future research will have to investigate this aspect.
The current studies have some limitations that have to be
addressed in future research. The research theoretically bases
on the slippery slope framework postulating that authorities’
different forms of power influence cognitions and subsequently
cooperative behavior. It can be argued that this causal
relationship could be the other way round that not power
impacts cognitions but actual cognitions are responsible for
the perceptions of power. This certainly can be the case and
needs further empirical evidence, nevertheless, as our studies
show, there certainly is a significant impact of power on
cognitions. As withmost laboratory experiments, the investigated
samples are not representative, they are specifically comprised
of students who are not well-experienced with tax authorities
and/or insurance organizations. This, nonetheless, is actually an
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TABLE 8 | Study 4: Mediation analysis from power to insurance fraud intention (IFI; standard errors in parentheses).
Path coefficients Indirect effects
To IFI To IT To RBT To AC To SC To EC To VC Estimate Sobel Z Symmetric
95% CI
From covercive power (CP) −18.96 (7.39) 0.36 (0.32) −0.02 (0.25) 0.94 (0.35) −0.32 (0.29) 0.72 (0.34) −0.45 (0.29)
From legitimate power (LP) 1.83 (7.86) 0.42 (0.31) 1.24 (0.25) −0.80 (0.35) 1.51 (0.29) 0.60 (0.34) 0.95 (0.29)
From implicit trust (IT) 4.10 (2.43)
From reason-based trust (RBT) −7.99 (4.74)
From antagonistic climate (AC) 2.23 (2.78)
From service climate (SC) 1.45 (4.46)
From enforced compliance (EC) 6.89 (2.32)
From voluntary cooperation (VC) 0.76 (3.19)
CP→IT→IFI 1.46 (1.75) 0.936 −0.69; 4.77
LP→IT→IFI 1.72 (1.81) 1.056 −0.51; 5.13
CP→RBT→IFI 0.15 (2.38) 0.080 −3.70; 4.21
LP→RBT→IFI −9.89 (6.14) −1.596 −20.80; −0.44
CP→AC→IFI 2.10 (2.89) 0.769 −2.09; 7.34
LP→AC→IFI −1.77 (2.51) −0.076 −6.31; 1.79
CP→SC→IFI −0.46 (1.98) −0.311 −4.08; 2.31
LP→SC→IFI 2.19 (6.89) 0.032 −8.62; 13.70
CP→EC→IFI 4.99 (3.09) 1.724 0.77; 10.64
LP→EC→IFI 4.16 (2.85) 1.517 0.28; 9.38
CP→VC→IFI −0.35 (1.74) −1.375 −3.43; 2.39
LP→VC→IFI 0.73 (3.15) 0.238 −4.29; 6.02
advantage. For naïve participants, it is easier to imagine the
fictitious scenario and act based on the presented scenarios and
not on prior experiences with the authority (Mittone, 2006).
That said, laboratory experiments still create a highly artificial
situation in which individuals might not behave as in an everyday
context. Therefore, allowing participants to take part in an online
experiment at home (Study 4) is a possibility to counteract this
artificiality without changing manipulation. Nevertheless, future
field experiments that not only investigate the direct impact of
power on cooperation (e.g., Ariel, 2012; Gangl et al., 2014) but
also investigate the underlying processes could strengthen the
current results; tax authorities and/or insurance organizations
displaying coercive and/or legitimate power would show the
effects of power in vivo. Furthermore, the experimental design
of the current study can only test for differences. The correlative
connections between power and processes are only assumed.
Thus, this design only allows for limited conclusions regarding
the mediators since they are based on manipulated factors
of fictitious authorities and not on actual existing authorities.
However, due to the experimental setting, we were able to obtain
high internal validity. Future research needs to increase external
validity and address the studied relationships by using field data.
Literature indicates that the severity of punishment is
contingent on the type of social dilemma situation (Molenmaker
et al., 2014). It has to be mentioned that legal circumstances of
tax authorities and insurance organizations are different. While
in comparison to tax authorities, insurance organizations do
not have the legal right to punish insurance fraud. Taxpayers,
compared to insurance holders, also do not have the option to
turn to another tax authority if they are not satisfied with a
specific tax authority’s conduct. Taxpayers are at the mercy of one
specific tax authority in a certain country. Nevertheless, results
on the impact of power work similarly in both contexts. The two
authorities in the studies, the tax authority and the insurance
organization, represent a small range of authorities that wield
power to control individuals’ behavior in different situations. In
future research, other institutions, such as governments ensuring
citizens’ environmental friendliness, should be investigated.
Research on how their power affects trust, relational climates, and
motives for cooperation will further support, as well as extend,
current findings.
From a practical point of view, the present findings are of
value, not only for tax authorities and insurance companies, but
for all authorities wielding power. Results show that sanctions
of undesired behavior, as well as legitimate procedures, both
not only foster cooperation, but also have different impacts on
underlying cognitions. Severe punishments lead to a hostile and
antagonistic climate that should be avoided, whereas supportive
procedures foster trust toward the authority and the perception
of a reciprocative service climate. Legitimate power operates via
establishing reason-based trust. Tax authorities and insurance
organizations are supposed to reduce costly punishments,
provide supportive procedures and helpful information, and
pursue societal goals to assure a service climate. This would, in
the long run, create trust toward them which fosters cooperative
behavior. The findings also indicate that strict audits and severe
fines might alienate individuals that are either reacting with
enforced compliance or looking for more appealing alternatives.
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Thus, the current results should initiate rethinking power of all
authorities shaping individual behavior.
Highlighting the mechanisms by experimentally showing
how coercive and/or legitimate power of authorities affect
trust in authorities, the relational climate, and their motives
over different contexts expanded the understanding of the
operating mode of authorities’ power. While the mediating
effects clearly show that a key factor in understanding the
mechanisms is reason-based trust, implicit trust, the relational
climates and motives to comply become of marginal interest.
They are mainly a product of specific forms of power,
but they do not interfere with the actual connection of
power and behavioral intention. These findings have extensive
consequences for theory, as well as for real world authorities,
giving direction for future research and specifying actions
for power wielding authorities. In a nutshell, trust building
measures are central, as reason-based trust is mediating
the impact of power on cooperation, but other cognitions
(interaction climates, motives) might not have that importance
for cooperation.
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ABSTRACT
Tax authorities utilize a wide range of instruments to motivate
honest taxpaying ranging from strict audits to fair procedures or
personalized support, differing from country to country. However,
little is known about how these different instruments and
taxpayers’ trust influence the generation of interaction climates
between tax authorities and taxpayers, motivations to comply,
and particularly, tax compliance. The present research examines
the extended slippery slope framework (eSSF), which distinguishes
tax authorities’ instruments into different qualities of power of
authority (coercive and legitimate) and trust in authorities (reason-
based and implicit), to shed light on the effect of differences
between power and trust. We test eSSF assumptions with survey
data from taxpayers from three culturally different countries (N =
700) who also vary concerning their perceptions of power, trust,
interaction climates, and tax motivations. Results support
assumptions of the eSSF. Across all countries, the relation of
coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit
trust. The connection from legitimate power to tax compliance is
partially mediated by reason-based trust. The relationship
between implicit trust and tax compliance is mediated by a
confidence climate and committed cooperation. Theoretical and
practical implications are discussed.
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Introduction
Tax authorities apply different measures to increase tax compliance. These measures differ
from country to country. Nevertheless, many practical and theoretical accounts such as the
slippery slope framework of tax compliance (Kirchler 2007) have categorized different
measures into two basics approaches: the power approach and the trust approach (Feld
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and Frey 2007; Kirchler 2007; Luttmer and Singhal 2014). The power approach (also
termed deterrence or the command and control approach) relies on frequent audits and
severe fines in case of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). In contrast, the trust
approach originates from transparency, fair procedures, or the conviction that paying
taxes honestly is a binding social norm (Braithwaite 2003a; Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl
2008; Luttmer and Singhal 2014). The mutual influence, interaction, and dynamic
between these two approaches is seen as important for tax compliance. Whereas some
authors suggested that power and trust mutually enhance each other’s effect on compli-
ance, others assumed that power can also erode trust and in turn could reduce compliance
(Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa 2005; Das and Teng 1998). However, only few studies exist
that examined this dynamic empirically (Hofmann et al. 2017).
To explain the dynamic between power and trust, the original slippery slope framework
was extended by differentiating the power of tax authorities into coercive and legitimate
power and trust in tax authorities into reason-based and implicit trust (Gangl,
Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015). Based on this, the extended slippery slope framework
(eSSF) describes how the different qualities of power and trust interact with each other
and lead to specific relationship climates between tax authorities and taxpayers and to
tax motivations that determine tax payments (Gangl, Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015). Coer-
cive power is suggested to decrease implicit trust in tax authorities and to lead to an antag-
onistic climate and an enforced motivation to pay taxes. Legitimate power fosters reason-
based trust, a service climate, and a voluntary motivation to pay taxes. Based on positive
experiences with tax authorities, the eSSF suggests that over time, reason-based trust
evolves to implicit trust, which leads to a confidence climate with a committed motivation
to pay taxes (Gangl, Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015). Whereas the original slippery slope fra-
mework received empirical support in numerous survey studies and experiments (e.g.
Muehlbacher, Kirchler, and Schwarzenberger 2011; Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler 2010),
only some of the assumptions of the eSSF were tested, mostly based on experiments (e.g.
Hartl et al. 2015; Hofmann et al. 2014). Throughout empirical analyses of all dynamics
between power and trust that are assumed in the eSSF and studies based on data from
real taxpayers living in different countries are rare. Closing this empirical gap allows an
examination of the eSSF and tests whether tax authorities’ approaches directly or indirectly
influence tax compliance via changing the perceived relationship with authorities and tax-
payers’ motivations. Testing eSSF assumptions with data from different countries also
informs whether different approaches aimed to increase tax compliance work in the same
manner independent of the country and cultural specifics in which they are applied.
The aim of the present paper is to test the eSSF assumption on the psychological processes
and consequences of the power-trust dynamic. Therefore, the present paper examines the
underlying psychological processes that allow power and trust approaches to influence tax
compliance. To increase the generalizability of found results and to test whether tax auth-
orities’ approaches have similar consequences in different countries, we also aim to
analyse taxpayer data from different countries that have varying tax cultures.
The extended slippery slope framework
Tax researchers agree that tax authorities need to apply the full range of possible instru-
ments in order to guarantee tax compliance from citizens (Alm and Torgler 2011;
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Braithwaite 2003a, 2003b). These instruments include the classical deterrence approach,
based on the force of the law through coercive audits and fines, and alternative approaches
including regulation, incentives, participation, fairness, or support and service. Although
the positive effect of each of these approaches on tax compliance received much theoretical
and empirical support (Alm and Torgler 2011; Blackwell 2007; Murphy 2004; Wahl, Kas-
tlunger, and Kirchler 2010), their dynamic and joint influence on tax compliance is still
largely unexplored (Gobena and Van Dijke 2016).
Experiments from fields other than tax compliance indicated that coercive control and
punishment is more effective if applied in a fair versus unfair manner (Mooijman et al.
2017; Verboon and van Dijke 2011). Similar experiments demonstrated that punishments
exerted by a trusted authority have stronger effects on moral judgments about rule-break-
ing behaviour than punishments exerted by an untrusted authority (Mulder, Verboon, and
De Cremer 2009). A meta-analysis also showed that punishments are more effective in
countries in which general trust is high compared to low (Balliet, Mulder, and van
Lange 2013). On the other hand, it is claimed that coercive control and punishment
break the social contract between authorities and citizens, decreasing trust between auth-
orities and fellow citizens (Feld and Frey 2007; Kramer 1999; Tenbrunsel and Messick
1999); this in turn can lead to lower cooperation (Ariel 2012; Gangl et al. 2014;
Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001). Thus, coercive punishment, trust, and fair pro-
cedures can mutually work together to either strengthen or weaken each other and in turn
have different effects on cooperation with authorities. However, thorough theoretical and
empirical examinations of the power-trust dynamic, particularly in tax research, is
missing. For instance, it is not clear how audits and fines may increase trust in the tax
system instead of decreasing it. Insights into these mechanisms could fortify our under-
standing of contradictory results from studies that have shown a positive effect (Hassel-
dine et al. 2007), no effect (Ariel 2012), or even negative effects of audits and fines
(Gangl et al. 2014; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001).
The eSSF aims to explain these contradictory findings and the dynamics and inter-
actions between different approaches. Therefore, the eSSF categorizes tax authorities’
different approaches into various qualities of power (i.e. coercive power and legitimate
power) and different qualities of trust (i.e. reason-based trust and implicit trust).
The power of tax authorities, which is defined based on the theory of the “bases of social
power” (French and Raven 1959; Pierro et al. 2012), is differentiated into coercive power
and legitimate power (Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998). These two qualities of
power are conceptualized as independent qualities; they can be applied alone or in com-
bination with each other.
Coercive power represents the power to punish and the power to reward; thus, it
becomes either a negative and positive incentive for behaviour. Examples of punishment
are fines or negative disclosure through transparent tax returns (Bø, Slemrod, and Thor-
esen 2014) or black lists (Perez-Truglia and Troiano 2015). Examples of rewards are well-
ness vouchers for timely payment (Koessler et al. 2016) or the promise of privileged
treatment (Simone, Sansing, and Seidman 2013 ). Both punishments and rewards likely
crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci 1971) and are seen as a form of coercion (Raven,
Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998).
Legitimate power is defined as the perception that authorities work based on a legiti-
mate foundation, expertise and information provision, and a positive reputation
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(Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998). Different subcategories of legitimate power
are related to transparency and fairness (Wenzel 2002), legitimate regulation (Murphy
2005), taxpayer’s voice and participation (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 1996),
the provision of relevant information (Alm et al. 2010), and to supportive services
(Gangl et al. 2013).
Based on the socio-cognitive trust theory (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010), trust is
differentiated into reason-based and implicit trust. Reason-based trust is defined as the
deliberate decision to trust tax authorities based on their perceived goals; their perceived
competence, motivation, and benevolence; and perceived supportive external circum-
stances. Reason-based trust is related to tax knowledge (Eriksen and Fallan 1996), the per-
ceived competence and good intentions of authorities (e.g. Gangl et al. 2013; Murphy
2004), and perceived institutional quality and corruption (e.g. Cummings et al. 2009).
In contrast, implicit trust is an automatic and associative reaction to a stimuli such as a
friendly face or voice or official-looking documents (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010).
However, reason-based and implicit trust are related. Along System 1 and System 2 con-
ceptualizations, it is assumed that trust is first based on rational considerations and
becomes implicit over time as a result of positive experiences (Evans 2008). Implicit
trust summarizes determinants of tax compliance related to marketing and newspaper
campaigns (Cyan, Koumpias, and Martinez-Vazquez 2017), social norms of tax honesty
(Hallsworth et al. 2017), and the perception of a shared identity (i.e. patriotism; Gangl,
Torgler, and Kirchler 2016). Nudges, such as automatic reminders or prepopulated tax
forms (Behavioural Insights Team 2011; Chirico et al. 2017), are also likely to trigger auto-
matic and implicit trust.
The eSSF assumes that two main mechanisms drive the dynamic between the different
qualities of power and trust that in turn impact the perceived relationship climate between
authorities and taxpayers and taxpayers’ motivation to comply (Figure 1; Gangl,
Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015). First, the eSSF suggests a negative relationship between
coercive power and implicit trust, which leads either to an antagonistic or confidence-
based climate. In an antagonistic climate, coercive power is high and implicit trust is
low, and tax authorities are perceived to persecute taxpayers primarily interested in catch-
ing them as tax evaders. As a consequence, taxpayers pay their taxes because they feel
enforced to do so by control and punishment (Braithwaite 2003a, 2003b; Feld and Frey
Figure 1. Extended slippery slope framework (Gangl, Hofmann, and Kirchler 2015).
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2002). In a confidence climate, implicit trust is high whereas coercive power is low. The
interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers is characterized by mutual trust and
respect; therefore, harsh coercive power is not perceived as necessary. In such a climate,
taxpayers feel committed to the tax system and see taxpaying as their moral obligation.
Second, the eSSF suggests a positive relationship between legitimate power and reason-
based trust that fosters a service climate. In a service climate, tax authorities and taxpayers
have a professional, bureaucratic relationship in which tax authorities as service providers
interact with taxpayers as clients (Alm and Torgler 2011; Braithwaite 2003b).
Based on these assumptions, it can be suggested that a pure coercive deterrence
approach has a negative effect on trust, interaction climates, and motivation, and in
turn tax compliance intentions. In contrast, if authorities’ power is perceived to be legit-
imate, or if authorities’ coercive power is combined with legitimate power, a positive effect
on trust, climate, motivation, and tax compliance can be expected.
Experiments on the effects of coercive power and legitimate power, applied solely or in
combination, largely confirmed the above mentioned assumptions (Gangl et al. 2017;
Hartl et al. 2015; Hofmann et al. 2014, 2017). In these experiments, participants were
asked to act as self-employed taxpayers who must pay taxes on a given income. Low
versus high coercive and legitimate power was manipulated by describing tax authorities
as applying lenient or severe controls (to manipulate coercive power) with ill or well-
trained tax officers (to manipulate legitimate power). These experiments showed, as
expected, that coercive power but not legitimate power increases taxpayers’ reactance
and reduces implicit trust in tax authorities, which in turn leads to an antagonistic
climate and enforced motivation to comply (Gangl et al. 2017; Hofmann et al. 2014).
However, these experiments only analysed the effect of coercive and legitimate power
but not trust (largely due to the difficulty of experimentally manipulating implicit
trust). In addition, survey studies on representative samples of self-employed taxpayers
from Austria and the Netherlands on the correlation of different motivations to comply
(i.e. enforced compliance, voluntary cooperation, and committed cooperation with tax
compliance intentions) were conducted (Gangl et al. 2013). These studies showed that
enforced compliance was negatively related to tax compliance, whereas voluntary and
committed cooperation were positively correlated to tax compliance. Thorough survey
studies that analysed all assumed dynamics between power and trust in the eSSF are
rare. One exception offered confirmation of the framework (Gangl et al. 2016).
However, this study was small in sample size, based on just one country, and did not
include tax compliance intentions. Hence, it is still not clear how robust the assumed
dynamics are between power, trust, interaction climates, motivation to comply, and tax
compliance.
National differences in tax behaviour
In the present study, we used data from three European countries that strongly vary con-
cerning authorities’ perceived power and citizens’ trust in authorities: Austria, Finland,
and Hungary. According to the European Value Survey (2011), only 15.7% of citizens
in Austria and 19.1% in Finland claim that the state should increase control of firms. In
contrast, 43.8% of Hungarians demand more frequent and efficient control. This might
indicate that in Hungary there are higher authoritarian attitudes and that authority is
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perceived as more legitimate than in Finland or Austria. Particularly, trust in authorities
differs across the three countries (e.g. Kogler et al. 2013). Data from the European Value
Survey (2011) showed that citizens’ trust in national authorities (i.e. the parliament) is
highest in Finland (42.1% of the Finnish have confidence in parliament), followed by
Austria (29.9%) and Hungary (20.7%). The data from the European Value Survey indi-
cated that Finland is the democratic extreme, whereas Hungary is on the authoritarian
extreme and Austria represents a middle position between the two.
The aim of the present study is to test the eSSF assumptions by examining whether the
relationship between power, trust, and tax compliance intentions is mediated by perceived
tax climates and motivations. Figure 2 visualizes our hypotheses. To increase the robust-
ness of our results, we examined the data of taxpayers from three countries differing in
regulation and citizens’ trust – Austria, Finland, and Hungary – who likely also differ con-
cerning power and trust, perceived tax climates, and motivation to comply with taxes.
Method
Samples and procedure
Overall, 700 taxpayers (253 Austrians, 223 Finnish, and 224 Hungarians) completed an
online survey. The first item on the questionnaire was a filter item asking whether partici-
pants had ever paid taxes in the past. Only those participants who indicated that they had
experience with taxpaying continued the survey. After additional exclusion of participants
who denied the question, “I have read all written instructions and questions carefully and
have given my personal opinion”, data of 249 Austrian (57% male; Mage = 35.06, SD =
Figure 2. (a – c) The extended slippery slope framework and tax compliance.
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12.82), 219 Finnish (48% male;Mage = 45.94, SD = 13.34), and 222 Hungarian participants
(39% male; Mage = 39.98, SD = 12.50) were considered in the analyses. Participants in
Austria and Hungary were recruited from acquaintances of university members.
Finnish participants were recruited by a market research agency and received a choice
of low-price items as a reward for participation.
Material
The online questionnaire was used to assess (a) perceived coercive power (three items; e.g.
“Tax authorities punishes severely”), (b) perceived legitimate power (seven items; e.g. “Tax
authorities do share understandable information”), (c) implicit trust (three items; e.g. “I
trust tax authorities most of the time automatically”), (d) reason-based trust (14 items;
e.g. “I trust tax authorities because they have committed employees”), (e) perceived antag-
onistic climate (three items; e.g. “Between the tax authority and taxpayer there exists a
climate of inconsiderateness”), (f) perceived service climate (three items; e.g. “The relation-
ship between the tax authority and taxpayer is service-oriented in nature”), (g) perceived
confidence climate (three items; e.g. “The relationship between the tax authority and tax-
payer is characterized by joint responsibility”), (h) enforced compliance (four items; e.g.
“When I pay taxes, I do so because I know I will be audited”), (i) voluntary cooperation
(four items; e.g. “When I pay taxes, I do so because the tax authority will probably reci-
procate my cooperation”), and (j) committed cooperation (four items; e.g. “When I pay
taxes, I do so because I feel a moral obligation to pay taxes”). Participants were also sur-
veyed on tax compliance (one item; “How likely will you pay your taxes for the current
year correctly and in full extent to the tax authority?”) and socio-demographic character-
istics. Scales and items are based on Hofmann et al. (2017) and Gangl et al. (2015) and
were answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). Cronbach’s
α for all scales were sufficient (see Table 1).
Results
In the following section, our preliminary analysis aimed to show that Austria, Finland, and
Hungary significantly differ regarding perceived power, taxpayer trust, interaction cli-
mates, and motivation for tax compliance. After that, we tested the dynamic between
power and trust, interaction climates, motivation, and tax compliance intentions by apply-
ing a mediation analysis.
Preliminary analysis: differences between Austrian, Finish, and Hungarian
taxpayers
To confirm that Austria, Finland, and Hungary differ concerning power and trust, per-
ceived tax climates, and motivations to comply with taxes, ANOVAs (Table 1) were com-
puted. Coercive power was perceived as higher in Hungary than in Austria and Finland (F
(687, 2) = 11.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = .03), whereas legitimate power was significantly perceived as
higher in Finland than in Austria and Hungary (F(687, 2) = 27.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = .07). Trust
– both implicit (F(687, 2) = 9.83, p < .001, ηp
2 = .03) and reason-based (F(687, 2) = 19.24,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .05) – was higher in Finland than in Austria and Hungary. An antagonistic
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M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Coercive Power .75 4.60 (1.41) 4.58 (1.38) 5.12 (1.22)
2 Legitimate Power .81 3.85 (0.91) 4.27 (0.96) 3.65 (0.84) −.12**
3 Implicit Trust .93 3.84 (1.88) 4.40 (1.65) 3.72 (1.65) −.13** .54***
4 Reason-based Trust .91 3.36 (1.04) 3.98 (1.16) 3.48 (1.21) −.15*** .66*** .73***
5 Antagonistic Climate .90 3.94 (1.61) 3.72 (1.67) 4.44 (1.72) .42*** −.33*** −.35*** −.35***
6 Service Climate .86 3.14 (1.41) 4.16 (1.49) 2.76 (1.35) −.25*** .57*** .43*** .58*** −.38***
7 Confidence Climate .88 3.05 (1.39) 3.64 (1.48) 2.62 (1.30) −.22*** .62*** .56*** .70*** −.44*** .68***
8 Enforced Compliance .84 4.11 (1.47) 3.75 (1.54) 3.67 (1.69) .23*** .03 −.07 −.04 .31*** −.01 −.08*
9 Voluntary Cooperation .75 3.34 (1.30) 3.80 (1.34) 2.89 (1.33) −.06 .52*** .41*** .53*** −.20*** .48*** .51*** .17***
10 Committed Cooperation .90 4.90 (1.56) 5.49 (1.32) 5.50 (1.42) −.07 .36*** .35*** .41*** −.17*** .23*** .26*** −.16*** .26***
11 Intended tax behaviour 6.13 (1.54) 6.34 (1.15) 6.28 (1.23) .02 .11** .15*** .15*** −.11** .07 .08* −.09* .07 .27***
Note. α = Cronbach-α, AUT = Austria, FIN = Finland, HUN = Hungary.








climate was perceived as higher in Hungary than in Austria and Finland (F(687, 2) = 11.02,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .03). A service (F(687, 2) = 57.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14) and confidence climate
(F(687, 2) = 29.87, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08) were both perceived as highest in Finland, as
second highest in Austria, and as lowest in Hungary. Finish and Hungarian participants
appeared to feel less enforced to pay taxes than Austrians (F(687, 2) = 5.25, p < .01, ηp
2
= .02). Finnish participants were the highest motivated to pay voluntary; Austrians were
second highest; and Hungarians were the least motivated to pay their taxes voluntarily
(F(687, 2) = 26.24, p < .001, ηp
2 = .07). Austrians felt less committed to pay their taxes
than Finnish and Hungarian participants (F(687, 2) = 13.55, p < .001, ηp
2 = .04).
However, concerning intended tax behaviour, no difference was observed between the
three countries (F(687, 2) = 1.63, p = .20, ηp
2 = .01). Table 1 shows means and standard
deviations separately for Austria, Finland, and Hungary.
Test of the extended slippery slope framework of tax compliance
To test whether the assumed dynamics between power and trust were related to tax com-
pliance intention via perceived climates and motivations, we conduced serial mediation
analyses (Process Model 6; Hayes 2012, 2013), controlling for participants’ country. The
first analysis comprised coercive power as a predictor and tax compliance as criterion,
whereby implicit trust, antagonistic climate, and enforced compliance were the mediators
(Figure 2(a)). Results showed a full mediation (95% CI [-0.0985; -0.0300], R2 =.04).
However, coercive power was only related to implicit trust (b = -.15, SE = .05, p = .002),
which in turn influenced tax compliance intentions (b = .12, SE = .03, p < .001; 95% CI
[-0.0309; -0.0029]). Country controls (p = .001) showed that in Austria, coercive power
was positively related to implicit trust (b = .19, SE = .37, p = .024) whereas it was negatively
related to implicit trust in Finland (b = -.38, SE = .08, p <.001) and Hungary (b = -.37, SE
= .09, p <.001). However, in the final model, concerning the relationship between implicit
trust and tax compliance, the country controls were not significant (all p’s > .22).
The second analysis comprised legitimate power as predictive and tax compliance as
criterion, whereby reason-based trust, service climate, and voluntary cooperation were
the mediators (Figure 2(b)). Country controls (p = .001) showed that the positive relation-
ship between legitimate power and reason-based trust varied in strength but not direction
(Austria: b = .67, SE = .06, p <.001; Finland: b = .90, SE = .06, p <.001; Hungary: b = .90, SE
= .08, p <.001). In the final model, concerning the relationship between reason-based trust
and tax compliance country controls were not significant (all p’s > .25).
The third analysis comprised implicit trust as a predictor and tax compliance intention
as criterion, whereby confidence climate and committed cooperation were the mediators
(Figure 2(c)). Country controls (p <.001) showed that in Finland and Hungary, the
relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is only mediated via committed
cooperation (Finland: b = .31, SE = .06, p < .001, Hungary: b = .24, SE = .06, p < .001) but
not via the confidence climate (min. p = .24). However, in the final overall mediation
model, country controls were not significant (all p’s > .25).
Discussion
The present paper examined the dynamic between power and trust as outlined in the
extended slippery slope framework in three different countries that vary in tax regulations
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and citizens’ trust. The aim was to shed light on how classical deterrence instruments of
audits and fines and alternative approaches of participation, fairness, and trust approaches
impact relationship climates, motivation to comply, and intended tax compliance. There-
fore, the present paper also informs the broader study of tax policy by highlighting that
authorities’ instruments do not impact taxpayers’ compliance in a vacuum but change
the relationship climate between tax authorities and taxpayers and the motivation of tax-
payers. Thus, the present paper sheds light on complex, underlying psychological mech-
anisms that enable power and trust to indirectly – versus directly – affect tax compliance.
Survey results from taxpayers confirm most assumptions of the extended framework and
show that based on data from countries with different tax cultures, general patterns of how
tax instruments influence tax compliance can be found. Even if these general patterns vary
in a single country such that in one country trust, climates or motivations are more or less
affected by tax instruments, the overall relationship and effect on citizens’ perceptions and
behaviours is likely very similar among different countries.
Overall counties, coercive power was negatively related to implicit trust and in turn to
intended tax compliance. Specifically, this result confirms that coercive powers’ positive
impact on tax compliance is undermined if coercive power reduces implicit trust
(Gangl et al., 2015). This outcome also might explain previous studies showing weak or
no relationship between coercive power and compliance (Ariel, 2012; Hofmann et al.,
2014). However, in one country (i.e., Austria) coercive power was positively related to
implicit trust. This result indicates as previous studies did, that the negative relationship
between coercive power and implicit trust is not stable (c.f. Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017)
and may depend on the cultural background and related to that, to the perception of coer-
cive power as safeguard or threat.
In the mediator analysis, results showed that for all countries, legitimate power posi-
tively impacted tax compliance intention only via reason-based trust. This result
confirms previous studies about the relationship between legitimacy and trust in police
studies (Jackson et al. 2012) and tax research (e.g. Gangl et al. 2013; Hartl et al. 2015;
Verboon and van Dijke 2011) and again highlights the unconfined positive effect of legit-
imate power on trust, motivation, and compliance.
Results confirm that the impact of implicit trust on tax compliance intentions is
mediated via a perceived confidence climate and committed cooperation. Country charac-
teristics are only marginally relevant for this relationship. These findings extend previous
empirical research on the importance of implicit trust for climates and motivations (Gangl
et al. 2016). In addition, this result highlights the importance of tax authorities’ instru-
ments that foster implicit trust. Marketing measures (Cyan, Koumpias, and Martinez-
Vazquez 2017), the communication of warmth and friendliness (e.g. via a website, tele-
phone hotline, or officers), the use of symbols of legitimacy (e.g. flags, stamps, certifi-
cations; Gangl, Torgler, and Kirchler 2016), or highlighting shared values can increase
tax motivation as a moral duty and in turn improve tax compliance intentions.
The present research has clear practical implications. Whereas coercive power can have
negative side-effects, fostering legitimate power seems to have a positive impact on a large
set of indicators such as trust, climate, motivation, and compliance. Thus, tax authorities’
instruments that aim to increase their perceived law-abiding behaviour, professionalism,
and expertise; provide clear and transparent information on tax procedures; and foster a
positive reputation as a service provider can increase citizens’ trust and cooperation. Tax
POLICY STUDIES 107
authorities should also consider ways to increase taxpayers’ implicit trust. Such measures
(e.g. building a long-term relationship between a specific tax officer and taxpayer) have a
significantly positive influence on compliance.
The present research must be considered in light of specific strengths and limitations. A
clear strength of the present research is the examination of taxpayer data from three
countries with different legislation and citizens’ levels of trust. Since general assumptions
of the eSSF received support among all countries, they can be seen as relatively robust. A
limitation of the present research is that only intentions and not real behaviour was
assessed. However, intentions are predictors of fraudulent behaviour (Carpenter and
Reimers 2005); thus, the present results may have some validity for the field.
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A B S T R A C T   
A confidence-based climate between public administrations and citizens is essential. This paper 
argues and provides empirical evidence that depending on the perceived interaction history, 
different policies are needed to build versus maintain confidence. Applying the extended Slippery 
Slope Framework of tax compliance, an online and a laboratory experiment were conducted to 
explore whether tax authorities’ coercive and legitimate power have different effects depending 
on whether they are situated in an antagonism-based or confidence-based climate. Results 
showed that in an antagonism-based interaction climate, a combination of high coercive and high 
legitimate power changed the climate into a confidence-based interaction climate. In contrast, in 
a confidence-based climate the same power combination did not maintain but erode the climate. 
Results also suggest that confidence-based climates are maintained by low coercive power 
combined with high legitimate power. The paper concludes that interaction climates operate as 
psychological frames which guide how policy instruments affect taxpayers’ trust in the tax au-
thorities.  
1. Introduction 
Mutual confidence is important. This is as true for couples and families, as it is for societies. A confidence-based climate in which 
citizens and the public administration trust each other, share the same values, and perceive each other as partners enhances co-
operation and is an important pillar for functioning democracies (Goodsell, 2008; Putnam, 1995). In this paper we want to focus on 
trust in tax authorities, as an essential determinant of citizens’ tax compliance and thus, the provision of public goods such as schools 
or health care (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). However, countries differ concerning the prevailing level of trust in their tax 
authorities. Whereas trust is low in some countries such as in the U.S. or Italy (Drake, 2013) there is high trust in other countries such 
as in Switzerland (Lozza & Castiglioni, 2018). 
Some tax authorities are perceived as antagonistic and need to build a confidence-based climate with citizens, whereas others 
already have citizens’ trust so that they face the challenge of maintaining trust. Both building and maintaining trust may be im-
perative for tax authorities to ensure cooperation. Research identified several determinants of trust in public administrations, such as 
law enforcement or legitimacy (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Tyler, 2003). But do tax authorities in need of building trust have to implement 
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the same policy measures as those in need of maintaining trust? One might argue that measures that are good for building trust will 
also work for maintaining trust. Note, however, that a climate in which trust is absent (or low) presents a markedly different context 
than a climate in which trust is already present (and high). 
In particular, determinants of trust may differ depending on whether the initial interaction climate is antagonism-based (i.e., 
related to mutual hostility) versus confidence-based (e.g., in a trusting partnership with shared values). Testing this relation requires 
a set-up that addresses the situational differences and temporal dynamics of building versus maintaining confidence-based climates; 
aspects that empirical research has not yet incorporated (Keele, 2007; Rothstein, 2000). Also theoretical accounts, for public ad-
ministration in general (Battaglio, Nicola, Paolo, & Paola, 2018) and tax administration in particular (Braithwaite, 2003) as well as 
empirical studies (Batrancea et al., 2019), highlighted the importance of context for the effect of authorities’ enforcement but only for 
rule compliance and not for trust in authorities. 
Additionally, these assumed contextual and temporal dependencies were rarely tested empirically. Based on the theory of the 
extended Slippery Slope Framework, the aim of the present research is to experimentally examine the differential determinants of 
trust building versus trust maintenance. 
2. The extended Slippery Slope Framework 
The Slippery Slope Framework was developed as a conceptual tool to summarize determinants of tax compliance into the di-
mensions power of authorities (i.e., the perception that authorities are able to ensure compliance) and trust in authorities (i.e., the 
perception that authorities work for the common good; Kirchler et al., 2008). The extended Slippery Slope Framework (eSSF) posits 
that the dynamic between power and trust explains how interaction climates between taxpayers and tax authorities can be built and 
changed (Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015). It distinguishes between two types of power (perceived coercive and legitimate power) 
and two types of trust (reason-based and implicit trust) which in combination constitute different perceived interaction climates 
between citizens and the tax authorities. Thereby, the eSSF examines and predicts the perceptions of taxpayers which motivate tax 
compliance behavior. 
With coercive and legitimate power, the eSSF connects to the main power theories in economics and psychology concerning the 
potential and perceived ability of a party to influence another parties’ behavior (French & Raven, 1959; Tyler, 2003). Coercive power 
is the perceived ability of the administration to enforce law compliance through incentives (i.e., the capability to control and punish 
or reward citizens). Legitimate power is the administration’s ability to convince citizens to comply voluntarily with rules and reg-
ulations through legitimate procedures, expertise, information, and a positive image. 
Reason-based and implicit trust are defined in line with the socio-cognitive trust theory of Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010), and 
relate to distinctions made in include a dash theories of social cognition (Kahneman, 2003). Reason-based trust means that citizens 
deliberately trust the tax authorities on which they depend, because it pursues an important goal, is perceived as motivated, com-
petent, and benevolent, and external conditions allow it to work professionally. In contrast, implicit trust is considered a more 
automatic trust reaction to associative learned stimuli, such as perceived shared identity, friendly faces, or official documents. 
Referring to research on regulation (Adler, 2001; Haslam & Fiske, 1999), the eSSF defines three interaction climates: antagonism- 
based, service-based, and confidence-based climates. Antagonism-based climates are defined as hostile climates in which mistrust 
prevails and authorities and citizens work against each other like “cops and robbers” (Kirchler et al., 2008). In service-based climates, 
such as in new public management approaches (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014), the tax administration (as service provider) and 
citizens (as clients) cooperate on the basis of a technical-bureaucratic relationship. In confidence-based climates, tax authorities and 
taxpayers share the same values, trust each other implicitly and collaborate as partners (Alm & Torgler, 2011; Brenninkmeijer, 2016). 
Compared to antagonism-based and service-based climates, confidence-based climates are likely also characterized by positive social 
norms concerning tax honesty. This belief that most other citizens are honest taxpayers is another important determinant of high 
individual tax honesty (Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, & Vlaev, 2017). Thus, confidence-based climates need fewer resources on mon-
itoring and administrative procedures as citizens are committed to cooperate with the authorities. It is therefore advantageous for 
administrations to build a confidence-based climate or to maintain it. 
3. Building, changing, and maintaining interaction climates 
The eSSF describes how tax administrations can build, change, and maintain perceived interaction climates ranging from an-
tagonism-based to service-based and confidence-based climates (see Fig. 1). A key element is the notion that tax authorities’ use of 
power may affect trust, and thereby affect interaction climates. In particular, coercive power is assumed to foster mistrust and to 
hinder implicit trust reactions which, in turn, builds an antagonism-based climate in which the tax authorities and taxpayers work 
against each other (Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann, Gangl, Kirchler, & Stark, 2014; Hofmann, Hartl, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthaler, & 
Kirchler, 2017). This notion fits well with research showing that control and sanctioning can undermine trust (Das & Teng, 1998; 
Kramer, 1999), and fuel suspicion about the good intentions of an administration (Feld & Frey, 2007; Rothstein, 2000) or fellow 
citizens (Bohnet & Baytelman, 2007; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006). Experiments also show that coercive power leads 
to reactance and enforcement, and drives out the moral implications of tax cooperation (Gangl, Pfabigan, Lamm, Kirchler, & 
Hofmann, 2017). 
The eSSF framework also posits that, by combining high coercive power with high legitimate power, tax administrations may 
increase reason-based trust which can change antagonism-based climates into service-based ones (Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 
2017). This insight relates to findings showing that legitimate and fair sanctioning systems overcome the negative effects of pure 
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sanctioning systems and instead, foster trust in public administrations (Mooijman, Van Dijk, Van Dijk, & Ellemers, 2017). Thus, 
coercive power combined with legitimate power might foster the feeling that sanctions are used in a professional and targeted way, to 
restore justice and uphold cooperation (Mooijman et al., 2017; Wenzel, 2003). Actually, there is a large body of literature from other 
disciplines than tax research that argues that coercion which is used in a fair manner is essential for cooperation (Fehr & Rockenbach, 
2003) because it generates instead of destroys legitimacy and trust (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Tyler, 2011). 
Based on this literature, the eSSF suggests that coercive power which is combined with high legitimate power gives good reasons to 
trust, reduces perceptions of an antagonism-based climate and increases perceptions of service-based climates. 
Service-based climates fall in-between antagonism-based and confidence-based climates. Over time and with positive experiences 
related to legitimate power, service-based climates change into confidence-based climates (Gangl et al., 2015). A good reputation and 
positive experiences with legitimate power can transform reason-based trust into implicit trust. This idea streams from the literature 
on dual-process theories suggesting that cognitions, initially based on more deliberate processes, over time and through repetition 
can change to more automatic processes (Evans 2008). Thus, trust first based on and built by deliberate considerations may transcend 
to new settings through automatic and associative learning processes (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010). 
Confidence-based climates are jeopardized if authorities use coercive power. In a high trust relationship harsh coercive power 
might be perceived as a betrayal of trust (Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2013). Thus, the eSSF suggests that if individuals perceive a 
confidence-based climate, only low coercive power combined with high legitimate power can maintain this climate. High coercive 
power, even when applied legitimately, will be seen as a sign of distrust (Kramer, 1999; Van der Weele, 2009). It will interrupt 
implicit trust reactions and trigger deliberate considerations about whether or not to trust. Thus, it will erode a confidence-based 
climate and change it into an antagonism-based climate. However, this assumption that high coercive power combined with high 
legitimate power erodes a confidence-based climate and thus, only has a positive effect in an antagonism-based climate, to the best of 
our knowledge, has not yet been tested empirically. This differential effect of legitimate coercion has also rarely been tested related to 
other theories than the eSSF. This is surprising, as behavioral science scholars state that the effectiveness of any public policy 
intervention is depending on the context (Ruggeri, 2019). 
4. Research aims and research questions 
The current psychological research aims to experimentally examine how perceptions of antagonism-based and confidence-based 
climates can be changed or maintained by the means of perceived coercive and legitimate power and how this affects cooperation, 
i.e., tax payments. In the following we present our research questions. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does high coercive power compared to low coercive power decrease implicit trust, foster a perceived 
antagonism-based climate and reduce a perceived confidence-based climate? 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does high legitimate power compared to low legitimate power increase reason-based trust, reduce a 
perceived antagonism-based climate and foster a perceived confidence-based climate? 
Research Question 3(RQ3): Does high coercive power combined with high legitimate power in a confidence-based climate com-
pared to in an antagonism-based climate, decrease reason-based trust, implicit trust, a perceived confidence-based climate and 
increase a perceived antagonism-based climate? 
Research Question 4(RQ4): Does low coercive power combined with high legitimate power maintain reason-based trust, implicit 
trust and a perceived confidence-based climate in an initial confidence-based climate? 
Research Question 5(RQ5): Does high coercive power compared to low coercive power increase tax payments? 
Research Question 6(RQ6): Does high legitimate power compared to low legitimate power increase tax payments? 
5. Experiment 1 
To examine our research questions with a sample of citizens, we conducted an online experiment. We used scenarios to ma-
nipulate the interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers in a 2 (antagonism-based versus confidence-based climate) × 2 (low 
versus high coercive power) × 2 (low versus high legitimate power) within-between factorial design. 
Fig. 1. Building, changing, and maintaining interaction climates according to the eSSF.  
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5.1. Sample and design 
Two hundred and thirty participants were recruited in Austria online via postings in newspaper comment sections, among family 
and friends of students, and among Rotary club members. After finalizing data collection, we excluded data of 31 participants 
(because they indicated in an open comment box to not have followed instructions or because their responding time was longer than 
the mean plus three standard deviations; these participants did not differ concerning gender or age from the final sample, all 
ps  <  .11). The final sample of 199 participants consisted of 72.9% men with an average age of 42.2 years (SD = 12.58; range 21–74; 
two missing values on age). Participants were allowed to give multiple answers on their educational status; most had a university 
degree (51.3%, high school degree: 39.2%, vocational school: 7.0%, vocational training: 6.0%, basic school degree: 3.5%, other: 
9.5%). Concerning working status most were employed (66.3%, self-employed: 28.6%, in education: 13.1%, retired 8.0%, maternity 
leave: 2.5%, at home: 2.5%, unemployed: 2.0%). 
5.2. Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions of a 2 (antagonistic versus confidence climate) × 2 (low versus 
high coercive power) × 2 (low versus high legitimate power) factorial design (see Fig. 2). At the beginning, participants were asked 
to imagine being in their first year of business as a self-employed in the fictitious country Chomland. They were also asked to imagine 
to earn a specific yearly gross income in Euro over several years on which they would have to pay taxes. Moreover, the tax authorities 
would conduct audits with a 1:6 change (approx. 17%) and those who would be detected as evaders would have to pay back the 
evaded amount plus the same amount as a fine. After this introduction, the study proceeded with the manipulation of the interaction 
climate, the first assessment at time 1 (T1) of tax payments, perceived climate, trust and power; the manipulation of coercive and 
legitimate power and the second assessment at time 2 (T2) of tax payments, perceived climate, trust and power. In addition, sex, age, 
employment status, and income were assessed as sociodemographic characteristics. The original material in German in presented in 
the Supplementary material. 
5.3. Experimental manipulations: 
5.3.1. Manipulation of Perceived Antagonistic- (Confidence-) based climate condition (T1). 
Assume that as a self-employed in Chomland you are talking to another self-employed friend about the tax climate in Chomland. 
He tells you that the climate between the state tax authorities and the citizens of Chomland is characterized by mutual (mis)trust. The 
tax authorities assume that most taxpayers evade (pay) taxes and therefore must be prosecuted (respected) and punished (supported). 
The taxpayers, in turn, feel tortured (understood). They think the authorities are interested to catch taxpayers doing something wrong 
(in working in the interest of taxpayers). Put yourself in this situation! How do you think you'd be treated personally by this 
authority? What feelings and thoughts would you have as a taxpayer to that tax office in Chomland? Write down three of these 
feelings or thoughts: 
5.3.2. Manipulation of Perceived high (low) Coercive and Legitimate Power (T2). 
Participants read that the government of Chomland changed which also led to a change in the tax administration: 
The tax authority is now imposing very high (low) penalties for tax evasion and is (not) acting in an exemplary manner. It works 
both based on legal (illegal) measures and with frequent (rare) controls. In addition, the tax authority is mainly composed of very 
well (poorly) trained employees who provide (un)professional consulting and apply strict (few) tax audits. Their working principles 
are based especially (little) on the traceability of their decisions and especially (little) on penalties for tax evasion. Overall, the rigour 
of controls and the severity of penalties for tax evasion are of great (minor) importance to the tax authority and the accuracy of tax 
returns is of minor (great) importance. 
Fig. 2. Experimental procedure.  
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5.4. Dependent variables 
Tax Payments. All participants filled in five identical tax compliance scenarios (Alm, Sanchez, & Juan, 1995), representing five 
years of a self-employed taxpayer at T1 and T2. In each scenario, participants learned their income (ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 
Euro), the tax rate (30%), audit probability (1:6), and fine (twice the evaded amount). 
Assume it has passed another year. In this year you have earned a gross income of 35,000,- (30,000; 25,000; 40,000; 20,000) 
Euro. According to the legal regulations, you have to pay 10,500 (9,000; 7,500; 12,000; 6,000) Euros (30%) as taxes from your gross 
income. You have various options for claiming payments that are not necessarily tax deductible, or to not declare some revenues. If a 
tax audit should take place, you will have to pay back the evaded amount as well as a penalty of the same amount. How much tax do 
you decide to pay (0 to 10,500 (9,000; 7,500; 12,000; 6,000)) Euros? 
Participants filled in the concrete number themselves. We calculated the mean of the relative honesty at T1 and T2 resulting in 
values between 0 (full dishonesty) and 1 (full honesty). 
After the tax scenario, we assessed the following scales, adapted from Hofmann et al. (2014), all answered on a seven-point Likert 
type scale with labeled endpoints (1 = I totally disagree/7 = I totally agree): 
Perceived antagonism-based climate was assessed with three items (time 1: Cronbach α = 0.87, time 2: α = 0.88): Between the 
tax authority and taxpayers there exists a climate… of inconsiderateness/ruthlessness/cops and robbers. 
Perceived Confidence-based climate was assessed with three items (time 1: α = 0.94, time 2: α = 0.95): Between the tax 
authority and taxpayers there exists a climate which is characterized by… mutual trust/shared responsibility/cooperation. 
Perceived Implicit Trust was assessed with three items (time 1: α = 0.88, time 2: α = 0.90): I trust the tax authority… mostly 
without thinking about it/without much concern/in most cases automatically. 
Perceived Reason-based Trust was assessed with seven items (time 1: α = 0.82, time 2: α = 0.87): I trust the tax authority 
because… there is no alternative/its goals seem plausible to me/it has dedicated employees/it does its job well/it is benevolent to the 
taxpayers/the stable economic situation guarantees its work/it has the necessary support to carry out its work. 
5.5. Assessment of manipulation checks 
Perceived Coercive Power (time 1: α = 0.82, time 2: α = 0.91) was assessed with three items: The tax authority… punishes 
severely/prosecutes taxpayers with controls and fines/enforces its demands with audits and fines. 
Perceived Legitimate Power (time 1: α = 0.80, time 2: α = 0.91) was assessed with five items. The tax authority … due to the 
legal situation, is in the position to levy taxes/shares comprehensible information/knows how a correctly filled in tax return should 
look like/makes all taxpayers understand which taxes they have to pay and how they have to pay them/knows how the correct tax 
return of every singly taxpayers should look like. 
5.6. Statistical power 
To examine our research questions, we investigated the direct effect of our manipulations on the dependent variables. Therefore, 
we conducted 2 (antagonistic-based versus confidence-based climate) by 2 (low versus high coercive power) by 2 (low versus high 
legitimate power) ANOVAs with perceived antagonism-based climate, perceived confidence-based climate, reason-based trust and 
implicit trust as well as tax payments as dependent variables at Time 1 and Time 2 as repeated measurement factor. It should be noted 
that the present between-within subject design requires smaller sample sizes than a pure between subject design (Bellemare, 
Bissonnette, & Kröger, 2005). Detailed sensitivity analyses were conducted with the program G*power. Generally, sensitivity analyses 
for an ANOVA: repeated measures, within-between interaction (F-tests, p = .05, power = 0.80, six groups, two measures) indicated 
that with an N = 199 we can detect effects of f = 0.13 (d = 0.25). Concerning RQ1 and RQ2, sensitivity analyses for t-tests for 
dependent means (two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80) showed that we can detect effects between d = 0.27 and d = 0.29 (min. 
N = 93; max. N = 106). The same sensitivity analyses (t-tests for dependent means, two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80) indicated 
that for RQ3 (N = 30 and N = 23) effects of d = 0.53 and d = 0.61 and for RQ4 (N = 25) effects of d = 0.58 can be detected. For 
RQ5 and RQ6, effects between d = 0.27 and d = 0.29 (min. N = 93; max. N = 106) are detectable with the current design (t-tests for 
dependent means, two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80). Cohen (1988) suggests that d = 0.20 are small effects, d = 0.50 are medium 
effects and d = 0.80 are large effects. Thus, we can detect at least medium effects. 
5.7. Manipulation checks 
Perceived Tax Climate (Time 1). Participants in the antagonism-based condition perceived the interaction climate as more 
antagonism-based (M = 4.29, SD = 1.72) than participants in the confidence-based condition (M = 1.77, SD = 0.99), t 
(197) = 12.05, p  <  .001; Cohen’s d = 1.73. In a similar vein, participants in the confidence-based condition perceived the 
interaction climate as more confidence-based (M = 5.69, SD = 1.48) than participants in the antagonism-based condition 
(M = 2.31, SD = 1.25), t(197) = 17.44, p  <  .001, d = 2.50. These findings suggest that our manipulation of interaction climate 
was successful. 
Perceived Coercive and Legitimate Power (Time 2): As intended, participants in the high coercive power condition (M = 5.93, 
SD = 1.21) perceived more coercive power than participants in the low coercive power condition (M = 3.65, SD = 1.66), t 
(197) = 11.19, p  <  .001, d = 1.59. Participants in the high legitimate power condition (M = 5.64, SD = 1.33) perceived more 
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legitimate power than participants in the low legitimate power condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.21), t(197) = 12.62, p  <  .001, 
d = 1.79. 
5.8. Results 
Detailed analyses of direct and indirect effects are presented in Supplementary material (1.2; 1.3). To examine our research 
questions, we conducted five 2 (antagonism-based versus confidence-based climate) by 2 (low versus high coercive power) by 2 (low 
versus high legitimate power) ANOVAs with perceived antagonism-based climate, perceived confidence-based climate, reason-based 
trust, implicit trust, and tax payments as dependent variables, and T1 and T2 assessment as repeated measurement factor. We also 
conducted planned comparisons (paired t-tests) to examine the differentiated effect of combinations of coercive and legitimate power 
in the antagonism-based versus confidence-based climate1. Fig. 3 provides an overview of the results. Descriptive results (mean, 
standard deviation) concerning all main and interaction effects are presented in the Supplementary material. 
Perceived Antagonism-based Climate. Supporting the assumptions of RQ1, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 
191] = 21.45, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.10) showed that low coercive power had no impact (p = .13), whereas high coercive power 
increased the perceived antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.25, SD = 1.95; T2: M = 4.34, SD = 1.96, t[105] = 4.53, p  <  .001; 
d = 0.56). 
Supporting arguments underlying RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 191] = 32.21, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.15) 
showed that low legitimate power increased the perceived antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.39, SD = 2.01; T2: M = 4.49, 
SD = 1.88, t[98] = 4.07, p  <  .001; d = 0.57), whereas high legitimate power had no effect (p = .20). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive and high legitimate power 
decreased the perceived antagonism-based climate in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 4.27, SD = 1.68; T2: M = 3.41, 
SD = 1.59; t[29] = 2.21, p = .035, d = 0.52), and increased the perceived antagonism-based climate in an initial confidence-based 
climate (T1: M = 1.88, SD = 1.15; T2: M = 3.33, SD = 1.92; t[22] = 3.87, p = .001, d = 0.92). 
Perceived Confidence-based Climate. Supporting assumptions of RQ2, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 191] = 9.49, 
p  <  .001, η2 = 0.05) showed that low coercive power had no impact on the perceived confidence-based climate (p = .95). High 
coercive power, however, decreased the climate (T1: M = 3.64, SD = 2.24; T2: M = 2.80, SD = 1.87; t[105] = 2.91, p = .004, 
d = 0.41). 
Supporting arguments underlying RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1,191] = 102.11, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.35) 
indicated that low legitimate power decreased (T1: M = 3.56, SD = 2.05; T2: M = 1.91, SD = 0.99, t[98] = 7.88, p  <  .001, 
d = 1.02) and high legitimate power increased the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: M = 3.91, SD = 2.23, T2: M = 4.66, 
SD = 1.91; t[99] = 2.72, p = .008, d = 0.36). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive with high legitimate power 
led to an increase in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 2.09, SD = 1.40; T2: M = 4.02, SD = 1.82; t[29] = 4.25, 
p  <  .001, d = 1.19) and to a decrease in an initial confidence-based climate (T1: M = 5.39, SD = 2.10; T2: M = 3.72, SD = 2.19; t 
[22] = 7.67, p = .014, d = 0.78). Supporting arguments underlying RQ4, low coercive power combined with high legitimate power 
did not strongly influence the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: M = 5.81, SD = 1.19, T2: M = 5.69, SD = 1.62, t 
[24] = 0.41, p = .685). 
Perceived Implicit Trust. Not supporting arguments underlying RQ1, results showed no main effect of Coercive power (p = .293) 
and no Coercive power × Time interaction (p = .085). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive with high legitimate power 
increased implicit trust in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.38, SD = 1.53; T2: M = 4.06, SD = 1.81; t[29] = 2.31, 
p = .028, d = 0.40), whereas the same power combination had no impact in an initial confidence-based climate (p = .13). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ4, the combination of low coercive power with high legitimate power did not have a strong effect on 
implicit trust in a confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.25, SD = 1.55, T2: M = 4.24, SD = 1.82, t[24] = 0.07, p = .940). 
Perceived Reason-based Trust. Supporting assumptions of RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 191] = 117.89, 
p  <  .001, η2 = 0.38) revealed that low legitimate power decreased reason-based trust (T1: M = 3.82, SD = 1.21; T2: M = 2.79, 
SD = 0.98; t[98] = 8.32, p  <  .001, d = 0.94) and high legitimate power increased reason-based trust (T1: M = 3.90, SD = 1.42; 
T2: M = 4.67, SD = 1.41; t[99] = 5.05, p  <  .001, d = 0.54). 
In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive with high 
legitimate power increased reason-based trust in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.30, SD = 1.22; T2: M = 4.41, 
SD = 1.37; t[29] = 4.52, p  <  .001, d = 0.86), whereas the same power combination had no impact in an initial confidence-based 
climate (p = .54). Supporting assumptions of RQ4, the combination low coercive power with high legitimate power increased reason- 
based trust in the confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.73, SD = 1.26, T2: M = 5.14, SD = 1.38, t[24] = 3.43, p = .002, d = 0.31). 
Tax Payments. Results showed a main effect for Climate, (F[1, 199] = 6.024, p = .015, η2 = 0.03), indicating that a confidence- 
based climate led to higher tax payments (T1: M = 0.88 [SD = 0.22]; T2: M = 0.86 [SD = 0.21]) than an antagonism-based climate 
(T1: M = 0.80 [SD = 0.28]; T2: M = 0.78 [SD = 0.21]). In addition, the main effect for Time was significant (F[1, 199] = 4.45, 
p = .036, η2 = 0.02), indicating that at T1 (M = 0.83, SD = 0.26) tax payments were higher than at T2 (M = 0.81, SD = 0.26). 
1 All analysis were also conducted as ANCOVAs in which sex and age were used as covariates. All significant effects remained significant and all 
non-significant effects remained non-significant. 
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Not supporting assumptions of RQ5, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 199] = 1.66, p = .20, η2 = 0.01) was not 
significant, indicating that the change in tax payments from T1 to T2 was not moderated by coercive power. 
Supporting assumptions of RQ6, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 199] = 23.19, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.11) was 
significant: Low legitimate power decreased tax payment (T1: M = 0.86, SD = 0.22; T2: M = 0.78, SD = 0.27; t[98] = 4.56, 
p  <  .001, d = 0.33), whereas high legitimate power increased tax payments (T1: M = 0.81, SD = 0.29; T2: M = 0.84, SD = 0.26, t 
[99] = 2.19, p = .03, d = 0.13). No other main or interaction effects were significant (all ps  >  .10). 
5.9. Discussion 
Experiment 1 offered first insights into the building, changing, and maintenance of interaction climates. Confirming the as-
sumptions of RQ1, results showed that high but not low coercive power affected the perceived interaction climates. However, in 
contrast to expectations, no impact on implicit trust was found. These results corroborate studies showing that coercive power 
triggers an antagonism-based climate, but it has no robust and strong effect on implicit trust (Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017). 
Fig. 3. Overview of results of Experiment 1. Notes: The figure shows how, depending on the initial antagonism-based climate (red T1) or confidence- 
based climate (green T1), the combinations of coercive and legitimate power at T2 led to an increase or decrease of (a) the perceived antagonism- 
based climate, (b) the perceived confidence-based climate, (c) implicit trust, or (d) reason-based trust (red for the initial antagonism-based climate 
and green for the initial confidence-based climate). Means are presented with 95% confidence intervals. T1 = Time 1 (in the figure, in contrast to 
the text, all four T1 assessments are presented in combination). Time 2 assessments are given for CP + LP+ = coercive power high, legitimate 
power, CP + LP- = coercive power high, legitimate power low, CP-LP+ = coercive power low, legitimate power high, CP-LP- = coercive power 
low, legitimate power low. 
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Results also supported the assumptions of RQ2 that, compared to low legitimate power, high legitimate power increased reason- 
based trust, reduced a perceived antagonism-based climate, and fostered a confidence-based climate. In addition, low but not high 
legitimate power had an impact on the perceived antagonism-based climate and implicit trust. This indicates that low legitimate 
power might be a more important signal to citizens than high legitimate power. Importantly, our findings showed that also under 
dynamic conditions legitimate power maintains its characteristic impact on trust, interaction climates, and tax compliance (Hartl, 
Hofmann, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthaler, & Kirchler, 2015; Hofmann et al., 2017; Mooijman et al., 2017). 
As assumed in RQ3, compared to in an antagonism-based climate, in a confidence-based climate high coercive power combined 
with high legitimate power decreased reason-based trust and implicit trust and decreased a confidence-based climate and increased 
an antagonism-based climate. These results provide first evidence showing that the effect of legitimately applied coercive power 
depends on the initial climate and, thus, is not always fostering trust. Results also showed, as outlined in the RQ4, that in an initial 
confidence-based climate low coercive power combined with high legitimate power maintained the confidence-based climate. 
In addition, our results did not confirm that high coercive power increased tax payments (RQ5). Supporting assumptions of RQ6, 
results showed that legitimate power increased tax payments. 
6. Experiment 2 
To assess the robustness of the results of our first (online) experiment, we conducted a second, laboratory experiment, which 
allowed us to incentivize tax behavior and collect data in a more controlled environment. 
6.1. Sample and design 
Two hundred and sixty-three Austrian university students (Mage = 25.45 years, SD = 7.79; 56.7% female) were recruited for a 
behavior-dependent remunerated laboratory study on tax decision-making. Participants could provide multiple answers on their 
educational status; most had a high school degree (71.5%, university degree: 26.6%, vocational training: 1.5%, basic school: 1.5%, 
vocational school: 0.4%, other: 1.5%). Participants also were allowed to give multiple answers on their working status; most were in 
education (66.9%, employed: 31.6%, unemployed: 12.5%, self-employed: 8.0%, maternity leave: 0.8%, retired: 0.8%, at home: 
0.4%). 
6.2. Procedure 
The study was conducted in a computer laboratory in which up to 16 participants were tested simultaneously. The experimental 
setting, the task, and the manipulations of initial interaction climates, coercive power, and legitimate power were identical to 
Experiment 1. Importantly, in contrast to Experiment 1, participants knew that the audits and possible fines for detected evasion also 
would determine their remuneration for participation. We used the fictitious currency ECU. Participants were informed that at the 
end of the study, based on one randomly chosen tax round, the experimenter would roll a die to determine whether this round would 
be audited. The number “1″ would result in an audit and the other numbers (“2” to “6”) would not. If participants would be caught as 
evaders they would have to pay back the evaded amount plus the same amount as a fine. Participants also learned that at the end of 
the experiment their earned income in ECU would be converted into Euro (2800 ECU was equivalent to 1 Euro) and paid out. On 
average participants earned €5.48 for participating (min. €2.85; max. €7.14). 
Dependent Variables. The same dependent variables as in Experiment 1 were assessed: Tax payments, perceived antagonism- 
based climate (T1: α = 0.86, T2: α = 0.87), perceived confidence-based climate (T1: α = 0.92, T2: α = 0.90), implicit trust (T1: 
α = 0.88, T2: α = 0.90), and reason-based trust (T1: α = 0.78, T2: α = 0.83). 
Manipulation Check Variables. The same scales as in Experiment 1 were used: Perceived coercive power (T1: α = 0.81, T2: 
α = 0.90) and legitimate power (T1: α = 0.82, T2: α = 0.87). 
6.3. Statistical power 
The same sensitivity analyses as for Experiment 1 were conducted. Generally, sensitivity analyses for an ANOVA: repeated 
measures, within-between interaction (F-tests, p = .05, power = 0.80, six groups, two measures) indicate that with an N = 263 we 
can detect effects of f = 0.11 (d = 0.22). Concerning RQ1 and RQ2, sensitivity analyses for t-tests for dependent means (two-sided, 
p = .05, power = 0.80) showed that we can detect effects between d = 0.24 and d = 0.25 (min N = 123; max N = 140). The same 
sensitivity analyses (t-tests for dependent means, two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80) indicated that for RQ3 (N = 35 and N = 28) 
effects between d = 0.49 and d = 0.55 can be detected and for RQ4 (N = 24) effects of d = 0.60 can be detected. For RQ5 and RQ6, 
effects between d = 0.24 and d = 0.25 (min N = 123; max N = 140) are detectable with the current design (t-tests for dependent 
means, two-sided, p = .05, power = 0.80). Cohen (1988) suggests that d = 0.20 are small effects, d = 0.50 are medium effects and 
d = 0.80 are large effects. Thus, with the current design we can detect at least medium effects. 
6.4. Manipulation checks 
Perceived Tax Climate (Time 1): Results showed that participants in the antagonism-based condition perceived the climate as 
more antagonism-based (M = 4.58; SD = 1.34) than those in the confidence-based condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.44), t 
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(261) = 11.96, p  <  .001, d = 1.41. In a similar vein, participants in the confidence-based condition perceived the interaction 
climate as more confidence-based (M = 5.25, SD = 1.49) than those in the antagonism-based condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.37), t 
(261) = 14.63, p  <  .001, d = 1.89. These findings suggest that our manipulation of interaction climate was successful. 
Perceived Coercive and Legitimate Power (Time 2): Results showed, as intended, that: (1) participants in the high coercive power 
condition (M = 5.77, SD = 1.31) perceived more coercive power than those in the low coercive power condition (M = 3.78, 
SD = 1.76; t[261] = 10.32, p  <  .001, d = 1.28) and (2) participants in the high legitimate power condition (M = 5.50, SD = 1.22) 
perceived more legitimate power than those in the low power condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.40; t[261] = 10.68, p  <  .001, 
d = 1.32). 
6.5. Results 
Detailed analyses of direct and indirect effects are presented in Supplementary material (2.1). As in Experiment 1, we examined 
our research questions with repeated measurement ANOVAs and planned comparisons (paired t-tests)2. Fig. 4 provides an overview 
of the results. Descriptive results on all main and interaction effects are presented in the Supplementary material. 
Perceived Antagonism-based Climate. Supporting assumptions of RQ1, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 
255] = 94.66, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.21) showed that low coercive power decreased (T1: M = 3.58, SD = 1.75; T2: M = 2.95, 
SD = 1.41; t[139] = 3.66, p  <  .001, d = 0.40) and high coercive power increased the perceived antagonism-based climate (T1: 
M = 3.59, SD = 1.70; T2: M = 4.56, SD = 1.76; t[139] = -5.01, p  <  .001; d = 0.56). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 64.40, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.15) showed that 
low legitimate power increased (T1: M = 3.49, SD = 1.69; T2: M = 4.34, SD = 1.69, t[137] = 4.98, p  <  .001; d = 0.50) and high 
legitimate power decreased the perceived antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.69, SD = 1.76, T2: M = 2.99, SD = 1.59; t 
[124] = 3.53, p  <  .001; d = 0.42). 
In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive and high 
legitimate power decreased the perceived antagonism-based climate in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 4.48, 
SD = 1.23; T2: M = 3.56, SD = 1.47; t[34] = 3.88, p  <  .001, d = 0.75) and increased the perceived antagonism-based climate in 
an initial confidence-based climate (T1: M = 2.26, SD = 1.10; T2: M = 4.02, SD = 1.74; t[27] = 5.76, p  <  .001, d = 1.17). 
Perceived Confidence-based Climate. Supporting assumptions of RQ1, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 
255] = 13.93, p  <  .001, η2 = 0.05) revealed that low coercive power had no impact on the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: 
M = 3.95, SD = 1.97; T2: M = 3.81, SD = 1.79; t[139] = 0.61, p = .55), whereas high coercive power decreased the perceived 
confidence-based climate (T1: M = 3.87, SD = 1.88; T2: M = 3.08, SD = 1.73; t[122] = 3.77, p  <  .001, d = 0.44). 
In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 63.44, p  <  .001, 
η2 = 0.20) showed that low legitimate power decreased (T1: M = 4.04, SD = 1.82; T2: M = 2.61, SD = 1.42, t[137] = 8.38, 
p  <  .001, d = 0.88) and high legitimate power increased the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: M = 3.77, SD = 2.03, T2: 
M = 4.42, SD = 1.69; t[124] = 2.91, p = .004, d = 0.35). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, the combination of high coercive with high legitimate power increased the perceived confidence- 
based climate in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 2.46, SD = 1.16; T2: M = 4.14, SD = 1.82; t[35] = 5.57, p  <  .001, 
d = 1.08) and decreased it in an initial confidence-based climate (T1: M = 5.73, SD = 0.99; T2: M = 3.63, SD = 1.41; t[27] = 7.23, 
p  <  .001, d = 1.71). In addition, supporting assumptions of RQ4, in an initial confidence-based climate, low coercive power 
combined with high legitimate power did not influence the perceived confidence-based climate (T1: M = 5.24, SD = 1.73; T2: 
M = 5.18, SD = 1.73; t[24] = 0.15, p = .884). 
Perceived Implicit Trust. In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ1, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 
255] = 5.47, p = .020, η2 = 0.02) revealed that low coercive power had no impact (T1: M = 3.74, SD = 1.84; T2: M = 3.81, 
SD = 1.72; t[139] = 0.59, p = .56) and high coercive power decreased implicit trust (T1: M = 3.83, SD = 1.66; T2: M = 3.56, 
SD = 1.68; t[122] = 2.08, p = .04, d = 0.16). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ3, planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive with high legitimate power 
led to an increase in implicit trust in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.30, SD = 1.72; T2: M = 3.70, SD = 1.74; t 
[34] = -2.21, p = .034, d = 0.23), whereas the same power combination had no impact in an initial confidence-based climate 
(p = .336). Supporting assumptions of RQ4, results also showed that, the combination low coercive power with high legitimate 
power did not strongly decrease implicit trust in an initial confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.37, SD = 1.46, T2: M = 4.33, 
SD = 1.75, t[24] = 0.34, p = .74). 
Perceived Reason-based Trust. Supporting assumptions of RQ2, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 56.78, 
p  <  .001, η2 = 0.26) revealed that low legitimate power decreased reason-based trust (T1: M = 3.84, SD = 1.11; T2: M = 3.06, 
SD = 1.10; t[139] = 7.95, p  <  .001, d = 0.71) and high legitimate power increased reason-based trust (T1: M = 3.76, SD = 1.21; 
T2: M = 4.40, SD = 1.21; t[139] = 5.95, p  <  .001, d = 0.53). 
In agreement with the reasoning underlying RQ3, results of planned comparisons showed that the combination of high coercive 
with high legitimate power led to an increase in reason-based trust in an initial antagonism-based climate (T1: M = 3.31, SD = 1.34; 
T2: M = 4.31, SD = 1.34; t[34] = 4.99, p  <  .001, d = 0.75), whereas the same power combination had no impact in an initial 
2 All analyses were also conducted as ANCOVAs in which sex and age were used as covariates. All significant effects remained significant and all 
non-significant effects remained non-significant. 
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confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.32, SD = 0.87; T2: M = 4.33, SD = 0.98; t[27] = 0.07, p = .94). Supporting assumptions of 
RQ4, results also showed that the combination low coercive power with high legitimate power did not strongly influence reason- 
based trust in the confidence-based climate (T1: M = 4.28, SD = 1.21, M = 4.53, SD = 1.46; t[23] = 1.20, p = .242). 
Tax Payments. Results showed a main effect for Climate (F[1, 255] = 9.98, p = .002, η2 = 0.04) indicating that a confidence- 
based climate led to more tax payments than an antagonism-based climate (T1: confidence-based climate: M = 0.74, SD = 0.33 vs. 
antagonism-based climate: M = 0.59, SD = 0.33; T2: confidence-based climate: M = 0.74, SD = 0.34 vs. antagonism-based climate: 
M = 0.63, SD = 0.36). No other main effects were significant (all ps  >  .07). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ5, the Coercive power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 6.03, p = .015, η2 = 0.02) showed that 
independent of the initial climate high coercive power increased tax payments (T1: M = 0.68, SD = 0.33; T2: M = 0.74, SD = 0.33, t 
[122] = 3.45, p = .001, d = 0.18), whereas low coercive power had no effect on tax payments (p = .59). 
Supporting assumptions of RQ6, the Legitimate power × Time interaction (F[1, 255] = 8.68, p = .004, η2 = 0.03) showed that 
high legitimate power increased tax payments (T1: M = 0.64, SD = 0.35; T2: M = 0.71, SD = 0.34; t[124] = -3.40, p = .001, 
Fig. 4. Overview of results of Experiment 2. Note: The figure shows how, depending on the initial antagonism-based climate (red T1) or confidence- 
based climate (green T1), the combinations of coercive and legitimate power at T2 led to an increase or decrease of (a) the perceived antagonism- 
based climate, (b) the perceived confidence-based climate, (c) implicit trust, or (d) reason-based trust (red for the initial antagonism-based climate 
and green for the initial confidence-based climate). Means are presented with 95% confidence intervals. T1 = Time 1 (in the figure, in contrast to 
the text, all four T1 assessments are presented in combination). Time 2 assessments are given for CP + LP+ = coercive power high, legitimate 
power, CP + LP- = coercive power high, legitimate power low, CP-LP+ = coercive power low, legitimate power high, CP-LP- = coercive power 
low, legitimate power low. 
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d = 0.21), whereas low legitimate power had no effect (T1: M = 0.68, SD = 0.34; T2: M = 0.66, SD = 0.36, t[137] = 1.23, 
p = .22). No other interaction effects were significant (all ps  >  .16). 
6.6. Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1′s main findings and offered additional support for the assumptions of our research 
questions on the effects of coercive power and legitimate power on building, changing, and maintaining climates. In agreement with 
the rational underlying RQ1, compared to low coercive power, high coercive power reduced implicit trust and increased a perceived 
antagonism-based climate and decreased a perceived confidence-based climate. Supporting assumptions of RQ2, high versus low 
legitimate power increased reason-based trust and fostered a perceived confidence-based climate and reduced a perceived antag-
onism-based climate. In agreement with the assumptions of RQ3, compared to in an initial antagonism-based climate, in a con-
fidence-based climate the combination of high coercive power and high legitimate power decreased implicit trust, reason-based trust, 
and the perceived confidence-based climate, whereas it increased the perceived antagonism-based climate. Supporting assumptions 
of RQ4, low coercive power combined with high legitimate power maintained reason-based, implicit trust, and a confidence-based 
climate. Finally, supporting assumptions of RQ5 and 6, compared to low coercive or legitimate power, high coercive power and high 
legitimate power increased tax payments. 
7. General discussion and conclusions 
The aim of the present research was to expand the knowledge on building and maintaining confidence-based climates with 
regulating public administrations, in particular tax authorities. The present research is based on the extended Slippery Slope 
Framework which, similar to other theoretical accounts (Adler, 2001; Alm & Torgler, 2011; Haslam & Fiske, 1999), suggests that 
citizens and public administrations cooperate in different interaction climates ranging from antagonism-based to confidence-based 
climates. The framework posits that based on these climates, the policy measures needed to build or maintain trust are markedly 
different (Gangl et al., 2015). In an antagonistic-based climate, authorities can build trust by regulating with legitimate sanctioning 
systems. In a confidence-based climate, however, coercive control and sanctions, even if they are applied in a legitimate way, erode 
trust and confidence. Thus, in a prevailing confidence-based climate likely only perceived low coercion combined with high legit-
imate power can maintain confidence and trust. 
Previous research indicated that existing individual perceptions and attitudes are cues that frame the meaning of policy measures 
(James & Van Ryzin, 2016; Olsen, 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous research examined experimentally how 
different initial interaction climates influence the building and maintaining of trust in public authorities. The literature typically 
reports that public institutions can increase citizens’ trust with legitimate sanctioning systems (e.g., Mooijman et al., 2017) without 
taking situational differences or temporal developments into account. The current two experiments confirm the assumptions of the 
extended Slippery Slope Framework and showed that only if the individually perceived interaction climate is antagonism-based, 
legitimate sanctioning systems increase trust and, in turn, foster a confidence-based climate. If the individually perceived climate was 
already confidence-based, legitimate sanctioning systems can be seen as a betrayal of trust (Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2013) and 
undermine the confidence-based climate. Moreover, our results suggest that high legitimate power combined with low coercive 
power maintained an initial confidence-based climate. 
In addition to these novel findings, the present research corroborates prior research about the independent effects of coercive and 
legitimate power (Gangl et al., 2017; Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017). Coercive power’s negative effects on (implicit) 
trust and cooperation, however, are rather small and not robust (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Hofmann et al., 2017). This result 
indicates that there exists no simple negative relationship between coercive power and trust. Legitimate power, on the other hand, 
seems to have a strong positive effect on reason-based trust, the perception of a low antagonism-based and high confidence-based 
climate, and on cooperation, independent of the initial interaction climate (Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017). 
Thereby, our results confirm that initial interaction climates can likely be changed and maintained by tax administrations’ 
coercive and legitimate power, as proposed by the extended Slippery Slope Framework (Gangl et al., 2015). Our exploratory 
analyses also suggested that initial confidence-based climates lead to higher tax cooperation than antagonism-based climates. In 
addition, the initial climates can have a prolonged impact on cooperation. An initial confidence-based climate led to more 
cooperation (i.e., tax payments) than an initial antagonism-based climate even after power was introduced (at T2). Results also 
showed that legitimate power had a robust impact on reason-based trust and tax payments, whereas coercive power’s impact was 
rather small and instable (Hofmann et al., 2017). This suggests that, compared to coercive power, legitimate power leads to more 
elaborate processing and highlights the moral implications of behaviour (Gangl et al., 2017). Results in line with previous 
research (Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017) showed that, despite the differentiated impact on trust, coercive and 
legitimate power did not differ in their overall level of obtained tax compliance. This confirms that there is cooperation without 
trust (Yang, 2008). However, the cooperation obtained by trust and legitimate power is more efficient as costly monitoring can 
be reduced. 
An important strength of the present research is that we replicated our main finding in two experiments with different samples 
and different settings. Participants in our online experiment were a bit older and predominantly male, whereas those in our la-
boratory experiment were younger and predominantly female. In the first experiment, responses had no consequences, whereas in the 
second experiment, students were paid depending on their decisions. Thus, the two experiments balanced each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses. The converging evidence from two different experiments indicates that our findings are a robust phenomenon 
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(Hüffmeier, Mazei, & Schultze, 2016). Previous studies on the external validity of laboratory tax compliance experiments found that 
behavioural patterns of participants (also students) in the laboratory conform to those of taxpayers making similar decisions in 
naturally occurring settings (Alm, Bloomquist, & McKee, 2015). Nonetheless, tax experiments have like online or laboratory ex-
periments in general, a lower external validity than for example representative survey studies which, however, do not allow causal 
conclusions (Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2016). Thus, to increase external validity of the present results, ideally, a large-scale field 
experiment using administrative data in which coercive and legitimate power are implemented in different countries varying in their 
antagonistic- and confidence-based tax climate should be conducted (Mascagni, 2018). Finally, we also argue that perceptions of tax 
climates are probably more important than “actual” tax policy or what is written in the law, as behaviour is built on perceptions. For 
instance, previous research showed that also media reports can elicit perceptions of powerful authorities and in turn influence the 
intention to be tax honest (Kasper, Kogler, & Kirchler, 2015). Thus, our results are not only theoretically but also practically relevant. 
The current experiments were designed to test the assumptions of the eSSF (Gangl et al., 2015). However, an important related 
question for future research would be whether there are threshold effects for coercive power. For instance, future experiments, ideally 
conducted in countries differing concerning their tax climates, could vary the degree of coercive power by using different audit 
frequencies while keeping a high degree of legitimate power constant, to examine the effect on the perceived confidence-based 
climate. Such investigations would inform authorities how much coercion is needed or too much in a specific situation. The current 
research examined how temporal changes influence trust and confidence development. However, also comparisons of the quality of 
relationship between different administrations might influence the interpretation of administrative measures and, thus, confidence 
development and change (Olsen, 2017). In addition, the relationship between trust in the administration and trust in fellow citizens 
and related perceived social norms needs further investigation. Empirical investigations are needed to examine how coercive and 
legitimate power impact the perceived social norm of cooperation and whether this also leads to trust in other citizens. Future 
research could also examine whether specific political orientations, religiosity or general trust are related to the perception of a 
specific interaction climate (Lozza, Kastlunger, Tagliabue, & Kirchler, 2013) and consequently to different reactions to coercive and 
legitimate policies. Moderator analyses also are relevant to further understand the relationship between coercive power and (implicit) 
trust. 
Practically, the present research suggests that tax administrations are well-advised to consider the specific perceived interaction 
climate of their taxpayers. Regulating institutions have to develop diagnostic capabilities to be able to plan and process targeted 
policies to specific groups (Braithwaite, 2003). The perceived interaction climate could be determined by survey studies to select the 
most effective strategy to foster trust and a confidence-based climate for a specific group of citizens. This targeted approach also 
would save resources as trusting citizens who likely have a high level of cooperation require less monitoring by expensive auditing 
schemes (Braithwaite, 2003). 
To conclude, the present results show that public administrations likely can change the interaction climate with their citizens by 
the means of coercive and legitimate power. They need to consider, however, the initial interaction climate, thus, the perceived 
interaction quality, before choosing the right combination of harsh and soft measures. 
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A constructive, highly professional relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers is
essential for tax compliance. The aim of the present paper was to explore systematically
the determinants of this relationship and related tax compliance behaviors based
on the extended slippery slope framework. We used in-depth qualitative interviews
with 33 self-employed taxpayers and 30 tax auditors. Interviewees described the
relationship along the extended slippery slope framework concepts of power and trust.
However, also novel sub-categories of power (e.g., setting deadlines) and trust (e.g.,
personal assistance) were mentioned. Furthermore, also little-studied categories of tax
behavior emerged, such as accepting tax behavior, e.g., being available to the tax
authorities, or stalling tax behavior, e.g., the intentional creation of complexity. The results
comprehensively summarize the determinants of the tax relationship and tax compliance
behaviors. Additionally, results highlight future research topics and provide insights for
policy strategies.
Keywords: public institutions, public administration, tax compliance, tax evasion, cooperation, power, trust
INTRODUCTION
The quality of the interaction climate between tax authorities and taxpayers is increasingly deemed
important for tax compliance. Whereas studies historically considered simple stimulus-response
mechanisms such as the influence of an increased tax rate on tax compliance (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972), today practice, and research increasingly considers the relationship between tax
authorities and taxpayers (Braithwaite, 2002; Feld and Frey, 2002; Kirchler, 2007). For instance,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2013) promotes cooperative relationships between tax
authorities and taxpayers, and encourages tax administrations to build up trust-based interactions
with honest taxpayers. These new policy perspectives are supported by theories such as the
responsive regulation theory (Braithwaite, 2002, 2003) and the slippery slope framework of tax
compliance (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008). Responsive regulation theory proposes that tax
authorities manage their relationships with taxpayers as response to the taxpayers’ motivational
postures (Braithwaite, 2007). Akin to other theoretical accounts (e.g., Feld and Frey, 2007; Luttmer
and Singhal, 2014), the slippery slope framework suggests that two key determinants (i.e., the power
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of authorities and trust in authorities) related to classical
economic deterrence factors such as audits and fines, as well
as psychological factors related to fairness and reciprocity rules,
shape the tax climate, and in turn, tax compliance (Gangl
et al., 2015). However, in spite of practical acknowledgment
and the existence of several theoretical models concerning
the relationship climate, empirical knowledge regarding the
determinants that shape the interaction process and resulting tax
behavior remains to be further investigated.
The first aim of the present explorative research is, based on
in-depth interviews with Austrian taxpayers and tax auditors,
to empirically examine the theoretical constructs regarding the
actors’ relationship and tax compliance behaviors that are defined
in the extended slippery slope framework. The second aim is, to
identify novel sub-categories about tax behavior and its perceived
relationship antecedents to generate new research hypotheses.
In contrast to quantitative experimental and survey approaches,
which often over-simplify compliance behavior, use closed
questions and investigate student samples, our interview-based
approach which includes both tax auditors and self employed
taxpayers, will increase the practical relevance of insights into the
tax compliance relationship, allowing to detect concepts that have
not been considered so far. There is only one previous study, to
the best of our knowledge, which investigates taxpayers and tax
auditors (Kirchler et al., 2006).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The Extended Slippery Slope Framework
The slippery slope framework was developed as a conceptual
tool to organize research on tax compliance determinants into
two dimensions: power of authorities and trust in authorities
(Kirchler et al., 2008). Power defines research predominantly in
economics and is defined as the potential and ability of an entity
to influence another entity’s behavior (Freiberg, 2010). Trust
summarizes predominantly psychological approaches and refers
to taxpayers’ perception of tax authorities’ competence and their
behavior in the interest of the community (Kirchler et al., 2008).
Both determinants affect tax behavior, although power fosters
an antagonistic relationship climate, whereas trust leads to a
synergistic climate. In the case of the former, compliance is based
on strict enforcement, whereas in the latter, compliance is based
on voluntary or committed cooperation (Kirchler et al., 2008).
According to the extended slippery slope framework (Gangl
et al., 2015), power, and trust are further differentiated. For
instance, the power of authorities is divided into coercive and
legitimate power (Turner, 2005; Tyler, 2006). Coercive power
is related to classical economic theories on tax compliance,
incentivizing a rational taxpayer through punishment, and
rewards (Becker, 1968; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Legitimate
power, on the other hand, summarizes social and legal
psychological ideas about influencing citizens by gaining their
acceptance through being perceived inter alia as legitimized and
as acting professionally (Tyler, 2006). The dimension of trust
in authorities refers to dual process theories (i.e., system 1 and
system 2) on cognition (e.g., Kahneman, 2003) and trust (e.g.,
Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Misztal, 1996), and differentiates trust
in reason-based and implicit trust (Castelfranchi and Falcone,
2010). Reason-based trust is defined as taxpayers’ deliberate
conclusion that the tax authorities can be trusted based on a series
of criteria such as tax authorities’ perceived goals. Finally, implicit
trust is defined as inter alia taxpayers’ automatic and unconscious
trust reactions to stimuli such as an official-looking document
(Gangl et al., 2015). In order to explain the development of
and change in tax relationships, the extended slippery slope
framework integrates a wide range of theories on cognition
(Kahneman, 2003; Evans, 2008), leadership (French and Raven,
1959; Avolio and Bass, 1991), and social and organizational
relationships (Lewin et al., 1939; Ouchi, 1979; Haslam and Fiske,
1999; Adler, 2001; Alm and Torgler, 2011).
Tax Authorities’ Power
In the following section, and based on the extended slippery
slope framework’s concepts of power and trust, we review and
categorize research on tax compliance determinants, particularly
relationship determinants as well as the different qualities of tax
compliance behaviors, by incorporating the latest findings from
psychological, economic, legal, and administrative research. After
each section, we present our research questions.
Coercive power
Coercive power is defined as the possibility of deterring tax
evasion and fostering tax honesty by using enforcement and
incentives. Based on the theory of the social bases of power
(French and Raven, 1959; Raven, 1993; Raven et al., 1998) and in
line with research on taxes, we differentiate between punishment
power and reward power as forms of coercive power. Although
Raven et al. (1998) called this forms of power harsh power, we stay
with the term coercive power as previous research on regulation
of citizens’ behavior (Turner, 2005).
Punishment power in the form of audits and fines is probably
the instrument that is most commonly used by tax authorities
to enforce compliance (e.g., Andreoni et al., 1998; Kastlunger
et al., 2009; Kirchler et al., 2010; Castro and Scartascini,
2013). Punishment power operates in line with the standard
economic model of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968) and the
standard model of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo,
1972). The models state that individuals evaluate the probability
and consequences of audits and punishment of law violation.
Given that individuals and firms are assumed to seek profit
maximization, next to income and tax rate, compliance is
essentially considered a function of detection probability, and
severity of sanctions (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan,
1973). Thus, all possibilities to coercively enforce compliance by
maximizing detection, e.g., based on third-party information or
withholding taxes, increase tax honesty (Luttmer and Singhal,
2014). More recent research has additionally examined public
disclosure in the form of transparent tax returns (Bø et al.,
2014) or black lists (Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2015) as coercive
measures to deter tax evasion.
Research question 1a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of punishment power (audits, fines and
public disclosure)?
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Research question 1b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of punishment that have not been
considered in the literature?
Akin to punishment power as negative reinforcement, reward
power in the form of positive reinforcement is considered in
the decision to comply or not comply (Feld et al., 2006).
Rewards for compliant behavior are also considered a form of
coercion, and are likely to crowed-out intrinsic motivation to
cooperate (Deci, 1971; Frey, 1997). Tax research on the effects
of monetary and non-monetary rewards is rather scarce and
findings are inconsistent (Falkinger and Walther, 1991; Torgler,
2002; Feld et al., 2006; Feld and Frey, 2007; Kastlunger et al.,
2010). For instance, studies examine the impact of lottery tickets
(Bazart and Pickhard, 2011), wellness vouchers (Koessler et al.,
2016), or the promise of privileged treatment (Simone et al.,
2013). Although, rare empirical evidence for the effect exists,
some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hope to increase
tax compliance by honoring honest taxpayers through positive
disclosure (see for example1).
Research question 2a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of reward power (monetary, non-
monetary or positive disclosure)?
Research question 2b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of reward power that have not been
considered in the literature?
Legitimate power
In the extended slippery slope framework, legitimate power is
characterized by the legitimacy of the tax authority (Hofmann
et al., 2014; Gangl et al., 2015). Based on theories of legitimacy
(Tyler, 1990, 2006; Turner, 2005) and social bases of power
(French and Raven, 1959; Raven et al., 1998), legitimate power
is seen as soft power, comprising positional power, information
power, expert power, and referent power. Although Raven et al.
(1998) called this form of power soft power, we stick with
the terminology of the regulation of citizens’ behavior, and call
soft power legitimate power (Turner, 2005). Positional power
refers to the perception that the authority has the legal right
to levy taxes. Information power is based on tax authorities’
circulation of relevant information. Expert power means that tax
authorities are perceived as skilled and professionally trained.
Referent power refers to authorities’ capacity to influence
taxpayers based on their own positive image (Raven et al.,
1998). The different categories of legitimate power are related
to the perception of a transparent and fair tax system (Wenzel,
2002; Bradford et al., 2014), facilitating the taxpayer’s voice, and
participation (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Feld
and Tyran, 2002) in levying and spending taxes. Rich empirical
data regarding the effectiveness of proxies for legitimate power
indicate a positive relationship between customer orientation,
perceived legitimacy, provision of relevant information and
supportive procedures, knowledge and skills, and tax compliance
(Alm et al., 2010; Hartner et al., 2011; Gangl et al., 2013;
Hofmann et al., 2014).
1fairtaxmark.com
Research question 3a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of legitimate power (positional, expert,
information and referent)?
Research question 3b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive forms of legitimate power that have not been
considered in the literature?
Taxpayers’ Trust in the Tax Authority
Citizens’ trust in authorities is of paramount importance with
regard to law compliance (e.g., Tyler, 1997; Jackson et al., 2012)
and this is particularly relevant in the tax relationship (e.g., Scholz
and Lubell, 1998; Feld and Frey, 2002; Murphy, 2004; Kirchler
et al., 2008; Hammar et al., 2009; van Dijke and Verboon, 2010).
Taxpayers trust the tax authority either deliberately or implicitly
(Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; Gangl et al., 2015).
Implicit trust
Implicit trust in the tax authority originates from an automatic,
unconscious reaction based on associative and conditional
learning processes (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). Based on
such associative experiences, individuals learn that in some
situations they can trust to a greater degree than in others. For
instance, if taxpayers possess positive experiences of interacting
with the tax authority, they are more likely to trust them in
the future without thinking about it (Gangl et al., 2015; see also
trust based on reciprocity and reputation, e.g., King-Casas et al.,
2005). Implicit trust is related to a perceived shared identity
and shared values (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). Individuals
are more likely to trust those who they perceive similar to
themselves (e.g., concerning sociodemographic background) and
who share their views, interests and values (Kirchler et al., 2006).
Relatedly, a perception that the tax authorities treat taxpayers
as equal partners and exhibit empathy for their problems is
likely to trigger implicit trust (Gangl et al., 2015). Finally,
cues such as official documents, smiling faces and friendly
voices can also stimulate automatic trust. Empirical studies
show that proxies of implicit trust such as nudges (Behavioural
Insights Team, 2011; Chirico et al., 2017) of social norms
(Hallsworth et al., 2017) or reminders of a shared national
identity (Gangl et al., 2016a,b) can increase tax compliance.
However, the quantitative approach of most preexisting studies
may explain why empirical evidence regarding the relevance
of implicit trust on tax behavior remains scarce (Hofmann
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, many tax authorities seek to trigger
implicit trust, such as through advertisements or appealing
website designs.
Research question 4a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of implicit trust (automatic trust,
experience, shared values, empathy, and perception of
being equal stakeholders)?
Research question 4b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of implicit trust that have not been
considered in the literature?
Reason-based trust
Reason-based trust is based on deliberate considerations
concerning taxpayers’ dependency on the tax authorities and the
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importance of tax authorities’ goals (Castelfranchi and Falcone,
2010; Gangl et al., 2015). In addition, taxpayers consider internal
factors of the tax authorities such as competence, motivation,
and benevolence and external factors, which may be relevant
for the work of the authorities, such as economic and political
conditions (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; Hofmann et al.,
2014; Gangl et al., 2015). Considerable empirical and theoretical
evidence exists concerning the positive effects of deliberate
forms of trust on cooperation, such as knowledge-based trust
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) and rational trust (Ripperger, 1998).
Conceptually, reason-based trust, especially internal factors,
overlap with legitimate power (e.g., Malhotra and Murnighan,
2002; Hofmann et al., 2017a). They represent two sides of the
same tax relationship: the legitimate power of the authorities is
a perception of influence, and reason-based trust of taxpayers
is the decision to be vulnerable based on the influencing entity
and its environment. Numerous studies have demonstrated that
reason-based trust (e.g., Murphy, 2004; Wahl et al., 2010; Gangl
et al., 2013; Kogler et al., 2013) and its proxies such as perceived
institutional quality and corruption (e.g., Cummings et al., 2009;
Torgler and Schneider, 2009; Gangl et al., 2017) are essential
for tax compliance.
Research question 5a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of reason-based trust (dependency,
shared goals, internal factors and external factors)?
Research question 5b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of reason-based trust that have not been
considered in the literature?
Tax Compliance Behavior
In the slippery slope framework, and similar to numerous
theoretical and empirical accounts, only small subsets of
tax compliance behaviors (such as honest payment and tax
avoidance; see however Kirchler and Wahl, 2010, who developed
scales on voluntary compliance, enforced compliance, tax
avoidance, and evasion) are distinguished (Kirchler et al.,
2008; Gangl et al., 2015). Furthermore, in the seminal work
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), tax
compliance is defined as the amount of honestly paid, or evaded
tax. Most empirical work applying laboratory experiments and
surveys is based on this simplified view on tax compliance
(Alm et al., 1995; Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2017b).
However, practitioners such as tax administrations (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2004)
hold a more complex understanding of tax compliance. They
see it as consisting of, e.g., correct registration as a taxpayer,
completing tax reports on time, reporting complete and accurate
information, and paying taxes on time. Others differentiate
between filing compliance, payment compliance, and reporting
compliance (Brown and Mazur, 2003), or administrative
compliance (i.e., registering, reporting, and time requirements)
and technical compliance (i.e., taxes are calculated based on the
technical requirements of the law, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2001). Finally, tax
authorities distinguish commercial tax avoidance as legal tax
reduction within the brackets of the law (e.g., claiming refund
for investments) from aggressive tax avoidance, as tax reduction
against the spirit of the law (e.g., cross-border profit shifting
and tax flight; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development [OECD], 2001).
Research question 6a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive different categories of tax compliance behavior
(honest taxpaying, tax evasion, tax registration, timely
filing, correct reporting, commercial tax planning, and
aggressive tax planning)?
Research question 6b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of tax behaviors that have not been
considered in the literature?
METHOD: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW
STUDY
In order to answer the research questions and to depict the
perception of the tax stakeholders, we followed a qualitative
approach and conducted semi-structured interviews. Qualitative
psychological research investigates the distinctive characteristics
of experience of persons and is usually distinguished from
quantitative methods adapted from natural sciences (Fischer,
2005). A qualitative approach is appropriate for investigating
exploratory questions, such as the tax auditors’ and taxpayers’
perception of power and trust, as well as tax behaviors, as it
gives voice to the subjective experience of the interviewees.
Our qualitative approach builds on social constructivism and
social representations theory, proposing that knowledge and
attitudes about tax issues are gained through social interaction,
communication and discussion in peer-groups, and insights from
media reports (c.f., Moscovici, 1998; Peters, 2010).
We interviewed self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors
as relevant stakeholders. We choose self-employed because
compared to employed taxpayers in Austria their taxes are not
withheld by the employer; rather they need to declare their gross
income and pay taxes out of pocket. Thus, they have likely
more experience with interactions with the tax authorities. In the
following section, we present the sample, recruitment technique
and interview procedures for both self-employed taxpayers and
auditors. The results are presented subsequently.
Self-Employed Taxpayers
Sample
In total, 33 Austrian self-employed taxpayers with small to
medium size businesses participated in the study. Participants (15
of whom were female) were on average 44.34 years old (N = 32;
one person did not indicate his/her age; SDage = 11.69), and
had on average 10.58 years (SD = 10.31) of experience as self-
employed persons. The number of employees working for the
self-employed taxpayers ranged from 0 (48.5%) to 50 (5.9%);
41.2% of those who employed personnel claimed to only have
one employee. The majority of participants reported an annual
turnover of less than 25,000 EUR (nine taxpayers), or between
25,000 EUR and 50,000 EUR (nine taxpayers). The majority of
self-employed taxpayers (17 taxpayers) utilized a tax advisor.
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Concerning their experience with the tax authority, 11 taxpayers
reported that they had been audited at least once.
Procedure and Material
Interviewees were recruited via a market research agency in 2013.
All interviews were conducted by one interviewer, accompanied
by two assistants, who tape-recorded the interviews. Interviews
were semi-structured, lasting between 30 and 90 min. Following
the interview, a short questionnaire was completed to gather
information regarding the participants’ demographics and their
businesses (see Supplementary Material). Interviews opened
with a general question concerning taxpayers’ experience with
the tax authority, thus affording them full freedom of expression.
Subsequent questions delved into the tax authorities’ potential to
affect tax behavior (power of the tax authority), taxpayers’ trust
in the authority, and the impact of power and trust on their tax
compliance. The interview questions were on taxes in general and
did not specify a specific kind of tax. The interview guideline
and questions were developed with the help of an experienced
advisory board of tax researchers, including improvement loops
based on test interviews. The interview materials can be found
in the Supplementary Material, the transcripts can be found




Overall, 30 Austrian tax auditors (13 of whom were female)
who were on average 46.73 years (SD = 4.59) old participated
in the study. Tax auditors reported their job experience, ranging
from 6 years (3.3%) to 34 years (3.3%), with an average
20.70 years (SD = 7.52). Participants worked as tax auditors in
three different eastern federal states of Austria; half were from
the city of Vienna (53.3%) and half were from the country
side (Styria: 26.7% and Lower Austria: 20.0%). Half of the
tax auditors were responsible for auditing small and medium
businesses, and the other half were responsible for auditing
large businesses.
Procedure and Material
Access to 30 experienced tax officers was provided by the Austrian
Ministry of Finance in 2013, which ensured that the participants
were evenly distributed in terms of sex, urban vs. rural area,
and area of responsibility. The interviews were conducted in
the offices of the tax auditors by two interviewers. Interviews
were semi-structured and lasted between 30 and 130 min. The
interviews opened with a general question regarding tax auditors’
work, followed by questions about tax authorities’ potential
to shape tax behavior (power of tax authorities), the role of
taxpayers’ trust in the tax authorities, and the impact of power
and trust on tax compliance. The interview questions were on
taxes in general and did not specify a specific kind of tax.
The interview materials can be found in the Supplementary
Material, the transcripts can be found at osf.io/nv285/. No
monetary or other form of remuneration was provided for
participation, but the interviews were conducted during the tax
auditors’ working hours.
Analytical Procedure
The interviews with self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors
were transcribed and analyzed using the qualitative analysis
software NVivo (Qsr International Pty Ltd, 2010). The analysis
followed an inductive as well as deductive approach. Data
were analyzed using qualitative content analysis (QCA; Schreier,
2012), i.e., deriving codes from the data, as well as the extended
slippery slope framework to provide codes. QCA is a method
for systematically describing and conceptualizing the meaning of
qualitative data, such as interviews, by categorizing parts of the
material using a coding frame (Schreier, 2012). QCA is flexible in
such as it is made to fit the material; thus, the coding categories
are not purely theory-based but data driven. After data collection,
two tax researchers read through the interviews, and build a
coding frame based on the basic text and along the extended
slippery slope framework. After the coding process, two other
researchers who were also well-acquainted with tax research
examined each of the categories, checking for homogeneity
within and clear discrimination between them.
RESULTS
Perception of Tax Authorities’ Power
In the following section, we present the results on perceived
power. Table 1 summarizes the findings. The results indicated
that tax auditors and taxpayers perceived the categories known




As regards research questions 1a,b, the interviews illustrated
that the tax stakeholders do perceive the categories of
punishment power discussed in the literature (audits, fines,
and public disclosure). Punishment power consisted of the
categories of “punishment” (e.g., financial fine or imprisonment),
“audits” (control mechanisms as well as monitoring), “negative
disclosure” (public exposure of tax evaders), and a new category,
“deadlines” (setting deadlines e.g., for taxpayers to submit
documents). As one tax auditor claimed: “And if he stood me up
the fifth time, I write beneath, that I want a deadline.” Like, “Until
that day you have to present the documents” (Tax auditor #08,
male, 41 years). It is of particular interest that “audits” played a
significant role, as this category was mentioned more often than
any other type of power measure. As one self-employed taxpayer
(#13, male, 43 years) claimed: “Well, without monitoring it is not
working for sure.”
Reward Power
Both tax auditors and taxpayers reported monetary and non-
monetary rewards, as well as positive disclosure as aspects of tax
authorities’ reward power (research question 2a). In particular,
reward power consists of the monetary “gain” (e.g., tax reduction
for taxpayers who pay on time – obviously, depending on legal
constraints), non-monetary “praise” (e.g., “thank you letter”
or positive feedback), “positive disclosure” (publicly praising
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(Self-employed taxpayer #26, female, 40 years)
“Somehow it is always a form of punishment [short laugh]”





(Tax auditor #21, male, 50 years)
“Yes, this is actually a policy taken up more strongly in the last years by the financial administration, with which
we want to reward the honest”
Legtimate power
Position power (Tax auditor #16, male, 49 years)
“Well, I would see it in a way, that when I go out there, I want to leave the impression of a persisting instance,
which ensures that the equality of taxation is adhered to”
Expert power (Self-employed taxpayer #28, male, 60 years)
“The tax authority is certainly the expert”
Referent power Image (Self-employed taxpayer #23, female, 43 years)
“When I identify myself with the state and say ‘OK, the money is used for this or that and Austria is very worth
living and therefore, we need taxes,’ this indeed increases tax honesty”
Information power Individual information
Attain information oneself
Publicity
(Self-employed taxpayer #10, male 31 years)
“Actually, that would be normal. That wouldn’t be so unusual, for example if you receive some kind of
information per mail”
Transparency (Self-employed taxpayer #13, male, 43 years)
“The most important point would rather be transparency, more transparency on the part of the tax authority, so
you know: the activity, the income, the expenditures, the taxes that you pay”
Justice Unfairness (Tax auditor #29, male, 50 years)
“The person vis-à-vis cannot say, ‘I won’t declare parts of my income,’ he has to pay taxes, no matter what tax
rate. It is simply about justice”
Participation (Self-employed taxpayer #16, male, 34 years)
“Of course there is the idea, that you can for example sort of decide, what taxes are used for, well. To a certain
degree, entirely or third. I want to promote this, I want to promote this. Yes, this would simply be a marvelous
way to see, where you want to get that to”
Direct translation.
honest taxpayers), and the new categories (research question 2b)
of “accommodation” (the authority demonstrates goodwill, for
instance when taxpayers can choose the date of an appointment),
and “active assistance” (employers of the authorities go beyond
their role, e.g., by providing helpful tips to honest taxpayers). Tax
auditors reported that they reward taxpayers by praising them
during audits: “Yes, yes. So that is really important. People like that
VERY much, when you praise them. I mean, everyone needs praise
and even if they then [ask]: “So, is that alright like that?” “Yeah,
you did an awesome job.” (Tax auditor #12, female, 48 years).
Some self-employed taxpayers noted that they perceived a lack
of additional tax payment a reward in itself. Many self-employed
taxpayers criticized the random application of rewards, believing
that individual tax auditors offer tax reductions with varying
levels of frequency. For instance, one self-employed taxpayers
compared the auditing situation to a bazaar, whereby taxpayers
and tax auditors are able to bargain about positive and negative
reinforcement: “And what makes me angry is that it became like a
bazaar. So really like at a bazaar.” (Self-employed taxpayer #23,
female, 43 years).
Nevertheless, most of the self-employed taxpayers wanted the
tax authority to have greater opportunities to reward desired
behavior. As one self-employed (#06, male, age not indicated)
said, “Just introduce bonus systems. But this is already what we
do today . . . what I have said before. Well, just bonus systems. Or
MORE bonus systems.”
Legitimate Power
Concerning research questions 3a,b, the interviews revealed that
legitimate power consists of “position power” (the authority
has the right to levy taxes), “expert power” (the authority and
its employees are perceived to be experts), “referent power”
(the authority has a positive image), “information power” (the
authority is circulating information), “transparency” (all tax-
related processes are transparent for the taxpayers), “justice”
(the authority is treating all taxpayers fairly), and “participation”
(taxpayers can take part in decision-making, e.g., how taxes are
used). A tax auditor noted that transparency as information
power is an important topic for self-employed taxpayers,
especially when it comes to the action taken by the tax authority:
“You have to show a lot of transparency in what you are actually
doing” (Tax auditor #14, male, 38 years). Both types of self-
employed taxpayers as well as tax auditors reported mechanisms
of legitimate position power and information power more
frequently than the other categories of legitimate power. A self-
employed taxpayer (#01, female, 52 years) mentioned “[. . .] that
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the tax authorities are legitimate, or simply that they are in the
position, that they then use strategies, well they can implement this
as strategies at taxpayers.” One tax auditor emphasized that it was
important to refer to the legal position of the institution of which
he is a representative: “There have to be rules and I have to tell the
people “I am the tax authority’ when I come to them” (Tax auditor
#33, male, 46 years).
Perception of Trust
Both self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors reported that
taxpayers trust the tax authority implicitly as well as based on
deliberation (Table 2). All categories of implicit and reason-based
trust (Hofmann et al., 2014; Gangl et al., 2015) were mentioned
in the interviews. In addition, new categories were found (e.g.,
implicit trust: personal support; reason-based trust: respect).
Implicit Trust
In line with research question 4a, both types of tax stakeholders
reported that implicit trust consists of the categories “blind trust”
(trusting the authority without thinking about it), “sympathy
and communication” (taxpayers can communicate openly with
employees of the tax authority), “empathy” (feeling of being
understood by the authority), “shared values” (the authority and
the taxpayers share the same values, or weltanschauung), and
“equal stakeholders” (the tax authority and taxpayers interact
at eye level). Furthermore, as regards research question 4b,
“personal support” (taxpayers receive personal support from the
employees of the tax authority) was mentioned as a new category.
Some interviewees spoke quite generally of fundamental or basic
trust (“Grundvertrauen”) in the tax system. As noted by a self-
employed taxpayer: “Well, I believe that in Austria there is
a fundamental trust in the state system and therefore also in
the system of taxation.” (Self-employed taxpayer #12, female,
27 years). Personal support was considered important for implicit
trust: “So if you know the face behind the institution, that tells
you: “Come here, we talk about it” (Self-employed taxpayer” #11,
female, 40 years), given that “for the entrepreneur a personification
of the tax office occurs” (Tax auditor #30, male, 40 years). Many
self-employed taxpayers refused to use the phrase “blind trust”











(Self-employed taxpayer #12, female,
27 years)
“I think, that in Austria, a level of basic
trust in the state system and therefore








(Self-employed taxpayer #07, female,
53 years)
“No, no, I think (. . .) that doesn’t work
with sympathy, that really only works
due to facts and actions”
Direct translation.
when discussing their trust in the tax authority, given that
it has a negative connotation, being associated with naivety
toward the authorities’ actions. They preferred instead the phrase
“automatic trust.” As one self-employed taxpayer (#03, female,
35 years) suggested: “Well, simple blind, blind trust that shows a
lot of naivety.”
Reason-Based Trust
The interviews revealed that stakeholders do perceive the
categories of reason-based trust discussed in the extended
slippery slope framework (research question 5a). Reason-based
trust consists of the categories “common goal” (tax authority and
taxpayers share the same goals), “internal factors” (employees
at the tax authority are competent, motivated, and benevolent),
“dependency” (taxpayers depend on the tax authority and
therefore trust the authority), and “external factors” (the
perception of opportunities and dangers). Furthermore, as a
novel category of reason-based trust (research question 5b),
“respect” (respectful communication between the tax authority
and the taxpayers) was mentioned. Tax auditors in particular
claimed that interaction with taxpayers was most successful
where there is mutual respect: “As said before, the encounter.
Every person needs to be respected” (Tax auditor #21, male,
50 years), “and taking them [the taxpayer] seriously and not
talking deprecatory to them.” (Tax auditor #09, male, 41 years).
The interviews revealed that media reports concerning the
unnecessary expenditure of taxes were perceived as important
external factors that hinder the work of the tax authority. One
tax auditor (#17, male, 49 years) stated: “The media – you have
said so already – [. . .] that has an extreme effect.” A second (Tax
auditor #27, male, 54 years) argued: “Based on different media
reports this – how shall I say it – trust is nowadays, I believe, is not
particularly high.” Accordingly, self-employed taxpayers referred
to negative media coverage of the topic of taxes. On the one hand,
they referred to scandalous tax evasions by prominent people, but
on the other hand they talked about the impression that their tax
payments are wasted, e.g., “Through the media you get to know
how much is squandered” (self-employed taxpayer #11, female,
40 years).
Tax Compliance
Taxpayers as well as tax auditors reported a differentiated view
of tax compliance. As shown in Table 3, both groups cited
the relevance of behaviors such as “tax honesty,” “tax evasion,”
and “tax avoidance” for compliance and non-compliance, which
relate to categories that have already been discussed in the tax
literature (research question 6a). However, “tax registration,”
“timely filing,” “correct reporting,” “commercial,” and “aggressive
tax planning” were not explicitly mentioned as distinct categories.
Concerning research question 6b, “accepting tax behavior” and
“stalling tax behavior” were identified as distinct categories. In
the following section, we present the contents of all mentioned
categories of tax behavior.
Tax Honesty
Tax honesty was a relevant category of tax compliance for both
self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors. Being tax honest was
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TABLE 3 | Categories of tax compliance behavior mentioned in the interviews.
Examples
Tax honesty (Self-employed taxpayer #05, male, 47 years)
“The tax honesty in Austria is certainly higher; this is also an
advantage”
Tax evasion (Self-employed taxpayer #06, male, age not indicated)
“If the authority takes advantage of it, then sooner or later it
actually causes tax evasion, because somehow you always
want to take revenge for giving you wrong advice or
saddling you up with too many taxes”
Tax avoidance (Tax auditor #15, female, 53 years)
“And among the big corporations there are always the – not
even loopholes – but legal possibilities to save taxes and
this is actually, this is difficult”
Accepting tax
behavior
(Tax auditor #10, female, 52 years)
“Well (. . .) basically I follow the people – I honestly have to
say that I rarely have difficulties – that the people basically
are very cooperative and it works”
Stalling tax
behavior
(Tax auditor #06, female, 49 years)
“And on the other hand you find audits where the taxpayers
block, where nothing is handed in”
Direct translation.
characterized as paying the full amount of the tax liability, in
particular submitting all documents and transferring the correct
amount of money to the tax authority on time. Self-employed
taxpayers especially perceived tax honesty as significant in
Austria: “I guess that 90% of the people, without knowing the
concrete numbers, are honest” (Self-employed taxpayer #06, male,
age not indicated).
Tax Evasion
When referring to tax evasion, all interviewees cited tax fraud.
Of particular interest was the finding that the great majority
thought of tax evasion as an intended behavior, with relatively
few discussing tax evasion as “sloppy taxpaying” (“Schlampiges
Steuerzahlen”). As a tax auditor (#26, female, 49 years) argued,
“There are firms that do this purely – how should I say –
purely because of sloppiness.” However, at least for some tax
auditors the distinction between intended and observed tax
evasion is important.
Tax Avoidance
Tax avoidance was considered in terms of being commercial
rather than aggressive, and hence as a “normal,” legal and
legitimate way of reducing the tax burden. Self-employed
taxpayers generally talked very positively about this means of
reducing the tax liability, often using the phrase “to save taxes”
(“Steuern sparen”). For example, a self-employed taxpayer (#05,
male, 47 years) claimed: “The more someone possesses, the more
he can employ someone to help save taxes”; moreover, (#21, male,
53 years): “BECAUSE in general the one who pays less tax is
cleverer.” A tax auditor (#08, male, 41 years) argued similarly:
“The citizen is like that, he tries to pay as less taxes as possible.
That is in the nature of the human being.”
Accepting Tax Behavior
Both self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors reported examples
of “accepting tax behavior,” referring to taxpayers who accept tax
authorities’ requests and behave cooperatively when interacting
with the tax authority. Providing ordered and full materials,
being accessible on the telephone, email or in person, and
giving comprehensive answers when asked, were all considered
examples of accepting tax behavior. A self-employed taxpayer
(#08, female, 36 years) argued “[. . .] that you be more precise,
that you be perhaps also more punctual.” A tax auditor mentioned
(#07, male, 48 years) that “If the counterpart is cooperative, it
works pretty easily, it takes the simplest route.”
Stalling Tax Behavior
In accordance with accepting tax behavior, stalling tax behavior
has rarely been considered in previous tax literature. Tax auditors
in particular spoke of taxpayers who fail to cooperate. Failing
to provide all documents, intentionally creating complexity, or
attempting to be inaccessible to the tax authorities comprised
examples of stalling behavior. For instance: “Why is this missing?
Why is it not there? Or how long did someone have time? If you
now say after a week he has said that he brings this and then it is
not there. Or someone has postponed a meeting for the fourth time
and then this occurs” (Tax auditor #08, male, 41 years).
DISCUSSION
Research into tax compliance increasingly postulates that the
quality of the relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers
is an important factor that shapes tax compliance (Braithwaite,
2002; Feld and Frey, 2002; Kirchler, 2007). The results of
the present study indicate that taxpayers and tax auditors
indeed perceive power and trust categories as determinants of
the relationship and use this categories to describe their tax
relationship and tax compliance behavior. Thereby, the present
study offers support for the assumptions of the extended slippery
slope framework (Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al., 2015) and
allows a comprehensive and theoretical conceptualization of
the determinants of the tax relationship and tax compliance
behaviors. However, the present results also indicate that the
tax stakeholders perceive categories that have scarcely been
acknowledged in previous research. In addition to the well-
known categories of power and trust, new sub-categories were
identified that should be included in the extended slippery slope
framework. The present research shows in particular, that the
extended slippery slope framework as well as other theoretical
models on the tax relationship (e.g., the responsive regulation
theory) need to consider a larger variety of tax compliance
behaviors. Thereby, the present research highlights research gaps
and facilitates the generation of new research questions.
The results indicated that coercive power as a form of
punishment pertains to audits, fines and negative disclosure
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Bø et al., 2014), as well as
the new category of deadlines. Deadlines are not considered
neutral, but rather as a means of enforcing compliance. To
the best of our knowledge, empirical research on the effect of
deadlines on the tax relationship, on tax compliance or on other
forms of citizens’ compliance with the administration is rare.
Thus, this represents an important starting point for future
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research and policy, because unilaterally established deadlines
are a typical administrative instrument to influence citizens,
and as the results here indicate, they may instigate the negative
consequences of coercive power such as a reduction in trust
and an increase in enforced motivation (Kirchler et al., 2008).
Future quantitative research should examine the ways in which
deadlines might be implemented to render them less aversive.
For example, research on the effect of deadlines on student
assignments has indicated that deadlines do not undermine
intrinsic motivation if students are allowed to actively participate
in the establishment of deadlines (Burgess et al., 2004), thus an
increase in perceived legitimacy.
Reward power is related to monetary and non-monetary
rewards and praise (Bazart and Pickhard, 2011; Simone et al.,
2013; Koessler et al., 2016), as well as to the new categories
“accommodation” (i.e., showing goodwill during the audit) and
“active assistance” (i.e., helping honest taxpayers in accounting
matters). It would appear that for many taxpayers, any
administrative actions that are perceived as cooperative and
as “not punishing” are considered a reward. In addition, our
results demonstrate that taxpayers perceive rewards as something
positive, and not as an additional form of coercion. However,
again the combination with legitimate power might be important.
The interviews indicated that rewards that result from arbitrary
and non-transparent negotiations (e.g., like at a bazaar) can
reduce trust in the administration and in turn preclude any
intrinsic motivation to be honest (Deci, 1971; Frey, 1997). Future
quantitative research should determine whether and under what
conditions rewards can foster trust in the tax system.
The results for legitimate power indicated that (as expected)
this is based on position, expert, referent and information
power (French and Raven, 1959). As regards legitimate power,
no new categories emerged. However, some related constructs
of legitimate power were mentioned frequently, hence we
summarized them into their own categories, including “justice,”
“transparency” and “participation” (Feld and Tyran, 2002). It
can be assumed that these are keywords, especially for taxpayers,
which signal a legitimate tax system. Thus, the present research
indicates that authorities possess numerous options to increase
their perceived legitimacy.
In the tax relationship, implicit trust plays an important role,
as tax stakeholders mentioned all known categories and spoke
of a kind of “basic system trust” in the state and its institutions.
In addition to empathy and perceived partnership, an interesting
new category emerged: long-term “personal support.” The self-
employed claimed to favor a person in the tax administration
who can be considered personally responsible and an expert
on their tax files. Although, personal assigned assistance (e.g.,
at unemployment agencies) is a standard procedure in other
areas of public administration, this is not the case in tax
administration. However exceptions include the specialized units
of individual relationship managers for very wealthy taxpayers
found in the United Kingdom (UK, National Audit Office, 2016).
Future research should clarify whether a personal tax officer
truly enhances trust and reduces stalling behavior, or whether
in contrast this is considered an additional form of monitoring.
In terms of personal support, numerous other (unintended) side
effects must be considered, such as whether tax officers can
remain neutral when they have known a taxpayer for a long
time. Nonetheless, a personal support officer would undoubtedly
represent a strong pillar for fostering a synergistic relationship
between the tax authority and taxpayers. This “service” would
change the culture in the administration, which is currently
perceived by some as an anonymous, bureaucratic machine.
Additionally, the current categories of implicit trust can be used
in future quantitative studies utilizing recognition and speed
tasks to examine whether implicit trust cues really lead to faster
trust reactions than explicit trust cues.
Reason-based trust originates from a perception of a common
goal, dependency, competence, motivation and benevolence;
in sum, a supportive political environment (Castelfranchi and
Falcone, 2010). The interviewees claimed that media reports
play a crucial role in building (or compromising) reason-based
trust, and so further quantitative research should be conducted
to examine the positive and negative effects of media reports
on tax compliance. “Respect,” as a new highlighted category of
reason-based trust, is of course central to the tax relationship.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the term has until
now been used largely superficially (Feld and Frey, 2007) or
considered a means of describing tax authorities’ respect for
the legal rights of taxpayers (Murphy, 2004). In our interviews,
respect meant mutual respect when interacting with each other,
taxpayers’ respect for tax auditors and their expertise, and that
tax auditors encounter taxpayers objectively and appreciatively.
Future research should examine whether taxpayers’ respect has a
real, positive influence on compliance, and whether tax auditors’
respect for taxpayers (e.g., for their hard work) can foster a
synergistic relationship and build voluntary tax compliance.
The interviews also supported previous studies (Kirchler
et al., 2003) that show that taxpayers and tax auditors alike
talk about different categories of tax behavior. In addition
to tax honesty, tax evasion and tax avoidance, the results
indicate the importance of direct cooperative or non-cooperative
contact between self-employed taxpayers and authorities as an
aspect of tax compliance (“accepting behavior” and “stalling
tax behavior”). Accepting tax behavior refers to all proactive
supportive actions and service provisions on the side of the
taxpayers that facilitate the quick and accurate determination
of the real tax burden. In contrast, stalling tax behavior refers
to all actions that jeopardize the work of the tax auditors and
determination of the real tax burden. These new categories
highlight the fact that some taxpayer behaviors are related to
more costly administrative burdens than others. It should be
noted that these categories are distinct from administrative
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD], 2001) or reporting compliance (Brown and Mazur,
2003), because they concern aspects such as being available or
not intentionally creating complexity in bookkeeping, which is
different from filing or submitting material on time. However, in
spite of their obvious relevance, to the best of our knowledge,
little research exists regarding the strategies that influence
taxpayers’ accepting or stalling behavior in collaboration with
tax authorities. We believe that this finding offers important
directions for future research. Another interesting finding was
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that tax auditors spoke of unintentional sloppiness as a factor
behind tax evasion. Future research could examine whether lack
of knowledge or motivation leads to sloppiness in tax filing
and paying and how tax auditors can distinguish intention
from sloppiness. Whereas intention needs compulsory action,
sloppiness (for example, also because of the complex tax system)
can be tolerated by tax auditors and needs supportive service
related actions. Empirical examination of the fostering of ordered
and accepting tax behavior and reducing stalling tax behaviors
has considerable potential in reducing the administrative costs of
collecting taxes.
Although the current approach has its merits, there are
some limitations that must be considered in future research.
The current research takes into account only one country
with a relatively high level of trust in public institutions
(Alm and Torgler, 2006; Schneider et al., 2010). The present
results are, thus, most generalizable only to other European
countries with similar tax morale, especially Germany, which
shares a similar legal and cultural background with Austria
(see Supplementary Material for details on the Austrian tax
system). Thus, the present results might not fully capture the
reality of developing countries (and others) that have large
populations of non-filers (Gangl et al., 2017). Also the view of
additional stakeholders, in particular the tax advisors is missing
in the present research. In addition, our results are unlikely
generalizable to large international corporations. Based on our
sample selection, our results apply to self-employed taxpayers
and less likely to employed taxpayers. However, self-employed
taxpayers who have to submit their taxes personally likely have
more experiences with the tax authority and with taxpaying
compared to employed taxpayers who’s taxes are deducted
automatically. Due to our aim to investigate a large diversity
of views and due to the qualitative research design with a
relative small sample, it is not possible to determine whether
the perceptions of tax auditors and taxpayers differ. We find
that both stakeholder groups hold similar perceptions. They gave
similar examples of power, trust and tax compliance. Although,
we do not find indication of clear differences, we suggest that
future quantitative research (e.g., example questions can be
found in the Supplementary Material) targets different views of
stakeholders and gives priority to similarities and differences to
understand possible misunderstands and conflicts. We used the
extended slippery slope framework to review the literature and to
categorize the interview data. Thus, applying different theoretical
models might lead to other categories. However, given that the
extended slippery slope framework builds on established theories
of taxation (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Braithwaite, 2002;
Kirchler, 2007), power (French and Raven, 1959; Tyler, 2006),
trust (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010), regulatory relationships
(Ouchi, 1979; Adler, 2001), and cognitive processing (Kahneman,
2003), we are confident that our results are valid. Finally, as most
qualitative studies also our study is based on a relative small,
non-randomly selected sample and does not allow generalizable
conclusions and hypotheses testing. Nonetheless, the present
qualitative study is the first which rigorously investigates both,
the tax auditors and taxpayers. Therefore, we are confident
that the present results are a fruitful starting point for future
quantitative research on tax compliance with larger samples from
different countries.
The current qualitative interview study can fuel further
quantitative research. The categories found in these interviews
can be used to develop more accurate measurement instruments
(see Supplementary Material for example questions and
scales) to evaluate tax administrative policies and to analyze
the relationship between different determinants of the tax
relationship and tax behaviors. Further, an important influencing
factor of the perception of power and trust, as well as tax behavior
might be the frequency of taxpayers’ contacts with the tax
authority. Also the employment of tax advisors, as intermediaries
between self-employed taxpayers, and the tax authority, may
have a significant impact on the taxpayers’ perception of the
tax authority. Future studies should test the causal link between
relationship determinants and tax compliance behaviors. Existing
studies on coercive and legitimate power have not considered
deadlines, different forms of reward power or personal support,
all of which may be considered determinants of compliance.
Some of the “known” categories such as public disclosure
continue to require further empirical investigation. Empirical
evidence regarding the effects (and side effects) of negative
disclosure through “black lists” and public shaming is also
limited; maybe shaming only effects middle class but not wealthy
tax evaders (Lenter et al., 2003; Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2015;
Casal and Mittone, 2016). Empirical evidence regarding the effect
of positive disclosure (e.g., the Fairtax mark) is especially rare.
The main advantage of the current paper is that the
perspectives of both individual citizens and authorities were
considered. Based on this strong empirical grounding, the present
outcomes have considerable practical relevance. They indicate
that the relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers is of
inherent importance for compliance. Taxpayers do not simply
respond and tax auditors do not simply use command and
control, but rather demonstrate a sophisticated understanding
and nuanced behaviors when interacting with one another.
However, in most countries the training of tax auditors and
the approach of tax authorities continue to focus on “hard”
auditing and monitoring skills, whereas the soft skills used to
shape relationships with taxpayers are neglected. The present
results present a summary of instruments of coercive power,
legitimate power, reason-based trust, and implicit trust and can
be used to develop strategies to improve the relationship between
authorities and taxpayers, and training programs for tax auditors
aiming to improve their communication skills when interacting
with taxpayers. For instance, in workshops, setting deadlines
could be trained such that their perceived coerciveness is reduced.
A significant trend in tax administration is digitalization and
automating, as well as reducing the personal interaction between
tax authorities and taxpayers (Kochanova et al., 2017). Based
on the results presented here, in particular on the appreciation
of personal support and respect as novel categories of implicit
and reason-based trust, we argue that the resources invested in
cooperative relationship programs should be increased. Without
doubt, digital services that enhance tax handling for taxpayers
are required. However, relying solely on a machine-mediated
interaction between the tax authorities and taxpayers, with
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the aim to reduce personalized service costs, bears the risk
that tax behavior degenerates to a merely rational calculating
task. The social dimension of paying one’s contribution must
not be neglected.
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Tax compliance is assumed to be shaped by three main motivations to comply: enforced, 
voluntary, and committed motivation. Taxpayers, who hold an enforced motivation to 
comply, only pay taxes because of audits and fines for non-compliance. Voluntary 
motivated taxpayers respect the law and pay taxes because it is the easiest option. 
Committed motivation represents an intrinsic motivation, whereby taxpayers feel a moral 
obligation and responsibility to be honest. However, little and inconsistent empirical 
research exists on the relationship between motivations and tax compliance. The present 
paper empirically examines the connection between motivations and reported tax 
compliance based on data from two representative samples of 500 self-employed Austrian 
taxpayers and 1,377 Dutch entrepreneurs. Results show that an enforced motivation is 
negatively related to tax compliance, whereas a committed motivation is positively 
related to compliance. Contrary to expectations, voluntary motivation is not related to tax 
compliance. Based on the present outcomes it is suggested that tax authorities should 
present themselves as legitimate and benevolent in order to decrease enforced motivations 




Taxpayers differ in their motivation to pay taxes (Braithwaite, 2003a; Kirchler, 
Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). Whereas some might be motivated to pay taxes because 
of audits and severe fines, others might pay taxes because they feel a moral 
obligation to contribute their fair share. Theoretically, it is assumed that these 
different motivations also determine differences in tax compliance (Braithwaite, 
2003a; Kirchler et al., 2008; Kirchler, Kogler, & Muehlbacher, 2014). Taxpayers 
with dismissive motivations are expected to see it as less important to pay taxes 
correctly than taxpayers who are morally motivated to comply with the tax law 
(Braithwaite, Murphy, & Reinhart, 2007). However, little empirical research has 
been conducted on the relationship between motivation and tax compliance and in 
addition, this research is contradictory (Hartner, Rechberger, Kirchler, & 
Schabmann, 2008; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010).   
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Consequently, it cannot be determined if and how tax authorities should respond 
to taxpayers’ motivations. The present paper sheds light on the relationship 
between motivations and reported tax compliance by examining data of two 
representative samples of self-employed taxpayers in order to determine the 
relevance of taxpayers’ motivations for tax authorities’ policies. 
  
The slippery slope framework originally differentiated between enforced and 
voluntary motivation (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008) and after an extension, 
now distinguishes between three different qualities of tax compliance motivations 
defined as enforced, voluntary and committed motivation (Gangl, Hofmann, & 
Kirchler, 2015). This categorization corresponds to research on general 
psychological reactions towards influence differentiating between compliance, 
identification, and internalization (Kelman, 2006). Enforced, voluntary, and 
committed motivation could be seen as representing a continuum between the two 
broad angles of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Feld & Frey, 2007; Frey & 
Jegen, 2001; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Extrinsic motivation emphasizes outcomes of 
behavior, e.g., working for pay, whereas intrinsic motivation reflects an inherent 
interest in the actual activity, e.g., working because of curiosity (Ryan & Deci, 
2000). Generally, it is assumed that tax compliance motivations develop within 
individuals based on their experiences, attitudes, and feelings towards taxpaying 
and the tax authority (Braithwaite, 2003a; Kirchler, 2007). This implies that tax 
authorities, through their activity, may also influence and change taxpayers’ 
motivations (Feld & Frey, 2002; Gangl et al., 2015; Kirchler et al., 2008). In the 
following, the three main motivations of tax compliance are presented according 
to the slippery slope framework (Gangl et al., 2015). 
 
Motivations of tax compliance  
 
Enforced motivation is based on the deterrent effect of audits and fines (Kirchler, 
2007; Kirchler et al., 2008). Taxpayers holding an enforced motivation only pay 
taxes when they fear audits and fines and therefore think there is no alternative to 
compliance. Such a motivation is related to the broader concept of extrinsic 
motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Taxpayers comply because it leads to a 
comparatively better financial outcome than non-compliance, i.e., not being fined 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). Enforced motivated taxpayers feel a large social distance 
between themselves and the tax authorities and the state (Braithwaite, 2003a). 
Consequently, enforced motivated taxpayers likely have negative attitudes and 
feelings towards paying taxes (Kirchler, 1998). They may even condemn the tax 
collecting state as a thief (Sloterdijk, 2010). The state and its tax authorities are 
perceived as taking money in terms of taxes from taxpayers with the help of 
coercion and force (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
 
Voluntary motivation to pay taxes is based on positive reciprocity (Gangl et al., 
2015; Kelman, 2006). The tax law is respected and tax authorities are perceived as 
service providers who should assist taxpayers to comply with the law. Taxpayers 
in turn reciprocate and are voluntarily motivated to pay their taxes without the 
need of enforcement. However, the voluntary motivation does not represent a true 
intrinsic motivation to be compliant (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Taxpayers do not value 
the tax system itself, they rather accept its necessity, give in and capitulate 
(Braithwaite, 2003a). Voluntary motivation reflects a view that taxpayers are 




compliant because of the law and because of tax authorities who collect taxes 
within a professional bureaucratic system. Taxes are paid voluntarily because this 
is easier than to evade them (Gangl et al., 2015). Nonetheless, voluntary 
motivated taxpayers are interested in engaging in tax avoidance and in reducing 
their tax payments within the legal framework. 
 
Committed motivation is an intrinsic motivation to be tax compliant (Feld & Frey, 
2002; Gangl et al., 2015; Kelman, 2006). Tax compliance is internalized and seen 
as a moral obligation. Tax authorities are perceived to share the same values as 
the citizens and the way taxes are collected and spent is appreciated. Taxpayers 
feel committed to the tax system and have the feeling that they actively contribute 
to societies’ well-being. Committed taxpayers do not need explicit rules and strict 
bureaucracy, because they follow the spirit of the law and not just the letter of the 
law (Gangl et al., 2015). For committed taxpayers honest taxpaying is seen as a 
natural and automatic activity. 
 
Relationship of tax motivations to tax compliance 
 
The different qualities of taxpayers’ motivations are assumed to be related to 
different types of tax compliance (Braithwaite, 2003a; Kirchler et al., 2008). Tax 
compliance can be defined as the opinion that one should cooperate with tax 
authorities and that it is important to pay taxes honestly and in time (OECD, 
2001). Taxpayers with an enforced and dismissive motivation are assumed to be 
not tax compliant. They feel it is not important to cooperate with the tax 
authorities, to pay taxes honestly or in time. In contrast, voluntarily motivated and 
committed taxpayers in particular want to pay taxes honestly and thus, should 
show high tax compliance (Braithwaite, 2003a; Gangl et al., 2015). Survey studies 
in different countries showed that taxpayers differ in their reported motivations to 
pay taxes (Braithwaite et al., 2007; Muehlbacher, Kirchler, & Schwarzenberger, 
2011). However, little empirical research exists that relates different motivations 
of taxpayers to tax compliance (Hartner et al., 2008; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010). 
Moreover, research has inconsistent results. A survey study among 300 self-
employed Austrian taxpayers indicated that both voluntary and committed 
motivations are positively related to tax compliance. No relation between 
enforced motivation and tax compliance was found (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010). In 
contrast, in two survey studies, conducted among more than 2,000 Australian 
citizens, enforced motivations assessed as defiance motivations towards tax 
paying were negatively related to tax compliance whereas committed motivations 
were not associated with tax compliance (Hartner et al., 2008). Hence, it is neither 
clear whether enforced, voluntary, and committed motivations are at all related to 
tax compliance nor which of these motivations might have negative or positive 
connections to the willingness to comply with tax obligations.  
 
Insights into the relation between tax motivations and tax compliance have a high 
practical relevance for tax authorities. If the exact relation between motivations 
and tax compliance is known, tax authorities could apply their strategies in a more 
efficient and tailored way, as suggested by the responsive regulation theory 
(Braithwaite, 2003b) and the slippery slope framework (Kirchler et al., 2008). The 
responsive regulation theory argues that taxpayers should be treated differently by 
tax authorities depending on their motivation, i.e., applying audits and fines for 




enforced motivated taxpayers and assistance and respect for voluntary and 
committed motivated taxpayers (Braithwaite, 2003b). As most taxpayers are 
assumed to be voluntarily and committed motivated, tax authorities’ major task is 
to be perceived as service-oriented and respectful (Braithwaite, 2003a). The 
slippery slope framework claims that tax authorities should apply a specific mix 
of coercive power and legitimate power to reduce enforced and to enhance 
voluntary and committed motivations among taxpayers (Gangl et al., 2015; 
Hofmann, Gangl, Kirchler, & Stark, 2014; Kirchler et al., 2008). However, as it is 
not clear whether motivations are at all relevant for tax compliance, it cannot be 
determined whether tax authorities should respond to motivations or should 
influence motivations of taxpayers. 
 
The aim of the present study is to examine the relation between different 
motivations to pay taxes and tax compliance. We seek to gain robust results by 
conducting two studies in countries, which are similar concerning tax compliance 
measured by the extent of the shadow-economy (Buehn & Schneider, 2012). 
Further, to gain results with high external validity we used representative samples 
of self-employed taxpayers. In contrast to employed taxpayers whose taxes are 
often deducted by the employers, self-employed taxpayers have to provide all 
relevant information themselves. Hence, they are more experienced regarding tax 
paying and have more opportunities to engage in tax avoidance and tax evasion 
than employed taxpayers (Antonides & Robben, 1995). We assessed motivations 
towards taxpaying with two different methods. In Study 1, we examine the 
relationship between enforced motivation, voluntary motivation, committed 
motivation and tax compliance in a representative sample of 500 self-employed 
Austrian taxpayers. In Study 2, we confirm results of Study 1 in a representative 
sample of 1,377 Dutch entrepreneurs by using the variables “Something is taken 
from me” as a proxy for enforced motivation, “I give up something” as a proxy 







The sample consisted of 500 self-employed taxpayers representative for the 
Austrian population of self-employed with respect to sex (49.9% women) and age 
(M = 44.46, SD = 10.55). Table 1 presents a detailed description of the sample 
concerning socio-demographic characteristics. 
 
Procedure and material 
 
A market research agency sent out an online questionnaire to self-employed 
Austrians who received 1.50 EUR (approximately 2 US-Dollar) for participation. 
The questionnaire consisted of several scales on tax-related issues. Four of them 
are used in the present paper: tax compliance intention, enforced compliance, 
voluntary cooperation, and committed cooperation. Tax compliance intention was 
assessed with the average of answers to six questions from Gangl et al. (2013) 
following the OECD (2001) definition of tax compliance (e.g., “To what extent do 
you think it is important that the Tax Administration receives correct and 




complete tax returns?”; 1 = very important, 7 = absolutely not important; 
Cronbach α = .77, M = 5.44, SD = 1.11). Scales to measure tax motivations were 
adapted from Hofmann et al. (2014). Enforced compliance was assessed with the 
average of answers to four items (“When I pay taxes, I do so because a great 
many tax audits are carried out,” “When I pay taxes, I do so because I know I will 
be audited,” “When I pay taxes, I do so because the tax authority often carries out 
audits,”, “When I pay taxes, I do so because I feel forced to pay my taxes”; 
Cronbach α = .87). Voluntary cooperation was also assessed with the average of 
answers to four items (“When I pay taxes, I do so because the tax authority will 
probably reciprocate my cooperation,” “When I pay taxes, I do so because the tax 
authority treats me correctly as long as I admit mistakes,”  “When I pay taxes, I do 
so because the tax authority supports taxpayers who make unintentional 
mistakes,” “When I pay taxes, I do so, because it is easier than to deceive the tax 
authority”;  Cronbach α = .79). Finally, committed cooperation was assessed with 
four items (“When I pay taxes, I do so because it is the right thing to do,” “When I 
pay taxes, I do so because it is ultimately in everyone’s interest,”  “When I pay 
taxes, I do so because I feel a moral obligation to pay taxes,”  “When I pay taxes, 
I do so, because it is an important civic duty”; Cronbach α = .92; M = 5.04, SD = 
1.56). All questions on tax motivations were assessed on seven-point Likert scales 
with labeled endpoints 1 (I totally disagree) and 7 (I totally agree). 
 
Table 1: The relation between motivations and compliance intention in the Austrian sample 
 f / M(SD) Block 1 Block 2  













Low education 2.6% -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
Medium education 66.8% 0.04 0.04 0.02 
0- 25,000 Euro turnover 35.6% 0.00 0.03 0.02 
25,001– 50,000 Euro turnover 26.2% -0.01 -0.00 0.01 
50,001 – 100,000 Euro 
turnover 
15.0% 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
100,000 – 1,000,000 Euro 
turnover 
18.0% -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
1-4 employees 19.2% 0.05 0.05 0.02 
5-49 employees 5.2% 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
50 < employees 0.4% -0.07 -0.04 -0.09 
Information technology 10.6% 0.01 0.00 -0.04 
Tourism 7.0% -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 








Financial services 5.6% 0.06 0.10 0.06 
Consulting & engineering 3.2% -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 





Voluntary motivation 3.56 (1.43)  0.04 0.05 







  0.07 0.31  
ΔR
2








ΔF   53.91
***
  
Max. VIF  6.06 6.06  
Note: Reference groups: male, high education, turnover of more than 1 million Euro, no 
employees, other sectors; f = frequency, M = mean, SD = standard deviation, r = Spearman or 
Pearson correlation; ΔR
2
 and ΔF refer to a change in R
2
 and F statistics; max. VIF refers to the 
largest variance inflation factor; asterisks denote significance at the 0.1% (∗∗∗), 1% (∗∗), and 5% 
(∗) level.  






To examine the relation between personal motivations and tax compliance 
intention an OLS regression analysis was conducted. In a first step, we included 
socio-demographic characteristics of entrepreneurs as control variables (Block 1) 
into the regression model and in a second step, enforced motivation, voluntary 
motivation, and committed motivation (Block 2) to explain the tax compliance 
intention from motivations. Results in Table 1 show that enforced compliance was 
associated with lower tax compliance intentions whereas committed cooperation 
was related to higher tax compliance intentions. Voluntary cooperation was not 






The sample consisted of 1,377 entrepreneurs representative of the Dutch 
population of entrepreneurs with respect to sex (31.7% woman), age (M = 48.67, 
SD = 11.22), number of employees, and startups versus existing companies. A 
detailed sample description can be found in Table 2 and in Gangl et al. (2013). 
  
Procedure and material 
 
Within the Dutch Fiscal Monitor 2010, mostly conducted via online 
questionnaires, entrepreneurs were asked to indicate their motivation to pay taxes 
(“Which describes your personal feeling about paying taxes best?”) by choosing 
one of three statements: “Something is taken from me” (15.9%), “I give up 
something” (46.6%), and “I contribute something” (37.5%). Tax compliance 
intention was assessed with the same six items as in Study 1 except that a five-
point Likert scale (1 = very unimportant, 5 = very important) was used (M = 4.07, 
SD = 0.60). This tax compliance scale was used in a previously published study 
(Gangl et al., 2013), where detailed descriptions of the scale can be found. Sex, 
age, education, turn-over, number of employees, and sector were included as 




To examine the relation between personal motivations and tax compliance 
intention an OLS regression analysis was conducted. In a first step, we included 
socio-demographic characteristics of entrepreneurs as control variables (Block 1) 
into the regression model and in a second step the motivations to pay taxes (Block 
2) to predict the tax compliance intention by motivations. Results in Table 2 
show, similar to Study 1, that an enforced motivation measured with the feeling 
“Something is taken from me” was negatively related to tax compliance 
intentions. Likewise, the feeling “I contribute something” as a proxy for 








Table 2: The relation between motivations and tax compliance intention in the Dutch sample 
 f / M(SD) Block 1 Block 2  
  β β r 
Female 31.7% .01 0.01 -0.01 





Low education 7.6% -0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Medium education 41.8% -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 
0- 25,000 euro turnover 28.5% -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 
25,001– 50,000 Euro turnover 11.3% -0.04 -0.04 0.00 
50,001 – 100,000 Euro 
turnover 
12.1% -0.03 -0.04 0.01 












5-49 employees 19.1% -0.15
+
 -0.13 -0.01 












Retail 26.9% 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Health care 7.0% 0-.01 -.01 -0.01 




















  0.03 0.05  
ΔR
2






ΔF   17.77
***
  
Max. VIF  12.10 12.11  
Note: Reference groups: male, high education, turnover of more than 1 million, no employees, 
other sectors, I give up something; f = frequency, M = mean, SD = standard deviation, r = 
Spearman or Pearson correlation; ΔR
2
 and ΔF refer to a change in R
2
 and F statistics; max. VIF 
refers to the largest variance inflation factor; asterisks denote significance at the 0.1% (∗∗∗), 1% 




The present paper shows that different motivations to pay taxes correspond to 
different levels of reported tax compliance. As predicted, negative feelings related 
to dismissive and enforced motivations seem to correspond to lower tax 
compliance than positive feelings related to committed motivations (Braithwaite, 
2009; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; Kirchler et al., 2008). In contrast with 
existing studies (Hartner et al., 2008; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010), the present 
outcomes suggest that both enforced and committed motivations relate to tax 
compliance, the former in a negative and the latter in a positive way. Voluntary 
motivation was unrelated to tax compliance. Therefore, the present paper suggests 
that enforced and committed motivations play an important role for tax decisions 
and should be considered by tax authorities. 
 
As expected, taxpayers holding an enforced motivation to pay taxes also report 
being less tax compliant (Braithwaite, 2003a; Kirchler et al., 2008). They seem to 
pay taxes only if they are forced to do so. The present results on voluntary 
motivation and tax compliance suggest that the relation between voluntary 
motivation and tax compliance could be two-fold. Voluntary motivation might 
lead to both positive and negative correlations with tax compliance which in turn 
mutually dissolve each other. Voluntary motivated taxpayers may pay taxes 




according to the law but at the same time try to utilize legal tax holes if possible. 
Hence, overall there might be no connection between voluntary motivation and 
tax compliance. Committed motivation as an intrinsic acceptance of taxpaying 
and a felt responsibility seems to be the only motivational force which increases 
tax compliance in the present study. This outcome suggests that initiatives which 
reduce enforced motivations and foster committed motivation seem to be 
important factors to enhance tax compliance. 
 
The present result extends previous theoretical and empirical findings. As 
predicted by the responsive regulation theory, taxpayers holding an enforced 
motivation likely need more audits and fines to pay taxes than voluntarily, or 
committed motivated taxpayers (Braithwaite, 2003b). As assumed by the slippery 
slope framework, it seems a worthwhile strategy of tax authorities to change 
motivations in order to increase tax compliance (Gangl et al., 2015; Kirchler et al., 
2008). Experiments indicate that severe audits and fines which are perceived as 
applied by illegitimate and unfair authorities produce enforced motivations 
whereas audits and fines which are applied by legitimate, fair and trusted tax 
authorities lead to voluntary motivations (Hartl, Hofmann, Gangl, Hartner-
Tiefentahler, & Kirchler, 2015; Hofmann, Hartl, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefentahler, & 
Kirchler, 2014; Kirchler & Wahl, 2010; Verboon & van Dijke, 2011). Thus, the 
present results strengthen the assumptions of previous research and suggest that 
tax authorities should react to different motivations with tailored enforcement 
programs and should apply strategies in such a way that voluntary and especially 
committed motivations are enhanced. 
 
To change taxpayers’ motivations, the slippery slope framework suggests 
application of a tailored mix of coercive power (i.e., audits and fines) and 
legitimate power (i.e., fair procedures, information services, etc.). Tax authorities 
should apply coercive audits and fines in a legitimate and fair way to enforced 
motivated taxpayers in order to change their motivation into voluntary motivation 
(Hofmann, Gangl, et al., 2014). Tax authorities should avoid coercive audits and 
fines for voluntary and committed motivated taxpayers and should focus on 
legitimate services procedures to maintain and foster the positive motivations of 
these taxpayers. Examples of initiatives which foster committed motivations are 
fair procedures of tax collection and tax spending, enhanced service initiatives 
(telephone hotlines, websites, etc.), communication strategies presenting public 
goods such as schools which are financed with tax money, and the establishment 
of trust-based relationships with taxpayers (Alm & Torgler, 2011; Gangl et al., 
2015; Gangl et al., 2013). In the enhanced relationship program of the OECD 
(2013), tax authorities dispense with auditing taxpayers going back for several 
years. Instead, they try to resolve and settle uncertainties on tax issues 
immediately when taxpayers ask for advice. On the other hand, taxpayers agree to 
fully disclose their tax files and to sign a voluntary contract of fair play in which 
they agree to refrain from aggressive tax planning (OECD, 2013). This enhanced 
relationship involves trust, which can be harmed. However, it pays off in lower 
costs of auditing for tax authorities and importantly in enhanced planning 
reliability for taxpayers. As a consequence, taxpayers are assumed to feel 
respected as honest taxpayers and gain trust towards the tax authorities (Gangl et 
al., 2015). Thereby, taxpayers are assumed to develop a committed motivation to 




pay taxes, which means a felt responsibility to be tax compliant. The present 
results provide evidence for these assumptions. 
 
The present paper has limitations. The present results only apply to developed 
countries with relatively high rates of tax compliance. To confirm and expand the 
generalizability of the present results, future studies should investigate the 
relationship between motivations and tax compliance in developed countries with 
relatively low rates of tax compliance. The explained variance of tax compliance 
differs in the Austrian and in the Dutch study. A reason for this difference might 
be the different way in which motivations were assessed. In the Austrian study 
seven-point Likert scales were used for each motivation whereas participants in 
the Dutch study had to choose between one of the three motivations. However, the 
direction of results is the same in both studies and the different measures applied 
to assess motivations also indicate that motivations have a robust relationship to 
tax compliance.  
 
Based on two studies on representative samples the present paper indicates that 
the distinction between different motivations to pay taxes seems to be a relevant 
factor for tax compliance. Tax authorities can be recommended to avoid actions 
which produce an enforced motivation and to foster initiatives which enhance a 
committed motivation to pay taxes in order to increase the number of citizens that 
comply. 
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• We study the impact of supervision on tax compliance with a field experiment.
• Wemanipulate supervision through friendly deterrence.
• Results suggest that supervision leads to delayed tax payments.
• It is concluded that supervision causes a crowding out of intrinsic tax compliance.
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a b s t r a c t
We conduct a field experiment on tax compliance, focusing on newly founded firms. As a novelty the
effect of tax authorities’ supervision on timely tax payments is examined. Interestingly, results show no
positive overall effect of close supervision on tax compliance.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Taxes are important as they finance the provision of pub-
lic goods. To ensure sufficient tax funds, tax authorities enforce
compliance—mainly by inducing fear via audits and fines (Alling-
ham and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973). Meta and overview
studies report that there is a tendency for deterrence to reduce tax
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +43 1 4277 47368.
E-mail addresses: k.gang@univie.ac.at (K. Gangl), benno.torgler@qut.edu.au
(B. Torgler), erich.kirchler@univie.ac.at (E. Kirchler), eva.hofmann@univie.ac.at
(E. Hofmann).
evasion (Fischer et al., 1992; Alm, 1999; Blackwell, 2010); however,
the effect is small or even negligible (Andreoni et al., 1998; Kirch-
ler, 2007). It has also been suggested that deterrence may crowd
out the intrinsic motivation of paying taxes (Feld and Frey, 2002;
Torgler, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2008).
Most of the empirical research on tax compliance is based on
surveys analyzing individual taxpayer self-reports and laboratory
experiments that mainly work with students. Hence, evidence on
firm tax compliance is limited (Torgler, 2002; Alm and McClellan,
2012). This gap in the empirical literature is particularly impor-
tant as firms or self-employed people have more opportunities to
engage in tax evasion and are reported to have lower tax morale
(Torgler, 2007). Laboratory experiments have been criticized for
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.027
0165-1765/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.
0/).
K. Gangl et al. / Economics Letters 123 (2014) 378–382 379
their lack of generalizability. On the other hand, despite the avail-
ability of very reliable field data such as that from the Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program of the IRS, it only permits the
exploration of limited questions and does not allow analysis of
causal relationships. Thus, controlled field experiments have re-
cently emerged as an important tool in empirical research because
they evoke real processes outside the laboratory while avoiding an
experimental demand effect, with the aim of generating causal ef-
fects (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Slemrod et al., 2001; Torgler, 2004;
Kleven et al., 2011).
To the best of our knowledge, there are only five studies that
manipulate deterrence in the field (Ariel, 2012; Hasseldine et al.,
2007; Kleven et al., 2011; Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; Slemrod
et al., 2001). However, these studies mostly have individual tax-
payers as subjects and manipulate deterrence through questions,
prior audits, or through letters announcing audits in order to em-
phasize a higher perception of audit probability (threat-of-audit
letter). Hasseldine et al. (2007) report a positive impact of deter-
rence on tax behavior while Kleven et al. (2011) find a modest im-
pact. In contrast, Schwartz andOrleans (1967) andAriel (2012) find
no effect whereas Slemrod et al. (2001) observe a small positive ef-
fect for low and middle income groups and a negative impact on
high income taxpayers. However, perceived audit probability may
differ from themanipulated audit probability (Slemrod et al., 2001;
Mittone, 2006). For example, one cannot be sure that the taxpayers
actually read the letter. Additionally, the letters themselves could
be perceived as unfriendly, invoking reluctance in taxpayers be-
cause of the hostile communication and not just due to deterrence
itself. Using reported taxable income, net profit, or deductions as
measures of compliance can also be problematic as they do not di-
rectly measure tax non-compliance (no information on taxpayer
return audits).Moreover, earnings generated in the informal sector
are not reported in taxable income. Audits also struggle to detect
tax evasion through informal activities which leads to measure-
ment biases in tax evasion and therefore lower-bound estimates
(Kleven et al., 2011).
The strength of our study is that it uses firm data and a field
experiment to provide further evidence on tax compliance. In ad-
dition, as a novelty, we explore the influence on the compliance
of close supervision by the tax administration. Supervision is de-
fined as a friendly and constant form of deterrence and interaction
with the firms. This allows controlling for awareness of the audit-
ing while avoiding communication that is perceived as unfriendly.
To reduce any historical or firm-specific experiences with the tax
administration we focus only on newly founded firms. In addition,
we explore firms that are classified as high-risk groups in regard to
tax evasion. To avoid tax compliance measurement biases we an-
alyze the timely payment of taxes and the amount of the delayed
taxes that were not paid.
2. Sample
The sample consists of all the 1721 firms that began operation
during the year 2011within the tax district ‘‘East-Styria’’ in Austria.
Each of these businesses was obliged to pay its full taxes before
November 15, 2012. Ninety-three of these firms were randomly
selected, mostly among the high-risk businesses in terms of tax
evasion (gastronomy: 54.8%, construction: 22.6%, trading: 19.4%,
mining: 1.1%, counseling: 1.1%) to compose the treatment group
that we call ‘‘supervision’’. The remaining 1628 enterprises com-
prise the non-treatment group of which 35.5% are high-risk
businesses (gastronomy: 4.2%, construction: 6.4%, trading: 14.5%,
mining: 0.1%, counseling: 10.3%) and 65.5% low-risk businesses,
mostly in the real estate (19.6%), service (8.2%) and agriculture
business (7.2%). It should be noted that we will also present re-
sults limiting this control group to only those sectors who appear
in the treatment group. Most enterprises had a turnover of up to
29,999 Euro (treatment group: 62.4%, non-treatment group: 74.2%;
p = 0.07). Finally, the majority of firms had the legal status of
a natural person (treatment group: 79.6%, non-treatment group:
72.2%, p = 0.22) and an employed tax practitioner (treatment
group: 86.0%, non-treatment group: 69.9%; p = 0.003). Using
a multivariate analysis we control for the legal status of a firm,
turnover, and the tax practitioner.
3. Procedure
The supervision consisted of two parts: (a) an introductory visit,
and (b) constant auditing throughout the first year of the firm. Both
phases were conducted and administered by a tax auditor. The in-
troductory visit took place at the firm following an application for
a tax number. The tax auditor offered advice regarding the tax law
and the subsequent rights and duties of a taxpayer, handed out in-
formation brochures and give-aways (a pen, a pad, and a candy).
The tax auditor explicitly used friendly and respectful communi-
cation and invited the firms to contact the auditor if there were
any further questions. Importantly, the auditor informed the firm
that he/she would audit the reports and payment liabilities on a
monthly basis throughout the year. The component of constant
auditing ensured that the tax auditor monitored the tax files of
the enterprise each month according to Austrian tax law. All other
firms that were not part of the treatment were deliberately not
contacted, informed, or audited by the tax authorities.
4. Measurements
According to the IRS, tax compliance comprises three aspects:
accurate reporting, timely filing, and timely paying (Slemrod et al.,
2001). As mentioned previously we only focus on timely paying
as the quality and frequency of an audit make accurate reporting
comparatively hard to assess. The variable on timely payment
has no measurement errors as one is able to assess whether a
taxpayer paid before or after the deadline, which is November 15
for Austrian firms. Thus,we compiled the anonymized tax accounts
of December 15, 2012, including all taxes from 2011 (VAT, income
tax, property tax etc.). Obviously, at this date all taxes owing can be
considered as late. Accordingly, timely payment is assessed as both
a dichotomous (paid in time or not) and a continuous (amount of
tax due for those who are late) variable. The continuous variable
was logarithmized to take into account the skewed distribution of
the variable’s values (skewness = −1.98).
Additionally, we clustered the analyses over the business sec-
tor and included as control variables the turnover, legal status, and
whether they have used a tax practitioner. The opportunity of tax
evasion is seen as one of the most important determinants of tax
compliance (Engström and Holmlund, 2009; Kleven et al., 2011).
Certain types of businesses such as gastronomy, construction or
trading operate with cash and thus have increased opportunities
to engage in tax evasion than, for example, real estate businesses.
The legal status allows us to differentiate between one-person en-
terprises and larger enterprises. Finally, involvement of a tax prac-
titioner is an important factor for tax compliance. There is evidence
that tax practitioners increase non-compliance (Erard, 1993) and
that changes in tax authorities’ interaction style influence tax com-
pliance of taxpayers who prepare their own taxes but not of those
who employ a tax practitioner (Hasseldine et al., 2007).
5. Results
In the following, two regression analyses are presented
(Table 1). First we use a probit model to explore whether our treat-
ment has an influence on timely paying (specification 1–3). We
then restrict our sample to those cases where firms did not pay on
time, using OLS specifications to analyze whether the treatment
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Table 1
Effect of supervision on not paying on time and the amount of delayed tax payment.
Dependent variable Paying on time Amount of delayed tax payment
Model Probit OLS regression
Clustering over business sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supervision 0.475*** 0.450*** 0.327*** −0.311 −0.699***
4.68 4.76 5.24 −1.08 −3.84
0.120 0.112 0.092
30,000–90,999 0.420* 0.395* 0.129 −0.223 −1.194
Euro turnover 2.34 2.14 0.66 −0.37 −1.35
0.102 0.095 0.034
100,000–219,999 0.184 0.166 0.009 −0.714 −0.684
Euro turnover 0.77 0.69 0.04 −0.68 −0.58
0.041 0.037 0.002
220,000–699,999 −0.035 −0.064 −0.066 2.565*** 1.817*
Euro turnover −0.13 −0.23 −0.19 5.18 3.85
−0.007 −0.012 −0.016
700,000–9.679,999 0.422a 0.396 −0.069 0.101 −0.903
Euro turnover 1.69 1.58 −0.34 0.09 −0.43
0.106 0.098 −0.017
Natural person 0.513** 0.527** 0.880* −0.361 0.053
3.02 3.19 2.57 −0.80 0.30
0.089 0.091 0.179
Limited liability corporation 0.975*** 0.941*** 1.266** −0.904 −0.102
4.60 4.39 3.29 −1.21 −0.15
0.283 0.270 0.428
Limited partnership 0.083** 0.799** 0.966a 0.882 0.442
2.80 2.79 1.83 1.14 1.11
0.241 0.231 0.330
Commercial corporation 0.570a 0.556a 1.012* −3.571 −3.509
1.69 1.67 2.09 −1.61 −1.42
0.152 0.147 0.348
Tax practitioner 0.171a 0.233 0.084 −0.31
1.66 1.54 0.18 −0.66
0.033 0.056
Observations 1713 1713 714 227 130
Pseudo R2 0.0497 0.0523 0.0368 0.079 0.1594
Note: z-values and t-values are given in italics, marginal effects in bold.
a Represent statistical significance at the 10 (p < .10).
* Represent statistical significance at the 5 (p < .05).
** Represent statistical significance at the 1 (p < .01).
*** Represent statistical significance at the 0.1 (p < .001) levels, respectively; the reference group
of turnover is 0–29,999 Euro, the reference group for legal status consists of all the other possibilities
(club, business partnership, consortium, civil law association, capital company, hiring association, silent
partnership, and house owner association).
influences the amount of the delayed tax (specification 4–5). In
specifications 3 and 5 we provide a robustness check by restrict-
ing the control group sample to only those industries that appear
in the treatment group (high-risk firms). In all specifications stan-
dard errors are clustered by business sectors to capture unobserved
sector-specific characteristics. For paying on time the results re-
port that the coefficient for our treatment variable is always sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level with marginal effects between
9.2% and 12%. Thus, the results on timely paying indicate that the
supervision actually crowds-out compliance.
When exploring the amount of tax owed by non-compliant
firms (those that did not pay on time) we actually observe that su-
pervision has a positive effect, reducing the amount of tax due. In
specification 4 we control for turnover, legal status, and tax practi-
tioner: the resulting coefficient is far from statistically significant.
However, whenwe restrict our sample to the same business indus-
tries as in the control group, the coefficient becomes highly statis-
tically significant. The estimated reduction of the amount of tax
due based on supervision is between 27% (100[exp(−0.311) − 1],
specification 4) and 50% (specification 5) taking into account that
the average tax due in our data set is 2723 Euro (SD = 6546).
To better acknowledge observable differences between control
and treatment group that can also be seen when estimating the
propensity score, namely the conditional probability of receiving
a treatment given pretreatment characteristics (see Table A.1),
we report in Table 2 estimations of average treatment effects
based on propensity score matching. We report several methods
jointly to offer a better assessment of the robustness of estimates.1
The results reported in Table 1 remain robust. The ATT (Average
effect of Treatment on Treated) is always statistically significant for
paying on time but not for the amount of delayed tax payment.
6. Discussion
The reported results indicate that supervision can backfire.
Rather than increasing tax compliance, even a friendly version of
deterrence reduces tax compliance. Thus, supervision seems to
crowd out the intrinsic motivation of tax compliance (Feld and
Frey, 2002; Torgler, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2008). It might be that
such interventions are perceived as too controlling, which reduces
self-determination and self-esteem, thereby decreasing intrinsic
motivation. Such an effect is observed in the literature on work
morale (Frey, 1997a). There is also evidence that sanctions are
perceived as a ‘‘price’’. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
observe that the introduction of a fine for parents arriving late to
a day-care center was perceived as a price rather than as a signal
encouraging on-time collection of children. Therefore, delayed
pick-up of children increased andwas persistent even after the fine
was removed.
1 For a discussion see Becker and Ichino (2002) and Guo and Fraser (2010).
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Table 2
Estimation of average treatment effects based on propensity scores using various matching
methods.
n. treat. n. control. ATT Std. Err. t
Not Paying on Time (logit)
Matching
Nearest-Neighbor 93 1480 0.132 0.048 2.715
Nearest-Neighbor bootstrapping 93 1480 0.132 0.05 2.622
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Kernel (Gaussian) 93 1627 0.143 0.048 2.974
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Stratification 93 1627 0.129 0.049 2.638
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Amount of delayed tax payment
Matching
Nearest-Neighbor 93 168 −0.616 0.377 −1.631
Nearest-Neighbor bootstrapping 93 168 −0.616 0.776 −0.793
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Kernel (Gaussian) 93 1627 −0.689 0.707 −0.975
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Stratification 93 1627 −0.885 0.635 −1.393
(2000 bootstrap replications)
Note: ATT: Average effect of the Treatment on Treated.
Thus, it does not seem that this external intervention was per-
ceived as supportive despite establishing a personal relationship
between the tax administration and the taxpayerwhich could have
been expected to reduce crowding-out of the firm’s intrinsic mo-
tivation to pay taxes (Frey, 1997b). On the other hand, for those
who were non-compliant, supervision tends to reduce the amount
of late taxes due, particularly when restricting the sample size to
high-risk industries.
In sum, the negative effect of supervision on timely paying and
the positive effect on the tax due which was not statistically sig-
nificant in most of the estimates lead to the conclusion that close
supervision of newly created high-risk firms offers no overall posi-
tive effect on tax compliance. Accordingly, alternatives to enforce-
mentmeasurements such as service and/or trust approachesmight
be recommended to the tax administration to increase tax compli-
ance (Alm and Torgler, 2011).
It should be noted that the study has some limitations. The
present outcomesmight not apply to countries with a different tax
culture to Austria (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Balliet and van Lange,
2013). Also, the relatively small sample size of our treatment group
makes it necessary to replicate the current outcome with a larger
treatment sample and in other countries. It might be argued that
supervised firms have adapted their behavior based on the ad-
ditional information available (e.g., a better understanding of the
sanctions for paying late, which are not that severe after all). Ad-
ditionally, it can be argued that the inexperienced non-treatment
group faced amuchmore ambiguous situation than the supervised
firms causing them perhaps to be more risk averse with respect to
reporting, and as a result more tax compliant.
To conclude, tax authorities are recommended to invest in fur-
ther services such as telephone hotlines or a website to increase
tax compliance (Braithwaite et al., 2007; Alm and Torgler, 2011;
Gangl et al., 2013). Future research could study the effects of such
services in the field to determine whether it is possible to gener-
alize the positive impact of ‘‘soft-factors’’ reported in survey and
laboratory studies.
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Table A.1
Estimation of the propensity score.
Probit estimates Coef. z
30,000–90,999 Euro turnover 0.630*** 4.49
100,000–219,999 Euro turnover 0.762*** 3.05
220,000–699,999 Euro turnover 0.517* 1.70
700,000–9.679,999 Euro turnover −0.035 −0.08
Natural person 0.580*** 2.75
Limited liability corporation 0.224 0.83
Commercial corporation 1.069*** 3.33
Tax practitioner 0.485*** 3.61
N 1721
Pseudo R2 0.088
Note: Common support condition imposed. Region of common support is
[.0044, .3820]. Balancing property is satisfied with the reported specification.
Number of blocks: 4.
* Represent statistical significance at the 10% (p < .10) levels.
** Represent statistical significance at the 5% (p < .05) levels.
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Although it seems reasonable to assume that activating patriotism might motivate citizens to cooperate with the
state in reaching societal goals, the empirical evidence supporting this contention is based mostly on
correlational rather than experimental studies. In addition, little is known on whether patriotism can be
manipulated without simultaneously triggering nationalism and on the psychological processes which
determine the patriotism-cooperation relation. This current article reports results of one survey and three
experiments that manipulate patriotism by displaying either a national flag or national landscapes or by
priming national achievements. The outcomes indicate that reported and manipulated patriotism indirectly
increase tax compliance, although the national flag also increases nationalism. National achievements, on the
other hand, seemingly increases trust in national public institutions and the voluntary motivation to cooperate,
whereas national landscapes only increase the voluntary motivation to cooperate. Hence, it is possible to
increase social capital in the form of trust and cooperation through patriotism without fostering nationalism as
well.
KEY WORDS: national pride, tax compliance, trust, voluntary cooperation, social capital
The state and its public institutions depend on such citizen cooperation as tax compliance, which
might potentially be increased by using patriotism as a promotional tool (Konrad & Qari, 2012; Mum-
mendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Public information campaigns, brochures, or websites, for instance,
might use the national flag or its colors to foster citizens’ identification with their community and thus
their willingness to cooperate (Jones, 1996; McMakin, Malone, & Lundgren, 2002). Survey studies
do in fact report a positive relation between patriotism and prosocial behavior such as tax compliance,
election participation, or blood donation (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Wenzel, 2007). Surprisingly, how-
ever, no experiments were conducted showing the positive impact of patriotism on cooperation.
Although there are several experiments analyzing whether national symbols such as the flag generate
patriotism rather than destructive nationalism (e.g., Becker, Enders-Comberg, Wagner, Christ, &
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Butz, 2012; Butz, Plant, & Doerr, 2007; Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovski, & Gross, 2007; Kemmelmeier
& Winter, 2008), only few experiments have empirically tested the effects of other potentially promo-
tional tools of patriotism like national achievements (Mummendey et al. 2001) and national land-
scapes. There is also a lack of empirical studies on the psychological processes through which
patriotism might impact cooperation indirectly by generating trust in public institutions and voluntary
motivation to cooperate (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008; Wenzel, 2002). Yet insights into the effects
of promotional patriotic tools would not only enhance theoretical understanding of patriotism and its
effects but might also allow public institutions to choose the most effective communication instru-
ments for enhancing cooperation of citizens by patriotism and not nationalism.
This present study, therefore, uses the results of one survey and three experiments to test for an
effect of three common patriotism promoting tools—the national flag, national achievements, and
national landscapes—on cooperation with the state in the form of tax compliance. It also assesses
whether the impact of such tools on tax cooperation is direct or indirect via increased trust in tax
authorities and voluntary motivation to cooperate.
Theoretical Background and Research Questions
One useful explanation of patriotism and its effects is offered by social identity theory (Tajfel,
1974; Tajfel, Billig, & Bundy, 1971), which may describe patriotism in terms of citizen self-
categorization as members of a specific social group such as a national or local community (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). Such self-categorization provides citizens with a positive self-concept through such
positive emotions as love and pride in national achievements (Federico, Golec, and Dial, 2005; Tajfel
& Turner, 1986), meaning that patriotism can be more narrowly defined as “positive identification
and feelings of affective attachment to one’s country” (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999, p. 152). This
patriotism as social identity provides important guidance for social behavior (Huddy & Khatib, 2007;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986): individuals tend to copy the actions of others seen as members of their own
social group (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) and likely increase their cooperation with them (Blader &
Tyler, 2009; Tajfel, 1974; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). Nevertheless, this increased cooperation
with individuals sharing the same identity is often accompanied by decreased cooperation with indi-
viduals perceived as belonging to an outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For instance, shared identity
can easily be manipulated experimentally by asking participants to express a preference for the paint-
ings of either Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinsky (Tajfel et al., 1971). As a consequence, these partici-
pants tend to identify more with others that share their painter preference who they subsequently
reward more and punish less than participants with a different painter preference. Participants in these
experiments are also willing to maximizing the difference between ingroup and outgroup members at
the price of deliberately disadvantaging the outgroup (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel et al., 1971). Hence,
increased cooperation with one’s own group often goes along with deliberate discrimination of an
outgroup.
Identification with one’s own country and community can also be the basis of “healthy” patriot-
ism, on the one hand, and “destructive” nationalism, on the other hand (Kosterman & Feshbach,
1989; Schatz et al., 1999). Patriotism reflects a psychological state of love for and pride in one’s coun-
try and its community, whereas nationalism reflects a belief that one’s own country should dominate
and discriminate against other countries and their citizens (Federico et al., 2005; Kosterman &
Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey et al., 2001). Patriotism, in principle based on positive evaluations of
the own nation, however, does not exclude or even demand criticism of the own community if the
community does not meet certain standards (Federico et al., 2005; Schatz et al., 1999). In contrast,
nationalism can be characterized as a form of ethnocentrism in which the own community is not
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criticized and perceived as homogeneous—a view, typically combined with hostility towards foreign-
ers living in one’s own country (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Federico et al., 2005).
Patriotism and nationalism are connected (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). However, the two are not
necessarily reciprocally related (Brewer, 1999) and hence, might be activated independently from
each other (Mummendey et al., 2001). According to experimental survey data from several countries,
patriotism is activated by comparing one’s own country’s present with its past or by evaluating it
without any explicit comparative standard or rational explanation (Mummendey et al., 2001). In con-
trast, nationalism tends to be activated when individuals are asked to compare their own country with
other countries. These studies also show that thinking about national achievements as a comparison
between past and present compared to thinking about differences between the own country and other
countries does not lead to derogation of outgroup members like foreigners (Mummendey et al., 2001).
Analogously, although no empirical evidence is yet available, the ability of identification with the
local community versus the identification with the national community also may render it capable of
reducing nationalistic tendencies (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; Paasi, 2003). A reason might be that
local patriotism in contrast to national patriotism is more dynamic concerning historical and geograph-
ical development (Raagmaa, 2010), a characteristic which might prevent immutable views and dis-
crimination of outgroup members.
Identification with the community in one’s country or local region in the form of patriotism, there-
fore, unlike nationalism, is social capital that fosters important prosocial behavior (Bar-Tal, 1993; Raag-
maa, 2010; Rothstein, 2003) and thereby fuels social prosperity (Rothstein, 2003). For example, an
analysis of World Value Survey (WVS) data from 45 countries suggests that those who are proud to be
members of their own community show more trust in other people and contribute to a society’s social
capital by such responsible behaviors as not claiming unjustified government benefits, not buying stolen
goods, and not lying in their own interests (Whiteley, 1999). Other studies also associate identification
with one’s own community with donation of blood or money and attentiveness to elections (Huddy &
Khatib, 2007; Skitka, 2005). For tax compliance particularly, surveys from across the globe indicate that
national pride and identification with one’s own country or local community, as measurements of
national and local patriotism, are positively associated with high tax morale (Hartner, Rechberger, Kirch-
ler, & Wenzel, 2011; Konrad & Qari, 2012; Torgler, 2003, 2004, 2005; Torgler & Schneider, 2005). For
instance, based on data from the WVS, European Value Survey (EVS), and Latinobarometro, being
proud to be a member of one’ s own country is positively correlated with tax compliance in Asia (Tor-
gler, 2004), Central and Eastern Europe (Torgler, 2003), Austria (Torgler & Schneider, 2005), and Latin
America (Torgler, 2005). A two-wave study of 1,161 Australians also indicates that identification with
the Australian community positively impacts social norms of tax compliance and tax-compliance inten-
tion (Wenzel, 2005). Admittedly, the very large samples in these studies (e.g., 92,141 participants in
Whiteley, 1999) increase the possibility that the patriotism–tax-compliance relation is simply an artefact
of large sample size (Lin, Lucas, & Shmueli, 2013); however, the effect sizes are not only statistically
meaningful but also economically significant. Nevertheless, no experimental evidence exists for a causal
impact of patriotism on cooperation, and none of the existing studies analyze the psychological processes
that might mediate the relation between patriotism and tax compliance.
Concerning psychological processes which might cause indirect effects of patriotism, the slippery
slope framework of tax compliance assumes that identification with one’s own community should
impact tax compliance through increased trust in the tax authority that then engenders voluntary tax
cooperation (Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015; Kirchler et al., 2008). That is, the more citizens
identify with their state and community, the more they should trust state authorities seeing them as
benevolent and dedicated to the common good, and the more citizens should be motivated to voluntar-
ily pay their taxes (Kirchler et al., 2008). Both experimental and nonexperimental research suggests
that a shared identity leads to an evaluation of others as trustworthy (Tyler, 2001; Voci, 2006) and
indicates that trust in tax authorities fuels individual voluntary motivation and willingness to pay them
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(Kogler et al. 2013; Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010). Hence, based on both the slippery slope
framework and existing empirical data, patriotism’s impact is likely to be based on an indirect psycho-
logical process that fuels trust in the tax authorities, generates voluntary motivation to cooperate, and
thereby increases cooperation.
Despite these valuable insights, however, no empirical studies have as yet examined whether
patriotism impacts cooperation directly or indirectly through different evaluative, emotional, and
ultimately motivational psychological processes (Bar-Tal, 1993; Wenzel, 2007). A direct impact of
patriotism would provide evidence that patriotisms’ effect is predominantly implicit and emotional,
conforming with a definition of patriotism as an emotional affiliation to one’s country (Bar-Tal, 1993;
Schatz & Lavine, 2007; Schatz et al., 1999). In contrast, an indirect effect via deliberate evaluations
on whether or not to trust public institutions would suggest that patriotism has a deliberative cognitive
impact on individuals as they evaluate whether or not to trust state institutions and only then develop
a voluntary motivation that leads them to cooperate (Gawronski & Bodenhause, 2003; Wenzel, 2002;
Wenzel & Jobling, 2006). At present, little is also known about whether the way that patriotism is
activated, for instance, whether national patriotism or local patriotism is triggered, generates different
processes such that some promotional patriotic tools induce a direct emotional process leading to auto-
matic loyalty and cooperation whereas others lead to an indirect deliberate process that results in
reason-based motivation to support one’s own community.
The present study analyses the results of one survey and three experiments to determine whether
typical patriotism promoting tools like the national flag, national achievements, and national land-
scapes lead to patriotism or nationalism. It also tests whether these tools impact tax cooperation and
whether this effect is direct or indirect, mediated by reason-based trust in tax authorities and voluntary
motivation to cooperate. To ensure results with high external validity, the study data were collected
from field settings in which government institutions would typically use promotional tools to promote
tax compliance—for example, the business sections of newspapers.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: the next section outlines the survey results,
after which we report the outcomes of the three experiments on the effects of the national flag,
national achievements, and national landscapes. We then discuss the theoretical and practical implica-
tions of these findings and explore how patriotism can be used to increase social capital and citizens’
cooperation with the state.
Survey
Sample
Our sample was made up of 84 Austrians, the majority of whom were male (66.7%), with an
average age of 44.13 (SD 5 12.24, range: 23–72). Most participants had a university degree (33.3%),
were employed in the private sector (45.2%), and reported a monthly income between 1,501 and
3,000 Euro (40.5%). When asked to indicate their experience with tax authorities on a 7-point scale,
participants rated themselves overall as rather experienced (M 5 4.45, SD 5 1.67).
Material
The online questionnaire included items on patriotism, nationalism, trust in the tax authorities,
voluntary cooperation, and tax-compliance intention. Patriotism was assessed as national and local
patriotism, based on national pride and identification with the local community. National pride was
measured on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 5 not proud at all to 7 5 very proud, using the following
WVS item: “How proud are you to be Austrian?” Identification with the local community “I see
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myself as a part of my local community” was measured on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 5 totally dis-
agree to 7 5 totally agree, again based on the corresponding WVS item. Nationalism was measured
based on four items from Meier-Pesti and Kirchler’s (2003) nationalism scale: (1) “It is important that
Austria is different than other countries”; (2) “Austria is a better country than most other countries”;
(3) “It would be good if Austria would differentiate itself more from other countries”; and (4) “It is
justified that Austria is better off than other countries.”
Trust in tax authorities was measured using five items modelled after Castelfranchi and Falcone’s
(2010) sociocognitive definition of trust which captures trust as a reason-based and deliberate decision
to trust: “I trust the tax authorities in Austria . . . (1) because of their highly motivated employees who
give comprehensive advice, (2) because they involve no financial dangers for me, (3) because they
have the important objective of giving competent advice, (4) because they benevolently advise tax-
payers, and (5) because they give me competent advice.” Voluntary tax cooperation was assessed
using five items from the TAX inventory (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010): “When I pay my taxes as required
by the regulation, I do so . . . (1) because to me it’s obvious that this is what you do, (2) to support the
state and other citizens, (3) because I like to contribute to everyone’s good, (4) because for me it’s the
natural thing to do, and (5) because I regard it as my duty as a citizen.” All scales were measured on a
7-point Likert scale from 1 5 I do not agree to 7 5 I totally agree and are highly reliable, with a Cron-
bach’s a equal to .79, .91, and .88, respectively.
Tax-compliance intention was assessed based on the following scenario: Participants were asked
to imagine having to pay 40% tax on a self-employed income of 83,330 Euro with an audit probability
of 17% and a tax evasion fine equal to the amount of the tax evaded. An open-ended question then
asked them to indicate how much tax they would be willing to pay in this scenario. The questionnaire
also collected sociodemographic data, including citizenship, sex, age, education, occupation, income,
and experience with tax authorities.
Procedure
To recruit participants, we posted an invitation to take part in a survey on the financial decision
making of individuals currently living in Austria on the business discussion forums of eight Austrian
newspapers. Those who followed the link were redirected to an online questionnaire structured in four
sections: The first asked participants to indicate their citizenship. The second included the scenario
measuring tax-compliance intentions, followed by items on national pride, identification with the local
community, nationalism, trust in tax authorities, and voluntary cooperation. The third and final sec-
tions collected the sociodemographic characteristics, after which participants were given an opportu-
nity to leave comments and were thanked for their participation.
Results and Discussion
To identify the overall relation between national pride, identification with the local commu-
nity, nationalism, trust, voluntary cooperation, and tax compliance, we conducted individual-level
correlational analyses to assess three factors: whether national pride and nationalism are related to
trust and voluntary cooperation, whether identification with the local community is related to vol-
untary cooperation, and whether voluntary cooperation is related to tax-compliance intention. The
results, reported in Table 1, show no direct link between national pride, identification with the local
community, nationalism, and tax compliance.
To test the assumption that national pride, identification with the local community, or national-
ism have an indirect effect on tax compliance via trust and voluntary cooperation, we used Process
software (Hayes, Preacher, & Myers, 2011) to run simple and multivariate linear regressions on a
bootstrap sample of 1,000 participants. This analysis assessed the extent to which the relation
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between two variables might be indirect through a path of other mediating triggers (Hayes, 2013;
Hayes et al., 2011).
The results indicate that, as expected, national pride leads to trust (b 5 .28, p 5 .01) which
impacts voluntary cooperation (b 5 .26, p 5 .04), and in turn impacts tax compliance (b 5 .28,
p 5 .03; 95% CI [0.05; 1.43]. The indirect effect via pride and trust alone (95% CI [21.22; 1.60]) or
pride and voluntary cooperation alone (95% CI [20.14; 3.06]), however, is not significant. The results
for identification with the local community show that identification with the local community triggers
voluntary cooperation (b 5 .33, p 5 .006), which in turn impacts tax compliance (b 5 .29, p 5 .03;
95% CI [0.03; 3.94]). Other indirect paths are not significant (identification and trust: 95% CI [20.49;
1.13]) or marginally not significant (identification, trust, and voluntary cooperation: 95% CI [20.00;
1.01]). Nationalism seems also to be indirectly connected to tax compliance: it triggers trust in tax
authorities (b 5 .20, p 5 .09), which fosters voluntary cooperation (b 5 .32, p 5 .009), and in turn tax
compliance (b 5 .28, p 5 .03; 95% CI [0.02; 1.31]). The other indirect effects are not significant
(nationalism and trust: 95% CI [20.71; 2.16]; nationalism and voluntary cooperation: 95% CI
[21.99; 1.00]). In sum, we identify only indirect relations between identification with the community
and tax-compliance intention: national pride and nationalism are related to trust in tax authorities,
which fuels voluntary motivation to cooperate and in turn tax compliance. Identification with the local
community, in contrast, seems to be related to voluntary cooperation (and less to reason-based trust),
which fuels tax compliance. Hence, whereas national pride and nationalism tend to trigger deliberate
processes in which evaluations about whether or not to trust tax authorities play a role, identification
with the local community seems to be a rather emotional process that fuels patriotic motivations based
on civic duty and not deliberate evaluation whether or not tax authorities can be trusted.
First Experiment: National Flag
Sample
The first experimental sample consisted of 110 Austrians, the majority of them male (70.9%),
with an average age of 41.44 (SD 5 12.18). Most participants had a university degree (34.5%), were
employed in the private sector (36.4%), and had a monthly income of between 1,501 and 3,000 Euro.
Again, when asked on a 7-point scale about their experience with the tax authorities, participants rated
themselves overall as rather experienced (M 5 4.28, SD 5 1.82).
Material and Procedure
The recruitment of participants, conducted in online newspaper forums, was identical to that
for the survey. After participants indicated their citizenship, their patriotism was manipulated by
Table 1. Intercorrelation of Scales and Items of the Survey
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5
1. National pride 5.16 (1.79)
2. Identification with local community 4.94 (1.95) .07
3. Nationalism 4.31 (1.49) .61*** 2.00
4. Trust 3.52 (1.41) .28* .15 .20†
5. Voluntary cooperation 5.13 (1.51) .25* .33** .01 .32**
6. Tax-compliance intention 81.58% (29.25) .14 .00 .01 .14 .29*
Note. M 5 mean, SD 5 standard deviation
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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randomly assigning them to one of two conditions: an image of their national flag or an image of
a fictitious flag (see the online supporting information). Next, participants were presented with
the same tax-compliance scenario as in the survey and filled in the same items on national pride,
identification with the local community, nationalism (Cronbachs’ a 5 .80), trust in tax authorities
(Cronbachs’ a 5 .92), voluntary cooperation (Cronbachs’ a 5 .92), and sociodemographic
characteristics.
Results and Discussion
The differences between the experimental groups were identified using t-tests, with the national
versus fictitious flag as the independent variable and national pride, identification with the local com-
munity, nationalism, trust, voluntary cooperation, and tax-compliance intention as dependent varia-
bles. The national flag led to greater national pride than the fictitious flag (t(101) 5 2.31, p 5 .02,
Cohen’s d 5 .47) and also to marginally more nationalism (t(98) 5 1.76, p 5 .08, Cohen’s d 5 .35).
No differences emerged for identification with the local community (t(102) 5 1.15, p 5 .25). The
results also indicate, however, that the national flag induced no higher trust in tax authorities
(t(90) 5 0.65, p 5 .52), tax-compliance intentions (t(108) 5 1.14, p 5 .26), or voluntary cooperation
(t(84) 5 1.56, p 5 .12) than the fictitious flag. Respective means and standard deviations of the exper-
imental groups are displayed in Table 2.
The corresponding regression analyses, again on a bootstrap sample of 1,000 participants, indi-
cate an indirect effect. The national flag elicits national pride (b 5 2.22, p 5 .02), which in turn
impacts tax compliance (b 5 .27, p 5 .009), 95% CI [213.71, 20.58]. The results also show that
national pride leads to more reason-based trust in tax authorities (b 5 .27, p 5 .01) and in turn fosters
voluntary cooperation (b 5 .34, p 5 .002) and tax compliance (b 5 .28, p 5 .01; 95% CI
[22.09,20.07]). The fact that no path without national pride is significant (trust in tax authorities:
95% CI [22.39, 1.16]; voluntary cooperation: 95% CI [210.78, 0.77]) implies that the national flag
increases intended tax compliance indirectly through an explicit and deliberative process based on
trust in tax authorities. Given the t-test result of no impact for the national flag on identification with
the local community, no indirect effect via identification with the local community is possible. Also
only tendencies but no significant indirect effects emerge for elicited nationalism (nationalism: 95%
CI [24.10, 4.20]; nationalism and trust: 95% CI [22.20, 0.25]; nationalism and voluntary coopera-
tion: 95% CI [20.05, 3.87]; nationalism, trust, and voluntary cooperation: 95% CI [21.70, 0.01]).
These results indicate that an indirect effect similar to that found in the survey study occurs only if the
national flag impacts national pride thereby indirectly fostering trust and voluntary cooperation and in
turn tax-compliance intention. No such indirect effect on tax compliance is observed if the flag
impacts nationalism.
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of the National Flag Experiment
National Flag Fictitious Flag
M (SD) M (SD)
National pride 5.32 (1.45) 4.48 (2.10)
Identification with local community 5.02 (1.93) 4.63 (1.59)
Nationalism 4.24 (1.57) 3.71 (1.44)
Trust in the tax authorities 3.22 (1.45) 3.02 (1.41)
Voluntary cooperation 5.36 (1.74) 4.78 (1.71)
Tax-compliance intention 79.22% (26.49) 72.37% (34.80)
Note. M 5 mean, SD 5 standard deviation
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Second Experiment: Priming
Sample
Our sample comprised 99 Austrians, the majority of whom were male (63.6%), with an average
age of 43.09 (SD 5 12.20, range: 17–71). Most participants had a university degree (40.4%), were
employed in the private sector (38.4%), and reported a monthly income between 1,501 and 3,000
Euro (40.4%). When asked to indicate their experience with tax authorities on a 7-point scale, partici-
pants rated themselves overall as rather experienced (M 5 4.46, SD 5 1.92).
Material and Procedure
The material, procedure, and analytical strategy were almost identical to those in the flag experi-
ment except that instead of using a flag to manipulate patriotism, we employed national achievements
as a priming mechanism to trigger patriotism (cf. Mummendey et al., 2001). Specifically, participants
were asked to write down three reasons why they like (dislike) living in Austria, a positive (negative)
priming eliciting high (low) patriotism. They were then instructed to read a short text highlighting
recent Austrian achievements or shortcomings in such areas as health care, infrastructure, the quality
of democratic institutions, and the economy. Next, as in the survey and experiment 1, participants
were presented with a tax-compliance scenario and items on national pride, identification with the
local community, nationalism (Cronbach’s a 5 .80), trust in the tax authorities (Cronbach’s a 5 .89),
voluntary cooperation (Cronbach’s a 5 .93), and sociodemographic characteristics.
Results and Discussion
The differences between experimental groups were again identified using t-tests with positive
versus negative priming as the independent variable and national pride, identification with the local
community, nationalism, trust, voluntary cooperation, and tax-compliance intention as dependent vari-
ables. The positive priming for Austria led to marginally more national pride than the negative pri-
ming (t(92) 5 1.84, p 5 .07, Cohen’s d 5 .39), but no differences are observable for identification
with the local community (t(92) 5 1.06, p 5 .29) or nationalism (t(91) 5 21.00, p 5 .32). Positive pri-
ming also generated more trust in tax authorities (t(97) 5 1.89, p 5 .01, Cohen’s d 5 .57) than did
negative priming and also lead to marginally more tax-compliance intention (F(97,1) 5 3.58, p 5 .06,
Cohen’s d 5 .38). No differences emerge, however, for voluntary cooperation (t(81) 5 0.90, p 5 .37).
Respective means and standard deviations of the experimental groups are illustrated in Table 3.
To identify the underlying psychological mechanisms, we again tested for indirect effects using a
bootstrap sample of 1,000 participants. The results indicate that the priming impacts national pride
(b 5 2.19, p 5 .07) which influences trust (b 5 .15, p 5 .15) and in turn impacts voluntary motivation
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of the Priming Experiment
Positive Priming Negative Priming
M (SD) M (SD)
National pride 5.08 (1.75) 4.35 (2.03)
Identification with local community 5.15 (1.95) 4.68 (2.29)
Nationalism 4.10 (1.55) 4.45 (1.74)
Trust in the tax authorities 3.64 (1.50) 2.83 (1.36)
Voluntary cooperation 5.22 (1.81) 4.84 (1.88)
Tax-compliance intention 81.77% (28.23) 69.43% (36.16)
Note. M 5 mean, SD 5 standard deviation
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to cooperate (b 5 .41, p< .001) and thus, tax compliance (b 5 .65, p< .001; 95% CI [24.04;
20.01]). The other paths with national pride are not significant (national pride: 95% CI [29.76;
0.16], national pride and trust in tax authorities: 95% CI [20.01; 2.49]). However, the analysis also
suggests paths without national pride: Compared to negative priming, positive priming leads to more
trust in tax authorities (b 5 2.26, p 5 .01) which in turn impacts tax compliance (b 5 .16, p 516;
95% CI [0.25; 9.09]) or impacts first voluntary cooperation (b 5 .43, p< .001) and then tax-
compliance intention (b 5 .68, p< .001; 95% CI [210.80; 20.89]). Likewise, the t-test results indi-
cate that priming has no impact on identification with the local community or nationalism, meaning
that no indirect effect is possible via identification or nationalism. Taken together, these findings indi-
cate that priming increases national pride and in turn, similar to the survey study, trust, voluntary
motivation to cooperate, and tax compliance. However, the present results also suggest that reason-
based trust in tax authorities seems to be particularly important for the indirect impact of the priming
on tax compliance. Thus, the priming of national achievements seems to increase tax-compliance
intention through an explicit deliberative process.
Third Experiment: National Landscapes
Sample
The third experimental sample consisted of 74 Austrians, the majority male (91.9%), with an
average age of 43.14 (SD 5 13.02, range: 21–70). As before, most participants had a university degree
(40.5%), were employed in the private economy (37.8%), and earned between 1,500 and 3,000 Euro
(55.4%) a month. When asked on a 7-point scale about their experience with the tax authorities, par-
ticipants again rated themselves overall as rather experienced (M 5 4.55, SD 5 1.79).
Material and Procedure
Although patriotism was manipulated differently, the material and procedure in this intervention
were identical to those in the previous experiments. Because market research suggests that national
landscapes are the most important reason for Austrians to be proud of their country (Beutelmeyer,
2011), participants were randomly assigned either to a condition of seeing images of Austrian land-
scapes or a control condition of seeing images of Australian landscapes. For both conditions, partici-
pants were randomly presented with four pictures in two different orders to avoid order effects (see
the supporting information for the images).
As in the national flag experiment and priming task, the dependent variables were tax-
compliance intention, national pride, identification with the local community, nationalism (Cron-
bachs’ a 5 .83), trust in tax authorities (Cronbachs’ a 5 .83), voluntary cooperation (Cronbachs’
a 5 .89), and sociodemographic characteristics. Participants were also asked to indicate whether they
recognized the landscapes presented and to write down what they thought each picture showed. Based
on this information, we were able to calculate a recognition variable indicating whether participants
(1) did not recognize or (2) recognized the landscape shown.
Results and Discussion
The differences between experimental groups were identified using ANCOVA, with national ver-
sus foreign landscape as the independent variable; national pride, identification with the local commu-
nity, nationalism, trust, voluntary cooperation, and tax compliance as dependent variables; and
recognition as the control variable. Although the national landscape pictures led to more identification
with the local community (F(71,1) 5 3.93, p 5 .05, g2 5 .05), the national (Austrian) landscape
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pictures did not generate more national pride (F(71,1) 5 0.14, p 5 .71) or nationalism
(F(71,1) 5 1.02, p 5 .32) than the foreign (Australian) landscape controls. The results also reveal no
differences between the conditions for trust in tax authorities (F(71,1) 5 0.29, p 5 .60) or voluntary
cooperation (F(71,1) 5 1.68, p 5 .20). They do, however, indicate that national landscapes led to
higher tax-compliance intention than foreign landscapes (F(71,1) 5 5.56, p 5 .02, g25 .07). Respec-
tive means and standard deviations of the experimental groups are shown in Table 4.
The significant recognition covariate for tax-compliance intention (F(71,1) 5 8.58, p 5 .01, g25
.11) also indicates that nonrecognition increases tax-compliance intention (Spearman
correlation 5 2.29, p 5 .01) in a similar manner in both experimental conditions (national landscape:
Spearman correlation 5 2.30, p 5 .07; foreign landscape: Spearman correlation 5 2.41, p 5 .01).
The covariate is insignificant, however, for pride, identification with the local community, national-
ism, trust, and voluntary cooperation (all at p .10).
An additional analysis with recognition as a control variable was aimed at identifying the mecha-
nisms determining the landscapes’ impact on tax compliance. This analysis, again conducted on a
bootstrap sample of 1,000, points to an indirect impact via identification with the local community
(b 5 2.24, p 5 .05), which impacts voluntary tax cooperation (b 5 .41, p< .001) and in turn tax-
compliance intention (b 5 .29, p 5 .02; 95% CI [25.04; 20.01]). No other mediation models pro-
duced significant results: identification with the local community (95% CI [23.34, 4.26]), identifica-
tion with the local community and trust in tax authorities (95% CI [22.40; 0.06]), trust in tax
authorities (95% CI [23.94, 1.99]), trust and voluntary cooperation (95% CI [21.35; 0.43]), or via
voluntary cooperation (95% CI [26.34; 1.95]). According to the ANCOVA results, the landscapes
have no impact on national pride or nationalism and can thus have no indirect effect via pride or
nationalism. These findings imply that the landscapes’ impact on tax-compliance intention is indirect
and rather implicit. This assumption is also supported by the finding that the landscapes particularly
increased tax-compliance intentions of those participants who did not deliberately recognize them. As
with the survey results, identification with the local community triggers the voluntary motivation to
cooperate and in turn tax-compliance intention without rational consideration of whether national tax
authorities can be trusted.
General Discussion and Conclusion
To demonstrate that patriotism can be used as a promotional tool for cooperation with the state,
this article reports evidence from one survey and three experimental studies showing that certain patri-
otic materials can indeed impact identification with the community and increase cooperation. Never-
theless, the present article also shows that attempts to manipulate patriotism can also lead to
destructive nationalism and apparently have different underlying mechanisms depending on whether
the identification is with the national or regional community (Bar-Tal, 1993; Mummendey et al.,
Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of the National Landscapes Experiment
National Landscape Foreign Landscape
M (SD) M (SD)
National pride 4.81 (2.03) 4.66 (1.58)
Identification with local community 4.92 (1.73) 4.03 (2.01)
Nationalism 3.91 (1.65) 4.23 (1.47)
Trust in the tax authorities 2.94 (1.31) 2.82 (1.13)
Voluntary cooperation 5.11 (1.49) 4.88 (1.66)
Tax-compliance intention 86.25% (23.07) 76.92% (26.42)
Note. M 5 mean, SD 5 standard deviation
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2001). Specifically, our results indicate similar to previous research from the United States (Butz
et al., 2007; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008), that the national flag, although it does have an impact on
patriotism, also increases nationalism. National achievements (Mummendey et al., 2001) or national
landscapes, on the other hand, impact patriotism without triggering nationalism. The results also show
that whereas the processes underlying cooperation generated by identification with the national com-
munity include deliberate trust in national tax authorities, those underlying identification with the local
community do not include trust in national authorities. The present article is one of the few which
uses different priming methods to examine the impact of patriotism and nationalism on domestic pol-
icy attitudes.
The current findings confirm and expand research showing a connection between patriotism and
cooperation with the state (Konrad & Qari, 2012; Whiteley, 1999). In particular, the present studies
demonstrate that identification with one’s own country or local community are indeed related to tax
compliance but through indirect paths mirroring different psychological processes. Whereas identifi-
cation with the community of one’s own country (e.g., manipulated through the national flag or
national achievements) impacts trust in national tax authorities, voluntary motivation to cooperate,
and thus tax compliance, identification with the local community (e.g., manipulated through national
landscapes) seems to impact tax compliance only via the voluntary motivation to cooperate out of a
felt loyalty and not via deliberate trust in national authorities. However, identification with the local
community might also involve trust in authorities, but in local authorities and not in national author-
ities. Future empirical studies are needed to replicate the present findings and additionally assess trust
in local authorities.
The present results also indicate that promotional tools which trigger identification on a local
level (e.g., through national landscapes) compared to identification on the national level (e.g., through
the national flag) run a smaller risk of triggering nationalism next to patriotism (Herrmann & Brewer,
2004; Raagmaa, 2010). This might be related to the way local identity was manipulated in the present
study. If local identity is triggered through local symbols such as flags or traditional costumes, a local
identity might also increase nationalism as degradation of outgroup members.
While national flags and national achievements trigger patriotism, only national achievements
seem to be able to trigger patriotism without nationalism. This outcome confirms previous experi-
ments on the effect of national flags (e.g., Butz et al., 2007; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008) and
national achievements (Mummendey et al., 2001). These results clearly suggest that public institutions
should rather present national achievements than the national flag to increase cooperation of citizens.
However, national achievements might also lead to nationalism if they are not carefully designed. For
instance, if the comparison between ones’ country’s past with its present leads to the impression that
the country is more successful in mastering challenges than other countries, nationalism might be trig-
gered as well. Therefore it can be suggested to public institutions to run pretests of promotional mate-
rial they would like to use to ensure that their material is only eliciting patriotism and not nationalism.
The results on the covariate recognition of landscapes show that nonrecognition of landscapes
leads to more tax-compliance intentions than recognition of landscapes. Although this relation can be
found in both experimental conditions (the national and the foreign landscape condition), it is only
significant in the foreign landscape condition. Concerning the foreign landscapes, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that explicit recognition of a foreign country is negatively related to national tax compliance.
Nonrecognition of a foreign landscape might be perceived as a neutral landscape which does not influ-
ence tax-compliance intentions. In contrast, the explicit recognition of a foreign country might lead to
the impression that tax compliance does not support one’s own community but a foreign community,
a perception which might reduce tax-compliance intentions. However, nonrecognition of national
landscapes also tends to be related with more tax-compliance intention than recognition of national
landscapes. One could speculate that recognized national landscapes might be linked to concrete and
sometimes negative attitudes which in turn reduce tax compliance. In contrast, nonrecognized national
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landscapes might unconsciously only be perceived as familiar and therefore might implicitly elicit
more positive emotions and more tax-compliance intentions. However, these are only speculations,
and the underlying sample sizes necessitate approaching such arguments with caution. Future studies
are needed to replicate the current finding and to shed light on the reasons why nonrecognition of
landscapes might be positively related to cooperation with the state.
The present research is subject to certain limitations. First, although public institutions like tax
authorities need the cooperation of foreign citizens, all participants in our research had Austrian citi-
zenship. This choice was made based on the assumption that the Austrian national flag, national
achievements, and/or national landscapes might not be as familiar to foreigners and might not, there-
fore, have equal power to increase their identification, trust, and cooperation. Nonetheless, future stud-
ies should investigate how identification with the country or region of residence can be triggered to
increase trust and cooperation in foreigners.
Second, unlike the findings in previous research (Torgler, 2003; Whiteley, 1999), the survey
results from this study identify no significant direct relation between patriotism and tax compliance,
only a tendency for the two to be linked. We attribute this failure to our smaller sample sizes; had our
survey used thousands of participants like others in the literature, this mere tendency might have
grown in significance. Nonetheless, this result does underscore our experimental finding that the rela-
tion between patriotism and cooperation is not direct but indirect and mediated through trust and vol-
untary motivation to cooperate.
Finally, our research design does not take into account the fact that Austria has one of the highest
tax morale and tax-compliance rates across the globe (Alm & Torgler, 2006; Schneider, Buehn, &
Montenegro, 2010). Future empirical research thus needs to clarify whether our findings can be repli-
cated in countries with lower tax-compliance rates and hence lower perceived social norms of compli-
ance. Our findings do, however, emphasize the high relevance of patriotism for cooperation: patriotism
seems to increase tax-compliance intention even beyond Austria’s already high tax-compliance rates.
Despite these shortcomings, our findings have important theoretical and practical implications for
governmental information campaigns promoting cooperation. First, they show that emphasizing
national achievements not only promotes patriotism without nationalism but increases cooperation
and maybe even more important, trust in public institutions. Given the declining levels of trust—and
thus social capital—in Western democracies (Putnam, 1995), this outcome seems particularly impor-
tant. Based on our findings, campaigns that make citizens aware of national progress can strengthen
reason-based trust and optimism, important determinants not only of tax compliance, but also of eco-
nomic and social prosperity (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009; Gangl, Kastlunger, Kirchler, & Voracek, 2012).
On the other hand, patriotic materials that trigger a local identity, although they too increase coopera-
tion, may not have the important side-effect of triggering trust in national public institutions. It also
seems likely that a cooperation effect induced through an implicit cue like national landscapes may be
short lived, whereas one induced through explicit positive evaluations of state achievements may have
a long-term impact. Although the use of national landscapes can be recommended to increase cooper-
ation, public institutions that want to increase patriotism, trust, voluntary motivation to cooperate, as
well as long-term cooperation should particularly highlight national achievements in their promotional
campaigns (Bar-Tal, 1993; Mummendey et al., 2001).
Our observations also provide useful insights for public campaigns in general. Whereas some patri-
otic materials (e.g., the national flag) induce nationalism and should be avoided, others, such as national
achievements or national landscapes, can increase citizens’ identification and cooperation with their com-
munity. Nevertheless, if a long-term impact on patriotism, trust, and cooperation is pursued, campaigns
should use salient and explicitly positive evaluations of state achievements (Bar-Tal, 1993). Such an
assumption is supported by our empirical evidence that patriotism can be elicited and leveraged to
increase citizens’ trust and gain their voluntary cooperation with both the state and the community.
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Tax compliance by the wealthy is relevant not only because their contributions
are essential to maintain public budgets and social equality, but because their
(non)compliance behavior and the perceived (un)fairness of their contributions
can fuel social unrest. In this article, after giving a brief history of taxing the
wealthy, we review the existing theoretical, empirical, and policy literature on
their tax compliance. We discuss how and why the wealthy differ from less affluent
taxpayers because of specific interrelated political, social, and psychological
conditions. Understanding the psychological mechanisms that determine the tax
compliance of the wealthy can provide policy insights on how to better integrate
the wealthy in the tax system. Therefore, the present review is also a starting point
for new policy approaches to increase tax compliance and tax morale among the
wealthy.
Healthy state budgets and social cohesion depend on the tax cooperation of
the wealthy. But with increasing levels of income inequality in strong economies
such as the United States or Germany (Stiglitz, 2018), the public and many
scholars are increasingly questioning whether the rich are sufficiently contributing
to the provision of public goods. Scholars and intellectuals such as Piketty (2014)
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and Bregman (2017) emphasize that the real problem of our time is tax avoidance
by the rich who do not pay their fair share (see, e.g., recent 2019 World Economic
Forum in Davos). Bregman, for example, emphasized the importance of taxes
compared with the philanthropic schemes of the rich.1
Tax compliance of the wealthy not only directly impacts a state’s capacity to
finance public goods, but it also influences the tax compliance of the general pop-
ulation and can be the cause of social and political turbulence (for historical exam-
ples, see Adams, 1993; Finer, 1999; Webber & Wildavsky, 1986). Recent examples
are the “Occupy Wall Street” protest in the United States in 2011 or the “Mouve-
ment des Gilets Jaunes” in France in 2018. Tax changes have become a divisive
issue centered around fairness in which some politicians regard efforts to increase
taxes as “class warfare,” whereas others consider lower taxes for the wealthy as
balancing the budget on “the backs of the poor” (Slemrod & Bakija, 2000, p. 50).
The wealthy’s tax behavior is also socially important because they, by
personifying society’s measures of success, prompt other citizens to imitate
their tax behavior (Fassin, 2005). This role model function, interpreted from an
evolutionary perspective, is a strategy to improve survival chances by learning
from those perceived as the best models, whose habits, styles, goals, and
motivations are worth imitating (Henrich, 2015, p. 120). Thus, if accusations of
tax fraud by sports stars, Chief Executive Officers, and politicians violate ordinary
citizens’ tax morale, these latter then start questioning the reasons for their own
tax honesty. Massive fines for tax evasion rarely harm their fame and positive
image, or even the role model function. For example, a fine of 18.8 million Euros
imposed on Portugal’s football superstar Cristiano Ronaldo did not diminish the
cheers and adulation after a brilliant hat trick in the World Cup.
For their part, the wealthy do contribute substantially to the tax pool. As
an example, the top 2.7% of the income bracket in the United States pays about
51.6% of total income taxes (Desilver, 2016), while in Germany, the top 5.6%
contributes 43.25% (Bundeszentrale für Deutsche Bildung, 2013). Even taking
into account the high portion of indirect taxes (e.g., value-added taxes) in total tax
returns (between 30% and 55% in the EU; Carone, Schmidt, & Nicodème, 2007)
paid mostly by the middle and lower classes, rich individuals’ contributions are
essential for financing public goods (OECD, 2008) such as infrastructure or health
care. The problem is, as empirical data show (e.g., E. Hofmann, Voracek, Bock,
& Kirchler, 2017b), that the motivation to engage in tax evasion and avoidance
increases with wealth. Many wealthy individuals also support initiatives to reduce
their tax contributions (e.g., Tea Party protests, see Martin, 2015) and promote
alternatives to tax payments such as the philanthropic system (Giridharadas,
2019). Thus, understanding the political macro, social, meso and individual micro
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8ijiLqfXP0
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mechanisms that determine and psychologically motivate the wealthy to pay
taxes are essential to maintain and increase state budgets and social cohesion.
Despite the importance of the subject, social science (and particularly
psychological science) remains surprisingly silent on the topic. Most tax research
focuses on compliance by average citizens, with only a limited number of studies
explicitly comparing the compliance behavior of the wealthy with that of the
middle or lower class. However, the wealthy are different from the average
citizen in the sense that they not only have access to different political and legal
possibilities, opportunities, and incentive structures, but also have different social
environments and individual dispositions that are relevant for their tax behavior.
The aim of the present review is to draw attention to these differences and their
psychological origins and expressions, thereby highlighting the importance for
more differential tax research and tailored tax policies.
The present article starts with an historical overview. This overview shows
the importance of tax collection from the wealthy and demonstrates that the status
quo is by no means unchangeable. We then move to contemporary tax research
and give a definition of tax compliance before examining the empirical evidence,
indicating that (on average) the wealthy are less tax compliant than less affluent
taxpayers. Based on a review of the interrelated political (macro), social (meso),
and individual (micro) factors, we discuss psychological causes, research gaps, and
practical solutions concerning the lower tax compliance of the wealthy. Among
other things, we show how the political and legal macro level allows the wealthy to
“morally disconnect” from their own tax behavior and therefore from their impact
on society. On a meso level, their ability to hire highly skilled tax practitioners
transforms their tax decisions into a group decision with specific group dynamics
allowing to “optimize” their tax behavior. Also, on the micro level, the wealthy dif-
fer from average taxpayers as wealth and status go together with specific personal
values, which likely increase reactance to taxation. We argue that the entire range
of these peculiarities calls for more tailored policy approaches, which (as our his-
torical overview shows) can be built on good examples from the past. Finally, we
discuss how the classical coercion-based and legitimacy-based instruments that
are used to influence tax compliance can be applied to address the peculiarities of
the wealthy. We claim that for each level—the macro, meso, and micro—a specific
combination of hard coercive-based and soft trust-generating legitimacy-based
measures is necessary to achieve tax compliance from the wealthy.
In this article, we highlight innovative social psychological research in
addition to reviewing literature from a wide range of other academic disciplines
(e.g., economics, sociology, political science, history) and practitioners (e.g.,
OECD, tax administrations). Applying this multidisciplinary approach allows us
to generate new ideas that go beyond expensive and hard-to-implement tactics
designed to foster tax compliance of the wealthy, such as international cooperation
in closing legal loopholes given the armada of tax havens that offer tax “saving”
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schemes to the rich. Understanding the specific psychological differences between
wealthy and average taxpayers and their causes is important to policymakers
whose job is to increase compliance in these specific target groups. Such
understanding is also relevant for researchers interested in cooperation, poverty
reduction, inequality, and behavioral interventions in public management.
A Short History of Taxing the Wealthy
The history of taxes and the evolution of human societies are closely
intertwined. In early societies, those with power created economic bottlenecks in
trade routes so that they could collect payments from merchants in return for safe
passage (Pennisi, 2012). These tax earnings were used to defend and further extend
their rule (Pennisi, 2012) making stable finances the foundation of state power
(Davies & Friedman, 1998; Webber & Wildavsky, 1986). For instance, from 5,000
BCE onward, the flourishing Egyptian culture had its own sophisticated tax system
(Davies & Friedman, 1998) with the Rosetta Stone (inscribed around 200 BCE)
as its most famous artifact, being a tax document granting exemptions to priests
(Carlson, 2005) and reporting the reactions to a tax revolt (Adams, 1993). The
Pharaoh regularly collected taxes from officials and ordinary citizens, with special
levies as needed (e.g., for military campaigns; Ezzamel, 2002). To avoid the risk of
scribes enriching themselves by cheating taxpayers, pharaohs increased the salary
of their scribes (Adams, 1993). In addition, scribes were instructed to conduct
tough enforcement strategies, but also to act kindly and were granted autonomy
to reduce the tax for poor farmers (Adams, 1993, p. 8). Thus, even in ancient
Egypt, the importance of a well-paid, and therefore trustworthy and competent
tax administration was recognized as a key factor for successful tax collection.
Ancient Greece developed a tax system that depended on a sophisticated ad-
ministration, but was also strongly based on social norms and social enforcement,
in which wealthy citizens were expected to make voluntary contributions to vari-
ous state projects (Reich, 2018). This so-called Liturgical system encouraged the
rich to compete for honor and gratitude in a way that led to public improvements
and beautiful buildings; that is, the liturgy. Public buildings, amusements, and,
in particular, military equipment were purchased by rich citizens and donated to
the city (Adams, 1993). An interesting feature of the liturgical system was the
so-called “antidosis procedure”: A wealthy person who was assigned a liturgical
service could attempt to resist to perform the liturgy by nominating another,
wealthier person who had not performed any significant liturgy recently. In cases
where the two could not come to an agreement, a court would decide which of
the two would carry out the liturgy (Reich, 2018).
With the Industrial Revolution, land and property were used to obtain
credit, to invest and earn income based on profit (Seligman, 1913). The new
developments allowed banking families like the German Fuggers to gain immense
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wealth. Wealth creation and contribution to state finances were intertwined. The
bankers lent money to the Kings who often paid back their loans not with money,
but by granting mining or other monopoly rights (Graulau, 2008). However,
sometimes, the Kings defaulted; for example, around 1,600 CE, the Spanish King
shirked his debts, thereby making the Fuggers pay for his wars. The Habsburg
dynasty was particularly notorious for defaulting (e.g., five times just in the 19th
century, see Gasser & Müller, 2012). Thus, especially in times of war—and hence
need—states took money away from the wealthy for state reasons.
In 1798, England needed to fund the Napoleonic Wars, which may have
provided the motivational base to invent the first known income tax. This was a
progressive system in which those with lower income paid less than those with
higher income (Cooper, 1982). The new idea was probably influenced by the
concurrent rise of the labor movement (Aidt & Jensen, 2009) and mirrored Smith’s
(1937, p. 777) similar proposal in his Wealth of Nations that “the subjects of every
state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as
possible, in proportion to their abilities.” Thus, although it was first implemented
only temporarily as “national defense levies,” the progressive income tax soon
became the primary source of national finance in most countries (Steinmo, 2003).
In the early and mid-20th century, progressive income taxation was extreme
by today’s standards, with national finances based on taxes from corporations
and from fewer than 5% of the wealthiest citizens (Steinmo, 2013). In Spain,
only 1,500 individuals paid taxes in 1933 (Alvaredo & Saez, 2009). In the United
States, the Second World War increased national expenditures more than 12-fold
(Steinmo, 2003), which meant that taxes on the easily identified rich were no
longer sufficient, and the government began to include the identifiable income
of an increased number of industry workers in the tax collection. To gain the
acceptance of the workers, the marginal tax on the wealthy was pushed up to
extreme levels, while the tax thresholds were substantially lowered (Steinmo,
2003), with a major propaganda campaign linking all income tax to the war effort
(Jones, 1988). Hence, while only the richest in the United States paid income tax
before 1930, by the end of World War II, 60% of income earners paid (Steinmo,
2003), and after the war, income tax was no longer an exclusive tax for the rich
but a tax for the masses (Jones, 1988). Nevertheless, at this time, the rich were
paying more than ever, with a 1957 U.S. federal individual income tax of 91% on
incomes over USD400,000 (equivalent to around USD3,500,000 today; Slemrod,
2000) compared with the current rate of 39.6%.
After the Second World War, income taxes were maintained rather than
being rolled back (Steinmo, 2003), with both politicians and economists positing
that the state should manage the capitalist society through tax regulations. This
political consensus ended in the early 1980s with representatives of neoliberal
thought such as Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman (Mirowski & Plehwe,
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2015) questioning whether the complex tax code was really fair, and whether it
helped accomplish the government’s goals (Steinmo, 2003).
Then, in the mid-1980s, U.S. taxes were cut dramatically, resulting in an
increase in public deficits. Further questions were raised about the state’s ability
to manage society, a trend that went hand in hand with disregard for a progressive
income tax system (Steinmo, 2003). Because of increased income tax evasion
(accelerated through the increased opportunities of a globalized financial market),
consumption taxes—being hard to evade—became more popular (Graetz &
Wilde, 1985), while at the same time, countries began competing to attract foreign
capital through tax exemptions (Devereux, Griffith, Klemm, Thum, & Ottaviani,
2002). Across the globe, countries began following the U.S. tax reforms, lowering
taxes while financing income tax reductions by increasing other taxes (e.g., VAT,
FICA; Devereux et al., 2002; Steinmo, 2003). As a result, the average tax rate of
26.38% for the top 400 highest earning taxpayers in 1992 fell to 23.13% in 2014
(IRS, 2014); since Donald Trump’s tax reforms began, this group now has lower
effective tax rates than any other group in the United States (Saez & Zucman,
2019). The same trend is observable in Germany where the tax rates on capital
companies declined from 53% in 2000 to 42% in 2005 (Hartmann, 2011). On the
other hand, the tax burden of the masses increased with the rise in value-added
taxes, so that in Germany today, around 50% (compared to 40% in 1990) of
total tax monies come from value-added taxes, with only around one third from
income tax (compared to 40% in 1980; Hartmann, 2011).
Overall, this history of taxation identifies several factors that facilitate the rais-
ing of tax revenue from the wealthy: (i) the ability of the state to identify wealth,
thus taxable assets, (ii) a professional tax administration, (iii) budgetary necessity,
often related to war, and (iv) political, social, and intellectual trends. If several of
these factors come together as they did in the United States during the world wars,
with the war against the Nazis generating patriotism and a common social drive, ex-
tremely high taxes can be collected from the wealthy (Steinmo, 2003). Thus, what
seems to help is a “common purpose” under which the community can assemble
and bond. Humans are “groupish” (Boyer, 2018) as within-group cooperation tends
to favor success in intergroup competition (Henrich, 2015). Thereby, the statement
of Nobel prize winner Joseph Stiglitz that “The climate crisis is our third world
war” (Stiglitz, 2019) might be the adequate first step in creating such a new narra-
tive and vision under which the global community, including the wealthy can unite,
a narrative that is strong enough to even increase tax contributions of the top 1%.
What Is Tax Compliance?
In the present review, we use the term tax compliance in general terms such
that high- versus low-tax compliance means that individuals pay more compared
to less tax to the state. Tax compliance can be differentiated into a motivational
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and behavioral component (Kirchler, 2007). Tax compliance motivation is defined
as the individual willingness to comply with the tax law. The literature typically
differentiates (as we do in our research) between the sources of motivation:
enforced, voluntary, and committed tax motivation represents the continuum
between the two broad angles of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (Feld & Frey,
2007; Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015; Ryan & Deci, 2000, Torgler, 2007).
Enforced motivation means that someone only pays taxes because of the fear of
audits and fines. Voluntary motivation means an individual gives in to the tax law
and pays because it is easier than evasion. Committed motivation drives someone
to pay taxes because of a felt moral duty (Gangl et al., 2015; Koessler, Torgler,
Feld, & Frey, 2019) or due to emotional stress, probably related to anticipated
guilt or shame (Blaufus, Bob, Otto, & Wolf, 2017; Dulleck et al., 2016).
Tax compliance behavior refers to the concrete behavioral compliance
with specific tax laws (Gangl, Hartl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2019; Kirchler,
Maciejovsky, & Schneider, 2003) such as honest and timely payment and tax
filing (i.e., tax honesty), proper and transparent handling of documents (i.e.,
administrative compliance), registering as a taxpayer (i.e., tax filing), legal
exploitation of the tax law (i.e., tax avoidance), paying less than the statutory tax
(i.e., tax evasion), or criminally exploiting the tax law (i.e., tax fraud).
Although a coherent typology of tax compliance motivations or behaviors
does not exist, many studies conclude that there is a positive relationship between
tax motivations and tax behaviors such that an intrinsic motivation to be an honest
taxpayer also should result in higher tax honesty or lower tax avoidance (Gangl
et al., 2015; Torgler, 2007; Wenzel, 2005). However, compared to tax motivations,
which can be assessed with specific questionnaires (e.g., Kirchler & Wahl, 2010;
Torgler, 2016), the assessment of tax compliance behaviors is inherently difficult,
operating as it does in the shadows. Therefore, real tax compliance behavior can
only be estimated, even by the revenue bodies. In fact, due to complex tax laws,
taxpayers themselves often do not know whether they are honest or dishonest
(Kirchler, Niemirowski, & Wearning, 2006), with some believing themselves
honest but actually evading taxes, while others report evading taxes but are, in
fact, honest. To study tax compliance, therefore, a multimethod approach is used
in which revenue data, survey data, experimental data, and qualitative methods
are combined to understand self-reported motivations and behaviors.
The Wealthy Are Less Tax Compliant than Average Taxpayers
The empirical evidence is relatively clear, no matter whether tax compliance
motivation or behavior is examined or what method is used: almost all studies
report that the wealthy are (on average) less tax compliant than middle-class
citizens. Research using World Values Survey data shows a negative relation
between income and tax motivation (Doerrenberg & Peichel, 2013), although
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our own research indicates that the results are mixed when different regions are
considered separately (for an overview, see Torgler, 2007). A meta-analysis of 334
survey studies also reports a negative relation between income and self-reported
tax compliance (E. Hofmann et al., 2017b). Furthermore, E. Hofmann et al.
(2017b) demonstrate that this negative relation is stronger in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia than in other world regions. Most notably, the negative relation
holds even when the data sets may not sufficiently capture particularly wealthy
taxpayers (e.g., the top 5% of income earners).
Studies based on tax revenue data that control for opportunity to evade and
for tax rates also find a negative relation between income and tax honesty (Crane
& Nourzad, 1986; Feinstein, 1991; Pommerehne & Weck-Hannemann, 1996).
Likewise, recent studies that match wealth records from Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark with microdata leaked from two large offshore financial institutions
(HSBC Switzerland and Mossack Fonseca) indicate that tax evasion increases
sharply with wealth, with the top 0.01% of the wealth distribution (i.e., households
with more than $40 million in net wealth) evading about 30% of their income and
wealth tax versus 3% by taxpayers overall (Altstaeder, Johannesen, & Zucman,
2017). Another study using IRS data of around 55,000 taxpayers concludes that
the relationship between income and tax compliance has a reverse U-shape (Cox,
1984), meaning that, on average, the most noncompliant taxpayers are those with
either very high or very meager incomes, with middle-income taxpayers being
the most compliant (Cox, 1984). On the other hand, reports from the United
Kingdom claim that affluent taxpayers are more likely to submit their tax returns
on time than other taxpayer groups (Tax Audit Office, 2016)
In general, aggressive tax avoidance tends to be discussed in relation to
companies, particularly with respect to large multinational corporations (e.g.,
Apple, Google, Starbucks, Amazon, Facebook) that engage in profit shifting from
high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions (European Commission, 2016; Frijters, Gangl,
& Torgler, 2019). Consequently, multinational enterprises pay relatively low
amounts of tax (Crivelli, De Mooij, & Keen, 2016; Dharmapala, 2014), like the
mere 10% tax on real profits paid by Google in the United Kingdom (Tax Justice
Network, 2016). According to the OECD, an estimated USD100 to 240 billion are
lost globally each year to the profit-shifting activities of multinationals (OECD,
2015a). Although OECD countries have begun implementing policies to reduce
profit-shifting (BEPS), the success of these initiatives depends on each country’s
willingness to forego maximization of its own short-term financial benefit. Some
suggest that a 10 percentage point reduction in a country’s average effective tax
rate would, in the long run, increase the stock of inward foreign direct investment
by an average of over 30% (De Mooij & Ederveen, 2008).
Like large corporations, wealthy individuals are also widely involved in
tax-avoidance activities, with top earners and football stars sometimes even
moving to another country to avoid taxation (Kleven, Landais, & Saez, 2013;
Kleven, Landais, Saez, & Schultz, 2014). However, most individuals may not only
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find such a step more difficult, but some star scientists (measured by the number
of patents) and millionaires (Moretti & Wilson, 2017; Young & Varner, 2011) stay
put simply because moving abroad also involves great costs; for example, costs
involved in migration, living expenses, personal circumstances, and connections
(Simula & Trannoy, 2010). Hence, rather than moving to another country, affluent
individuals may prefer to avoid taxes by moving money to less-taxed assets (e.g.,
in the stock market, trusts, or real estate; Goolsbee, 2000) or by donating to charity
(Peloza & Steel, 2005). On the other hand, as the so-called Paradise Papers show,
wealthy individuals can also legally avoid taxes by moving money to offshore
havens. Overall, however, in contrast to the tax loss from corporate tax avoidance,
the loss from wealthy taxpayers stems from a combination of tax avoidance and
tax evasion (Gravelle, 2009). For instance, the U.K. HRMC reports that their 2015
auditing and monitoring activities enabled the collection of £230 million from
avoidance schemes, £140 million from disclosure of offshore facilities, and £80
from serious civil fraud, a clear indication that tax avoidance and tax evasion are
equally important for tax loss among rich taxpayers (National Audit Office, 2016).
Finally, some wealthy also engage in criminal tax fraud, although they might
frame it as a sort of clever tax avoidance. One such example are the cum-ex
business models in which wealthy individuals (with the help of banks) claim
unjustified tax refunds for investments, generating a total loss of 31.8 billion
Euros for Germany (Ackermann et al., 2017). Thus, the simple business model of
cum-ex investments is to withhold money from the public tax coffers by exploiting
imperfections in the tax administration. A legal solution for the future would be
to forbid any businesses whose profit is only generated by exploiting the tax law.
However, by considering the interrelated micro, meso, and macro conditions,
governments can understand why the rich evade and avoid taxes, and therefore
develop strategies to increase motivation to pay honestly. In the following, we
present the political, social, and individual factors that are likely reasons for the
wealthy’s tax compliance and starting points for policy interventions.
Political and Economic Conditions That Shape Tax Compliance of the
Wealthy
The macro context is shaped by international secrecy jurisdictions including
tax havens, and generous national tax exceptions often related to philanthropic
foundations. We argue that this political and legal environment not only offers the
opportunity to evade and avoid taxes, but also creates a tax climate with an ideo-
logical setup that reduces the moral concerns of the wealthy when avoiding taxes.
Tax Havens and Secrecy Jurisdictions
Politicians, celebrities, billionaires, and sports stars, along with fraudsters
and drug traffickers, use tax havens to hide assets in secret trusts (Weisbord,
How to Achieve Tax Compliance by the Wealthy 117
2016). Such tax havens allow large-scale tax avoidance among the rich (Forsythe,
2017), with an estimated 80% of hidden assets escaping any taxation (European
Commission, 2016). Wealthy taxpayer decisions to avoid and evade taxes might
thus be related to the jurisdictive environment offered by their own or, more
often, a foreign country. In fact, many nations, both large and small, are motivated
to earn extra money at the expense of other countries by rather hypocritically
motivating rich foreigners to commit tax evasion (Weisbord, 2016). Scholars such
as Piketty (2014) suggest the automatic transmission of banking information as
a solution, something he sees as a first step toward a global tax on capital.
The world’s most important tax havens, according to the 2018 Financial
Secrecy Index, are the following 10 countries (in descending order): Switzerland,
USA, Cayman Islands (United Kingdom), Hong Kong (China), Singapore,
Luxembourg, Germany, Taiwan, Dubai, and Guernsey (Islands in the English
Channel). The vicious international competition (or “race to the bottom”;
Sharman, 2006) to attract these funds is probably one reason that an estimated 8%
of global financial wealth is placed untaxed in another country (Zucman, 2013).
Although the developed nations (e.g., the EU) lose the largest absolute amount,
developing countries (e.g., African nations) lose the largest fraction of their finan-
cial wealth to tax havens (European Commission, 2016; Zucman, 2013). Hence,
in the context of these nations’ evasion-friendly jurisdictions, large corporations
and wealthy individuals might also avoid suffering moral compunction when
shifting funds from one country to another. The existence of these jurisdictions
offering financial secrecy allows moral disconnection and moral disengagement
(Den Nieuwenboer & Weaver, 2019), thus generating the perception that the own
tax avoidance behavior is legal and normal, something that does not violate moral
values. To reduce these psychological evasion maneuvers, the state should formu-
late strict legal codes in order to clearly communicate expectations. Importantly,
tax administrations should actively avoid euphemistic language sometimes used
among tax practitioners, who talk about tax optimization, tax saving schemes,
creative tax planning, or testing the limits to disguise the ethical implications of
their actions (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Instead, tax administrations should
clearly use the terms aggressive tax avoidance, illegal accounting practices, tax
evasion, or tax fraud to show that such behaviors are socially disapproved.
The situation becomes even more complicated when lobbying organizations
intentionally influence tax laws to include loopholes for the rich (McBarnet, 1992;
Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015), an effect that may have increased greatly over recent
years (Martin, 2015; Scheiber & Cohen, 2015). According to one analysis of the
political elite and income tax in the United States since 1945, this shift in tax laws
is marked by two phases (Hartmann, 2009). Between 1945 and 1980, two thirds
of the political elite came from working class environments and tax rates for top
earners were high; since 1981, however, almost 70% of the political elite have
originated from the upper or upper middle class, while tax rates for top earners
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have declined (Hartmann, 2009). Although movements to cut taxes for the rich
tend to be in the political majority (e.g., Trump and the Republicans in the United
States, Conservatives in the United Kingdom or Germany; Hartmann, 2011;
Martin, 2015), some wealthy individuals want to see their taxes increase. For
example, 64 wealthy Germans belong to an association that lobbies for increases
in such wealth taxes as the inheritance tax (www.appell-vermoegensabgabe.de),
while in the United States, billionaire investment mogul Buffett (2011) publicly
stated that those as wealthy as he should pay more taxes. In the same vein, in 2010,
a group of 51 German millionaires and billionaires (the “Club of the Wealthy”)
unsuccessfully proposed to Angela Merkel that they should give up 10% of their
income over a period of 10 years as a form of “rich tax.” The two contradictory
trends—that some wealthy people see tax rates as too low, whereas others see
them as too high—mirror the mixed outcomes of research on the impact of tax
rates on tax honesty. While some studies (Alm, 1999) argue that the estimated
underreported income-tax rate elasticity is between 0.5 and 3.0, a large number of
empirical studies find no support for tax rates as an explanation for the negative
relation between income and tax compliance (Cox, 1984; Crane & Nourzad,
1986; Feinstein, 1991; Goolsbee, 2000; Pommerehne & Weck-Hannemann, 1996;
Poterba, 1987). It may be that perceived fairness of the tax system (derived from
knowledge of the own and others’ true tax burden rather than the tax rate itself)
explains a certain portion of lower tax compliance by the rich (Gangl, Kirchler,
Lorenz, & Torgler, 2017; Lewis, 1978). The practical conclusion is that tax admin-
istrations should focus on increasing perceived fairness by informing taxpayers
about their true tax rates, in addition to detailing expenditure of tax revenue.
Tax Exemptions for Philanthropic Foundations
The generous tax treatment of philanthropic foundations and charities may
legitimize tax avoidance of the wealthy by reducing the moral obligation to
contribute to society via taxes (Giridharadas, 2019; Reich, 2018). In many
countries, but particularly in the United States, charity is heavily subsidized by
the state with allowances for generous tax exemptions. For instance, in 2016, the
United States faced $50 billion foregone tax revenue due to tax relief for charities
(Reich, 2018). However, these tax exemptions are relatively recent—only since
1917 the United States has allowed tax deductions for donations to charity (due
to interventions by Rockefeller; Reich, 2018). Now, initiatives such as the “giving
pledge,” in which billionaires such as Bill Gates promise to give away half of their
fortune to charity, are increasingly received with a critical view (Giridharadas,
2019). These contributions are made outside democratic institutions and are often
more likely to increase the power of the founder than they are to support more
equal societies. Nonetheless, think tanks and lobbyist organizations legitimize
charitable giving by disparaging collection of taxes, highlighting that the donors
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are engineers of success who created profitable businesses, and can (in the
same manner) solve society’s problems much better than the state (Giridharadas,
2019).
Moral licensing theory suggests that individuals who initially behaved in a
moral way can later display behaviors that are immoral because they may believe
that past good behavior frees them to do something bad in the future (Merritt,
Efron, & Monin, 2010). Field experiments indicate that committing a moral act
earlier in the day was associated with an above-average likelihood of a subsequent
immoral act (W. Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). Other research on
field data found that companies with a good reputation are more likely to engage in
aggressive tax avoidance than firms with a poorer reputation (Bai, Lobo, & Zhao,
2017). For instance, the good reputation from charitable giving might function as
a license that allows firms to accept reputational consequences of tax avoidance.
Thereby, charitable giving also avoids moral dissonance between the own unethical
tax behavior and the moral self-concept, which is seen as a major driver for moral
behavior (Bastian, 2019). However, empirical research comparing tax systems with
charity systems as well as research on the influence of charitable giving on tax
compliance are scarce. The insights from the liturgy in Ancient Greece indicate that
the contribution was linked to community spirit, public sentiment, duty, and public
demands (e.g., for infrastructure such as bridges). As Athenian statesman Pericles
(429 BC) stated in a famous funeral oration, “We regard wealth as something to
be properly used rather than something to boast about. ( . . . ) Every one of us who
survives should gladly toil on her [Athens’s] behalf” (cited in Adams, 1993, p. 63).
Sitaraman (2017, p. 302) emphasizes the misalignment between constitutional and
economic structure in the United States due to economic and political inequalities,
citing John Adams who in 1767 raised the concern that there is “so much Rascallity,
so much Venality and Corruption, so much Avarice and Ambition, such a Rage for
Profit and Commerce among all Ranks and Degrees of Men even in America, that
I sometimes doubt whether there is public Virtue enough to support a Republic.”2
Thus, policy makers should consider how pragmatic management of large-scale
philanthropy would function. Philanthropy should support democratic institutions
instead of delegitimizing them by questioning their capability to solve societal
problems. For instance, it is argued that foundations designed to operate beyond
one’s death should be limited or forbidden, that foundations should focus on testing
new approaches, should be integrated into state policy and importantly, need ap-
proval of democratic institutions before implementation (Reich, 2018). In addition,
tax administrations might learn from charity administrations on how tax contribu-
tions might be made more attractive for the wealthy, for instance, by granting honor
and gratitude to large taxpayers (as in the Ancient Greece liturgical system). Most
current tax systems focus on deferring tax evasion with shame and guilt rather than
2 See https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-03-02-0202.
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rewarding tax compliance with pride and honors; empirical studies on the shaming
effect show that shaming increased the payments of individuals with small debts,
but had no effect on individuals with larger debt amounts (Perez-Truglia & Troiano,
2018).
Special Enforcement Regimes
Increasingly, countries have specialized enforcement regimes for the wealthy.
Ordinary taxpayers often complain that the rich and powerful do not pay taxes be-
cause they are not controlled or fined. Such beliefs are sometimes fostered by media
reports such as a German government press release that the tax audit rate for the
wealthy had declined from 1,838 cases in 2010 to 1,391 cases in 2014 (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2017). On the other hand, in recent years, tax administrations in many
countries (e.g., Australia, Spain, or Greece) have been more purposely target-
ing the rich. For instance, data on corporate audit probabilities from the German
Ministry of Finance show that in 2015, 21.3% of large corporations were audited
compared to 6.4% of medium corporations, 3.2% of small corporations, and 1.05%
of tiny corporations (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2016). For the United States, de-
tailed IRS (2016) data reveal that the 0.01% who earn USD10,000,000 or more
had an audit probability of 18.79% on their 2015 tax return compared with an
audit probability of between 0.41% and 0.80% for those with an income between
USD25,000 and 200,000. Many countries also have specialized bodies that focus
on auditing large corporations or even high net worth individuals (OECD, 2010,
2015b), or that implement special measures to identify wealthy tax evaders, such
as owners of luxury cars or villas and those who take many international flights
(Casaburi & Troiano, 2016; Gangl et al., 2017). In the United States, the IRS
has a whistle-blower program that pays informers who help to detect an evader
(Davis-Nozemack & Webber, 2012). Germany also buys information on offshore
tax havens from whistle-blowers to identify rich tax evaders (Reuters, 2014; Wit-
trock, 2012). Thus, in contrast to the public perception, large corporations and
wealthy citizens may be more likely to be audited than average or poor citizens.
Nonetheless, the political, legal, and economic context of financial secrecy
laws and national tax loopholes—including those for charities—not only give
the wealthy many more opportunities to evade and avoid taxes than the average
citizen, but might also create an ideological environment that legitimizes
aggressive tax avoidance behavior.
Social Contextual Factors That Influence Tax Compliance of the Wealthy
The tax relevant social meso context of the wealthy is different from that of
average taxpayers. First, compared to average taxpayers who often prepare their
tax returns alone, most wealthy people have the help of tax advisors. Research
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claims that this professional support not only leads to tax returns that are less
compliant, but it also creates social group dynamics that often accelerate opinions
to the unethical extreme. Second, the social environment (and thus the social
identity) of the wealthy is likely different from the social identity of average
citizens, creating comparisons to other wealthy, and thinking along in- and
out-group interests. We will now consider each of these concerns.
Tax Practitioners
Research classically models tax behavior as individual behavior. This
assumes that it is an individual who decides whether or not to be honest on their
tax return (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972), which might be true for many employed
taxpayers and also small entrepreneurs, but it is generally not true for wealthy
taxpayers. As outlined above, compared to ordinary taxpayers, wealthy taxpayers’
tax decisions are made in groups involving tax practitioners and wealth managers.
Those who assist wealthy taxpayers in exploiting national and international tax
laws include professional tax specialists, banks, and international accountancy
firms and wealth managers (Harrington, 2012, 2015; Sikka & Hampton, 2005).
Taxpayers who want to minimize their taxes and who are high risk-takers seek
out tax agents who are adept at finding loopholes (Sakurai & Braithwaite, 2001).
As one U.S. lawyer put it, “You have to understand, the smartest people in the
country think 24/7 about the best tax saving schemes, which they seek to sell for
millions of dollars to specific companies and rich individuals” (informal comment
given to us at a conference). Thus, not only do the lower income classes have less
ambiguous income than higher income classes (Klepper, Mazur, & Nagin, 1991;
for instance, higher income classes may have revenues from entrepreneurial
activities that are easier to conceal than income from employment), but “the
poor evade [while] the rich avoid” with the assistance of their advisors (Slemrod,
2007). This stereotype of a wealthy individual who searches out and is convinced
by the most aggressive tax advisors has some empirical support (Schisler, 1995).
For instance, a study of 7,127 income tax returns found that those who used a tax
preparer had lower tax liabilities, higher tax reductions, and lower prepayments
than those who had no such help (Christian, Gupta, Weber, & Willis, 1994).
Findings of another experimental study suggest that tax practitioners have lower
moral reasoning about taxes than nonspecialists, a difference explained by tax
advisors’ specific professional environment (Doyle, Hughes, & Summers, 2013).
Several other studies also report that the average level of noncompliance is higher
for returns prepared by tax practitioners (Ayres, Betty, Jackson, & Hite, 1989;
Erard, 1993), although there is also empirical evidence that tax practitioners
are less aggressive than taxpayers (Schisler, 1995) or that taxpayers do not
want tax practitioners to be aggressive (Hite & McGill, 1992). Nonetheless, tax
professionals do tend to be more aggressive when audit and penalty risks are low
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(McGill, 1988). Overall, then, individuals conceal tax money through professional
tax lawyers (Ackermann et al., 2017) and with the help of banks and agencies,
such as Mossack Fonseca (the Panama Papers) or Appleby (the Paradise Papers;
Weisbord, 2016).
In this context, an interesting sociological study was conducted by Harrington
(2015) who spent about 8 years in participatory research and conducting in-depth
interviews with wealth managers in tax havens all over the world. She reports
that almost all of them saw themselves as misunderstood good guys. Their
self-perceptions cast them as protectors of elderly clients from rapacious heirs,
facilitators of development finance to emerging markets, and quasi-family
members to wealthy parents seeking advice on how to prevent their children from
being destroyed by idleness and easy access to drugs. Those wealth managers
concerned about poverty urge their clients to donate to charity. Wealth managers
allow the ultrarich personal freedom, mobility, and privacy—they keep them off
the radar of regulatory authorities, which clearly indicates that policies to increase
the tax compliance of the wealthy also need to consider the role of tax advisors
and wealth managers.
Social psychological group research indicates that decisions made in small
groups—even dyads—differ from individual decisions. For instance, in the
context of economic games, and compared to individuals, groups make more
rational and analytical (Kugler, Kausel, & Kocher, 2012; Luhan, Kocher, &
Sutter, 2009) and more competitive and unethical decisions (Moore & Gino,
2013; Stawiski, Tindale, & Dykema-Engblade, 2009; Wildschut & Insko, 2007).
Although comparatively rare, there is also research indicating that small groups do
not always differ from individuals concerning competition and ethical behavior,
or are even more altruistic than individuals. Power-to-take experiments (Bosman,
Hennig-Schmidt, & van Winden, 2006) and lying experiments (Muehlheusser,
Roider, & Wallmeier, 2015) did not find overall differences between groups and
individuals. Another experiment observed that small groups in dictator games
can also be more prosocial and altruistic than individuals (Cason & Mui, 1997).
Heterogeneity of results concerning ethical decision-making in groups thus
might be the consequence of different dominant opinions that existed for the
respective decision situations (Isenberg, 1986). It also shows, in contrast to some
suggestions from the literature (Moore & Gino, 2013), that not all group decisions
are more unethical than individual decisions, as groups mainly amplify existing
joint preferences. This implies that tax authorities should use information on tax
advisors and on past behavior to distinguish between dishonest and honest groups.
For instance, this could be achieved by increasing the auditing intensity on wealthy
taxpayers who are known to employ aggressive tax advisors, or on the wealthy
who, based on screenings, demonstrate initial signs of dishonesty. In contrast,
wealthy people who employ nonaggressive tax advisors or those who are known
to have been honest in the past would not need to be subjected to such harsh audits.
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Social Identity
For the wealthy, the perception of belonging to a particular group might
be related to at least two social psychological processes that influence tax
motivations. On the one hand, wealthy individuals might identify with and
compare themselves to other wealthy individuals, and, on the other hand, they
also might feel a social distance to less affluent individuals.
Enhanced identification and comparison with other wealthy individuals
adjusts internalized social norms connected with the wealthy rather than to the
ordinary individuals (Wenzel, 2005), motivating affiliation and compliance with
images and perceptions of what rich people ought to do. The drive to be similar
to the reference group applies not only to lifestyles but also to tax behaviors. If all
wealthy friends move money to offshore tax havens, then the individual will also
more likely do that. On the one hand, this is due to compliance with the in-group
norms, but, on the other hand, it is also due to competition and comparison,
because one does not want to fall behind in the financial race (Mols & Jetten,
2017). Thus, tax evasion can be the result of fear of losing one’s privileged
position, or because taxes are a hindrance to upward mobility (Jetten, 2019).
Wealthy individuals’ likely identification with other wealthy people is also
relevant for the tax authorities, as wealthy taxpayers might be more focused on
how the tax authorities treat other wealthy people and not the general population.
Thus, harsh audits are more likely to be accepted if there is a perception that all
wealthy people are subject to such audits, and thus, while the treatment might be
harsh, it is also fair. A negative example would be the (publicly known) lower
tax audit rates in the rich south compared to the poorer north of Germany (Balser,
2011). Currently, the southern German state of Bavaria employs 15% less than the
recommended number of tax auditors. Thus, in Bavaria, the probability of having
evasion detected is lower than in other German states (Balser, 2011). However,
federal tax administrations should avoid the perception that different audit fre-
quencies or procedures exist within one country, as this might generate a feeling
of unfairness and enhance the motivation to move to another state to evade taxes.
Belonging to and group identification with the wealthy could also lead to
felt social distance from nonwealthy individuals, or even to the perception of
in- and out-groups (Cardenas, 2003; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Taifel & Turner,
1986). Wealth increases real physical distance, with the wealthy tending to live in
separated neighborhoods on large properties that do not allow much (spontaneous)
contact with others, particularly with individuals from another social class. Such
social distance reduces empathy and trust (Kraus, Tan, & Tannenbaum, 2013;
Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012) and increases the perceived difference
between rich and poor, which leads to a decline in a felt shared identity (Poteete
& Ostrom, 2004).
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Classical social psychological experiments show that even minimal signs of
group belongingness such as shared art preferences can lead to in- and out-group
perceptions (Taifel, Billig, & Bundy, 1971). Wealth differences likely create much
stronger signs of difference, which makes it possible that perceived out-group
members are more disadvantaged, more often punished, and less rewarded than
in-group members (Taifel et al., 1971; Vuong, Chan, & Torgler, 2018). In this vein,
some wealthy individuals’ agreement with the narrative that low taxes are good,
or tax avoidance is okay, may also be the result of out-group derogation (Brewer,
1999; Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, & McKee, 2017). The wealthy might argue that
a low redistribution through taxes is justified; because in contrast to the poor, they
are high achievers who use the money to create new firms and jobs (Jetten, 2019).
Practical interventions to reduce the perceptions of in- and out-groups could
focus on increasing the likelihood of face-to-face contact between different social
classes (Hewstone, 2015). Examples are the financing of social housing in rich
neighborhoods, as well as providing excellent public schools, playgrounds, public
parks, and sport facilities, or encouraging voluntary organizations such as the
voluntary fire brigades.
In sum, as inequality increases, so does social distance, accompanied by a sim-
ilar decline in shared identity among all citizens, the wealthy, and the poor. In turn,
this affects empathy and trust and reduces cooperation in general and tax compli-
ance in particular (Cardenas, 2003; Gangl et al., 2015; Kramer & Brewer, 1984).
Individual Characteristics That Affect Tax Compliance of the Wealthy
Values
Values and attitudes vary with socioeconomic status (Brown-Iannuzzi et al.,
2017). According to social-psychological research, the rich likely hold fewer
egalitarian values than the average citizen (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner,
2010) and prefer social hierarchy. For example, U.S. elites are less fair-minded
than the general population and prefer efficiency to equality (Fisman, Jakiela,
Kariv, & Markovits, 2015). Evidence from Germany indicates that acceptance
for social inequality is also stronger among the rich who grew up in affluent
families than among the rich who grew up in working-class families (Hartmann,
2013). The experience of relative poverty might increase empathy with the
less affluent and the willingness to pay taxes to contribute to social services,
which reduce financial hardship. Experimental research shows that income
and wealth distribution seemingly create a social hierarchy that (especially)
those on top may be motivated to sustain through less egalitarian values, and
ultimately, less cooperative tax behavior (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Oc, Bashshur,
& Moor, 2015; Xie, Ho, Meier, & Zhou, 2017). For instance, one experiment
showed that individuals are reluctant to redistribute money if the redistribution
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changes or reverses the relative ranking in a given hierarchy (Xie et al.,
2017).
Research evidence that high socioeconomic status likely increases immoral
behavior such as cheating, lying, or egoism (Cardel et al., 2016; Piff, Stancato,
Coté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012) further suggests that wealth may be
related to lower moral values. In fact, other experimental and survey-based studies
indicate that the wealthy have less concern for others (Stellar et al., 2012) and
more favorable attitudes toward greed (Piff et al., 2012). For instance, during
the 2007 financial crisis, top-earning managers constantly increased their pay
without delivering any additional benefit to shareholders (Haynes, Campbell, &
Hitt, 2017). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether or why the wealthier are
greedier, given that income is positively related to financial satisfaction (Sahi,
2013). However, greed may not moderate the ethical behavior of either rich or
poor (Balakrishnan, Palma, Patenaude, & Campbell, 2017): several empirical
studies conclude that wealthy individuals are more prosocial and moral than less
affluent individuals (Andreoni, Nikiforakis, & Stoop, 2017; Balakrishnan et al.,
2017; Liebe, Naumann, & Tutic, 2017; Trautmann, van de Kuilen, & Zeckhauser,
2013), suggesting that there is no simple linear relationship between wealth and
ethical behavior (Mols & Jetten, 2017).
On the one hand, many of these studies demonstrating that the wealthy are
more unethical than the poor only study relative wealth, and therefore may not per-
mit conclusions on the super wealthy but only on people earning a bit more than the
average. One suggestion is that moderately wealthy (but maybe also very wealthy)
individuals’ ethical behavior depends on felt entitlement and security concerning
the own status and the perception that status group boundaries are permeable
(Jetten, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2017). Wealthier individuals behave more egoisti-
cally and harshly if they fear that they or their children could lose their status in
the future (Scheepers, Ellemers, & Sintemaartensdijk, 2009). It could also be that
they think that they need to be harsh to climb the social ladder even further (Mols
& Jetten, 2017). In contrast, if the wealthy feel secure in their position, they may
also be more generous. From a practical perspective, such insights would suggest
that tax authorities need to be aware that the wealthy have a sense of entitlement
or deservingness and perceived need to protect both current and future wealth and
status (Mols & Jetten, 2017, pp. 128–129). This can become particularly important
in situations where unpredictability and instability increase (Jetten, Mols, & Healy,
2017). The goal of the tax administration and tax policy in general should not be
to threaten their social position but rather to think of instruments that encourage
intergroup cooperation, prosocial behavior, and empathy toward other groups
while taking into account their “Achilles heel” or particular sensitivity around the
fear of losing their status in future. This will also require a good understanding
of how the perceived normative climate affects individual behavior (Sánchez-
Rodrı́guez et al., 2019). In addition, as Bird (1995) points out, “[p]ractical
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tax policy is, and always will be, in large part an exercise in damage control”
(p. 1041).
On the other hand, wealthy and less affluent individuals might not differ in
their values but in their freedom to express them. That is, wealthy people are likely
more able to show their true attitudes because they are not as dependent on others
as poor individuals, who might face social pressures to suppress their true feelings
(Na & Chan, 2016). Experimental evidence indicates that individuals who adhere
to “tit-for-tat” rules (e.g., equivalent retaliation) become more self-interested when
in power, while those who opt for a more communal strategy are more prosocial
when in power (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). It therefore seems reasonable
to suggest that, compared to people who feel poor, individuals who feel rich can
express their values more readily and efficiently regardless of whether these are
seen or perceived as good or bad by society and people around them. Thus, tax
auditors can expect that wealthy clients communicate their values, interests, and
attitudes. For instance, they may openly talk about their disregard or regard of the
tax system, which, in turn, makes it easy to classify their true tax motivation and
to target interventions accordingly. For instance, taxpayers who disregard the tax
system need to be informed about the existence of professional auditing procedures
while seemingly committed taxpayers should be thanked for their cooperation.
Cognitive Styles
A comparison between 130 German millionaires with a representative sample
of the German population showed that the wealthy differ on some personality
dimensions from average citizens (Leckelt et al., 2019). Wealthy people generally
have higher scores on personality dimensions such as emotional stability,
extraversion, openness, disagreeableness, and agentic narcissism, and were found
to have a more internal locus of control. Individuals who perceived themselves
to be in a high rather than low economic position enjoy an increased sense of
personal freedom and control (Manstead, 2018). In other studies, the wealthy
were reported to perceive themselves as having a greater ability to influence their
own and others’ social environment and to overcome external threats (Guinote,
2017; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton,
Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012). Indeed, economic affluence is often equated
with a feeling of power (Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2010), which can lead to
the illusion of control—sometimes over events that, in fact, cannot be controlled
(Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). This increased sense of control
could make influential people more optimistic and augments their perceived
self-sufficiency and self-esteem (Guinote, 2017). The rich are thus generally more
willing to persuade others to adopt their goals (Guinote, 2017; Laurin et al., 2016),
but also more likely to start an argument, make the first offer, and compromise
less often in negotiations than less wealthy individuals (Fast et al., 2009; Kraus &
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Mendes, 2014). The poor, in contrast, tend to be more risk-averse and short-sighted
(Haushofer & Fehr, 2014), making them more likely to control themselves and in-
hibit spontaneous responses than the rich (Na & Chan, 2016). Hence, while wealth
may activate the behavioral approach system, poverty seemingly activates the be-
havioral inhibition system (Gray, 1990; Keltner et al., 2003; Lammers et al., 2010).
This heightened sense of freedom, self-esteem, and perceived control might
increase the willingness to resist and oppose anything that restricts freedom
(Brehm, 1966) in a response referred to as “reactance.” Reactance can drive
individuals to do forbidden acts or the exact opposite of what is requested simply
to reestablish their personal sense of freedom, the magnitude of which governs
the size of the corresponding reactance (Brehm, 1966). Given that taxes and tax
authorities’ attempts to increase tax cooperation can be perceived as a limitation
on personal freedom, the rich find it harder to relinquish this freedom and easier to
fight against such a loss. In fact, experimental research shows that coercive audits
and fines increase taxpayer reactance more than less coercive attempts by the tax
authorities (Gangl, Pfabigan, Lamm, Kirchler, & Hofmann, 2017). Thus, wealthier
individuals faced with unfair treatment are more likely to fight for their rights
(Kraus et al., 2013), while lower class individuals react with more self-conscious
emotions, such as shame, guilt, or embarrassment. Additionally, the fact that the
rich face less daily life risks than the poor might make them more willing to take ex-
tra risks (Guiso & Paiella, 2012; Haushofer & Fehr, 2014) of tax evasion, because
compared to a poor person, a possible fine is not an existential threat. The outcome,
as two field experiments (Castro & Scartascini, 2015; Slemrod, Blumenthal, &
Christian, 2001) and another study (Tauchen, Witte, & Beron, 1993) indicate, that
the rich, when faced with an increased audit probability, reduce their tax compli-
ance, while the average citizen’s tax compliances increases. These observations
suggest that the rich may feel more reactance and a greater need to fight back when
confronted by tax enforcement, which, in turn, leads to lower compliance. While
more research is needed to analyze how the wealthy react to enforcement, from
a practical point of view, it seems crucial to implement enforcement measures
in a way that does not provoke resistance, thus increasing tax compliance and tax
returns.
Fairness
Although conditional cooperation theory argues that the rich do not contribute
more taxes because the poor cannot be expected to reciprocate (Cherry, Kroll, &
Shogren, 2005; Frey & Torgler, 2007), another possible reason for the wealthy’s
lower tax compliance may be a perception that the tax system treats them unfairly
(Fung & Au, 2014; Reuben & Riedl, 2013). Studies show that the rich are much
more sensitive than less affluent individuals to violations of fairness, and more
motivated to defend and restore it (Sawaoka, Hughes, & Ambady, 2015). They
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might believe that taxation is predominantly used to redistribute wealth—thus,
no personal benefit is perceived at all. In addition, the perception that taxes
reduce the capital base in addition to reducing capital growth might lead to
perceived unfairness and fear of losing ones’ privileged position. The opinion
that “my money” is paid as taxes and then wasted by incompetent politicians
and civil servants who are not held accountable for mismanagement might
cause perceptions of unfairness. This belief might be more pronounced among
the wealthy than average taxpayers because first, the wealthy (along with their
companies) are often audited and thus held accountable; and second, they make
tax contributions in magnitudes that allow a direct comparison to larger scale
public projects that also helps to explain why liturgy in Ancient Greece was such
a powerful mechanism to encourage the contribution of the rich.
Public good research suggests that wealthy individuals make lower contribu-
tions to the public good when their own economic activity is less dependent on
the local commons (Cardenas, 2003; Martinsson, Villegas-Palacio, & Wollbrant,
2015). However, this research also indicates that wealthy individuals who believe
that their contribution is critical to group success feel responsible and cooperate
more (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002). Yet, as our own research showed, the
rich also seem to be less knowledgeable about their true tax rate—with the
noncompliant rich having less tax knowledge than the compliant rich (Gangl et al.,
2017)—impacting how they perceive fairness and reducing their tax compliance
relative to poorer individuals (Lewis, 1978). This low perceived fairness may
thus be related to a lack of knowledge about the wealthy’s own relevance for the
public good and/or their own exact tax contributions and direct benefits such as
public infrastructure or security. A related, but not yet researched possibility is
that a misperception of numbers might contribute to perceived unfairness, with
individuals focusing on their total tax contribution rather than their relative tax
contribution. Thus, the rich might see an absolute tax contribution of 5,000,000
Euro as more unfair than a middle-class taxpayer’s absolute contribution of 5,000
Euro, although in relative terms, both might be contributing the same proportion of
income. Nonetheless, from a practical standpoint, it is key to inform wealthy about
their true tax contributions and benefits by reporting percentages, for instance,
through information brochures. This increased knowledge about concrete relative
costs and benefits may increase perceived fairness of the tax system.
Subjective Wealth Perceptions
Subjective wealth perceptions influence individuals’ psychological processes
and decisions more than true wealth (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017). Individuals
who believe that they are on the top of the wealth distribution disregard
redistribution more than individuals who believe that they are on the bottom of
the wealth distribution, regardless of the true position (Brown-Iannuzzi et al.,
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2017). For instance, millionaires who are reminded of their privileged status
relative to most other citizens may act and comply differently than millionaires
who compare themselves with billionaires and thus might feel “relatively
poor.”
In laboratory experiments, subjective wealth is manipulated by endowing
participants with different amounts of money or by allowing them to earn money.
These experiments, such as those conducted by Durham, Manly, and Ritsema
(2014), show a positive causal impact of subjective wealth on tax evasion and
tax nonfiling by demonstrating that participants who earned more experimental
income via a task (sorting numbers) evaded more than individuals who received
less (Alm & McKee, 2006; Alm, Cherry, Jones, & McKee, 2010). In fact, data
collected from both students and taxpayers show that those who earned the
most during the experiment (by placing objects with the computer mouse) also
evaded the most (Choo, Fonseca, & Myles, 2016). This effect even occurs within
subjects: individuals evade more in tax or public good rounds (Bühren & Kundt,
2014; Grundmann & Graf Lambsdorff, 2017; Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2009) in
which they earn more than in rounds in which they earn less. Wealthy individuals
evade more than the nonwealthy when money is endowed (Baldrey, 1987; Boylan
& Sprinkle, 2001). Nonetheless, the effect seems to be stronger for earned money
related to effort than endowed money related to a windfall gain (Kroll, Cherry, &
Shogren, 2007). Thus, perceived income heterogeneity reduces tax compliance,
particularly when individuals believe that the heterogeneity stems from actual
effort rather than random allocation of windfall gains. To increase overall
cooperation, tax administrations’ communication efforts should counteract the
perception that material well-being is based on individuals’ own faults or efforts.
In addition, the fact that tax money subsidizes services (e.g., childcare, care for
the elderly) that are essential for the community could be used to increase the
acceptance of redistribution through tax payments.
Tax experiments indicate that the subjective wealth effect on tax contributions
also depends on visibility. In laboratory experiments, wealth heterogeneity must
be visible and known to all participants to enhance positional concern or social
comparisons that can crowd out, for instance, monetary contributions to public
goods (Cardenas, 2003; Chan, Mestelman, Moir, & Muller, 1999), induce
competition, reduce social or common identity, and decrease cooperation (Fung
& Au, 2014; Nishi, Shirado, Rand, & Christakis, 2015). For example, if rich
individuals know their own relative wealth position, it is possible that they
consider their in-group to include other wealthy individuals, whereas the poor
are perceived as members of the out-group. This in-group/out-group construction
may reduce the willingness of the rich to cooperate with the poor (Fung & Au,
2014). In contrast, subjectively, wealthy individuals who perceive themselves to
be alone among the poor tend not to reduce their cooperation (Reuben & Riedl,
2013). Thus, tax administrations’ communication strategies should avoid the
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creation of a social class discourse in which a group of wealthy opposes a group
of poor, as this likely enhances visibility of differences and reduces cooperation.
Tax attitudes are also impacted by subjective expectations about the own and
children’s future, anticipated gains or losses, or anxiety and worry about losing
money (and thereby the associated status) (Mols & Jetten, 2017). It has been sug-
gested that the anticipated future wealth status is even more important than the cur-
rent perceived status when it comes to cooperative behavior (Mols & Jetten, 2017).
For instance, the perception of permeable status group boundaries (upward mobil-
ity threat) and insecure relative status positions can fuel unrest among the wealthy,
particularly during unstable economic conditions and among those who acquired
wealth in the recent past (Jetten, 2019; Jetten et al., 2017; Mols & Jetten, 2017).
Thus, anxiety about the future might motivate some to avoid paying taxes in order
to secure their wealthy status for the future. However, until now there is no research
that analyzes the subjective current and future wealth perceptions of the wealthy
and their impact on tax behavior. Nonetheless, if tax authorities think that such fears
are relevant for a specific taxpayer, the communication strategy could highlight the
factual wealth difference between a millionaire and an average person, clarifying
how taxes do not change relative status positions (some reassurance of the stability
of wealthy taxpayers’ status quo). For example, taxes financing social services en-
sure social peace and thereby secure system stability. Overall, however, research on
subjective wealth suggests that policy makers might be well advised to emphasize
the rhetoric that wealthy are just as much part of society as all other socioeconomic
groups with a duty to contribute in a meaningful way and no more virtuous or
“better” than other people so as to reduce egoistic status enhancing behavior.
Policy Interventions to Motivate Tax Compliance by the Rich
There is no silver bullet to manage tax compliance of the wealthy; rather
different methods have to be applied in combination while considering the
context. A general idea in the tax literature is that a carefully considered mix of
coercive-based harsh and legitimacy-based soft measures is needed to ensure tax
compliance. This basic idea is also likely true for wealthy taxpayers. However,
given the discussed peculiarities of the wealthy compared to average taxpayers,
some special adjustments might be necessary. In the following, we present research
on the basic distinction between coercive-based and legitimacy-based instruments
before discussing how this approach in general—and, in particular, for the macro,
meso, and micro level—should be applied to wealthy taxpayers. The overall
aim is to use a nuanced application of the “carrot and stick” approach to better
integrate the wealthy into society, or at least to the community of citizens and
taxpayers.
Theoretical models on tax compliance such as the slippery slope framework
(Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008) and its extension (i.e., eSSF, Gangl et al., 2015),
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the multifaceted approach (Alm & Torgler, 2011), or the responsive regulation
theory (Braithwaite, 2003, 2007) assume that a combination of coercive-based
and legitimacy-based interventions can efficiently impact tax motivations and be-
haviors. Coercive-based interventions are founded on various auditing tools (e.g.,
third-party information, personal audits) and punishments (e.g., fines, prison sen-
tences) but also incentives (e.g., tax amnesties). Legitimacy-based interventions
aim to convince citizens to comply voluntarily with tax rules through fair proce-
dures, professional support, information provision, and a positive image of the tax
administration (Gangl et al., 2019). While both approaches are effective overall
in generating higher tax payments, their psychological functioning is different
(Kirchler et al., 2008). Coercive-based interventions lead to enforced compliance,
and thus people pay because of the fear of audits (Kirchler et al., 2008). Legitimacy-
based interventions foster trust in the tax system and voluntary tax compliance,
and thus, people accept their tax obligations without threatening audits and
fines.
These theoretical assumptions receive empirical support from lab experi-
ments. In these experiments, students or taxpayers are put into the role of a self-
employed person earning profit and paying taxes over several years. Importantly,
participants receive remuneration, depending on audits and fines imposed by hy-
pothetical tax authorities. We conducted a neurophysiological experiment in which
students were asked to pay taxes, either in a country that relies on constant harsh
controls and fines (i.e., coercive-based intervention) or on competent and helpful
tax administrators (i.e., legitimacy-based intervention, Gangl et al., 2017). All
participants made 40 tax-paying decisions in each condition, while ERPs (event-
related signals on the cortex) were recorded. The analyses focused on signals be-
tween 150 and 500 ms after stimulus presentation (the page when the tax decision
was to be made). Observed patterns of early signals indicated an enhanced response
conflict and a higher arousal under the legitimacy-based than coercive-based in-
tervention, while later signals suggested that the coercive-based intervention is
related more to automatic processing than the legitimacy-based intervention. Us-
ing earlier economic decision-making studies as a reference, these results suggest
that coercion-based interventions reduced the tax decision to a simple calculative
problem, whereas legitimacy-based interventions maintained the complex moral
and social dimension of tax compliance. Additional survey data indicated that
the coercive (in contrast to legitimacy-based) intervention increased self-reported
reactance and enforced motivation and decreased voluntary motivation.
Empirical evidence also shows that the combination of coercive-based and
legitimacy-based interventions can reduce the negative effects of pure coercive-
based interventions. Previous lab and online experiments framed participants as
self-employed in a country in which tax authorities use harsh/lenient controls
(coercive-based intervention) and employ well/poorly educated tax auditors
(legitimacy-based intervention). Although no interaction effects were found,
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results suggested that coercive-based interventions lose some of their negative
effects on trust and tax motivation when they are combined with legitimacy-based
interventions (Gangl et al., 2013; Hofmann et al., 2014; E. Hofmann, Hartl, Gangl,
Hartner-Tiefenthaler, & Kirchler, 2017a). However, together with the Austrian tax
authorities, a field experiment was conducted in which the combination of coercion
and legitimacy implemented through close supervision over the first year of young
entrepreneurs’ enterprise showed differential short-term effects. Entrepreneurs in
the intervention paid more taxes but they were also late more often than en-
trepreneurs in the control group (Gangl, Torgler, Kirchler, & Hofmann, 2014).
In general, coercion-based and legitimacy-based interventions as classical
administrative tools are also relevant for the tax decisions of the wealthy. However,
some peculiarities need to be considered. Our review showed that on the micro
level, the wealthy are more willing to promote and defend their view, seeking to
restore fairness and remove restrictions on their freedom; this likely makes them
more reactant to coercive interventions than average taxpayers who might more
often give into coercion. This view is supported by field experiments that indicate
how an audit threat increases compliance of average taxpayers but reduces
compliance of wealthy taxpayers (Castro & Scartascini, 2015; Slemrod et al.,
2001). In addition, wealthy taxpayers are less likely to give into coercion due to
peculiarities on the macro and meso level that mean the wealthy are more easily
able to exploit international secrecy jurisdictions with the help of skilled tax advi-
sors. Thus, wealthy people who feel coerced by the tax administration are likely
more reactant and also have more resources (compared to the average taxpayers)
to escape this situation, making classical coercive attempts to increase their tax
honesty less effective. Therefore, to reduce reactance and to ensure compliance
of the wealthy, coercive-based interventions need to be cautiously combined with
legitimacy-based interventions. The functionality of coercive-based interventions
depends on perceived professionalism, fairness, and thus, legitimacy.
In detail, coercion-based and legitimacy-based interventions for each level
(the macro, meso, and micro) have different priorities and different aims. On
the macro level, coercive-based interventions are essential, because only com-
pulsory legal environments and specialized revenue bodies—which can enforce
compliance—can reduce the avoidance and evasion opportunities of the wealthy.
However, accompanying legitimacy-based interventions through marketing
campaigns are necessary to reduce the aversion to and increase the acceptance of
coercive interventions. In addition, on the meso level, coercive-based interventions
are needed to regulate tax advisors more strictly. However, legitimacy-based
interventions should dominate on the meso level to leverage social dynamics
and to create social norms of tax honesty. At the micro level, during the direct
interaction between tax auditors and wealthy taxpayers, coercive-based interven-
tions should be reduced to a minimum, whereas legitimacy-based interventions
should be prioritized. Well-educated tax auditors should target coercive-based
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Table 1. Conceptual Summary of Policy Interventions to Achieve Tax Compliance by the Wealthy









 Specialized revenue bodies
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 Well-trained tax auditors
 Responsive regulation
 Appreciation and respect
instruments only to known criminal tax fraudsters (“crooks”), thereby following
a responsive regulation approach. Importantly, personal interaction should be
characterized by appreciation and respect to increase perceived legitimacy of tax
collection and trust in the tax system. Table 1 provides an overview of how, on
each conceptual level, different psychological causes of tax compliance of the
wealthy can be addressed by coercive-based and legitimacy-based interventions.
In the following, we present the different interventions in detail.
Compulsory Legal Environments
On the macro level, moral disengagement has to be addressed by coercive
tax laws that clearly communicate that tax flight and aggressive tax avoidance
are morally objectionable. Thus, countries with high-tax losses through tax flight
need to establish a tax law with fewer loopholes and possibilities of escape
to tax havens. For example, this could include the creation of national VAT
taxes that (unlike profit taxes) cannot be shifted to another country, or it might
involve establishment of legal virtual locations to facilitate taxation of profit in all
countries in which a company operates virtually (Rohwetter, 2017). Aggressive
tax avoidance can, for example, be addressed by a modern form of a tribute
(Frijters, et al., 2019). Like some kings in the past, the state could decide (with
the help of an independent agency) to calculate how much a company can afford
to pay in tax without endangering the company itself—and then charge exactly
this amount (e.g., based on market signals about the amount of surplus created in
the relevant region by the companies taxed and therefore what they could pay).
Such modern ways of compulsory acquisition are particularly an option if society
needs to address extreme challenges such as war or environmental disasters.
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Human history is full of examples in which states demanded tribute, for example,
the tribute of grain in ancient Egypt and Rome.
Charities allow moral licensing as some might feel that giving to charity
permits the avoidance of taxes. Thus, legal regulations need to counteract the spin
that private charities are better (or as good) as the state in addressing societies’
problems. The options are to regulate more strictly what counts as a deductible
charity, and in general to reduce the tax exemptions for charities (Reich, 2018).
It is essential to focus on a strict legal environment. Without simultaneously
securing public opinion and the voluntary compliance of the wealthy through
additional legitimacy-based instruments, however, no legal remedies will suffice.
Specialized Revenue Bodies
Engaging in tax evasion and aggressive avoidance without consequences
fosters moral disengagement and the belief that it is normal to evade taxes. The
OECD (2015b) suggests that countries should establish special revenue bodies for
both large corporations and rich individuals that can implement targeted auditing
techniques (e.g., data mining or whistle-blower systems; Casaburi & Troiano,
2016; Wittrock, 2012). However, a 100% audit rate is unrealistic and high fines
may not be an existential threat to the financial situation of the wealthy (e.g., one
experiment found that a fine has to be 15 times the evaded amount to be effective;
Friedland, Maital, & Rutenberg, 1978); it may even provoke their resistance and
their willingness to sue (e.g., Slemrod et al., 2001). Nonetheless, suspending
audits and fines offers no solution either, and tax amnesties, which allow rich
taxpayers to repatriate their money from tax havens without being fined, also show
no long-term positive effect (Alm & Beck, 1993; Toro, Story, Hartnett, Russell,
& Van-Driessche, 2017). In fact, amnesties might even lower tax morale among
honest taxpayers (Torgler, Schaltegger, & Schaffner, 2003). Thus, working with
coercive-based interventions alone is not enough; for example, the OECD (2015b)
suggests that it is essential that special revenue bodies combine coercive-based
with legitimacy-based interventions.
A good example of how to combine coercion with legitimacy comes from
the United Kingdom. There, a specialized revenue body exists that focuses on
6,500 individuals (0.02% of all taxpayers) who pay 1.3% of all income tax and
15% of all capital gains tax in a year (National Audit Office, 2016). To reduce
tax avoidance schemes, this audit-focused unit employs 40 customer relationship
managers, each responsible for about 160 taxpayers. According to the unit’s data,
it has been successful in substantially increasing tax compliance (National Audit
Office, 2016), making this use of specialized tax officers implementing individ-
ualized customer treatments an idea worth further exploration. Such relationship
managers could treat taxpayers differently depending on the business category
and interaction history. They could ensure that wealthy taxpayers are sufficiently
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informed about their actual tax rates and tax rights, and emphasize how significant
their contributions are for the community, while explaining what the money will
finance, and how it profits the taxpayer (e.g., legal and social security; Chen et al.,
2001; Guinote, 2017; Oc et al., 2015). Such a monitoring system may generate
less reactance among the rich and increase their perception of the tax system as
trustworthy and legitimate, thereby ultimately encouraging honest tax payment.
Some tax authorities have also opted to abandon many coercive measures.
For example, the tax authorities in the Netherlands, the United States, Australia,
and Austria have established new working and monitoring relationships with
large corporations who were honest in the past (Colon & Swagerman, 2015; De
Simone, Sansing, & Seidman, 2013; Torgler & Murphy, 2004; The Netherlands
Tax and Customs Administration, 2010). In such trust-based relationships, the
taxpayer agrees to be transparent about all tax data and tax strategies, while
the tax administration promises to resolve all tax issues on time and abstain
from auditing the taxpayer for prior years, thereby reducing uncertainty for a
corporation. Nonetheless, although evaluations indicate that this system leads to
reduced monitoring costs and faster issuance of final corporate tax statements
(Elmecker et al., 2016), there is still no empirical evidence for its positive effect
on tax payments itself, which makes this noncoercive approach less attractive.
Marketing Campaigns
Public marketing campaigns are especially suited to communicating the legit-
imacy of the tax system and thus to generate trust. However, the practical aim is to
change public opinion such that tax evasion and aggressive tax avoidance is pub-
licly disregarded as unethical. Such public campaigns need to back up (coercive)
legal regulations and administrative procedures, promoting legitimacy and mak-
ing moral disengagement and moral licensing more difficult. Campaigns could
promote coercive measures as protection of the honest, important pillars of demo-
cratic societies, stability, and safety. To counteract the attempts of some lobbies to
disregard government interventions (Reich, 2018), campaigns should show what
is financed with the tax money, thereby creating a positive vision for the country
(e.g., fighting climate change, security) and enhancing social belongingness and
cooperation. One historical example of this was seen in the United States during
the world wars. Our own experiments showed that priming patriotic feelings by
explaining what the state had successfully accomplished in the past, or by expos-
ing participants to typical landscape pictures of the country (e.g., of mountains
or rivers; Gangl, Torgler, & Kirchler, 2016) could help to increase trust, felt so-
cial belongingness and cooperation (Macintyre, Chan, Schaffner, & Torgler, 2018;
Torgler, 2004b, 2005a, Konrad & Qari, 2012). Importantly, in addition to involving
different stakeholder groups, wealthy and famous individuals could be used as pos-
itive role models, thereby creating a social norm of tax honesty and pride in being
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a significant taxpayer. In India, the government has used celebrities to promote or
change tax-paying behavior. For example, the 1997 tax amnesty campaign in India
used sports and film stars to attract 350,000 delinquent taxpayers and generate
2.5 billion dollars in erstwhile lost revenue (Torgler & Schaltegger, 2005). Public
campaigns may also motivate more whistleblowing among wealth managers.
Even though the positive effect of such campaigns on tax compliance seems
plausible, empirical evidence is still scarce (Cyan, Koumpias, & Martinez-
Vazquez, 2017), and thus, tax administrations should conduct field studies in this
area. Overall, a good policy intervention to achieve lasting behavioral changes
requires consideration of insights from social psychology (Mols, Haslam, Jetten,
& Steffens, 2015).
Regulation of Tax Practitioners
On the meso level, tax decisions of the wealthy are often conducted in a
group-setting involving tax practitioners. This tends to produce more exploitative
tax returns than if taxpayers made their tax decisions alone (Christian et al., 1994;
Doyle et al., 2013). One option for a coercive-based regulation would be to reduce
or even exclude the involvement of tax practitioners through implementing direct
relationships between tax authorities and taxpayers (e.g., based on automatic data
transfers). One option for legitimacy-based regulation would be to interact only
with tax practitioners who have earned certificates of trust by completing official
training that addresses the interests of the community, and not only the individual.
It would also be worthwhile discussing strategies to increase good ethics and
practices that stipulate the type of professional code exemplified by medicine’s
Hippocratic oath (field evidence on promises, see Koessler et al., 2019). Such
public training and professional codes could counteract the promotion of low-tax
values in current private trainings. Thereby, social norms of tax honesty are
built among the tax practitioners, which likely influence the tax decisions of
the wealthy. Certificates could serve as both a gatekeeper and a criterion for
promotion: only tax practitioners with a respective certificate would be allowed
to submit tax returns in the name of a taxpayer.
Reputation Mechanisms
On the meso level, our literature review showed that social norms play a
significant role. One option to influence the social norms of the wealthy is to
combine coercive-based and legitimacy-based instruments in reputation measures
by publicly disclosing a person as a negative or positive example. For instance,
identifying tax evaders publicly (Casal & Mittone, 2016; Coricelli, Joffily,
Montmarquette, & Villeval, 2010) may act as punishment and a deterrent from
engaging in aggressive tax avoidance (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, & Shroff, 2013).
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Preliminary empirical evidence from the United States, however, does not confirm
that a fear of lost reputation is effective. Moreover, the use of a tax haven seems
to have no negative effect on stock prices or media reports (Gallemore, Maydew,
& Thornock, 2014). Similarly, a field experiment in the United States that shamed
the noncompliant via letters to neighbors increased tax compliance for small but
not for large tax evaders (Perez-Truglia & Troiano, 2018). On the other hand, after
Greece published a blacklist of over 4,000 citizens who owed tax money to the state
(Aswestopoulos, 2012), it experienced a decline in the size of the shadow economy
from 25.4% in 2010 to 22.0% in 2016 (Schneider, 2016). Shaming could also be
applied to aggressive tax advisors or countries that serve as tax havens (Comte,
2017) by publishing blacklists (e.g., financialsecrecyindex.com). Admittedly,
these nations’ incentives to attract foreign investment through tax reduction strate-
gies could reduce the efficacy of a shaming signal (Weisbord, 2016). However, in
the future, it may be possible to link specific desirable benefits with a country’s
decision to not be a tax haven; for example, visa and market access, or access to
international credit, which are more significant than the benefits from foreign tax
evasion investment. Perhaps, shaming would be more effective if there were exten-
sive media reports on the legitimacy of tax collection and the related harm of tax
avoidance.
An alternative to shaming evaders is to reward honest taxpayers (Feld, Frey,
& Torgler, 2006). An example is the “fair tax mark” assigned by a U.K. NGO
to companies assessed as honest taxpayers (fairtaxmark.net). Recipients of this
designation can leverage the label in marketing. If such a mark were accompanied
by mass media reports, it could benefit honest companies, like the “fair trade”
and “certified organic” labels. Another suggestion put forward by Feld et al.
(2006) is that tax offices issue a certificate of “correct declaration and tax
cooperation” showing the firm to be a good taxpayer. The resulting increase in a
firm’s reputation and image could attract more favorable conditions on the capital
market and positive shareholder reactions through higher share prices. In general,
it would seem worthwhile to reward honest taxpayers with special attention (e.g.,
being held up as honorable citizens and role models), and even small rewards (e.g.,
vouchers; Koessler et al., 2019). Another method of rewarding honest taxpayers
would be to place their name on public buildings that were financed with tax
money. The Liturgy system of ancient Greece surely can be an inspiration for new
ways to leverage the social norms existent among the wealthy, using gratitude and
honor to motivate tax payments. As the late Boulding (1992) pointed out, “[T]he
dynamics which governs the creation, destruction, and distribution of various
forms of pride and shame in society are very little understood, yet nothing perhaps
is more crucial to the understanding of the overall dynamics of a particular
society than the marked differences which exist among societies in this regard”
(p. 93).
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Increased Participation
On the meso level, participatory elements are key to increasing legitimacy.
Participation and voice in the selection of tax rules foster perceived fairness, felt
responsibility, identification with the state, and the community at large (Feld &
Tyran, 2002) and, in turn, tax morale and tax compliance (Alm, 2019; Torgler,
2005b). Thus, both the rich and the less affluent citizens could be more involved
in (i) the administrative processes, (ii) determination of tax rates, and (iii) the
spending of tax money. In the administrative process, taxpayers could have a
voice in setting deadlines and scheduling meetings. Concerning the determination
of tax rates, citizens (like in Switzerland) could be asked which assets should be
taxed more than others (Pommerehne & Weck-Hannemann, 1996). With respect
to spending, taxpayers could be allowed to have a voice in the outlay of at least
a certain proportion of their own tax money. Rich taxpayers may even become
involved in the realization of particularly needed public goods; for example,
by choosing from a list of such projects that they could finance and support
personally. Once the project is underway, a committee could be formed with
other citizens to bring it to fruition. Once again, ancient Greece’s liturgy system
shows how to encourage the rich by involving them in the tax collection and
spending process in a way that leads to public improvements. The administration
of charities could give further ideas on how to manage the tax system in a more
participatory way allowing the relevant wealthy contributors more control over
tax issues. Nonetheless, there are few extant field studies (Touchton & Wampler,
2019) concerning participation, and rarely do they focus on wealthy taxpayers.
Well-Trained Tax Auditors
On the micro level, the powerful situation of wealthy taxpayers has to be
addressed by well-trained tax auditors to generate legitimacy, trust, and voluntary
tax motivation. Thus, tax administration personnel need to not only be well versed
in their legal and administrative skills but also on their social, emotional, and psy-
chological skills. The Pharaohs in Ancient Egypt realized that those who collect
the tax are key for a successful tax system (Adams, 1993). Tax auditors should be
able to compete with their counterparts, i.e., tax practitioners of the wealthy, who
are often better equipped with resources and are well trained and highly compen-
sated. Thus, tax administrations need to offer competitive salaries, and also need to
put the single tax auditors or auditing teams into an empowered and autonomous
position, allowing them to directly negotiate with taxpayers by maintaining a high
level of transparency to avoid the potential of corruption. Hence, tax auditors need
to be highly skilled and trusted professionals who are given and are capable of tak-
ing a lot of responsibility. Some countries, particularly in the past, have employed
tax auditors without a university degree. This was especially the case outside of big
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cities: tax auditors were not specialists, and had little knowledge of specific target
groups or business sectors. In addition, the practice of giving the decision-making
power to someone who is not present during an audit (e.g., to the supervisor of
the auditor) reduces perceived competence of personnel directly interacting with
the taxpayer. Accordingly, to ensure perceived legitimacy of those who interact
with a taxpayer, an excellent and specialized education is necessary. International
educational and exchange programs and international cooperation programs that
create and exchange information and expertise such as the EU Fiscalis program3
or sabbaticals at universities can also contribute to an increase in skills.
Responsive Regulation
On the micro level, it is important to recognize the peculiarities and diversity
of wealthy taxpayers’ attitudes, motivations, and cognitions in order to choose
the most effective coercive-based and legitimacy-based strategy. Responsive reg-
ulation claims that taxpayers need to be treated differently depending on their
tax motivation (Braithwaite, 2003, 2007). For instance, strict and harsh control
measures should be targeted only to taxpayers motivated by enforcement, such as
known fraudsters. Tax audits for new taxpayers should be used to educate and to
demonstrate the professional way in which monitoring is conducted. Finally, harsh
audits for committed motivated taxpayers should be suspended, and instead, these
taxpayers should be respected and thanked (Gangl et al., 2015). Additionally, tax
auditors should be aware of the special values, cognitions, and fairness perceptions
of the wealthiest, in order to choose a convincing and trust-generating communi-
cation strategy. For instance, the wealthy who respond to gratitude should be made
aware of gratitude measures, whereas wealthy who are afraid that they are the only
ones who pay honestly should be made aware of auditing frequencies for fellow
wealthy taxpayers. Thus, tax auditors should also be trained in how to psycho-
logically diagnose a taxpayer in order to implement the right communication and
enforcement strategy. One way of training these competencies is through role-plays
that practice convincing arguments in response to the most common complaints
of taxpayers. Additionally, escalation plans for coercive measures can be devel-
oped, giving tax auditors a road map of which situation (e.g., repeated postponed
meeting) should be addressed with which measure (e.g., issuing a caution).
Appreciation and Respect
On the micro level, cognitive tendencies of the wealthy such as an increased
willingness to defend own rights or to fight perceived unfairness likely increase
their sensitivity to friendly or unfriendly interactions. Thus, appreciation and
3 https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fiscalis-programme_en
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respect for those who are tax compliant represent very inexpensive legitimacy-
based instruments, which nonetheless are central to maintain, guarantee, or
generate trust, particularly the basic trust in the system (Gangl et al., 2019). In
official documents and interaction, respectful treatment would include a thank you
note in advance for future cooperation, past cooperation, and the tax contribution
itself, which is a sign of appreciation. In addition, examples of what will be
financed with the money could be shared. Personal interactions are important. In
personal encounters, tax auditors should listen to the taxpayers and convey a feel-
ing of genuinely caring for their situation, and for valuing their accomplishments
and contributions to society. This empathic and respectful approach should, of
course, be the rule for all taxpayers, not just the wealthy; however, it is suggested
that it is especially needed for the wealthy. If unsatisfied by treatment from the tax
authorities, the wealthy have more options to sue or to hire aggressive tax advisors.
Conclusions
Tax compliance by the wealthy is of paramount importance to a well-
functioning society. The present review summarizes the existing evidence from
various academic fields, from history, and from practitioners, delineating how and
why the wealthy differ from average taxpayers. We do not yet fully understand
the extent or the determinants of the wealthy’s tax noncompliance. However, the
tax decisions of the wealthy are based on specific interrelated political-economic,
social, and individual differences with associated psychological consequences.
We discuss how these peculiarities can be addressed by tax authorities, via tailored
coercive-based and legitimacy-based instruments. Given the recent burgeoning
of costly crises that are straining public budgets across the world (e.g., climate
and demographic change, financial recessions, the refugee crisis), together with
a loss of public confidence in governments’ ability to establish a fair economic
and political system, it seems both important and timely to intensify efforts into
research and policies regarding wealthy taxpayers. Thereby, research and practice
should go hand in hand. To foster an evidence-based focused tax administration,
all new policy attempts should be accompanied by evaluation procedures that
recognize contextual dependencies and examine differential effects. One way to
test the usefulness of new potential instruments would be through randomized
control trials conducted in close collaboration between researchers and the tax
administrations (for a detailed discussion, see Torgler, 2016).
One main aim of this review was to shed light on the tax compliance of the
wealthy, to show that they are different from average taxpayers, and to suggest
that research and policy interventions in this regard can be successful. The
historical overview at the beginning of this review should convince researchers
and policy makers that there are many possible different ways to motivate the
wealthy to contribute more taxes to the benefit of the society.
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Abstract
Interpersonal trust is an important source of social and economic development. Over
decades, researchers debated the question whether and how public institutions influence
interpersonal trust, making this relationship a much-discussed issue for scientific debate.
However, experimental and behavioral data and insights on this relationship and the under-
lying psychological processes are rare and often inconsistent. The present set of studies
tests a model which proposes that institutional trust indirectly affects trust among unrelated
strangers by enhancing individuals’ feelings of security. Study 1 (survey on trust in a broad
spectrum of state institutions), Study 2 (nationally representative data from 16 countries),
and Study 3 (experimental manipulation of institutional trust) provide convergent support for
this hypothesis. Also, the results show that the effect remains consistent even after control-
ling for individual dispositions linked to interpersonal and institutional trust (Study 1 and 3)
and country level indicators of institutional performance (Study 2). Taken together, these
findings inform and contribute to the debate about the relationship between institutions and
interpersonal trust by showing that when institutions are trusted, they increase feelings of
security, and therefore promote interpersonal trust among strangers.
Introduction
Trust among citizens is crucial for the societal, political, and economic functioning of a state
[1]. Societies with high interpersonal trust have happier citizens [2], more political participa-
tion [3], and stronger economic growth [4]. Traditionally, trust is deeply rooted in social inter-
action in dyads and small groups. However, those interactions do not occur in a social
vacuum, as they are directly or indirectly embedded in a societal context regulated by institu-
tions, which constitute “rules of the game” that structure social life [5].
In the last two decades, research has been conducted to understand whether certain features
of the institutional setting (e.g., performance, efficiency, and fairness) can favor the
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development of interpersonal trust among strangers [6–10], often leading to opposite predic-
tions [11]. Also, little empirical evidence for the key mechanisms underlying a presumed asso-
ciation between institutions and interpersonal trust is provided in the research literature (e.g.,
[12]), largely relying on survey studies within one particular society and a limited set of institu-
tions. In the present research, we contribute to this body of literature by focusing on individu-
als’ perceptions of institutions and, more specifically, testing the hypothesis that institutional
trust can stimulate trust among strangers by enhancing feelings of security. Across three stud-
ies (a survey, an analysis of a cross-national database, and an experimental study), we tested a
model proposing that institutional trust fosters interpersonal trust as it serves as cue conveying
that one is not completely at the mercy of potentially hostile strangers, but rather is protected
in case strangers have malevolent intentions.
Interpersonal trust and institutions: Crowding-out and institution-
centered approaches
Interpersonal trust is a pervasive phenomenon of social life and a lubricant for many societal
processes. It is defined as a psychological state that involves the intention to accept vulnerabil-
ity in social interactions, under conditions of social risk and interdependence [13,14]. It is
often conceptualized as a multidimensional construct that can be differentiated into trusting
beliefs and the resulting trusting intentions or behavior [15–17]. The former refer to individu-
als’ perceptions of trustworthiness of others, while the latter reflect the acceptance of vulnera-
bility and actions undertaken to gain possible advantages [18]. Positive expectations regarding
the intentions or behavior of one or more persons are often based on own direct experience or
reputational information shared by others [19–21]. Such interaction processes are key to the
development of trust and, thus, to people’s willingness to accept risk in situations often charac-
terized by strong interdependence (e.g., [18,22]; for reviews see [23,24]). However, in modern
complex societies, individuals often face interactions with strangers, in situations where trust
is unlikely to be based on social interactions or reputational information shared by others.
Here formal institutions, conceptualized as external systems of control that offer “rules of the
game”, help to structure and increase the predictability of such exchanges [5]. Indeed, state
institutions such as public administration or the police provide safeguards ensuring that others
behave cooperatively, and therefore offer cues that increase trust in others [11].
The relationship between institutions and interpersonal trust has been debated, however,
especially in light of institutions’ key role in providing rules and normative expectations [7,11].
The main claim of the so-called crowding-out approaches is that interpersonal trust becomes
no longer relevant if institutions are in place. External sources of control as sanctioning sys-
tems directly affect the incentive structure of the interaction by increasing the cost of non-
cooperative actions. As a consequence, such institutions remove the social uncertainty
involved in the social exchange, and expectations and actions become driven by assurance
rather than interpersonal trust [25]. While interpersonal trust is based on beliefs about the
benevolent and intrinsic motivation of the partner, assurance is based on the expectation that
the interaction partner will behave according to the relevant incentive structure, thus crowd-
ing-out interpersonal trust and voluntary cooperation [26]. Moreover, the mere need to estab-
lish such systems can even be considered as a signal of others’ untrustworthiness and,
therefore, decrease the motivation to trust [27]. Also, findings from cross-cultural research
make similar claims, showing that individuals in societies that differ along the tightness-loose-
ness dimension (i.e., the strength of social norms and the tolerance of deviance) manage their
relationships differently in terms of interpersonal trust. Individuals in tight societies, com-
pared with loose ones, tend to rely on strongly defined norms that provide clear expectations
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enforced through external control systems [28,29], while those in loose cultures, where rules
and regulations are less prevalent, are more likely to rely on interpersonal trust instead [30].
On the other hand, a different theoretical perspective considers formal institutions as laying
the ground for the development of interpersonal trust, especially when there is high level of
uncertainty about others’ beliefs and norms [31]. Accordingly, institutions initially enforce
trustworthy interactions through external rules, but after repeated successful interactions, indi-
viduals would not rely on mere assurance anymore, generalizing their beliefs about others’
benevolence to other settings [32]. In fact, evidence shows that societies with efficient institu-
tions, operationalized for example as societies with high level of democracy or effectiveness in
enforcing agreements between strangers, display greater levels of interpersonal trust, as com-
pared to countries with inefficient institutions [7,9].
The relationship between institutional and interpersonal trust
Importantly, together with the quality of the institutions, individuals’ perceptions and subjec-
tive assessments based on existing information of institutions might play a major role in
understanding how institutions affect trust and the underlying mechanisms. Indeed, existing
empirical evidence shows that, compared to institutional quality indicators, perceptions of
institutions are similarly associated to interpersonal trust. For example, citizens’ perceptions of
institutional fairness or perceptions of corruption are related to interpersonal trust as do coun-
try-level indicators of fairness (e.g., skewness of income distribution) and corruption (e.g.,
number of arrests for corruption) [33,34]. Thus, it is possible to assume that, although in some
situations external institutions may undermine interpersonal trust, this effect is conditional to
whether people perceive them as legitimate and trustworthy (e.g., [35,36]). That is, taking into
account whether these institutional constraints are trusted themselves can be crucial for under-
standing how they affect interpersonal trust. Indeed, institutional trust, defined as the extent to
which individuals accept and perceive institutions as benevolent, competent, reliable, and
responsible toward citizens [37], has been proposed as especially relevant for sustaining inter-
personal trust [38,39]. For individuals, trusting institutions involves the perception that insti-
tutions would act in accordance to the common interest and society’s needs to resolve disputes
[40,41]. Recent evidence drawn from survey studies suggests that countries with high institu-
tional trust are also characterized by more interpersonal trust [42,43]. This correlation appears
robust across different countries and institutional settings, e.g., in Europe [44], Asia [45,46],
and the USA [47], suggesting that these two types of trust are interrelated, with institutional
trust influencing interpersonal trust. Given the observational nature of these studies, some
authors argue that this relationship might actually be reversed (i.e., with interpersonal trust
influencing institutional performance; e.g., [48]) or of mutual influence (e.g., [49]), while other
more recent studies with individual fixed effects and cross-lagged panel models suggest that
this is unlikely, and that institutional trust has an impact on interpersonal trust (e.g., [44,50–
52]). Institutional trust has also been proposed as a mediator mechanism to explain how qual-
ity of institutions relates to interpersonal trust. For example, in a recent study, Lo Iacono
showed that the ineffective institutions mostly affected interpersonal trust via a decrease in
institutional trust [38]. Similarly, in a pilot study we found that institutional trust mediated the
relationship between the presence (vs. absence) of institutions and trusting beliefs and behav-
ioral intentions (methods and results are presented in detail in S1 Appendix in S1 File).
Although the existence of a relationship between institutional trust and interpersonal trust
has been extensively discussed (e.g., [39]), empirical evidence to illuminate the underlying pro-
cesses is scarce. In a pioneering experiment, Rothstein and Eek [53] manipulated corruption
with scenarios describing corruption of institutional representatives in a fictitious country in
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order to test the effect of institutions on interpersonal trust. In this study, student participants
from Sweden and Romania were exposed to eight vignettes which respectively manipulated a
bribe (present or absent), the initiator (the authority or the citizen), and the outcome of the
exchange (positive or negative). The results showed that when public authorities were depicted
as corrupt, participants perceived fellow citizens in the scenario as less trustworthy. The
authors of the study further speculated that this effect could be explained by an inference-
based underlying mechanism. Accordingly, individuals would make generalized inferences
about others’ trustworthiness based on observations of corrupt behavior enacted by public offi-
cials, others, and even themselves, interpreting these signals as information about what type of
“game” is being played in a society [53,54]. Up to date, this remains the only experimental evi-
dence available. However, the authors did not test the mechanisms underlying this effect, nor
did they test the implications for trusting behavior. As such, little is still known about the ques-
tion of whether institutional trust influences interpersonal trust beliefs and behavior toward
unrelated strangers, or what underlying processes are responsible for this relationship. The
present studies were designed to fill this void and to provide preliminary evidence for a poten-
tial underlying mechanism that might inform this debate.
The mediating role of feelings of security
Previous literature suggests that, among their other functions, institutions have a crucial role
for individuals to achieve security and safety in life [55,56]. Benevolent institutions provide
structure in society, which allows individuals to achieve a greater sense of control over their
lives [57]. Indeed, individuals are motivated to avoid victimization and exploitation from oth-
ers [58] and to pursue safety and security by reducing personal threats in social situations [59].
Accordingly, institutions related to law and order may lead citizens to experience generalized
feelings of security that would make them feel protected from potential offenses perpetrated by
other fellow citizens [60]. We define these feelings as individuals’ generalized perception of
how safe they feel and to what extent they feel protected from socially threatening events.
Additionally, we propose that when challenged by threats, feelings of security may be influ-
enced by cues of trustworthiness of formal institutions, such as encounters with corrupt public
officials or witnessing corrupt exchanges between other citizens and public representatives, as
they provide a strong signal that social order is not guaranteed [53,60]. When it comes to inter-
personal trust, there is evidence that general emotional states play a role [61], but, in particular,
feelings of security are relevant to build interpersonal trust because they lead individuals to feel
less vulnerable, which is key in trusting interactions with unknown strangers [14].
Law and order institutions are specifically related with protecting one’s personal safety, but
also social institutions [56], religious institutions [62], or the government [12] have been pro-
posed to serve this motive and affect individuals’ feelings of security. Despite the underlying
role of feelings of security has never been investigated in previous research, other indirect
empirical evidence is also in line with this assumption. In experiments, individuals prefer to
interact in settings where sanctioning and rewarding institutions are in place [63]. These insti-
tutionalized societal models are particularly effective in mitigating people’s fear of exploitation
and, thus, to establish a culture of cooperation over time [64]. Further evidence in this vein
comes from survey research, suggesting that efficient institutions promote less parochial
behavior and more interpersonal trust [55]. Moreover, recent survey data support the protec-
tive function of trust toward governmental and legal institutions in Sweden focusing on fear of
crime [12], showing that crime-related insecurity mediated the relationship between institu-
tional trust and interpersonal trust.
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The current studies
The aim of the current three studies is to provide a first experimental and cross-country test
for the hypothesis that institutional trust indirectly promotes trust among strangers by provid-
ing feelings of security, which in turn allow people to accept vulnerability and to trust others.
Fig 1 summarizes the model tested across all studies, as well as the expected relationships
between the constructs. In Studies 1 to 3, we tested whether feelings of security mediate the
relationship between institutional and interpersonal trust. In Study 1, through a survey, we
investigated whether trust in several formal institutions is related to feelings of security, and
subsequently, to interpersonal trust. In Study 2, we tested our model with a multilevel media-
tion analysis on European Social Survey data (ESS; [65]) across 16 countries. Finally, in Study
3, we addressed the same hypothesis by directly manipulating institutional trust in a between-
subjects experimental design. Additionally, in Study 3 we also test an alternative mediation
model, according to which institutional trust affects interpersonal trust through an increase of
the expectations about other’s behavior. For an overview of the different operationalizations of
the constructs used to test the model across all studies, and their descriptive statistics, see S1
Table in S1 File.
To establish the robustness of our results, all studies included control variables to account
for variation in the dependent measure. Indeed, the lack of control for stable psychological dis-
positions in previous cross-sectional studies might have overestimated the relationship
between the two forms of trust in the past (see [39]). In Studies 1 and 3, we controlled for indi-
vidual dispositions related to interpersonal and institutional trust, namely trust propensity,
political orientation, and security values. Trust propensity is a stable individual disposition,
defined as a generalized expectation about others’ trustworthiness, and one of the most signifi-
cant predictors of trust in interactions with strangers [13,66]. This variable was included in
Study 1 and 3 to disentangle that trusting beliefs and behavior toward a specific target did not
depend on an underlying general willingness to trust others. Right-wing political orientation
and, more generally, conservative ideology [67] may both be associated with the need to
reduce uncertainty and support of external control systems [68]. The endorsement of security
values characterizes individuals who prioritize security and predictability [37] and, therefore,
Fig 1. The model: Institutional trust as a predictor of interpersonal trust (trusting beliefs and subsequent behavior) via feelings of security.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237934.g001
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are more likely to prefer strong institutions. In Study 2, we included country-level indicators
of institutional performance that strongly correlate with both institutional and interpersonal
trust (e.g., political and economic performance; [69]).
Study 1
In Study 1, we aimed to extend findings on the relationship between institutional trust and
interpersonal trust by providing a preliminary first test of the hypothesis that institutional
trust promotes interpersonal trust toward strangers by enhancing individuals’ feelings of secu-
rity. In doing so, we used a cross-sectional survey design that analyzed trusting beliefs toward
state institutions and fellow citizens. Additionally, we assessed institutional trust toward a
large set of public institutions to identify whether the perceiving feelings of security would be
relevant for specific institutions (such as those absolving more monitoring or sanctioning
functions) or generalizable across institutional settings. Unlike previous observational studies
that use single items to measure institutional trust, institutional trust was measured through
scales covering perception of competence, benevolence, and integrity [70], to overcome single-




The sample consisted of 181 Italian participants (75.7% female;Mage = 28.06, SDage = 9.74).
Most of them had bachelor’s degree (40.3%) and described themselves as slightly left-wing on
a 10-point political orientation scale ranging from left to right (M = 4.06, SD = 2.31). The par-
ticipants’ regions of origin were proportionally distributed among north (43.1%), center
(14.9%), and south Italy (42%). To ensure that all participants had some degree of experience
or previous information about Italian public institutions, we recruited participants being at
least 18 years of age, and excluded participants that reported to have a different nationality
(N = 1). Sensitivity analysis revealed that this sample size would result in 80% statistical power
to detect a small effect of institutional trust on trust beliefs (f 2 = 0.04; [71]). The whole research
was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (7th revision, 2013) and local
ethical guidelines for experimentation with human participants and was approved by the insti-
tutional review board at the University of Turin and by the ethical commission of the Zeppelin
University in Friedrichshafen. All participants gave written informed consent prior to the
experiments.
Procedure
Participants were recruited on social media through a snowball sampling. They accessed to the
online survey through a call for participation posted on social media accounts and were
requested to share the call with others. The study included measures of trust toward different
state institutions, interpersonal trust, feelings of security enhanced by public institutions, secu-
rity values, trust propensity, and a socio-demographic section. To avoid sequence effects, all
items were presented in a randomized order within each scale and, unless otherwise stated,
they were answered on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (I completely disagree) to 7 (I
completely agree).
Institutional trust. We assessed trust in five different institutions related to social order
([70], eight items for each institution, e.g., “I trust the police in Italy because they behave benev-
olently toward citizens”, police: α = .81; legal system: α = .84; government: α = .81; media: α =
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.82; religious institutions: α = .87). Following Agroskin, Jonas, and Traut-Mattausch [72], in
addition to the items proposed in the original scale, we presented an additional item to
increase the scale validity (i.e., “I generally trust the police in my country”). Following previous
research on institutional trust (e.g., [73]), we then additionally averaged the scores of these five
scales in a single cumulative index of institutional trust, which showed a good reliability, α =
.70.
Interpersonal trust. Trusting beliefs toward Italian citizens were measured through an
adaptation of General Trust Scale ([25]; six items, e.g., “I believe that Italian citizens are basi-
cally honest”, α = .93). This scale consisted in a series of questions that assessed to what extent
respondents perceived fellow citizens as trustworthy.
Feelings of security. We included a measure of feelings of security that individuals experi-
ence in relation to institutional performance and representatives (three items, i.e., “I feel pro-
tected by public institutions”, “I am comforted by thinking that I can count on public institutions
if anything happens to me”, “I feel I can rely on public institutions to assert my own rights”, α =
.89).
Control variables. As control variables, we measured trust propensity through the Trust
in Others Scale ([74]; three items, e.g., “I dare to put my fate in the hands of most other people”,
α = .65) and the endorsement of security values using the respective subscale from the Portrait
Values Questionnaire [75]. Here respondents are asked to indicate own perceived similarity to
a described person (five items, e.g., “It is important to him to live in secure surroundings.He
avoids anything that might endanger his safety”, α = .74) on a six-point Likert scale from 1 (not
like me at all) to 6 (very much like me).
Results
Results showed the expected significant associations between average and distinct trust in the
five institutions, feelings of security, and trusting beliefs toward citizens (S2 Table in S1 File).
Additionally, the individual dispositions used as controls confirmed the hypothesized associa-
tion with both interpersonal trust and institutional trust. The Pearson’s correlation analyses
also showed associations between trust propensity and interpersonal trust (r = .39, p< .001),
the endorsement of security values and institutional trust (r = .22, p = .003), and right-wing
political orientation and trust toward the police (r = .27, p< .001) and religious institutions (r
= .21, p = .006), respectively. We also found a medium correlation between institutional trust
and feelings of security (r = .50, p< .001), suggesting a possible partial overlap between the
two constructs. However, confirmatory factor analyses showed that this is unlikely, and that
security and institutional trust are separate factors (statistical details are reported in Table A in
S2 Text in S1 File).
The main effect of institutional trust on interpersonal trust. We conducted a simple
linear regression with institutional trust (average trust in all five institutions) predicting trust-
ing beliefs. Institutional trust significantly predicted trust toward fellow citizens (interpersonal
trust), F(1, 179) = 15.29, p< .001, R2 = .08.
The indirect effect of institutional trust on interpersonal trust via feelings of security.
A mediation analyses with 5,000 bootstrapped samples using the SPSS macro Process model 4
[76] showed that the indirect effect of institutional trust on trusting beliefs towards other citi-
zens is significant for each of the five institutions under analysis: police (b = 0.12; 95% CI
[0.05; 0.21], R2 = .12), legal system (b = 0.14; 95% CI [0.06; 0.24], R2 = .11), government (b =
0.13; 95% CI [0.06; 0.23], R2 = .12), religious institutions (b = 0.04; 95% CI [0.01; 0.09], R2 =
.02), and the media (b = 0.09; 95% CI [0.04; 0.16], R2 = .12). Overall, the relationship between
institutional trust and trusting beliefs towards fellow citizens was mediated by feelings of
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security while considering the aggregate index of institutional trust as a predictor in the
model, b = 0.18; 95% CI [0.06; 0.32], R2 = .13. These results appeared robust even if trust pro-
pensity, security values, political orientation, and education were included as controls in the
analyses, b = 0.15; 95% CI [0.05; 0.27], R2 = .26. Detailed results of the mediation models are
presented in detail in Table 1.
Discussion
The findings of Study 1 are in line with previous studies and our key hypothesis. Institutional
trust was associated with interpersonal trust, and this relationship was mediated by the feeling
that institutions can protect individuals from the exploitative behavior of strangers. This
Table 1. Results of mediation models for the effect of institutional trust (aggregate measure and single institutions) on interpersonal trust through feelings of
security.
Predictor and effect Outcome: Trusting beliefs
Model 1 Model 2
b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI
Mediator: Feelings of security 0.23 0.07 0.08; 0.37 0.19 0.07 0.05; 0.33
Predictor: Institutional trust (Aggregate)
Total effect 0.39 0.10 0.19; 0.59 0.29 0.10 0.10; 0.49
Direct effect 0.21 0.11 -0.01; 0.44 0.15 0.11 -0.07; 0.37
Indirect effect 0.18 0.06 0.06; 0.32 0.15 0.06 0.06; 0.27
Mediator: Feelings of security 0.25 0.07 0.11; 0.39 0.19 0.07 0.06; 0.33
Predictor: Institutional trust (Police)
Total effect 0.25 0.07 0.10; 0.40 0.22 0.08 0.07; 0.36
Direct effect 0.13 0.08 -0.03; 0.29 0.11 0.08 -0.06; 0.27
Indirect effect 0.12 0.04 0.05; 0.21 0.11 0.04 0.04; 0.20
Mediator: Feelings of security 0.26 0.07 0.12; 0.41 0.2 0.07 0.06; 0.34
Predictor: Institutional trust (Legal system)
Total effect 0.22 0.07 0.08; 0.36 0.18 0.07 0.05; 0.31
Direct effect 0.08 0.08 -0.08; 0.23 0.07 0.08 -0.08; 0.22
Indirect effect 0.14 0.05 0.06; 0.24 0.11 0.04 0.03; 0.19
Mediator: Feelings of security 0.26 0.07 0.12; 0.40 0.20 0.07 0.07; 0.34
Predictor: Institutional trust (Government)
Total effect 0.24 0.08 0.09; 0.39 0.19 0.07 0.04; 0.33
Direct effect 0.11 0.08 -0.06; 0.27 0.09 0.08 -0.07; 0.24
Indirect effect 0.13 0.04 0.06; 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.04; 0.18
Mediator: Feelings of security 0.28 0.06 0.16; 0.41 0.23 0.06 0.11; 0.35
Predictor: Institutional trust (Religious institutions)
Total effect 0.12 0.06 0.01; 0.25 0.06 0.06 -0.06; 0.18
Direct effect 0.09 0.06 -0.03; 0.20 0.03 0.06 -0.09; 0.15
Indirect effect 0.04 0.02 0.01; 0.09 0.03 0.02 -0.01; 0.07
Mediator: Feelings of security 0.27 0.07 0.14; 0.40 0.22 0.06 0.10; 0.35
Predictor: Institutional trust (Media)
Total effect 0.21 0.08 0.06; 0.37 0.14 0.08 -0.01; 0.30
Direct effect 0.13 0.08 -0.03; 0.28 0.07 0.08 -0.9; 0.22
Indirect effect 0.09 0.03 0.04; 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.03; 0.14
Results based on 181 observations. Model 1: Mediation analyses did not include control variables. Model 2: Mediation analyses included trust propensity, security
values, political orientation, and education as control variables.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237934.t001
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indirect effect appeared to be independent from individual dispositions. Moreover, Study 1
showed that this indirect effect was consistent over all the five main public institutions related
to social order, even for those that do not directly deal with monitoring or sanctioning (e.g.,
the media). However, religious institutions seemed to play a more marginal role, as suggested
by the magnitude of the effect size and the fact that the indirect effect becomes non-significant
after control variables were added.
Study 2
Study 1 provided initial evidence for the hypothesis that institutions, when trusted, are associ-
ated with feelings of security, which in turn predict trust in strangers. However, our results
were limited to relatively small and non-representative samples from a single country and
institutional context (i.e., Italy). In Study 2, we filled this gap by testing this hypothesis across
16 countries. Importantly, the current study presents different operationalizations of feelings
of security and interpersonal trust. Feelings of security were measured as perception of per-
sonal safety. This measure is not explicitly tied to the specific institutions under investigation
as in Study 1, but it is particularly relevant for institutions that are supposed to regulate social
exchange and safeguard law and order. A different operationalization of feelings of security
also allows to further generalize the findings and disentangle any possible overlap with the
construct of institutional trust. Interpersonal trust has been assessed using respondents’ scores
on the Generalized Trust Scale. Differently from Study 1, the current trust measure does not
involve a specific target of the trusting beliefs, but rather reflects beliefs toward “most people”,
that are likely to drive behavior in contexts involving unfamiliar actors. This different operatio-
nalization of interpersonal trust allows to relate our findings to previous evidence from survey
studies using this scale (e.g., [43]) and to generalize them above specific trust targets (i.e.,
members of own community such as Italian citizens in Study 1). Finally, we included several
control variables specifically related to both respondents’ trust-relevant socio-demographic
characteristics and institutional performance.
Materials and methods
Participants and procedure
This study used data from the European Social Survey (ESS). In total, answers from 180,051
participants (50.65% female;Mage = 47.27, SDage = 18.04) from 16 countries of the European
area (Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom,
Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Slovenia) were
included in the analysis. Most respondents completed upper secondary education (35.7%) and
described themselves as politically moderate (M = 5.08, SD = 2.11) on a bipolar 11-point scale
from 0 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing). ESS data are gathered through cross-sectional face-to-
face individual interviews administered to nationally representative samples, with different
samples recruited for each wave. To provide greater temporal stability of the theoretical
assumption, we decided to include only those countries participating to all survey waves (1–7)
from 2002 to 2014, as well as only respondents without missing values in the variables
described below (initial and final sample sizes and main descriptive statistics for each country
are reported in S3 Table in S1 File). For the present analysis, we selected measures of trust in
different state institutions, interpersonal trust, feelings of security, and country level indicators
of institutional performance.
Institutional trust. As in Study 1, we obtained the measure of institutional trust by aggre-
gating trust ratings toward four state institutions (i.e., “Howmuch you personally trust the par-
liament”, “the legal system”, “the police”, and “the politicians”, α range among countries = .78 -
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.87). Individual responses were given on a 11-points Likert scale, ranged from 0 (no trust at
all) to 10 (complete trust).
Feelings of security. The study contained a single-item measure as a proxy for respon-
dents’ feelings of security (i.e., “How safe do you—or would you—feel walking alone in this area
after dark?”). Answers have been reverse-scored to allow consistent interpretation with the
three-items measure used in Study 1, thus ranging from 1 (very unsafe) to 4 (very safe).
Interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust was assessed using the Generalized Trust Scale
(three items, e.g., “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”, α range = .63 - .77). As for institutional trust,
each item was answered on a 11-points Likert scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete
trust), phrased according to the specific item from 0 (you can’t be too careful) to 10 (most peo-
ple can be trusted).
Control variables. Last, country-level indicators of institutional performance of political
and economic institutions were retrieved from established databases for each of the countries
under investigation (i.e., government effectiveness, political rights, rule of law, economy com-
petitiveness, GINI, and GDP per capita) from available time points between wave 1 and 7 of
the ESS (2002–2014). A detailed description of these indicators is provided in S2 Appendix in
S1 File.
Results
First, data were corrected for sampling errors, since the ESS data involved respondents from
multiple countries. By applying the design weight variable (dweight) included in the ESS data-
set, we adjusted for the differences in the chance of selection of respondents for each country
in all the following analyses. Moreover, control variables were included in the models in two
steps, with respondents’ trust-relevant socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender, and
education) being included first, followed by institutional performance indicators at a second
stage. We report results from both analyses.
The indirect effect of institutional trust on interpersonal trust via feelings of security.
To test our main prediction that institutional trust predicts interpersonal trust through
increased feelings of security, we performed multilevel mediation analyses with bootstrapping
method with the R package mediation [77,78] to account for the nested structure of the ESS
data. In this model, respondents (level-1) are nested within countries (level-2). The mediation
functions took as an input two multilevel regression models. The first multilevel regression
had institutional trust as independent variable and feelings of security as dependent measure
with countries as random intercept. The independent variables of the second multilevel regres-
sion were institutional trust and feelings of security, while the dependent variable was interper-
sonal trust, again with country as random intercept.
In line with the hypothesis, the results showed that the feelings of security had a significant
indirect effect in interpersonal trust, b = 0.013, 95% CI [0.0117; 0.0136] controlling for survey
wave and common sociodemographic variables associated to interpersonal trust in survey
research (i.e., gender, age, and education; e.g., [79]). The relationship was partially mediated
since the effect of institutional trust on interpersonal trust, b = 0.342; 95% CI [0.3377; 0.3458],
remained significant when the mediator was included in the model, b = 0.329; 95% CI [0.3251;
0.3325]. Moreover, the results showed that including institutional performance indicators
(e.g., GDP per capita, government effectiveness, and rule of law) as covariates in the multilevel
mediational analysis did not affect the significance of the model, b = 0.013; 95% CI [0.0123;
0.0145]. While controlling for institutional performance indicators, the effect of institutional
trust on interpersonal trust, b = 0.352; 95% CI [0.3484; 0.3563], remained significant when the
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mediator was included in the model, b = 0.339; 95% CI [0.3354; 0.3424]. Results of the multi-
level mediation models are presented in detail in Table 2.
As in Study 1, we also run our models considering trust in the four different institutions,
instead of a single aggregated measure. As expected, results showed consistent patterns, sug-
gesting that the effect can be generalized over a variety of institutions. The details of such anal-
yses can be found in S4 Table in S1 File. Given that estimates of indirect effects were similar
across the four institutions (b range = 0.007–0.011), we limit the report to trust in the police, as
it will be the focus of Study 3. Overall, the relationship between trust in the police and interper-
sonal trust was mediated by feelings of security, b = 0.007; 95% CI [0.0068; 0.0087], even con-
trolling for individual differences b = 0.008; 95% CI [0.0076; 0.0091], and differences in the
quality of institutions, b = 0.008, 95% [0.0069; 0.0084].
As an additional robustness check, we also tested our hypotheses with a different model
specification. We included countries as fixed effects, thus removing the multilevel structure.
The results (using both aggregate measure of institutional trust and trust in the four different
institutions) were in line with those presented above, even controlling for individual differ-
ences (see S5 Table in S1 File).
Discussion
The results of Study 2 replicated findings of Study 1, using cross-national data with representa-
tive samples. Taking together responses obtained from participants of 16 different countries,
we found that individuals who trusted institutions tended to feel more secure, which resulted
in higher levels of interpersonal trust. Remarkably, these effects have been observed even con-
sidering more general feelings of security, not directly tied to the specific institutions as in
Study 1. Moreover, by including country-level indicators of institutional performance (both
political and economic), we found support for the hypothesis that the indirect effect of the feel-
ings of security is related more to individuals’ perception of the public institutions, rather than
their actual efficiency and performance.
Study 3
Study 1 and 2 provided support for the hypothesis that institutional trust is positively associ-
ated to interpersonal trust, and that the effect is related to the feelings of security that institu-
tions convey. In Study 3, we aimed to experimentally test this mechanism by manipulating
Table 2. Results of the multilevel mediation models for the effect of institutional trust (aggregate measure) on interpersonal trust through feelings of security.
Predictor and effect Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI
Mediator: Feelings of security 0.298 0.2978; 0.2984 0.326 0.3260; 0.3265 0.296 0.2954; 0.2962
Predictor: Institutional trust (Aggregate)
Total effect 0.352 0.3479; 0.3564 0.342 0.3377; 0.3458 0.352 0.3484; 0.3563
Direct effect 0.339 0.3347; 0.3421 0.329 0.3251; 0.3325 0.339 0.3354; 0.3424
Indirect effect 0.013 0.0121; 0.0144 0.013 0.0117; 0.0136 0.013 0.0123; 0.0145
% of Total effect 0.04 0.04 0.04
Results of all models are based on 180,051 observations and use countries as random effects. % of Total effect: Proportion mediated (i.e., ratio of the total effect to the
indirect effect).
Model 1: Mediation analyses included survey wave as control variable. Model 2: Mediation analyses included survey wave and individual-level variables (gender, age,
and education) as control. Model 3: Mediation analyses included survey wave and country-level variables (political rights, government effectiveness, rule of law,
economy competitiveness, GINI coefficient, and GDP per capita) as control.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237934.t002
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institutional trust, in order to replicate the results obtained in Study 1 and 2. The manipulation
consisted in providing participants with specific information about the institution’s compe-
tence, benevolence, and reliability, in order to elicit consequent trust assessments. Addition-
ally, we wanted to extend our claims on trusting beliefs to actual trusting behavior in an
economic game. Thus, we tested our main prediction that institutional trust promotes trusting
behavior, operationalized by investments in a trust game with a stranger, by increasing feelings
of security conveyed by institutions.
Moreover, we also tested an alternative mechanism, to disentangle a possible explanation
that the effect of institutions merely depends on the expectations regarding the behavior of the
interaction partner. This would allow to test the hypothesis that interpersonal trust is influ-




A total of 94 participants (70.2% female;Mage = 25.45, SDage = 6.24) were recruited from an
online panel (i.e., Sona System) at a large Austrian University and received a 2 € show-up fee
and a behavior-depending remuneration. Most had a high school diploma (44.7%) and
reported a moderately left-wing political orientation (M = 4.12, SD = 1.57). Participants were
mainly Austrians (59.5%), 22.3% were Germans, and the remaining 18.1% were German-
speakers from other countries. Sensitivity analysis revealed that this sample size would result
in 80% statistical power to detect a medium effect of institutional trust on trusting behavior
(d = 0.58; [71]).
Procedure
Participants were invited to take part in an incentivized online study on decision-making.
They learned that their choices could be matched with those of other anonymous participants
from ten different countries, whose identity or belonging country would not be disclosed at
any time. This matching protocol was introduced to manipulate institutional trust, providing
the respondents with different information about the police in the partner’s home country.
After the manipulation, we measured participants’ trusting beliefs toward the partner, trusting
behavior, and expectations of reciprocity. Then, they completed a questionnaire assessing the
feelings of security enhanced by the police depicted in the scenario, trust propensity, security
values, risk attitudes, and political orientation.
Experimental manipulation (institutional trust). Past research found that individuals
lacking perfect information about others (e.g., in interactions with strangers) make inferences
about others’ trustworthiness based on behavior of public officials in that society [53]. Follow-
ing the same approach, at the beginning of the study, participants were randomly assigned to
one of the two experimental conditions manipulating institutional trust (low vs. high) and
were exposed to two scenarios providing different information about the police in the trustee’s
home country (referred to as Country X from now on), that was never disclosed across the
entire duration of the study. They read a fictitious report of a survey about police’s perfor-
mance and perception in Country X the previous year. Following the definition of institutional
trust as perception of benevolence, competence, and reliability of public institutions toward
citizens (e.g., [37]), in the low institutional trust condition, the police were depicted as poorly
qualified, neither fulfilling their obligations and nor serving the collective interest. Conversely,
in the high institutional trust condition, the police were described as extremely skilled, com-
mitted, and responsible (see S3 Appendix in S1 File).
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Manipulation checks. Two measures were used as manipulation checks to evaluate the
extent to which the scenario elicited different degrees of (low vs. high) trust in the police. First,
we directly asked participants how much would they trust the police in Country X on a seven-
point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely). Additionally, participants were asked to
guess the trustee’s country out of a list of ten countries, select as those ranking highest (i.e.,
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Finland) and lowest (i.e., Portugal, Slovenia,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Greece) in institutional trust scores according to data from OECD
[80]. We expected that participants exposed to the high institutional trust condition would
have associated Country X to an actual country renowned for its institutional trust.
Dependent variables (trusting beliefs and behavior) and mediating variables (feelings of
security and expectations of reciprocity). In this study, interpersonal trust was operationa-
lized as trusting beliefs and trusting behavior (i.e., the money invested in a trust game played
with an unknown other) [81]. Participants were endowed with 5 Lab Coins (LC), each worth €
0.30, and assigned to the role of trustor. At stage one of the game, the trustor could transfer any
of this amount (0–5 LC) to the trustee, keeping the remaining for herself, being aware that the
transferred amount would have been tripled by the experimenter while passing it to the trustee.
In stage two, the trustee could have transferred any portion of the tripled amount received back
to the trustor. Importantly, they were informed that their decision would be randomly matched
with that of another participant in the pool who will play a complementary role at a later stage
of data collection in order to determine the final payment from the game. In reality, all partici-
pants played the sole role of trustor, since we were only interested in trusting behavior. The use
of deception in this study (i.e., providing participants with fictitious information about the insti-
tutions in place in the trustee’s country) was functional to increase internal validity of the study
and to set up a situation in which any observed effect on interpersonal trust would have been
solely attributed to the manipulated information. Given that we did not assess actual return
behavior, the final payment for the participants was determined by tripling the amount they
transferred in the game (€ 0–1.50) and was paid in addition to the show-up fee. After verifying
the comprehension of the game, we assessed expectation of reciprocity by asking to express the
percentage of the money they expected to receive back (0–100). Then, as in Study 1, we mea-
sured trusting beliefs toward the trustee through an adaptation of General Trust Scale ([25], α =
.88) and feelings of security using the 3-items measure (α = .96).
Control variables. To adjust for potential underlying baseline individual dispositions
across the different conditions, a number of variables were included in the experimental design
and analyzed as covariates in the mediational models. As Study 1, we included as covariates a
measure of trust propensity ([74]; α = .75), security values ([75]; α = .72), and political orienta-
tion measured through a bipolar 10-point scale item. In addition, we included a measure of
risk attitudes as further control, as trusting behavior consisted in an actual monetary invest-
ment decision, which is generally associated with individual risk preferences [82]. Risk atti-
tudes were measured using the financial subscale of the Risk-Behavior Scale [83]. Here
respondents are asked to indicate the likelihood to engage in a series of economically risky
behaviors (10 items; e.g., “Spending money impulsively without thinking about the conse-
quences”, α = .68) on a seven-point Likert answering scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely)
to 7 (extremely likely). To avoid sequence effects, all items were presented in a randomized
order within each scale.
Results
As expected, participants exposed to the scenario of high institutional trust reported more
trust in the police of Country X (M = 5.15, SD = 1.07), compared to the other condition
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(M = 2.43, SD = 1.44), t(92) = -10.39, p< .001, d = 2.14. Also, a Chi-square test was performed
to test whether, consistently with the experimental condition, participants associated the
description of Country X to an actual high trust vs. low trust country as classified in OECD
official rankings. As predicted, those in the high institutional trust condition associated Coun-
try X to a high trusting country significantly more than in the other condition, χ2(1, N = 94) =
68.12, p< .001 (Table 3), suggesting that the manipulation was successful in eliciting the
intended perception of partner’s country institutions and, thus, institutional trust.
The main effect of institutional trust on interpersonal trust. To test whether institu-
tional trust had a main effect on trusting beliefs and trusting behavior, we used an independent
samples t test comparing the trusting beliefs about the trustee and trusting behavior (i.e., the
amount of money invested in the trust game) observed in the two experimental conditions.
On average, participants transferred 70.6% (SD = 26.7%) of their initial endowment to the
trustee. Results of the t test showed no differences between the two experimental groups in
either trusting beliefs toward the trustee, t(92) = -1.00, p = .317, R2 = .01, nor trusting behavior,
t(92) = -1.00, p = .321, R2 = .01 (see S6 Table in S1 File).
The indirect effect of institutional trust on interpersonal trust via feelings of security.
A serial mediation (Process model 6) on a bootstrap sample of 5,000 participants showed a sig-
nificant effect of institutional trust on the money invested in the trust game, mediated by the
feelings of security, which impacted trusting beliefs toward the partner in the trust game,
b = 0.21, 95% CI [0.06; 0.54], R2 = .11. The full serial mediation model remained significant
after controlling for trust propensity, security values, risk attitudes, political orientation, and
education, b = 0.19, 95% CI [0.03; 0.54], R2 = .13. Results of the mediations are presented in
detail in Table 4.
Testing two competing psychological explanations for enhanced interpersonal trust.
One additional intended contribution of Study 3 was to test whether the indirect effect of insti-
tutional trust on interpersonal trust could simply be explained by increased expectations of
reciprocity rather than increased feelings of security. To examine this possibility, we conducted
Table 4. Results of serial mediation models for the effect of institutional trust (manipulation) on interpersonal trust through feelings of security.
Predictor and effect Outcome: trusting behavior
Model 1 Model 2
b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI
Mediator 1: Feelings of security� -0.07 0.10 -0.28; 0.13 -0.07 0.11 -0.28; 0.15
Mediator 2: Trusting beliefs� 0.52 0.17 0.19; 0.85 0.51 0.18 0.15; 0.88
Institutional trust (Manipulation)
Total effect 0.28 0.28 -0.27; 0.82 0.38 0.29 -0.19; 0.95
Direct effect 0.34 0.34 -0.34; 1.02 0.36 0.37 -0.36; 1.09
Indirect effect 0.21 0.11 0.06; 0.54 0.19 0.12 0.03; 0.54
Results based on 94 observations. Model 1: Mediation analyses did not include control variables. Model 2: Mediation analyses included trust propensity, security values,
political orientation, risk attitudes, and education as control variables.
�Estimates of regressions of the mediators (feelings of security and trusting beliefs, respectively) predicting trusting behavior.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237934.t004
Table 3. Guessed trustee’s country according to experimental condition.
Institutional Trust Switzerland Luxembourg Norway Sweden Finland Portugal Slovenia Hungary Czech Republic Greece
Low 0 4.35% 2.17% 0 0 4.35% 6.52% 32.61% 21.74% 28.26%
High 22.92% 10.42% 18.75% 27.08% 12.50% 0 2.10% 2.10% 2.10% 2.10%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0237934.t003
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a parallel mediation analysis (Process model 4) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. The results
show that feelings of security had a significant indirect effect on trusting beliefs toward the
trustee, b = 0.41, 95% CI [0.13; 0.83], while expectations of reciprocity did not, b = 0.02, 95%
CI [-0.01; 0.15] (all path coefficients are reported in S7 Table in S1 File).
Discussion
The results of Study 3 replicated the indirect effect obtained in Study 1 and 2 with experimen-
tal data. Institutional trust enhanced feelings of security, which in turn significantly predicted
interpersonal trust. As expected, the extent to which participants transferred money to the
other person depended on their achieved feelings of security from the institutions. Study 3 also
generalized these effects on trusting behavior with real incentives, providing evidence for the
external validity of the results.
Differently from Study 1 and 2, we did not observe a main effect of institutional trust on
trusting beliefs or behavior. One possibility to explain these different findings can be attribut-
able to the operationalization of institutional trust. In Study 3, institutional trust was indirectly
manipulated by providing information about institutional performance, aimed at creating dif-
ferent perceptions of institutions in the two experimental condition. In the two surveys, how-
ever, respondents’ perceptions of institutions were built across years of repeated exposure to
institutional performance and behavior of institutional representatives.
General discussion
Interpersonal trust among strangers is key for the societal, political, and economic develop-
ment of a state. Given that interactions are embedded in a context regulated by societal institu-
tions, recent research has increasingly focused on the questions whether and how these
institutions can enhance (or impair) the development of interpersonal trust. In three studies,
we tested the hypothesis that institutional trust indirectly promotes trust among strangers by
increasing feelings of security, which in turn allow people to accept vulnerability and to trust
others. Study 1 provided initial evidence for this underlying psychological process and showed
that the association between institutional trust and interpersonal trust is mediated by feelings
of security. Institutions that are trusted serve as a cue that individuals are protected, which in
turn indirectly allows them to accept vulnerability and trust others. Study 2 further validated
this initial evidence by analyzing cross-sectional data from 16 countries and using different
operationalizations of the constructs. Finally, Study 3 provided an extension of the findings by
manipulating institutional trust in an experimental design, and testing the effects on trusting
behavior. In this study, we found again support for the indirect effect obtained in Study 1 and
2 with experimental data but, in contrast with these, we did not observe a main effect of insti-
tutional trust on trusting beliefs or behavior.
The current studies add an important piece to the puzzle on how micro-level perceptions
and behaviors relate to macro-level societal processes. When it comes to institutional features,
individual psychological processes often reflect the broader societal context. For example, indi-
vidual self-regulation is higher in institutionally regulated countries [29], and citizens’ intrinsic
honesty is affected by country-level norm violations [84]. With respect to trust among strang-
ers, our findings suggest that trusted institutions can provide feelings of security that serve as a
basis to develop interpersonal trust [42,44]. Given the vulnerability to exploitation that trusting
acts involve [14], we traced back the effect of institutional trust to the key functions of institu-
tions to serve the fundamental need to feel protected. Indeed, trusting institutions does not
automatically lead individuals to feel secure. Even if institutions are considered competent and
reliable, individuals still may feel highly insecure in unpredictable and extreme situation (e.g.,
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terroristic attacks, that highly increase distrust toward others). This is confirmed by our
results, showing that the two constructs are only moderately correlated (Pearson’s r = .50 and r
= .18 in Study 1 and 2, respectively) and load on different factors.
Our findings are not in line with research that would propose that institutions have a detri-
mental effect on interpersonal trust in light of their primary role of providing assurance by
affecting the incentive structure and individuals’ normative expectations [25,26]. In Study 2,
we included a series of control variables related to institutional quality to control for the possi-
bility that the actual performance of institutions is driving the effect. Among those, there were
estimates of the ability of government to provide high quality public services, implement effec-
tive policies, protect legal entitlements, and to maintain social order through formal rules [85].
These variables did not affect the significance of the model. Moreover, when institutional trust
was manipulated in Study 3, we observed an indirect effect on trusting behavior even if the
institution was not directly involved in the interaction and had no actual power to influence
the outcome of the interaction and provide assurance (e.g., by punishing exploitative actions).
Also, this study sought to rule out that this effect could be merely explained by positive expec-
tations about the partner’s behavior. Although this was not a key goal of the research, this find-
ing suggests that social inferences are unlikely to be the main mechanism underlying the
relationship between institutional and interpersonal trust [54]. If that would have been the
case, we should have observed expectations to mediate this relationship, given that institu-
tional representatives (the police in Study 3), according to this approach, should act as a signal
of the type of game played in a certain society. Future research should further explore this
question by designing ad hoc studies to understand the relative contribution of feelings of
security and social inference-based mechanisms.
The current findings highlight the need to actually implement cues that generate trust in
public institutions such as transparent communication, legitimate law enforcement, or explicit
anti-corruption policies to promote trust in the general society and thereby, social and eco-
nomic prosperity [46]. If public institutions cannot fulfil the need of individuals to feel secure,
citizens may turn away from established institutions, start to individually protect themselves
(e.g., by investing in lawyers and insurances), and support or develop new parallel institutions
(e.g., alternative media) to achieve this need and restore trust levels. In extreme cases, as
response to perceived insecurity, individuals might start to endorse nationalist positions [86],
and even turn to anti-social organizations like the mafia in order to restore their lack of secu-
rity [87,88]. Also, the results have implications for policy in light of research on the effects of
individuals’ past experiences of victimization on interpersonal trust. In particular, trust has
been showed to be hardly affected by direct victimization [89], but rather by a more general
fear of crime, developed as response to the environmental context, such as segregated and dis-
advantaged neighborhoods [12,79]. This can undermine efficacy of interventions exclusively
aimed at reducing victimization experiences (such as severe monitoring and sanctioning of
violent and property crimes). Thus, public institutions might combine these interventions
together with others with a focus on restoring feelings of security, such as the implementation
of direct and accessible dialogue and transparent communication with citizens, as well as the
possibility to monitor openly this process, especially in disadvantaged contexts where fear of
victimization is more prevalent.
Limitations and future research
Our findings have some limitations that need to be acknowledged. Due to the use of observa-
tional data across Study 1 and 2, it may be argued that our results are affected by endogeneity.
That said, we addressed this issue in two ways. First, in both Study 1 and 2 we included
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relevant control variables related to stable individual dispositions to prevent overestimating
the hypothesized relationships, which are often overlooked in current research practices (see
[39]). Second, we specifically integrated the survey evidence provided in Study 1 and 2 with an
experiment that exogenously manipulated institutional trust by providing specific information
about institutions in the trustee’s country (Study 3).
Another potential limitation is the lack of a main effect of institutional trust in Study 3,
which was observed in Study 1 and 2. That said, this finding does not affect the overall conclu-
sion we derive from the results for several reasons. First, the main focus of this work was test-
ing the indirect effect of institutional trust on interpersonal trust and this effect was replicated
across all studies (with different datasets and operationalizations), even when tested against
competing mechanisms. Moreover, our manipulation in Study 3 was carefully designed from
previous research which found a significant effect on trusting beliefs toward strangers based
on the behavior of institutional representatives [53]. Therefore, it is possible that higher sample
sizes would be successful in detecting a significant main effect. Although previous research
found evidence that the presence of cues (or inferences), rather than the actual implementation
of mechanisms (such as reputation), is enough to elicit an effect [90], future research might
consider to identify the boundary conditions of this effect by designing a setting that more
closely resembles daily experience with (not) trusted institutions, that could actually intervene
in the situation (e.g., punishing untrustworthy behavior), and not involving the use of decep-
tion, in order to draw stronger conclusions about whether and how this perception, and subse-
quent feelings, affect interpersonal trust.
Moreover, even if we collected evidence from several countries, all respondents of the cur-
rent studies were from Western democratic countries in which institutional trust levels are
generally high. Additionally, two of the three studies involved convenience samples and, thus,
not representative of the national population. Thus, a remaining question for the future would
be to test these hypotheses on a more diverse set of institutional contexts and to test the gener-
alizability in non-Western societies. Last, although exchanges with strangers within a society
often do not exceed a single interaction, future research could explore the role of institutional
trust in repeated interactions, where reputational information comes into play.
All things considered, the present findings appear robust and generalizable across research
methodologies and variables operationalizations, and remain consistent even when controlling
for relevant individual characteristics and institutional performance indicators. Study 1 allows
to generalize the results across the entire set of studies by firstly testing the reliability of the
three-items measure of feelings of security and trusting beliefs then adopted in Study 3, and to
provide a more fine-grained measure of institutional trust as compared to the standard single-
item questions adopted by the ESS in Study 2. Additionally, by testing our hypotheses across
different conceptualizations of strangers (i.e., fellow citizens, most people, a person from a for-
eign country), the current set of studies controlled for the risk of refer to different targets, rang-
ing from family members to people from other nationalities, while answering to the standard
interpersonal trust question that is widely diffused in survey research (i.e., trust radius prob-
lem; [91]).
Concluding remarks
Trusting strangers is a fundamental pillar of human societies. Understanding how institutional
trust can shape and maintain interpersonal trust, with a focus on individual’s needs, brings
together converging insights from different research traditions and methodologies. The pres-
ent work provides survey, cross-cultural, and experimental evidence in support of the conclu-
sion that trust in formal institutions is important for understanding variation in interpersonal
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trust, especially when they manage to enhance a feeling of security among citizens. This is rele-
vant both for the theoretical debate around interpersonal trust and social capital. But also, the
role of institutions may become even more essential, as societies become more and more com-
plex, and if anything, move away from small societies in which trust is largely based on tight
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Misconduct in organizations (such as fraud, stealing, deception, and harming others) is
not only a matter of some “bad apples” but also related to the organizational context
(“bad barrels”), which can facilitate either ethical or unethical behaviors. Given the
financial crisis and recurring corporate ethics scandals, policymakers, regulators and
organizations are interested in how to change their organizational cultures to enhance
ethical behavior and to prevent further disasters. For this purpose, organizations need
to better understand what strategies and factors of the organizational environment
can affect (un)ethical behavior. However, to assess the corporate ethical culture, solid
measures are required. Since there is an urgent need to have a German measure to
promote research in German-speaking countries, this research developed and tested
the German Ethical Culture Scale (GECS). Drawing on a prominent approach that has
received much attention from scholars and practitioners alike, the GECS attempts to
integrate the notion of compliance- and integrity-based ethics programs (with its focus
on how to steer organizations) with the notion of ethical culture (with its focus on what
factors inhibit or foster ethical behavior). Three studies with heterogeneous samples
of German and Swiss employees and managers were conducted to develop, test
and validate the multidimensional scale (total N > 2000). Overall, the studies provide
first evidence of the measure’s construct, criteria-related and incremental validity. The
paper concludes with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the GECS and
implications for future research.
Keywords: ethical culture measure, compliance-based culture, integrity-based culture, ethics management,
organizational culture
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis and recurring corporate ethics scandals have strengthened the interest of
policymakers, regulators and industry in leveraging corporate culture to enhance ethical behavior.
There is broad consensus that misconduct in organizations (such as fraud, stealing, deception, and
harming others) is not only a matter of some “bad apples” but also related to the organizational
context (“bad barrels”), which can facilitate either ethical or unethical behaviors. To manage this
challenge, organizations need to better understand what strategies and factors that make up the
organizational environment influence (un)ethical behavior. For this purpose, solid measures are
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required that allow assessing those dimensions, help to provide
benchmarks and allow reflecting progress in firms’ cultures. The
goal of our research is to develop and provide a first testing
of a German measure of features of a corporate ethical culture.
While most research in this field has mainly been conducted
drawing on English measures, a German measure on ethical
culture is still lacking. There is an urgent need to develop a
German measure to make it possible to advance research on
ethical culture in countries with German-speaking populations,
such as Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, which encompass
an overall population of approximately 100 million people.
However, it is about not only the possibility of advancing research
in German-speaking countries but also offering organizations
in those countries instruments to obtain information about
the existing organizational environment in the firm, to deduce
interventions and to monitor potential progress. Not all firms are
international, so it cannot be expected that all people understand
and speak English fluently.
Conceptually, over the past decades, three main research
lines have emerged that examine the ethical environment of
an organization: A first stream is related to the notion of
ethical climate. Most research in this field has referred to the
seminal work by Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988). According to
them, ethical climate refers to shared perceptions about “what
constitutes right behavior” in an organization, thus delivering
guidelines for the employees on how they should behave (Martin
and Cullen, 2006, p. 177). In their pioneering work, Victor
and Cullen also developed the Ethical Climate Questionnaire
(ECQ), which was originally designed to assess nine various types
of ethical climates (Victor and Cullen, 1987, 1988). Although
this measure has been criticized for its inability to provide a
consistent factor structure, most research has used the ECQ. This
research has often found that an employee’s perception of the
organization’s focus is associated with unethical behavior and the
employee’s attitudes toward the organization (for a review, see
Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Mayer, 2014).
A parallel stream is related to the notion of ethical culture.
In contrast to ethical climate, ethical culture focuses more on
the perceived formal and informal elements of an organizational
context that may be likely to encourage ethical conduct (Treviño
et al., 1998; Kaptein, 2008a; Ruiz-Palomino and Martínez-Cañas,
2014). As was true for ethical climate, research on ethical culture
has consistently found that the perception of an ethical culture
among employees is, e.g., associated with more-favorable job
attitudes, ethical intentions and behavior (for a review, see
Mayer, 2014). In comparison to ethical climate, we believe
that the concept of ethical culture better allows interventions,
since it draws more directly on the conditions of (un)ethical
behavior. However, as Mayer (2014) pointed out, there is still
little consistency in not only the conceptualization but also the
measurement of ethical culture. While previous studies treated
ethical culture as a one-dimensional construct (Treviño et al.,
1998), Kaptein, for instance, conceptualized ethical culture as a
multi-dimensional construct. Drawing on a virtue-based theory
of business ethics, he developed the Corporate Ethical Virtues
questionnaire (CEV; Kaptein, 2008a, 2011), which was designed
to assess eight organizational virtues. These virtues are posited
to represent organizational conditions that may be likely to
stimulate employee ethical conduct.
Finally, there is a third prominent stream targeting corporate
ethical culture, which has received much attention from
scientific scholars and practitioners alike. Since Paine’s (1994)
groundbreaking article on how to manage organizational
standards, it has become an integral part of organizational
discussions on distinguishing between compliance and integrity.
Yet, the governance strategies associated with a compliance- or
integrity-based approach are quite different. The compliance-
oriented approach (also called the command-and-control
approach) is mainly designed to prevent violations through
control, detection and threats of punishment for misconduct.
The integrity-oriented approach (also called the value-oriented
or self-regulatory approach), on the other hand, combines a
concern for legal issues with the goal of supporting ethically
sound behavior through encouraging moral self-governance and
responsibility for shared values. In contrast to ethical climate
and ethical culture, the notions of compliance- and integrity-
oriented programs emphasize how to steer organizations toward
profitability while taking into account consistency with legal and
ethical standards (Verhezen, 2010; Webb, 2012; Wieland et al.,
2014). Despite their varying characteristics, both ethics programs
represent organizational control systems that aim to encourage
rule adherence (Weaver and Treviño, 1999; Weaver et al., 1999;
Tyler and Blader, 2005).
There is no doubt that compliance- and integrity-based
ethics programs are currently the leading pragmatic approaches
to ethics used in the business environment (see e.g., OECD,
2009, for a recognition of this general trend in business, or
see Wieland et al., 2014, for acknowledging this trend in
Germany). Surprisingly, despite this dominance, it has not been
adopted in the (empirical) research on ethical culture. To our
knowledge, no sound measure assessing those components has
thus far been developed.
The purpose of this paper is to take first steps to address
this gap by developing a new measure. We believe that there
are several reasons that it is necessary to expand previous
scales. (1) The prior ethical climate/culture approaches do not
say a great deal about how to embed ethics in organizations
and managerial practice. Adopting the compliance and integrity
framework in a new measure thus complements prior work by
emphasizing more how to steer an organization. (2) Integrating
the compliance and integrity framework into a measure not only
better matches trends in practice but also offers an important
means to organizations, risk managers, compliance or ethics
officers of reflecting current states and progress in their firm.
It also allows comparing the utility of both approaches to
achieve adherence to rules and ethical standards. (3) A new
measure is also needed to be able to conduct rigorous empirical
research on the antecedents, consequences and effectiveness
of the applied governance strategies. Astonishingly, empirical
studies in this domain are thus far nearly absent. Most inferences
for organizations are, as far as we can see, mainly based on theory
and cased-based studies (e.g., Paine, 1994; Verhezen, 2010). As
rare exceptions, we mention Treviño et al. (1999), Weaver and
Treviño (1999), and Tyler and Blader (2005), who have provided
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first empirical evidence that integrity-based programs are likely to
make a unique contribution to predicting unethical behavior and
employee attitudes compared to programs that are solely based
on command and control. However, our knowledge about what
those various programs actually accomplish and how they affect
employee’s attitudes and ethical behavior is still severely limited.
Thus, developing a measure integrating this framework offers
opportunities to examine more thoroughly possible antecedents
and consequences of a compliance- and integrity-based culture
and the interplay of those programs. (4) A further reason
we decided to start developing a new measure was to better
account for essential findings from the field of behavioral ethics
and social psychology. In particular, behavioral ethics research
has, in recent years, provided many important insights about
organizational factors that can affect ethical behavior but which
have, as far as we can see, not been considered in prior ethical
culture measures.
Overall, we aim to develop a new scale that adopts both a
compliance and integrity orientation, representing two steering
strategies to implement ethics programs, and adopting features
of the organizational culture, which can inhibit or facilitate
the effectiveness of those governance strategies. Specifically, we
propose that to manage ethics, compliance- and integrity-based
programs should be supplemented by knowledge about features
of the organizational culture, which can inhibit or facilitate the
effectiveness of the governance strategies.
ADOPTING THE COMPLIANCE AND
INTEGRITY FRAMEWORK
As mentioned above, compliance- or integrity-based programs
focus on different strategies for how to steer the organization.
However, while both compliance- and integrity-based
approaches share the same goal (behavior in accordance
with organizational rules and values), the procedures to steer
the organization are quite different. Whereas the former
emphasizes regulation through lawful rules, the latter emphasizes
regulation through values (Paine, 1994; Weaver and Treviño,
1999; Verhezen, 2010; Webb, 2012; Wieland et al., 2014). Ethics
policies, however, whatever aim they have, have to rely on an
effective implementation. Obviously, there may be key features of
the organizational environment that can affect the effectiveness
of the policies. For example, an organization may attempt to
build on shared values such as honesty, fairness and respect;
however, the leaders in the firm may not “live” those values,
thereby potentially undermining the effectiveness and credibility
of the ethics program.
To implement effective ethics programs, board and managers
need therefore to know how members of an organization
perceive and evaluate the firm’s policies and activities; however,
it is also important that they have insights into factors of the
organizational context that may affect the effectiveness of the
firm’s strategies. The goal of the proposed German measure here
is to assess both (1) people’s belief about the extent to which an
organization relies on compliance and/or integrity governance
procedures and (2) people’s perception about the unwritten
but lived norms, expectations and behaviors. Consistent with
this goal, we define ethical culture as perceptions about the
governance strategies and the effectively implemented norms and
expectations that are shared by the members of the organization.
As mentioned earlier, we believe that adopting the compliance
and integrity distinction will, among other things, identify new
research questions that can advance our knowledge about the
consequences of ethical culture. This framework points to the
possibility that compliance- or integrity-oriented approaches,
despite sharing the same goal, may have different implications
for employee motivation, attitudes and behavior (see Stimmler
and Tanner, 2019, for developing various propositions). For
example, whereas compliance factors may likely be associated
with controlled motivation, integrity factors may likely foster
autonomous motivation (Gagné and Deci, 2005). Indeed,
prompted by corporate scandals and the financial crisis,
compliance officers and risk managers have mainly implemented
compliance-based programs to prevent legal violations (Paine,
1994). Several authors have pointed out the necessity to
move beyond an exclusively compliance-based approach (Paine,
1994; Verhezen, 2010; Webb, 2012; Wieland et al., 2014).
For example, it is proposed that an integrity-oriented culture
may be more advantageous in managing misconduct, since it
builds on encouraging people’s intrinsic motivation to follow the
organizational standards. This suggestion is intuitively appealing,
but it still awaits empirical examination.
We also expand previous measures by including important
insights from the fields of behavioral ethics, social psychology
and organizational psychology into organizational factors that are
likely to be related to ethical behavior. Drawing on this research,
our measure will incorporate dimensions such as the role of
ill-conceived goals, accountability or pressure to compromise
(which will be detailed below). These dimensions have thus
far not been addressed in prior ethical culture measures.
With rule viability and rule defectiveness (which will also be
detailed below), we will adopt two new dimensions. We learned
from discussions with practitioners about those dimensions
allegedly representing two essential challenges of compliance
management. We continue by describing the German Ethical
Culture Scale (GECS).
BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE GECS
As is common in research on ethical climate or culture, we
measure employee perception of both formal elements (e.g., code
of ethics or availability of a hotline) and informal ones, since
their perception is the reality based upon employee reactions.
Building on the converging features of previous measures, we
also conceptualize ethical culture as a multi-dimensional concept.
The focus will be on dimensions that are proposed to match with
a compliance- or integrity-based strategy. As mentioned earlier,
the GECS will be designed to assess (1) people’s belief about
the extent to which an organization relies on compliance and
integrity governance strategies and (2) people’s perception about
the lived norms and expectations. These factors might inhibit or
promote the implementation of the strategies.
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Compliance Factors
A compliance-based approach to ethics management focuses
on preventing misconduct through control, monitoring and
punishment (Paine, 1994; Weaver and Treviño, 1999). Such
procedures are based on classic economic theory that following
rules is a function of extrinsic costs and benefits associated
with questionable behavior (e.g., Sutherland, 1983; Tyler and
Blader, 2005). Such strategies are also implicitly based on the
assumption that people cannot be trusted and are ethically
incompetent, which is why external controls are inevitably to
prevent wrongdoing (Weaver and Treviño, 1999; Verhezen, 2010;
Webb, 2012). Building on past studies and converging elements
of previous measures, we propose the following five aspects to
reflect a compliance-based culture:
(1) Controlling and (2) Sanctioning reflect classic governance
procedures clearly associated with a compliance strategy.
Controlling is the degree to which people believe that they are
being monitored and that misconduct is likely to be detected.
Sanctioning refers to the extent to which people believe that
unethical conduct is not tolerated and will be punished. However,
for sanctions strategies to work, organizations must also be
willing to invest resources into monitoring behavior and make
detection of misconduct sufficiently likely. These two dimensions
are similar to previous ethical culture models, which have posited
that visibility and punishment of unethical behavior is likely
to inhibit unethical behavior (Treviño et al., 1998; Kaptein,
2008a). Empirical studies on the effects of supervision and
incentives on unethical behavior are, however, controversial.
Some studies suggest that command-and-control strategies do
affect undesirable behavior, whereas other studies question the
effectiveness of such strategies (see Tyler and Blader, 2005).
Furthermore, we propose three dimensions to reflect the
(in)effectiveness of rule-based compliance strategies. (3) Rule
clarity is the extent to which rules and expectations, as they are
often portrayed in codes of ethics or conduct, are sufficiently clear
and concrete to employees. This aspect is consistent with Kaptein
(2008a), who posited that ethical standards should be concrete,
comprehensible and understandable if employees and managers
are expected to follow them. Clear rules help to reduce ambiguity
and vagueness of ethical expectations, thereby supporting ethical
behavior in positive ways. Other authors also pointed out that, for
rules to become effective for influencing behavior, one important
precondition is that they are accessible, clearly communicated
and easy to understand (Schwartz, 2001; Stevens, 2008).
(4) Rule defectiveness is the extent to which employees believe
that there are ethical gray areas or other challenging situations
where corresponding guidelines are missing. According to
Jackson (2000), an issue that has been mainly neglected in
prior studies on ethics programs is how organizations deal with
“ethical gray areas,” i.e., decisions that do not overly attract ethical
condemnation but that nevertheless represent characteristic daily
work topics that may be considered as ethical issues (e.g., Should
I call in sick to have a day off? Should I do personal business
on company time? How should I deal with giving and receiving
gifts or ethical dilemmas?). Cross-cultural studies have usually
found differences between nations and companies concerning
which ethical gray areas are perceived as important and which
are adopted in the codes of ethics (see Jackson, 2000). It is
plausible to assume that a compliance program’s efficiency in
shaping behavior is limited if employees believe that important
ethical issues and daily challenges are not appropriately addressed
in the proposed rules. To render unethical behavior less likely,
employees must believe that they have some guidance when they
are faced with important ethical issues.
(5) Rule viability refers to the degree to which the company’s
rules are perceived to complicate and hinder daily work rather
than to provide support. Various authors have expressed concerns
that if codes and rules are not deemed relevant and useful for daily
work, they are less likely to be accepted and adopted for guiding
behavior (Schwartz, 2004; Bageac et al., 2011). An additional
aspect of rule viability that has thus far hardly been addressed in
prior studies is the issue of being faced with too many rules. This
aspect can also minimize the perceived usefulness of rules. In fact,
the most prominent response to scandals in business in general
and the last financial crisis in particular has been to revise laws
and to increase regulation. More rules may increase bureaucratic
demands, but they may also confuse and disenable employees,
limiting the effectiveness of compliance strategies.
Integrity Factors
An integrity-based approach to ethics management focuses on
promoting ethical behavior through encouraging self-governance
and responsibility (Paine, 1994; Weaver and Treviño, 1999). Such
programs are based on the view that following rules is a function
of an individual’s intrinsic desire to follow organizational rules
(Tyler and Blader, 2005). Such strategies are also implicitly based
on the assumption that employees can be trusted and are prone
to follow ethical values. Hence, integrity-oriented approaches are
designed to support ethical aspirations and the identification with
and internalization of ethical standards (Weaver and Treviño,
1999; Verhezen, 2010; Webb, 2012). We propose the following
aspects to reflect an integrity-based culture:
We deem (6) accountability and (7) leader’s role modeling to
reflect two essential governance procedures that are associated
with an integrity strategy. Accountability refers to the extent to
which people are clear about who is responsible for which tasks
and has to justify one’s actions to others. To our knowledge,
accountability has not been addressed in previous ethical cultural
models. The argument is, however, that if an organization
makes clear that its members are responsible for what they
do, this action can intrinsically motivate employees to feel a
personal responsibility and a desire to bring behavior in line
with corporate rules and ethical standards. We believe that, in
contrast, an organization lacking such a governance strategy is
more likely to encourage rationalization processes, such as denial
of responsibility (Anand et al., 2004).
It is important to acknowledge, however, that accountability
has at least three facets. We use the term “task accountability” to
refer to who is accountable for which tasks. Being a member of
an organization with a hierarchical structure or being involved
in teams and collective decision-making tasks is likely to provide
people with opportunities to free themselves from personal
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responsibility. Bandura (1990, 1999) called, e.g., passing the cause
of wrongdoing to others displacement of responsibility, and the
dispersion of tasks and blame across the members of a group
diffusion of responsibility. Consistent with past research in social
psychology and behavioral ethics, we refer to “outcome” and
“procedural accountability” when organizational members are
expected either to justify the results of their decisions (outcome)
or to justify how decisions were made (procedural). Empirical
studies have shown that accountability can encourage self-critical
and deliberate thinking (e.g., Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). The
studies by Pitesa and Thau (2013) are also noteworthy. They have
provided evidence that organizations holding their employees
accountable for their choice procedures (compared to holding
them accountable for performance outcomes) reduced agents’
propensity to behave in a self-serving, unethical manner. In other
words, employees should in practice be judged on not only the
basis of the achieved outcomes but also how those outcomes
were accomplished.
Leader’s role modeling refers to the extent to which employees
perceive their top management or direct supervisors as role
models for ethical conduct. Several authors have proposed ethical
leadership to be a crucial element of a value-based organization
that guides employee thought and action (see e.g., Treviño et al.,
1998; Kaptein, 2008a; Ruiz et al., 2011; Wieland et al., 2014).
Leader’s behaviors do reflect the values of the organizational
culture. Therefore, managers and supervisors do play a crucial
role in setting the ethical tone in an organization and by living up
to the values. Furthermore, through a process of social learning
(Bandura, 1986), employees are likely to adopt the values and
behaviors of the managers.
Many empirical studies have shown that leaders being
perceived as ethical models is likely to affect followers’ ethical
intentions and behaviors in positive ways (e.g., Brown and
Treviño, 2006; Tanner et al., 2010; Ruiz et al., 2011; Ruiz-
Palomino and Linuesa-Langreo, 2018). Some authors treat role
modeling of top management and role modeling of supervisors
as two distinct categories that affect employees’ responses in
distinct ways (Kaptein, 2008a; Ruiz et al., 2011). Both, however,
are expected to be negatively related to unethical behavior.
Furthermore, three dimensions are proposed to hinder
the effectiveness of integrity-based strategies. (8) Pressure to
compromise is the extent to which people experience role/value
conflicts and pressure from the organization to counter their own
sense of right and wrong. The sources of such pressures may be
job or role demands, authority figures or working teams that push
the employee in behavioral directions that are inconsistent with
ethical standards. Previous organizational, business or behavioral
ethics research suggests that employees who feel pressure to
behave counter to their conscience are likely to suffer from
stress and burnout (e.g., Örtqvist and Wincent, 2006; Eatough
et al., 2011; Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2012). A meta-analytic
study by Örtqvist and Wincent (2006) indicated that among
the most prominent consequences of role conflict were job
dissatisfaction, loss of organizational commitment and emotional
exhaustion. Another meta-analysis by Eatough et al. (2011) found
a negative relationship between role conflict and organizational
citizenship behavior (OCB).
It seems therefore plausible to assume that organizational
members’ believing that they are expected to compromise their
own values is likely to discourage intrinsic motivation to identify
with organizational values and to render unethical behavior more
likely. Consistent with this point, empirical studies have shown
that a mismatch between the expectations of the employees and
the organization is likely to not only lower job satisfaction but
also increase cheating (Burks and Krupka, 2012) or other forms
of unethical behavior (Suar and Khuntia, 2010).
(9) Obedience refers to the extent to which people believe
that they are expected to be subordinate, keeping authorities
and tasks unquestioned (Treviño et al., 1999). Such expectations
are likely to enforce a culture of fear and silence rather than
a culture of voice (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Kish-Gephart
et al., 2009). While research has suggested multiple factors that
can affect the choice to remain silent or to speak up (for an
overview, see Morrison, 2014), one common explanation for
why people hesitate to speak up is related to fear. Kish-Gephart
et al. (2009) found across several studies that a substantial
number of respondents reported remaining silent out of fear of
experiencing negative personal, social or material consequences.
If organization members feel uncomfortable to speak up, such
people hardly feel encouraged to practice self-regulation and
moral responsibility. In contrast, in such an environment, people
may feel not committed and willing to adhere to corporate
rules and standards. They may also be likely to withhold input
about questionable practices (Snell, 1999; Miceli et al., 2008;
Detert et al., 2010). Consistent with this reasoning, Kaptein
(2011), for example, found that the opportunity for employees
to raise concerns and discuss ethical issues is associated with less-
unethical behavior. Additionally, Treviño et al. (1999) found that
employees perceiving a structure that expects obedience from
them were less willing to report ethical or legal violations or to
forward bad news to management.
(10) Ill-conceived goals are the extent to which the organization
is seen as mainly relying on competitive and economic goals
(Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011). Thus far, prior ethical culture
models have not addressed this issue. A growing body of
research in the field of behavioral ethics, however, has shown
that despite the beneficial role of goals in increasing achievement
motivation and productivity, goals can also lead to undesirable
side effects by encouraging unethical behavior. Indeed, empirical
research has demonstrated that people facing competitive or too
challenging (also stretch) goals (Barsky, 2008) are more likely
to exhibit cheating (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2004; Schwieren and
Weichselbaumer, 2010; Welsh and Ordóñez, 2014) and lower
intrinsic work motivation (Ordóñez et al., 2009). Similarly, Van
Yperen et al. (2011) have shown that interpersonal achievement
goals (that emphasize competition among colleagues) are more
likely than are intrapersonal goals (that emphasize mastering
a task) to increase cheating. Thus, the argument here is
that too challenging, competitive goals hardly support the
development of moral responsibility, thereby making unethical
behavior more likely.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of integrity-oriented programs
may also be undermined by an organization focusing only
on economic or self-interested goals in the workplace while
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not questioning its compatibility with ethical aspirations.
For example, an organization may attempt to build on
integrity and ethical values, but employees may nevertheless
perceive their organizational environment as emphasizing only
economic and egoistic goals. Consistent with this point, Kish-
Gephart et al. (2010) found meta-analytic evidence for a
positive relationship between an egoistic ethical climate and
unethical behavior.
Thus, acknowledging the importance of the role of goal-
setting, this dimension was also included in our instrument.
However, as with the dimension accountability, we distinguish
between various facets of ill-conceived goals. Acknowledging
this literature, we distinguish between goal-setting with regard
to its focus on “competition” and with regard to its focus
on “economic” goals. An ethical culture mainly focusing
on competition and economic goals is expected to be less
likely to promote responsibility and adherence to ethical
standards and behavior.
OVERVIEW OF SAMPLES AND STUDIES
The primary objective of the following studies was to develop
and assess the validity of the GECS. For the following studies,
data from three independent and heterogeneous samples of
employees and managers in Switzerland and Germany were used.
To test the questionnaire, it was important to us to have a
broad sample of employees and managers from various economic
sectors and from various hierarchical levels. Participants were
therefore recruited from panels of participants of market research
agencies. All data were collected through online surveys. Samples
A and B were used to develop the instrument and to perform
an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor
analyses (CFAs) to provide first evidence for the construct
validity of the measure. Sample B was also used to assess the
criterion related and incremental validity by testing its relation
to (observed) deviant workplace behaviors, based on regression
analyses. Finally, Sample C was used to take first steps to provide
evidence of the convergent validity of the GECS. The studies
were conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the
Zeppelin University and the Swiss Psychological Society. The
samples are briefly described below. Table 1 reports further
work-related characteristics.
Sample A: This sample consisted of 300 (German-speaking)
Swiss employees and managers working in divers economic
sectors. Of these respondents, 36.3% were female, and mean age
was 42.6 years (SD = 12.6, range: 16–72 years).
Sample B: This sample consisted of 990 German employees
and managers, after 17 participants had to be excluded from the
analysis because of a lack of variation in their answering pattern.
Of these respondents, 46.6% were female, and mean age was
44.6 years (SD = 11.23, range: 21–74 years).
Sample C: This sample consisted of 493 German and 498
Swiss participants (total N = 991), after exclusion of nine
participants due to a lack of variation in their answering pattern.
Of this sample, 46.1% were female, and mean age was 44.4 years
(SD = 12.81, age range: 16–75 years).







Country Switzerland Germany Switzerland/
Germany
Employment
Full-time 91.7% 72.9% 66.7%
Part-time 5.7% 27.1% 33.3%
Job position
Non-Management Level 54.3% 58.4% 65.9%
Lower management 17.0% 17.8% 15.0%
Middle management 13.7% 17.7% 12.7%
Upper management 15.0% 6.2% 6.3%
Tenure (in current organization)
<1 year 9.3% 0.3% 1.1%
1–2 years 16.3% 15.8% 25.6%
3–5 years 21.0% 22.3% 21.1%
6–10 years 19.7% 20.4% 18.5%
>10 years 33.7% 41.2% 33.6%
Company size
<50 employees 32.0% 28.1% 29.4%
50–249 employees 23.3% 20.2% 22.5%
250–10,000 employees 32.7% 36.8% 36.7%
>10,000 employees 12.0% 14.9% 11.4%
Economic Sector
Agriculture and Energy 3.7% 2.0% 1.3%
Industry 28.0% 18.5% 17.3%
Services 57.7% 71.1% 73.3%
Others 10.7% 8.4% 8.1%
In sample A, 2.6% of participants were currently unemployed but worked in an
organization in the past 2 years for at least 9 months.
In the following, we present the development of the GECS,
its factorial structure and psychometric properties (Study 1a, 1b).
We then present results on the criterion-related and incremental
validity (Study 2) and tests on construct validity with external
constructs (Study 3).
Study 1a – Initial Development of
Instrument
In a first preliminary step, an initial pool of items was generated
based on the definition of the dimensions proposed to be
related to compliance and integrity, as explained in the previous
section. We first created items to assess the following constructs:
controlling, sanctioning, rule clarity, rule defectiveness, and
rule viability (proposed to represent compliance factors) and
accountability, role modeling of top management, role modeling
of supervisors, pressure to compromise, obedience, and ill-
conceived goals (proposed to represent integrity factors).
Our aim was to develop simple items that avoid, as often
as possible, terms such as “ethical” or “moral.” Examination of
previous instruments revealed that they often include items that
may be somewhat precarious, since they utilize the word “ethical”
in the wording. Such items, however, may be problematic since
they require from the respondents an understanding of what
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characterizes ethical or responsible conduct, which is often
not self-evident. We tried to avoid this shortcoming whenever
possible for this reason and also as an attempt to minimize
socially desirable responses.
Furthermore, our intention was ultimately to have a relatively
short but sound inventory. Of course, the generally accepted
argument is that longer instruments tend to have better
psychometric properties than shorter ones do (Gosling et al.,
2003). However, researchers are often faced with the problem
that time is limited and employees or managers are simply
not willing to fill out lengthy questionnaires. In such cases
(as is true in our research domain), practicable and efficient
measures are necessary. We therefore sought to have a minimum
of three items for each subscale. For accountability and ill-
conceived goals, since they contain nuanced facets, we wished
to have a minimum of six items (accountability with its
facets task, outcome and procedural accountability) and four
items (ill-conceived goals with its facets competition and
economic goals).
To this end, 34 items were developed by us, and 27 items were
adapted from prior instruments (e.g., Treviño et al., 1998; Brown
et al., 2005; Kaptein, 2008a). The items were then discussed with
three doctoral candidates experienced with the field. Based on
their inputs, items were reworded. An initial pool of 61 items
was then subjected to a first EFA (principle axis factor analysis,
promax rotation) with data collected from Sample A (N = 300).
Participants rated each item using a 5-point Likert-style format
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), including the response
option no answer is applicable.
Based on this EFA, we removed 23 items with loadings lower
than 0.45 on one factor and cross-loadings higher than loadings
of 0.30. Rerunning the EFA with the remaining 38 items resulted
in nine factors (eigenvalues > 1). However, recognizing that
several subscales were insufficiently represented, we repeated the
item-generation and item-selection process in Study 1B.
Study 1b – Instrument Refinement and
Factor Analyses
We conducted a second iteration of instrument development.
Using EFA, we examined the scale’s factorial structure and
psychometric properties with data collected from Sample B
(N = 990). The goal of Study 1B was also to assess the robustness
of the proposed factor structure by conducting CFAs across
Sample B and Sample C (N = 991).
Measure
In addition to the remaining items from Study 1a (38 items),
new items were created in this second iteration. We added
more items to those constructs, which were suggested to have
nuanced facets (accountability, ill-conceived goals) (plus 15
items), and we also created some new items in the remaining
scales (4 items) just to be on the safe side when subjecting the
items to new analyses. In this stage, we also discussed content
and comprehensiveness of the items with three business ethics
scholars and three specialists with significant practical expertise
in ethics management. Especially from the practitioners, we
learned about rule viability and rule defectiveness as representing
two essential challenges in the managerial practice of compliance
management, which we consequently also included in our item
pool (plus 10 items). Based on the input of those external experts,
items were adapted, resulting in a final pool of 67 items.
The items describe concepts related to compliance
(controlling, sanctioning, rule clarity, rule defectiveness,
and rule viability) and integrity (accountability, role modeling
of top management, role modeling of direct supervisor, pressure
to compromise, obedience, and ill-conceived goals). Again,
participants rated each item on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 5 = strongly agree), including the response option
no answer is applicable. The items of the final instrument (37
items) – the original German items and the English translation
(based on Brislin, 1976) – can be found in the Supplementary
Table 1. Sample items include the following (English translation):
“In my work environment, measures are carried out to detect
rule violations and misconduct” (controlling); “In my work
environment, people who engage in dishonest behavior are
disciplined” (sanction); “My organization makes it sufficiently
clear to me which behaviors are right or wrong” (rule clarity);
“Some of the organization’s rules are intentionally not or
vaguely defined” (rule defectiveness); “The organization’s code
of conduct makes everything complicated” (rule viability);
“In my workplace, how goals are achieved also plays a role”
(accountability); “My direct supervisor is a good model of
integrity” (role modeling of direct supervisor); “In my work
environment, I am sometimes asked to do things that are in
conflict with my conscience” (pressure to compromise); “I
am expected to do what I am told” (obedience); and “In my
workplace, I can only make a career by outperforming others”
(ill-conceived goals).
Results
Building on the data from Sample B, the initial item analyses
revealed no peculiarities. The pool of 67 items was then
again subjected to an EFA (principal component analysis,
promax rotation).
We removed items with factor loadings less than 0.45 on
one factor and cross-loadings higher than loadings of 0.30.
These changes ultimately resulted in an instrument of 37
items (see Supplementary Table 1). Rerunning the EFA on
this instrument reduced the 37-item measures to 10 distinct
factors (eigenvalues > 1.0) corresponding to controlling (three
items), sanctioning (three items), rule clarity (three items),
rule defectiveness (three items), rule viability (three items),
accountability (six items), pressure to compromise (four items),
obedience (three items), and ill-conceived goals (four items).
Role modeling of top management and role modeling of direct
supervisors were not revealed as two separate factors. They were
therefore combined into one leader’s role modeling factor (five
items). All factors accounted for 72.07% of the variance. The
factor loadings are reported in Table 2.
Table 3 reports the means, standard deviations, internal
consistencies (Cronbach’s alphas), and intercorrelations among
the subscales. The subscales in this table were calculated by
averaging the corresponding item scores. As shown, each scale
showed good internal consistency (αs between 0.72 and 0.91).
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TABLE 2 | EFA factor loadings and CFA standardized factor loadings (Study 1b).
Factor loadings
PCA CFA
(Sample B) (Sample B and C)
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 λ B λC
Controlling 1 0.09 0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.07 0.07 −0.07 −0.08 0.92 0.81 0.80
Controlling 2 −0.01 −0.06 0.02 0.04 −0.06 −0.03 0.06 −0.04 0.13 0.91 0.85 0.85
Controlling 3 −0.10 0.10 −0.02 −0.03 0.22 0.16 −0.20 0.27 −0.08 0.48 0.48 0.59
Sanctioning 1 −0.05 0.05 0.00 −0.03 −0.07 −0.03 0.04 0.94 −0.07 −0.02 0.78 0.80
Sanctioning 2 0.01 −0.07 −0.04 −0.01 −0.06 0.01 0.01 0.89 0.08 0.01 0.83 0.73
Sanctioning 3 0.19 −0.15 −0.02 0.17 0.05 −0.05 0.06 0.54 0.10 −0.08 0.55 0.58
Rule Clarity 1 0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.92 0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 −0.03 0.91 0.88
Rule Clarity 2 −0.05 0.05 0.03 0.89 −0.03 −0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.83 0.88
Rule Clarity 3 0.06 −0.07 −0.01 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.04 −0.05 0.02 0.02 0.86 0.82
Rule Defectiveness 1 −0.08 −0.04 0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.02 0.85 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.83 0.79
Rule Defectiveness 2 −0.05 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.82 −0.02 −0.03 0.03 0.88 0.88
Rule Defectiveness 3 0.02 0.18 −0.01 0.02 0.07 −0.04 0.78 0.10 −0.10 0.01 0.73 0.70
Rule Viability 1 0.10 −0.09 0.00 0.01 −0.05 0.96 −0.04 −0.01 0.02 0.03 0.72 0.69
Rule Viability 2 0.07 0.06 0.04 −0.04 −0.03 0.87 0.05 0.02 0.02 −0.03 0.88 0.90
Rule Viability 3 0.04 0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.07 0.81 0.09 −0.05 0.09 −0.06 0.87 0.82
Accountability 1 −0.13 −0.07 0.87 −0.02 0.10 0.11 −0.05 −0.02 −0.12 −0.02 0.67 0.82
Accountability 2 −0.01 −0.06 0.83 −0.05 0.02 0.06 0.07 −0.01 0.10 −0.01 0.64 0.74
Accountability 3 0.10 0.09 0.74 0.02 −0.16 −0.10 0.08 −0.12 −0.01 −0.02 0.68 0.74
Accountability 4 0.11 −0.05 0.66 0.01 0.02 −0.14 −0.02 −0.01 0.07 −0.03 0.74 0.77
Accountability 5 −0.04 −0.04 0.60 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.05 0.13 −0.13 0.07 0.61 0.55
Accountability 6 0.11 0.07 0.56 0.05 −0.05 −0.12 −0.15 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.66 0.64
Role Modeling 1 0.96 0.00 −0.03 0.02 0.05 0.09 −0.04 −0.06 0.00 0.03 0.94 0.92
Role Modeling 2 0.95 0.00 −0.06 0.08 0.03 0.11 −0.02 −0.08 −0.05 0.02 0.90 0.86
Role Modeling 3 0.94 −0.01 −0.05 0.04 0.09 0.10 −0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.89 0.91
Role Modeling 4 0.68 0.09 0.16 −0.13 0.02 −0.10 −0.03 0.14 −0.04 −0.01 0.67 0.68
Role Modeling 5 0.65 0.10 0.16 −0.09 −0.10 −0.03 0.03 0.15 −0.02 −0.01 0.62 0.67
Pressure To Compromise 1 0.04 0.92 −0.02 0.02 −0.07 −0.02 0.02 −0.03 0.06 0.03 0.87 0.87
Pressure To Compromise 2 0.07 0.89 −0.05 0.04 0.01 −0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.06 −0.01 0.86 0.85
Pressure To Compromise 3 0.05 0.86 −0.04 −0.02 0.00 −0.04 0.03 −0.05 0.02 0.02 0.81 0.76
Pressure To Compromise 4 −0.04 0.81 0.04 −0.05 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.00 −0.05 0.87 0.87
Obedience 1 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 −0.01 0.05 −0.03 0.01 0.89 0.00 0.77 0.81
Obedience 2 −0.10 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.80 0.01 0.90 0.91
Obedience 3 −0.13 0.17 −0.01 −0.09 0.13 0.08 −0.04 0.04 0.54 0.02 0.72 0.84
Ill-Conceived Goals 1 0.01 −0.20 0.02 −0.04 0.86 −0.06 0.07 −0.07 0.14 0.04 0.63 0.63
Ill-Conceived Goals 2 0.26 −0.07 −0.05 −0.08 0.85 −0.17 0.14 −0.03 0.07 −0.03 0.56 0.53
Ill-Conceived Goals 3 −0.09 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.66 0.07 0.01 −0.01 −0.10 −0.05 0.76 0.85
Ill-Conceived Goals 4 −0.11 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.65 0.05 −0.14 −0.02 −0.11 −0.04 0.76 0.85
Factors: 1 = Leader’s Role Modeling, 2 = Pressure to Compromise, 3 = Accountability, 4 = Rule Clarity, 5 = Ill-Conceived Goals, 6 = Rule Viability, 7 = Rule Defectiveness,
8 = Sanctioning, 9 = Obedience, 10 = Controlling; λ = standardized factor loadings of the CFA (Model C with 10 first-order factors and correlated error terms for role
modeling of top management items).
The GECS with the final item set (37 items) was then sent
online to Sample C. We next tested robustness of the proposed
model by conducting a series of CFAs across Samples B and
C. CFAs were performed using AMOS 22 maximum likelihood
estimation of covariance. The answer no answer is applicable
was coded as missing values; hence, we were allowed to estimate
means and intercepts.
Five models were estimated and compared: Model A with one
factor, Model B with two factors (compliance and integrity) and
Model C with the proposed 10 factors. With Models D and E,
we also examined whether the 10 factors can be summarized
into higher-order factors. In the theory section, we proposed
that compliance and integrity would converge at two higher-
order constructs (controlling, sanctioning, clarity, defectiveness
and viability of rules should load onto a compliance factor;
accountability, leader’s role modeling, pressure to compromise,
obedience, ill-conceived goals should load onto an integrity
factor, Model E). We compared this Model E with the
alternative Model D (10 factors loading on one higher-
order construct).
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TABLE 3 | Correlation matrix of the GECS factors, means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas (Sample B, Study 1b).
M (SD) α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(1) Controlling 3.43 (0.90) 0.72
(2) Sanctioning 3.47 (0.88) 0.74 0.46∗∗∗
(3) Rule clarity 3.99 (0.91) 0.90 0.39∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(4) Rule defectiveness 2.71 (1.08) 0.85 −0.04 −0.13∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(5) Rule viability 2.73 (1.08) 0.86 −0.01 −0.14∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(6) Accountability 3.59 (0.73) 0.83 0.36∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(7) Leader’s role modeling 3.43 (1.01) 0.91 0.28∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(8) Pressure to compromise 2.38 (1.09) 0.91 −0.01 −0.11∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(9) Obedience 2.95 (1.00) 0.83 0.02 −0.06 −0.09∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(10) Ill-conceived goals 2.81 (0.91) 0.77 0.19∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.03 0.36∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.12∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
To assess the model fit, the chi-square (χ2/df ), comparative
fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis-Index (TLI) and root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) were used. According to
previous studies, it is suggested that χ2/df should be equal to or
less than 3 or at least less than 5. For CFI and TLI, values above
0.90 are regarded as acceptable, and values close to or greater
than 0.95 are regarded as good fit. For RMSEA, values equal to
or less than 0.07 indicate a good fit. To compare the models, we
used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), with smaller values
indicating a better-fitting model (see, e.g., Wheaton et al., 1977;
Hooper et al., 2008).
An examination of modification indices revealed high error
covariance between the two top management role-modeling
items in Models C, D, and E. When the two error terms were
free to correlate, the fit was clearly improved. Importantly,
this modification also makes theoretical sense because prior
research suggested that role modeling of top management and
role modeling of supervisors are two distinct constructs (Kaptein,
2008a; Ruiz et al., 2011).
Table 4 displays the fit statistics of the models. The results
repeatedly revealed across all samples that the ten-factor solution
(Model C) fit the data better than did the one- or two-factor
solution (Models A and B), which was also confirmed by χ2-
difference tests between the three nested first-order models.
Based on the criteria, all fit indices indicated a good or acceptable
fit for the 10-factor model. The same applies to the two
second-order models (D and E), with the exception of CFI and
TLI, which were marginally below the recommended criteria.
Comparing the two second-order factor models, χ2-difference
tests pointed to Model E (with two second-order factors: Integrity
and Compliance) fitting the data better than did Model D (with
one second-order factor: Ethical Culture). Testing the robustness
of our Models C, D, and E separately for the Swiss and German
respondents of Sample C also yielded very similar results for
both countries. Overall, the results largely supported the 10-factor
solution but also deemed second-order factors acceptable. CFA
standardized factor loadings of the 10-factor model (Model C)
are reported in Table 2.
We examined convergent validity of the 10 factors by assessing
average variance extracted (AVE) in the CFAs (Fornell and
Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2014). The results are reported in
Table 5. With regard to AVE, the analyses revealed that most
constructs were greater than 0.50, as recommended (Fornell and
Larcker, 1981). Just for accountability (AVE = 0.45) and ill-
conceived goals (AVE = 0.46), but only in Sample B, the criterion
was not met. We assume that the reason the AVE of those
factors is below the recommended threshold is that accountability
and ill-conceived goals may be more heterogeneous in content.
However, with data from Sample C, the criterion of 0.5 was met
for all constructs.
We also examined divergent validity by AVE. Adequate
divergent validity is given when the square root of the variance
extracted from each of the factors is greater than the correlations
between each pair of factors (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). As
shown in Table 5, all factors satisfy this condition with data from
both Samples B and C.
Study 2 – Criterion-Related and
Incremental Validity
To establish criterion-related validity, the association between the
GECS and deviant workplace behavior was considered with data
from Sample B. To minimize potential social desirability bias, we
administered observed and not self-reported deviant workplace
behavior (which is assumed to be more susceptible to socially
desirable responding and impression management), and we used
different response formats to assess the predictor and criterion
variables. Specifically, we expected controlling, sanctioning, rule
clarity, accountability, and leader’s role modeling to be associated
with less observed deviant workplace behavior. We expected
rule defectiveness, rule viability, pressure to compromise,
obedience, and ill-conceived goals to be associated with more
observed misconduct.
Several authors have argued that to align employee’s behavior
with ethical standards, it is important to move beyond
compliance-oriented strategies, since control and punishment
may prevent wrongdoing, but they do not necessarily change
convictions (e.g., Paine, 1994; Tyler and Blader, 2005). Integrity-
based strategies, on the other hand, encourage personal
commitment to ethical aspirations, thereby being more successful
in affecting behavior (e.g., Weaver and Treviño, 1999). If so,
we should be able to find that integrity factors will account for
variance increments over and above the compliance factors.
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TABLE 4 | Goodness-of-Fit Indices of CFA models (Study 1b).
Model χ2(df) χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA AIC χ2 difference tests
1χ2 1 df
Sample B (N = 990)
A: 1 factor (Ethical Culture) 13736.22 (629)∗∗∗ 21.84 0.39 0.36 0.15 13958.22 A–C 11897.49∗∗∗ 46
B: 2 factors (Integrity, Compliance) 12485.15 (628)∗∗∗ 19.88 0.43 0.36 0.14 12709.15 B–C 10646.42∗∗∗ 45
C: 10 factorsa 1838.73 (583)∗∗∗ 3.15 0.94 0.93 0.05 2152.73
D: 10 first ordera, 1 second-order factor (EC) 3015.02 (618)∗∗∗ 4.88 0.89 0.87 0.06 3259.02 D–E 32.58∗∗∗ 1
E: 10 first ordera, 2 second-order factors 2982.44 (617)∗∗∗ 4.83 0.89 0.87 0.06 3228.44
(Integrity, Compliance)
Sample C (N = 991)
A: 1 factor (Ethical Culture) 13025.28 (629)∗∗∗ 20.71 0.42 0.35 0.14 13247.28 A–C 11153.60∗∗∗ 46
B: 2 factors (Integrity, Compliance) 11896.09 (628)∗∗∗ 18.94 0.47 0.41 0.14 12120.09 B–C 10024.41∗∗∗ 45
C: 10 factorsa 1871.68 (583)∗∗∗ 3.21 0.94 0.93 0.05 2185.68
D: 10 first ordera, 1 second-order factor (EC) 3001.54 (618)∗∗∗ 4.86 0.89 0.87 0.06 3245.54 D–E 7.07∗∗ 1
E: 10 first ordera, 2 second-order factors 2994.47 (617)∗∗∗ 4.85 0.89 0.87 0.06 3240.47
(Integrity, Compliance)
EC, Ethical Culture. In models C, D, and E, the error terms for the two-role modeling of top management items were allowed to correlate. aThe 10 factors are as
follows: controlling, sanctioning, rule clarity, rule defectiveness, rule viability, accountability, leader’s role modeling, pressure to compromise, obedience, ill-conceived
goals. ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 5 | Convergent and discriminant validity of the 10-Factor Model (Model C) (Study 1b).
Latent constructs AVE Square root of AVE Latent construct correlation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Sample B (N = 990)
(1) Controlling 0.54 0.73
(2) Sanctioning 0.53 0.73 0.52
(3) Rule clarity 0.75 0.87 0.44 0.48
(4) Rule defectiveness 0.66 0.81 −0.11 −0.16 −0.27
(5) Rule viability 0.68 0.83 −0.10 −0.15 −0.19 0.58
(6) Accountability 0.45 0.67 0.44 0.54 0.50 −0.29 −0.35
(7) Leader’s role modeling 0.66 0.81 0.33 0.41 0.38 −0.34 −0.29 0.63
(8) Pressure to compromise 0.73 0.85 −0.09 −0.10 −0.18 0.63 0.57 −0.24 −0.36
(9) Obedience 0.64 0.80 −0.02 −0.04 −0.07 0.43 0.48 −0.23 −0.40 0.64
(10) Ill-conceived goals 0.46 0.68 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.43 0.43 −0.03 −0.17 0.62 0.55
Sample C (N = 991)
(1) Controlling 0.56 0.75
(2) Sanctioning 0.50 0.71 0.62
(3) Rule clarity 0.74 0.86 0.50 0.58
(4) Rule defectiveness 0.63 0.79 −0.06 −0.17 −0.30
(5) Rule viability 0.65 0.81 0.08 −0.07 −0.14 0.48
(6) Accountability 0.51 0.71 0.33 0.47 0.48 −0.39 −0.39
(7) Leader’s role modeling 0.67 0.82 0.30 0.36 0.40 −0.37 −0.34 0.63
(8) Pressure to compromise 0.70 0.84 0.01 −0.17 −0.23 0.59 0.52 −0.39 −0.47
(9) Obedience 0.72 0.85 0.07 −0.07 −0.05 0.35 0.43 −0.35 −0.40 0.57
(10) Ill-conceived goals 0.53 0.73 0.20 0.13 0.03 0.33 0.43 −0.20 −0.27 0.53 0.50
AVE, average variance extracted.
Measures
Observed deviant workplace behavior
Beyond the GECS, participants were also asked to report
observed misconduct in the workplace. Drawing on a German
version of Kaptein’s (2008b) scale of observer-reports of unethical
behavior (Kaptein, 2011; Zuber and Kaptein, 2014), participants
were asked how often in the past 12 months they had observed
or had first-hand knowledge of intra- or extra-organizational
deviant behaviors in their work environment (e.g., discriminating
against others due to age, gender, or sexual orientation; violating
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contracts or lawful rules; misleading others; or stealing; 19 items).
Consistent with Kaptein (2008b, 2011) and Zuber and Kaptein
(2014), responses were given on a 5-point frequency scale (never,
rarely, sometimes, often, almost always), including the response
option no answer is applicable.
Formal factors of ethics programs
Participants were also asked about the availability of formal
codes or other forms of internal formal ethics programs in their
organization, such as the existence of a code of ethics, ethical
training, a telephone hotline, availability of ethics officers, formal
ethics controls or an ethics report (adapted from Kaptein, 2014).
Possible answers were yes, no, and not applicable.
Results
To assess criterion-related and incremental validity, correlation
and regression analyses were conducted to examine the relation
between the GECS dimensions and the dependent variable
(observed deviant workplace behavior). As mentioned above,
the observer-based reports on deviant workplace behaviors were
assessed using a 5-point frequency scale. Though such scales
are widely used in social sciences, we decided to dichotomize
the response scale, partly because of its skewness and kurtosis
but mainly because we can hardly expect participants to have a
common understanding of “rarely, sometimes, and often.” The
linguistic meaning of those frequency expressions is too vague.
Consistent with this reasoning is Bocklisch et al. (2012), who
showed that the positions and shape of participant response
patterns varied considerably and that frequency expressions
such as “rarely, sometimes, often” were hardly equidistantly
distributed. Dichotomizing reduces this linguistic vagueness. We
first dichotomized each item (0 indicates that the corresponding
behavior was never observed; 1 indicates that this behavior was
observed at least rarely; see also Zuber and Kaptein, 2014).
Calculating the sum across all items then yielded the number
of situations across which misconduct was observed (ranging
from 0 to 19). This variable served as a criterion variable in the
regression analyses.
The results of the bivariate correlations and hierarchical
regression analyses are depicted in Table 6. The bivariate
correlations between the ten dimensions composing the GECS
and the deviant workplace behavior scale were all significant
(ps < 0.01) and in expected directions (see Table 6, last
column). Using regression analyses, we then tested how strongly
sociodemographic variables (step 1), formal factors of ethics
programs (step 2), compliance factors (step 3) and integrity
factors (step 4) contribute to the variance in the outcome
variable deviant workplace behavior. As scores for the GECS
dimensions, we entered the factor scores of the PCA. As shown
in Table 6, entering the formal factors (step 2) following the
sociodemographic variables (step 1) increased the accounting for
predicted variance from 3 to 6%. Entering the compliance factors
of the GECS further increased the explained variance from 6 to
33%. However, entering the integrity factors again increased the
explained variance from 33 to 48%. Thus, the results provide
evidence for the incremental validity of the GECS over and above
formal factors, but they also support the view that the integrity
factors contribute to predicting observed misconduct even above
the compliance factors.
Though not shown in the table, we also conducted an
analysis using only the integrity factors (after entering the
sociodemographic variables and ethics programs factors) to
better compare the overall utility of the compliance versus
integrity factors in predicting the criterion variable. This model
explained 46% of the variance in deviant workplace behavior,
while the model with the compliance factors, as mentioned above,
explained 33% of the variance. These results further confirm that
the utility of the compliance approach is relevant but somewhat
weaker than that of an integrity- or value-oriented approach.
Overall, the final analysis revealed that 6 of 10 dimensions of
the GECS were significant predictors of the extent of observed
misconduct (ps < 0.05). The significant positive relations
indicated that, as expected, participants reporting higher levels
of rule defectiveness, rule viability, pressure to compromise, or
ill-conceived goals were likely to observe more misconduct. The
significant negative relations indicated that participants reporting
higher levels of controlling or of accountability were likely to
report less misconduct at work.
Study 3 – Construct Validity
Data from Sample C (N = 991) were used to provide further
evidence of the measure’s construct validity by comparing the
GECS with other established measures of related constructs. We
examined convergent validity by examining the relations between
the composite measures of compliance and integrity factors and
theoretically related constructs. As previous authors suggested
that an integrity-based culture is more focused on enabling
self-governance and personal commitment (e.g., Paine, 1994;
Verhezen, 2010; Wieland et al., 2014), we expected integrity-
based factors to correlate positively with autonomous motivation
and negatively with controlled motivation. In contrast, given that
a compliance-based culture is proposed to be more focused
on controlling people, we hypothesized that compliance-based
factors of the GECS would correlate positively with controlled
but negatively with autonomous motivation. To assess those
relations, we included a well-known work motivation measure
(Gagné and Deci, 2005).
Furthermore, we included a measure of duty orientation
reflecting people’s volitional obligation to perform organizational
tasks, groups and missions (Hannah et al., 2014). This
scale was originally developed in the context of active
army soldiers but later also employed with government
and corporate employees. This scale is interesting for us
to examine construct validity, since it distinguishes between
adherence to normative codes and rules (duty to code),
the willingness to support and serve one’s group and its
members (duty to members), and the willingness to support
the purpose of the group and to make personal sacrifices
(duty to mission). We expected both integrity and compliance-
oriented factors of organizations to be positively related to duty
orientation, since the purpose of both GECS components is
ultimately to ensure employees’ consistency with organizational
codes and standards. However, since compliance-oriented
programs are more focused on compliance with rules, we
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TABLE 6 | Results on hierarchical regressions and correlations with deviant workplace behavior (Sample B, Study 2).
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
β SE β SE β SE β SE r
Sociodemographics
Female 0.04 0.68 0.03 0.67 0.01 0.57 0.03 0.50 −0.07∗
Age −0.05 0.03 −0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 −0.12∗∗∗
Job position 0.11∗ 0.31 0.13∗∗ 0.31 0.11∗ 0.26 0.10∗ 0.24 0.16∗∗∗
Years in company −0.10 0.04 −0.08 0.04 −0.02 0.03 −0.02 0.03 −0.02
Size of the company 0.17∗∗∗ 0.33 0.19∗∗∗ 0.34 0.08 0.30 0.04 0.27 0.06
Formal factors
Ethics code −0.02 0.73 0.02 0.62 0.04 0.55 −0.02
Ethics training 0.03 0.84 −0.01 0.71 0.06 0.63 0.00
Telephone hotline −0.22∗∗∗ 0.77 −0.17∗∗∗ 0.66 −0.12∗∗ 0.58 −0.07∗
Ethics office 0.10 0.93 0.10 0.79 0.07 0.70 0.07
Ethics control −0.09 0.81 −0.03 0.72 −0.06 0.63 −0.02
Ethics report 0.10 1.01 0.10 0.86 0.04 0.77 0.11∗∗
GECS – Compliance
Controlling −0.13∗∗ 0.30 −0.10∗ 0.27 −0.17∗∗∗
Sanctioning 0.02 0.31 0.03 0.29 −0.10∗∗
Rule clarity −0.12∗ 0.29 −0.07 0.26 −0.28∗∗∗
Rule defectiveness 0.26∗∗∗ 0.28 0.10∗ 0.27 0.43∗∗∗
Rule viability 0.31∗∗∗ 0.29 0.10∗ 0.29 0.41∗∗∗
GECS – Integrity
Accountability −0.16∗∗ 0.31 −0.29∗∗∗
Leader’s role modeling 0.01 0.30 −0.36∗∗∗
Pressure to compromise 0.40∗∗∗ 0.30 0.58∗∗∗
Obedience 0.04 0.28 0.33∗∗∗
Ill-conceived goals 0.11∗ 0.28 0.36∗∗∗
Adj. R2 (1R2) 0.03 0.06 (0.03) 0.33 (0.27) 0.48 (0.15)
F (1F ) 3.71∗∗ 3.51∗∗∗ (3.25∗∗) 14.57∗∗∗ (35.78∗∗∗) 20.51∗∗∗ (25.92∗∗∗)
Dependent variable: sum of observed deviant workplace behaviors; 1R2 and 1F refer to a change in R2 and F statistics; Max. VIF refers to the largest variance inflation
factor. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
also expected compliance factors to reveal somewhat higher
positive correlations with duty to codes than would integrity
factors. In contrast, as integrity-oriented programs are more
focused on encouraging intrinsic, motivated commitment to
standards, we expected integrity factors to reveal higher positive




Beyond the GECS, a German version of the Multidimensional
Work Motivation scale (Gagné et al., 2015) was administered.
This measure assesses five distinct types of motivation along a
continuum from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation. These types are
combined into one category representing controlled motivation
(11 items, e.g., “I am involved in my job, because others
put pressure on me,” α = 0.85) and another one representing
autonomous motivation (6 items, e.g., “I am involved in my job,
because what I do in this job has a lot of personal meaning to me.”,
α = 0.92). Items were rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Duty orientation
Duty orientation was assessed with the 12-item Duty Orientation
scale (Hannah et al., 2014). Items were translated into German
using the backtranslation method. Hannah and colleagues
suggested that duty orientation is a higher-order factor that
reflects three subordinate concepts, such as duty to codes, duty
to members, and duty to mission. We therefore used the overall
scale across all items (α = 0.86) and the subscales (duty to codes,
α = 0.78; duty to members, α = 0.78; and duty to mission,
α = 0.77). Sample items include “I do what is right always,” “I
put the interest of my team ahead of my personal interest,” and
“I do whatever it takes to not let the mission of my organization
fail.” Items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree;
5 = strongly agree).
Results
To examine convergent validity, we assessed the correlations
between work motivation, duty orientation and the single and
composite measures of compliance and integrity (Table 7).
As shown, among the five integrity-based factors, leader’s
role modeling, accountability and pressure to compromise
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mostly show a convergence with autonomous work motivation
(rs > 0.24, ps < 0.001), while obedience and ill-conceived
goals coincided with more-controlled motivation (rs > 0.21,
ps < 0.001). Among the five compliance-oriented factors,
we mainly found that rule clarity correlated positively with
autonomous motivation (r = 0.25, p< 0.001) and that controlling
(r = 0.22, p< 0.001) with correlated controlled motivation.
Note that for calculating the correlations between the
composite measures of compliance, integrity and work
motivation, the composite measures were constructed after
reverse coding the negative items. Overall, supporting our
expectation, the composite integrity factor correlated positively
with autonomous work motivation (r = 0.37, p < 0.001) and
negatively with controlled motivation (r = −0.11, p < 0.001).
At least partially also supporting our hypothesis, the composite
compliance factor correlated positively with controlled
motivation (r = 0.13, p < 0.001) but also positively with
autonomous motivation (r = 0.27) (even though to a lesser extent
than with the composite integrity factor).
Furthermore, consistent with our expectations, both the
composite integrity and compliance factor correlated positively
with duty orientation (rs > 0.22, ps < 0.001), with leader’s role
modeling and accountability revealing the largest correlations
(rs > 0.30, ps < 0.001). Consistent with our more specific
expectations, the compliance factors correlated somewhat more
positively with duty to codes than did integrity factors, while
integrity factors revealed higher correlations with duty to
members than did compliance factors. Surprisingly, duty to
mission revealed correlations only around zero.
Overall, the patterns of correlations in this study provided
acceptable support for the convergent validity of the GECS.
However, Table 7 also shows that the specific dimensions
composing the compliance or integrity factor do correlate,
though most of them in the expected direction, to various degrees
with work motivation and duty orientation measures, suggesting
that the compliance or integrity factors are not homogeneous
factors but rather overlap somewhat.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research has taken first steps toward developing, refining
and testing a German ethical culture measure. In doing so,
we intended to advance the nomological network of corporate
ethical culture by integrating the notion of compliance- and
integrity-based ethics programs (with its focus on how to steer
organizations) with the notion of ethical culture (with its focus
on what factors inhibit or foster ethical behavior). In several
studies involving more than 2000 participants, we presented first
evidence for the factorial structure, reliability and validity of the
instrument. Concerning the factor structure, fit indices based on
data from various (sub)samples suggested the 10-factor solution
as the best-fitting model among those tested. Considering the
model with two overarching second-order factors (integrity and
compliance) revealed acceptable or nearly acceptable fit indices.
Item reliabilities of all subscales were good, ranging between
0.72 and 0.91. We found supporting convergent and divergent
validity of the scale derived from CFA in most cases across
the two samples.
Further supporting convergent validity of the scale, we
found that compliance and integrity factors were in most cases
predictably related to different forms of work motivation and
duty orientation. The correlations were mostly modest but
still significant. Composite compliance and integrity factors
were mostly related in expected directions with controlled
and autonomous work motivation and with variants of
duty orientation (duty to codes and duty to members).
The composite integrity factor was positively related to
autonomous motivation but negatively to controlled motivation.
The composite compliance factor, on the other hand, correlated
positively with controlled motivation. However, somewhat
unexpected was that the composite scale of compliance factors
also correlated with perceived autonomous motivation (although
to a lesser extent than did the composite integrity factor).
This correlation may suggest that compliance factors can
also be advantageous to autonomous motivation. As will be
discussed later, this finding may provide an interesting avenue for
future research.
Furthermore, the GECS revealed good predictive validity.
Our studies showed that both compliance and integrity factors
predicted significantly deviant workplace behavior beyond the
formal factors of ethics programs. At the same time, the analyses
of incremental validity stressed the added value of integrity
factors in predicting deviant workplace behavior over and above
compliance-base factors. Specifically, the integrity-based factors
accounted for a 15% additional amount of variance beyond
compliance factors. Consistent with previous studies (Treviño
et al., 1999; Tyler and Blader, 2005), these results support the
view that organizational strategies and factors relying on the
monitoring of rule adherence may not be the only means of
shaping people’s deviant behavior. Moreover, in the research
reported here, the utility of a command and control approach
overall appears to be weaker than that of an integrity- or value-
oriented approach that attempts to influence ethical behavior by
encouraging employee’s self-responsibility and moral motivation.
Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and ethics
programs factors, the model including the compliance factors
explained 33% of the variance of deviant workplace behavior,
but the model including the integrity factors explained 46%
of the variance.
Clearly, it would be useful to study the GECS together with
other ethical culture approaches to examine the criteria and
incremental validity of the GECS compared to those of other
models. In our current research, we refrained from including
other ethical culture questionnaires in our surveys simply to
avoid too much burden from too lengthy questionnaires (e.g.,
the ethical culture questionnaire, the CEV, by Kaptein, 2008a,
contains 58 items). Measurement economy must always be
accounted for and carefully balanced out when running such
studies. Nevertheless, a first rough comparison between the GECS
and the CEV may be given building on Kaptein’s study (Kaptein,
2011), which included the nearly identical observed work deviant
behavior scale as in our study. (The only differences were that
Kaptein’s study included a list of 37 items of observed deviant
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TABLE 7 | Relation between GECS, work motivation and duty orientation (Sample C, Study 3).
GECS M (SD) Controlled Autonomous Duty Duty Duty to Duty to
motivation motivation orientation to codes members mission
Controlling 3.19 (0.97) 0.22∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Sanctioning 3.41 (0.90) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Rule clarity 3.89 (0.98) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Rule defectiveness 2.86 (1.05) 0.06 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.09∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
Rule viability 2.91 (1.05) 0.10∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.02
Accountability 3.57 (0.82) 0.12∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
Leader’s role modeling 3.51 (1.02) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Pressure to compromise 2.28 (1.08) 0.11∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ 0.08∗
Obedience 2.95 (1.14) 0.21∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.07∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.07∗
Ill-conceived goals 2.54 (0.99) 0.30∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.01 −0.20∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
Composite compliance factor 3.35 (0.61) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
Composite integrity factor 3.46 (0.73) −0.11∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.00
To calculate the composite compliance and integrity factors, items from the scales rule defectiveness, viability, pressure to compromise, obedience and ill-conceived goals
were reversed. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.00.
workplace behavior and a general score calculated by averaging
the scores across all items. Our study included a list of 19
behavioral items, and we calculated a general score by summing
across all dichotomized items.) Conducting regression analyses,
the author found that a model entering sociodemographic
variables, formal factors of ethics programs and ethical climate
(Victor and Cullen, 1987, 1988) accounted for 14% of the variance
in observed unethical behavior. Upon entering the CEV, the
exploratory power of the complete model increased to 31%. In
our study, the analyses revealed that entering sociodemographic
and formal factors of ethics programs accounted for 6% of
the variance in observed unethical behavior. Upon entering the
GECS with the 10 factors, the exploratory power of the complete
model increased to 48%. This result is promising and indicates
that, at least in this case, our measure appears to be superior in
predicting observed unethical behavior.
This measure has several strengths. As a novelty, this measure
integrates the notion of compliance- and integrity-based ethics
program (with its focus on how to steer organizations) with
the notion of ethical culture (with its focus on what factors
inhibit or foster ethical behavior). To our knowledge, prior
research on climate or culture has never considered this
association, despite the prominence of the compliance and
integrity distinction in theory and practice. At the same time,
studies on compliance- and integrity-based ethics management
have rarely conducted rigorous empirical research. We took
the challenge to develop a measure to address the gap.
Data gathered to test the scale were obtained across large
samples, in two countries (Germany and Switzerland), and
across a wide variety of organizations and jobs. This data
collection is not taken for granted since many studies in this
domain gather data within single organizations. Hence, the
heterogeneity of our data allows some confidence to claim
that the GECS is applicable across varying organizational
contexts. Offering researchers a German scale will allow them
to conduct stringent research in German-speaking countries
on antecedents and consequences of compliance and integrity-
oriented organizational cultures. In addition, such a measure
allows organizations, risk managers and compliance officers
to reflect the current state of corporate ethical culture within
their own organizations, to design targeted interventions and to
monitor organizational progress.
The present measure also represents an advancement to
existing instruments in terms of including less-problematic
item wording (to minimize social desirability, we avoided
terms such as “moral”) and including current theoretical
concepts. Drawing on important insights from behavioral ethics
social psychology and organizational research, our measure
incorporated dimensions such as ill-conceived goals, pressure
to compromise and accountability. Furthermore, building on
insights from practitioners, we incorporated dimensions such as
rule defectiveness and rule viability. These concepts have thus far
not been addressed in prior measures. In fact, it is interesting
that nearly all of these factors were the most relevant predictors
of deviant workplace behavior. Of course, we do not claim that
our measure contains all relevant dimensions, but the findings
indicate that our measure contains at least some important
dimensions over and above previous measures.
Though the current measure is in German, we do not
believe that the content is only applicable and relevant for
the German-speaking world. In fact, compliance and integrity-
based ethics programs are the leading approaches to ethics
in today’s business world (e.g., OECD, 2009). Therefore, the
application of the instrument in other countries would be not
only very meaningful but also needed. Clearly, this process would
also require testing and validation of the instrument in other
languages and countries.
This research also has interesting implications for practice
and future research. As mentioned above, the GECS offers
practitioners a framework and measure to examine their state and
progress within their own organization. In addition, our finding
that integrity-based factors account for an additional amount
of variance beyond compliance factors is relevant for practice,
since most companies currently appear to focus primarily
on improving control and command strategies in combating
unethical behavior. Our results, however, strongly suggest that
more attention should be focused on procedures that promote
self-regulation and responsibility.
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The GECS is also a basis for addressing empirical questions
about the antecedents and consequences of compliance- and
integrity-oriented cultures. Integrating the compliance and
integrity distinction offers a unique opportunity to steer research
in new directions. One fruitful direction for future research
is certainly related to studying the various implicit or explicit
assumptions about how compliance- and integrity-based cultures
may be associated with employee motivation, attitudes and
behavior (Paine, 1994; Verhezen, 2010). However, many of
those assumptions still await empirical examination. In a
recent theoretical paper, Stimmler and Tanner (2019) proposed
that the potential implications of a compliance- or integrity-
oriented culture may be better understood when considered
in combination with perceptual, motivational, affective and
behavioral processes at the individual level. For example, the
regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) can provide us with
an interesting heuristic to deepen our understanding of what the
psychological implications for the individual might be when an
organization counts more on a compliance or integrity culture.
With a regulatory focus, people can regulate their behavior via
a prevention or promotion focus. Numerous empirical studies
have shown that these different foci evoke different psychological
processes (Higgins, 1997, 1998, 2001). We hypothesize that a
compliance-oriented culture may be more likely to evoke a
prevention focus, while an integrity-oriented culture may be
more likely to support a promotion focus among employees. This
avenue may be interesting for future research to examine these
relations more thoroughly.
One specific direction for future research also relates
to the, as mentioned above, somewhat unexpected finding
that the composite compliance factor also correlated with
autonomous work motivation. This finding could point to
positive implications associated with compliance-oriented
culture worth examining in more detail. Interestingly, empirical
research in this domain is nearly absent, even though, for
instance, the question about the possible implications of
monitoring employees has been highly debated for many
years (Frey, 1993; Ferrin et al., 2007). This literature primarily
expect negative effects on employee work effort and intrinsic
motivation. However, we speculate that, besides the potentially
negative implications of a control- and command approach,
such an approach may also be likely to provide employees with a
comfortable feeling of certainty about the processes in the firm.
An integrity-based culture, on the other hand, with its focus on
encouraging self-governance, may create more uncertainty and
uneasiness since it lacks explicit guidelines. It seems obvious
that both compliance and integrity-oriented strategies are
necessary for an effective ethical business culture. Nonetheless,
our knowledge about the negative and positive implications
associated with a compliance and an integrity-oriented culture
and what combination or interplay may be most effective is
severely limited.
Also interesting is the finding that leader’s role modeling
did not emerge as a significant predictor of deviant workplace
behavior, though past studies strongly emphasized the relevance
of the “tone of the top” and leaders being role models to
encourage similar behaviors among employees (e.g., Treviño
et al., 1999; Kaptein, 2011). Leader’s role modeling, however,
correlated highly positively with autonomous work motivation.
This result suggests that role modeling is possibly more
relevant for motivation than for behavior implications. Another
possibility may be that leader’s role modeling is more likely
to moderate the relationship between some other cultural
dimensions and unethical behavior. It remains open for research
to examine this issue in further detail.
Of course, this research also has limitations. The first one is
associated with the fact that our analyses (CFA) revealed only
moderate statistical support for dividing the single factors into
composite compliance and integrity components. Although the
GECS provides a first essential step in assessing compliance or
integrity-based cultures, an important endeavor for further work
is to further ameliorate the items and foci. In fact, whereas there
is a fair consensus in the literature about what the governance
strategies of a compliance-based program (such as control,
monitoring, and sanctioning) are, there are still divers opinions
about exactly what procedures constitute an integrity-based
program. Thus far, we suggested accountability and leader’s role
modeling as crucial building blocks of an integrity culture. Future
discussions and work will probably reveal further strategies that
may then be incorporated into the GECS.
Another limitation refers to the fact that some expectations
about the relations between compliance and integrity factors were
not confirmed. For example, in contrast to our expectations,
integrity factors did not correlate with duty to mission (neither
did the compliance factors). This finding might be caused by the
fact that the duty orientation scale was originally developed in
the context of army soldiers (Hannah et al., 2014). According
to Hannah et al. (2014) and taking a closer look at the
duty to mission items, this subconcept is about individual’s
willingness to make personal sacrifices and accept personal risks
to achieve the goals of the group. We suppose that in the
context of “normal” organizational life, such expectations of
employees are too unrealistic and therefore likely to result in
correlations around zero.
Finally, a limitation of this research may be the possibility
of a common method bias. Recall that in study 2, the same
respondents answered the GECS and deviant workplace behavior
questions. One strength of our studies is that data were
collected from heterogeneous samples, including employees
and managers across various organizations. This variety has
allowed us to examine the robustness of the proposed structure
across heterogeneous organizational contexts. Although we
administered observed rather than self-reported misconduct and
used different response formats to assess the predictor and
criterion variables to reduce this problem, we cannot completely
exclude the possibility that the associations between the predictor
and criterion measures may be biased. Thus, future research
should attempt to collaborate with single organizations and to
assess the predictor and criterion variable for different employees
from the same working groups within an organization.
Overall, we believe that the GECS provides a first measure to
build upon to advance research in German-speaking countries,
to provide a basis for empirically examining antecedents and
the short- and long-term consequences of compliance- and
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integrity-based cultures, and to improve our understanding of
the influences that may hinder or facilitate the effectiveness of
such procedures. In this vein, we strongly believe that the GECS
can fuel future research and make contributions to the field of
organizational ethics.
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